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This research investigates how threats to people’s ingroups promote ways of thinking and 
behaving that benefit these groups (ingroup prosociality). Drawing on terror management 
theory and other relevant literature, I propose that threats promote ingroup prosociality, 
and that threats play an important role in explaining why members of collectivistic 
societies (e.g., Eastern) tend to exhibit more ingroup prosociality than members of 
individualistic societies (e.g., Western). Three experimental studies isolated effects of 
threats on outcomes I propose reflect ingroup prosociality: holistic versus analytic types 
of cognitive and social orientations (Study 1), upholding status orders in groups (Study 
2), and promoting the legitimacy of power in groups (Study 3). To experimentally 
manipulate threat, participants wrote about either a threatening or non-threatening 
situation. In the group studies (2 and 3), the threat situation was also part of the task 
itself. Study 1 provides some support for increased ingroup prosociality when threatened, 
and some evidence for differences by culture and type of threat. Though results generally 
  
suggest that Americans respond more ingroup prosocially than Indians, they do not 
provide compelling evidence of consistent cross-cultural patterns as predicted. Study 2 
provides only minimal support for threat increasing adherence to status orders. Study 3 
provides a great deal of support for threat increasing promotion of the legitimacy of 
power structures, and results suggest especially strong responses among high-status 
participants with low-status partners. For each study, I also address some results in the 
opposite direction predicted. Taken together, the results only somewhat support my 
proposed ingroup prosociality worldview theory. Alternatively, patterns in results suggest 
that threatened ingroup members may be motivated to preserve their self-esteem and 
reduce their anxiety. Though this self-serving explanation is consistent with terror 
management theory, it is not consistent with the ingroup prosociality worldview initially 
proposed. Overall, the results provide evidence that threat (1) affects both behaviors and 
orientations (many proposed to reflect ingroup prosociality), which warrant consideration 
together as defensive responses to threats, and (2) increases promoting the legitimacy of 
power based on status in some situations. I discuss limitations, implications for theory 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Theory 
This chapter introduces the dissertation research, which aims to develop a theory about 
the effects of threats to groups on ingroup prosociality, and presents findings from three 
experiments designed to test the theory. 
  
Introduction 
This research investigates how threats to people’s ingroups encourage prosociality 
toward these groups. Drawing on terror management theory and other relevant literature, 
I propose that threats promote ingroup prosociality, and that threats play an important 
role in explaining why ingroup prosociality tends to characterize members of 
collectivistic societies more so than members of individualistic societies. Three 
experimental studies attempt to isolate threat’s effects on outcomes I propose reflect 
ingroup prosociality: holistic versus analytic cognitive and social orientations (Study 1), 
status in groups (Study 2), and legitimacy of power in groups (Study 3). The common 
thread between these studies is the role of threats in promoting ingroup-prosocial 
orientations and behaviors. 
 Cross-culturally, I propose that threat is a possible explanation for why 
collectivistic society members tend to be more ingroup prosocial — such that the more a 
society is threatened, the more ingroup prosocial its members tend to be. Members of 
collectivistic societies (e.g., Eastern) tend to think and behave in ways that benefit their 
social groups more so than members of individualistic societies (e.g., Western). These are 




social groups may promote ingroup prosociality, there is no currently known cohesive 
cross-situational and cross-cultural explanation. I demonstrate why threat and ingroup 
prosociality are interesting to examine together, and I present research that begins to 
investigate their relationship. 
 I aim to: (1) consider threats as a more diverse range of disruptions to groups than 
previous literature has, (2) bridge sociological and psychological literatures to develop a 
theory of how threat promotes ingroup-prosocial orientations and behaviors, and (3) 
assess threat’s role in explaining differences in ingroup-prosociality between 
collectivistic and individualistic societies. 
Overall, the results provide evidence that threat (1) affects both behaviors and 
orientations (many proposed to reflect ingroup prosociality), which warrant consideration 
together as defensive responses to threats, and (2) increases promoting the legitimacy of 
power based on status in some situations. 
 
Outline of the Chapters 
In Chapter 1, I introduce the dissertation research and draw on terror management 
theory and other existing literature to inform my theory and explain my predictions. In 
Chapter 2, I present an overview of the methods, data, and analyses I used for my three 
studies. Chapter 3 describes in detail the methods, data, and analyses used for Study 1, on 
how threat affects ingroup prosocial social and cognitive orientations such as holism, and 
comparing these processes cross-culturally. Chapter 4 presents and discusses results from 
Study 1. Chapter 5 describes in detail the methods, data, and analyses used for Study 2, 




from Study 2. Chapter 7 describes in detail the methods, data, and analyses used for 
Study 3, on how threat affects legitimacy of power processes in groups, specifically as 
they relate to status. Chapter 8 presents and discusses results from Study 3. Chapter 9 
presents general discussion and conclusions, including limitations of the work and 
potential directions for future research. 
 
Results Overview 
 There is some support for more ingroup prosocial orientations under threat, such 
as increased holism and decreased individualism (Study 1), and there is a great deal of 
support for increased promotion of legitimate power structures among high-status 
participants with low-status partners in positions of power (Study 3). However, support 
for upholding status orders is only minimal (Study 2). Cross-culturally, Americans and 
Indians (Study 1) tend to respond on different ingroup prosociality outcomes, and Indians 
become less ingroup prosocial in some ways. The Study 1 results also suggest that 
Americans may be more responsive to threats, but there is not abundant statistical support 
for this. 
In Study 1, threats do not consistently increase ingroup prosociality, but there are 
some results in the direction predicted, and some noteworthy differences in responses 
between Americans and Indians and the two types of threats (natural disaster and 
terrorism). The initial assumptions about greater sense of threat and more ingroup 
prosociality among members of collectivistic societies are not clearly supported. Results 
generally suggest that Americans respond in the ways predicted more so than Indians do. 




respond on measures relating to individualism. Both Americans and Indians respond 
more so to terrorism than natural disaster. Against the prediction, Indians become less 
ingroup prosocial for pre-to-post manipulation changes in importance of family and 
country groups. However, these results do not provide compelling evidence for cross-
cultural differences in threat responses or the proposed historical threat explanation. 
 In Study 2, there is little statistical evidence supporting enhanced adherence to a 
group’s status order under threat. Most of this support is from manipulation check and 
cohesion questions. Notably, compared to those non-threatened, threatened high-status 
participants (with low-status partners) express that it is less important to earn as many 
points as possible. This could be interpreted as a status-consistent attitude. There is also 
some potential statistical evidence in the opposite direction predicted for some cohesion 
outcomes. 
 In Study 3, there is a great deal of support for threat increasing support of 
legitimate power structures, and the results suggest that high-status participants with low-
status partners (less legitimate holders of power) especially react. Some results also 
suggest general ingroup prosociality and cohesion responses to threat. There is some 
statistical evidence in the opposite direction predicted for low-status participants with 
powerful high-status partners. Also notably, low-status group members accepted a higher 
proportion of offers from their powerful high-status partner when threatened. 
Taken together while the results from the three studies somewhat support the 
main prediction, results in the opposite direction and methodological limitations suggest 
that further investigation is warranted. Patterns in results also suggest a potential 




their own self-esteem and lessen anxiety. Anxiety is especially relevant when faced with 
the possibility of poor personal performance during the group studies. Of significant 
interest, preserving self-esteem as a means of buffering anxiety when faced with threat is 
consistent with TMT responses to threatened worldviews (e.g., Greenberg et al. 1997). 
However, it is not consistent with the specific ingroup prosociality worldview 




Taken together, the results only somewhat support my proposed ingroup 
prosociality worldview explanation. Alternatively, the pattern in the results suggests that 
threatened ingroup members are motivated to preserve their self-esteem and lessen 
anxiety. In this, they do not necessarily prioritize their ingroup’s interests. Though this 
explanation is not consistent with the ingroup prosociality worldview explanation, it is 
still consistent with a TMT explanation (e.g., Greenberg et al. 1997). Overall, these 
results (1) provide some evidence that both ingroup prosocial behaviors and ingroup 
prosocial orientations increase under threat, and warrant consideration together as 
instances of defensive responses to threats, and (2) provide strong evidence that threat 
increases promoting the legitimacy of power based on status in some situations, and 
perhaps that people especially react when a less legitimate actor is acting selfishly. 
This work helps to inform future studies and potential interventions. While there 
are some results that suggest cultural differences in threat and ingroup prosociality 




further investigation is warranted. Of significant interest is further examining the 
relevance of terror management theory to threat and ingroup prosociality processes. The 
present results suggest investigating this possibility — if the self-concept is relatively 
ingroup prosocial, an accompanying result of increasing self-esteem under threat should 
be increased ingroup prosociality. Future work may also explore different 
conceptualizations of threats to groups and ingroup prosociality outcomes. These efforts 
may help to disentangle potential relationships between group processes and terror 
management framings of these mechanisms, specifically as practical behavioral responses 
to situations compared to internalizing ingroup prosociality worldviews.  
Terrorism is currently a widespread and salient threat, and findings from this 
research may help to explain responses to attacks and suggest ways to improve 
mobilization for groups, such as improved leadership strategies. Potentially useful 
insights from the findings include considering both behaviors and orientations as 
instances of ingroup prosocial responses to threats, and how threatened high-status 
individuals are likely to react especially negatively to lower-status actors in positions of 
power. The findings from Study 3 suggest the critical need for leadership that is 
perceived as legitimate in threatening situations. 
 
Theory 
I explain why I propose that threat increases ingroup prosociality, drawing on 
terror management theory (TMT), and I explain the specific outcomes I expect to observe 




I define ingroup prosociality as both behaviors and orientations that benefit one’s 
own group.1 Though Simpson and Willer (2015:44) define prosocial behavior as “an 
individual behavior that benefits one or more others,” my theory specifically addresses 
ingroups.2 I refine Simpson and Willer’s (2015:44) treatment to specify that a particular 
ingroup benefits, whether one’s family, work group, or nation. The ingroup scope may be 
implicit in much work that does not specify it, but in the present theory, it is imperative to 
specify the ingroup scope. The benefits of ingroup prosociality are relative to the groups’ 
needs and interests, and they may not always align with those of other groups or broader 
society. Examples are terrorist groups such as ISIS, and groups that support categorical 
inequalities such as sexism and racism, such as white supremacist groups. 
I argue in the following sections that certain orientations (such as holism) are 
instances of ingroup prosociality, along with certain behaviors. Ingroup prosocial 
orientations I propose considering include holism versus analysm (e.g., Choi, Koo, and 
Choi 2007), interdependence (Singelis 1994), and group-orientedness (Lucas and 
Schooler 2012, unpublished, based on Schooler 1990). I address my predictions about 
ingroup prosocial orientations in more detail below. While much research has framed 
ingroup prosociality behaviorally (e.g., Van Lange 1999, Rodríguez et al. 2006), there is 
limited if any literature describing these types of orientations as instances of ingroup 
prosociality. For example, Moskalenko, McCauley, and Rozin (2006) frame increased 
identification with country following the 9/11 terrorist attacks as increased ingroup 
cohesion. Cohesion is an important concept to consider in terms of the present theory, 
and I discuss cohesion in more detail below. 
                                                
1 I thank Nicholas D’Amore for suggesting this term to distinguish ingroup prosociality from prosociality 




My definition of ingroup prosociality encompasses most treatments of cohesion in 
group processes. Ingroup prosociality reflects several treatments of cohesion within the 
group processes subfield — for example, willingness to make costly investments in one’s 
group (Benard 2012, citing Hechter 1987). Basham (2009) discusses task cohesion as 
smooth operation while working on a task, and social cohesion as smooth socializing and 
a mutually agreed-upon hierarchy. Cohesion can also manifest as affect and “we-feeling” 
(e.g., Benard and Doan 2011). While I focus on ingroup prosociality as orientations and 
behaviors that benefit groups, my studies include questions about sense of cohesion (e.g., 
feeling like part of the group and feeling the group is important). Including these 
questions helps to assess the extent to which sense of cohesion should be considered 
alongside other ingroup prosocial orientations and behaviors in the present theory about 
threats promoting ingroup prosociality. 
 In the following sections of this chapter, I first discuss my broad consideration of 
threats, and I explain why I propose that threats promote ingroup prosociality generally. I 
then consider the relevance of cultural context in terms of the prominence of ingroup-
prosociality in collectivistic societies and how threats may have shaped these cultural 
contexts. I then discuss several specific outcomes I expect to reflect ingroup prosociality, 
and I present predictions for how I expect threat to affect these outcomes. These 
correspond to my three studies: holistic versus analytic cognitive and social orientations 
(Study 1), status in groups (Study 2), and the legitimacy of power in groups (Study 3). 
Considering Threats Broadly 
I define threats as situations or conditions likely to disrupt social groups. I 




Benard (2013) speculate that multiple types of threats promote cohesion in similar ways, 
and suggest that testing this is a worthwhile endeavor (see also Benard and Doan 2011). 
Though I assess multiple types of threats, a noteworthy scope condition is that the threats 
are not made excessively or otherwise illegitimately; if they are, they may not be taken 
seriously (e.g., Emerson 1962). Consistent with this, Barclay and Benard (2013) conclude 
that abusing power by making repeated threats is not likely to promote ingroup-prosocial 
behavior. 
 Below I discuss four categories of threat I expect to operate similarly in 
promoting ingroup prosociality. My experiments explicitly address two of these four, 
existential and intergroup threats. Study 1 includes natural disaster and terrorism, Study 2 
includes intergroup competition and scarcity of resources, and Study 3 includes a 
simulated existential threat via loss of group resources (though several examples of 
threats, including intergroup, are presented in describing the simulation). The remaining 
two types of threats, intragroup and intrapersonal, remain of interest to test in future 
work. 
Intergroup Threat. Intergroup threat is when one’s group faces competition from 
another group for scarce resources (e.g., Benard 2012). This threatens the group because 
if they do not win, they may not attain resources necessary to sustain the group and 
complete tasks. Under intergroup threats, ingroup prosociality helps to improve chances 
of winning. However, increasing relative standing over other groups may come at the 
expense of resources for the ingroup members (Tajfel 1971). Terrorism is an instance of 
intergroup threat when outgroups threaten, or act on threats, to withhold or take resources 




Existential Threat. Existential threat, such as natural disaster, threatens a group’s 
physical existence or functioning. This involves deprivation of necessary resources or 
risk of dissolution, whether through attrition of members or destructive means. Terrorism 
is an existential threat when outgroups threaten, or act on threats, to physically harm the 
group. As mentioned above, the aftermath of a natural disaster, such as Hurricane 
Katrina, can prompt ingroup prosocial behavior (e.g., Rodríguez, Trainor, and Quarantelli 
2006). Experimentally replicating existential threat, Barclay and Benard (2013) found 
that an apparent increase in the threat level, as the chance of losing all group resources, 
incentivized costly individual contributions to the group. 
Intragroup Threat. Intragroup threat is when a member or members of the 
ingroup threaten the ingroup itself, such as a deviant or defector (e.g., Wellen and Neale 
2006). Domestic terrorism may be considered an instance of intragroup threat. Another 
example is ingroup members competing for rank or status in the group (e.g., Barclay and 
Benard 2013). Barclay and Benard (2013) found that unstable group orders led high-
ranking individuals to threaten their group more, and that low-ranking group members 
were less invested in their group when high-ranking members appeared to have more 
power. Here, it seems possible that instability undermines the legitimacy of power. 
Intrapersonal Threat. Intrapersonal threat brings into question one’s identity as a 
prosocial group member. Though this type of threat less directly undermines a group’s 
social structure, it puts the group at risk of having members that are not invested. An 
example of this potential for group undermining is the importance of morale in military 
groups. A field experiment by Perez-Truglia and Troiano (2015) found support for 




importance of paying taxes and the public good seemed to be effective in getting tax 
delinquents to pay.  
Two theories closely related to intrapersonal threat processes are control systems 
theories of identity. Affect Control Theory (ACT) predicts that when the self and the 
situation are inconsistent (based on abstract fundamental sentiments, see Francis 2006), 
individuals are motivated to try to change the situation to lessen the dissonance they feel 
(e.g., Owens 2002). Following ACT, if the ingroup prosocial identity is threatened, group 
members will behave in ways that try to affirm the prosocial group member identity. 
Identity Control Theory (ICT) is similar to ACT, but rather than specifying behavioral 
outcomes in the social world, it specifies self-level negotiation of the internal identity 
(Smith-Lovin and Robinson 2006). Following ICT, if the ingroup prosocial identity is 
threatened, group members will negotiate their self-meanings in ways that promote them 
thinking of themselves as ingroup-prosocial. 
 While threats to groups include a broad range of situations, I clearly define them 
as conditions likely to disrupt the functioning of the group. In terms of the present theory, 
I propose that threats are a general class of situations that promote a general class of 
responses, which I define as ingroup prosociality. I discuss this in greater detail below. 
 
Threat Promotes Ingroup Prosociality 
Some research suggests that threat promotes ingroup prosociality. Americans 
have expressed more identification with their country and reported experiencing prosocial 
benefits after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (e.g., Moskalenko, McCauley, and Rozin 2006; 




following the Hurricane Katrina damage in Louisiana (e.g., Rodríguez et al. 2006). 
Support for U.S. President George W. Bush increased with government-issued terror 
warnings (Willer 2004), and Landau et al.’s (2004) experiment found that inducing 
reminders of the 9/11 attacks increased support for Bush.  
While many research findings suggesting that ingroup prosociality arises from 
threats come from the TMT tradition, relevant findings come from other literatures as 
well. An economics experiment found that participants were more likely to participate in 
conflict with an outgroup when their ingroup was threatened (Weisel and Zultanb 2016). 
Supporting the idea that competition facilitates performance, simply being compared to 
another group increased public goods contributions to the ingroup (Böhm and 
Rockenbach 2013), and considering rivals as especially threatening competitors, Kilduff, 
Elfenbein, and Staw (2010) found support for increased defensive efficiency among 
NCAA basketball teams during games with rival teams. Benard’s (2012) experiment 
found that conflict with an outgroup increased individuals’ contributions to their group 
and punishment of fellow group members for insufficient contributions. Nadler, Harpaz-
Gorodeisky, and Ben-David (2009) found support for defensive helping of outgroups, 
such that when the status order between groups is unstable, ingroups will help outgroups 
in ways that encourage the outgroup’s dependence on the ingroup. 
 
Terror Management Theory (TMT) 
The terror management theory (TMT) literature helps to explain why threat 
promotes ingroup prosociality. According to TMT, people respond defensively to threats 




worldviews are strongly-held values, expectations, and beliefs about how the world 
works (e.g., Greenberg et al. 1997). From this point on, I discuss cultural worldviews as 
worldviews to prevent confusion with my cross-cultural predictions. I assume that 
ingroup-prosocial values are fundamental across cultures. However, the literature 
suggests that the extent to which these worldviews are fundamental may differ across 
cultures (e.g., Simpson and Willer 2014, citing Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994). In 
Study 1, I investigate the extent to which ingroup prosocial responses to threats differ by 
culture. 
While some research finds that terror management effects depend on personality 
(e.g., Landau, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, and Martens 2006), many worldviews 
are widespread.3 For example, Rosenblatt et al. (1989) found that when mortality is 
salient, participants with relatively negative attitudes toward prostitution proposed higher 
bail punishments. Another example is how prejudiced whites primed with mortality 
salience preferred a black person portrayed stereotypically over a black person portrayed 
counterstereotypically (Simon, Waxmonsky, Greenberg, Pysczynski, and Solomon 1996, 
as cited in Greenberg et al. 1997). In terms of these research findings, society’s 
sentiments toward prostitution and racial stereotypes, respectively, are worth considering. 
I argue that ingroup prosocial worldviews are prevalent enough that it is worthwhile to 
test whether threats to these worldviews increase ingroup prosocial orientations and 
behaviors. 
In my formulation, ingroup prosocial worldviews and ingroup prosocial self-
concepts and social identities may overlap. Though I mainly frame my theory in terms of 
                                                
3 The personal need for structure (PNS) construct is often examined in TMT research (e.g., Landau et al., 




the TMT literature, both TMT and control systems theories of identity (ACT and ICT) 
emphasize individuals’ needs for consistency and reconciliation between reality and the 
self (reflecting Festinger’s 1957 classic concept of cognitive dissonance, e.g., referenced 
in Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon, 1997). However, conceptually worldviews 
extend beyond the self into the social world, and encompass schemas such as how status 
orders and power structures are supposed to work. Like TMT, ACT and ICT explain why 
people prefer to think of themselves as ingroup prosocial. However, TMT is more useful 
in its ability to frame individuals’ perspectives on the social world. Study 3 is especially 
promising in its ability to assess reactions to power structures individuals see as more or 
less legitimate, and the extent to which people act in ways to change them. 
 The TMT literature has examined a great deal of ingroup prosocial outcomes, and 
found that threats to worldviews (most often the standard mortality salience 
manipulation) increase support of ingroup prosocial worldviews. Examples of this type of 
worldview is that of one’s social groups, such as one’s country or an organization they 
belong to, enduring beyond one’s death (Routledge and Arndt 2008), and viewing one’s 
country as a single, cohesive entity, or entitativity (Herrera and Sani 2013). Herrera and 
Sani (2013) found that sense of entitativity increased ingroup identification. Other 
relevant outcomes include increased support for an American charity but not a foreign 
one (Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski 2002), increased conformity to ingroup 
members’ attitudes (Renkema, Stapel, and Van Yperen 2008), and increased derogation 
of a critic of the University ingroup when it was presented as an impermeable group 
(Dechesne, Janssen, and van Knippenberg 2000). As discussed above, ingroup 




broadly. A prime example is Greenberg et al.’s (1990) finding that when mortality is 
salient among Christians, positive evaluations of Christians increased and negative 
evaluations of Jews increased. 
A standard procedure demonstrated to induce the predicted terror management 
effects experimentally manipulates salience of one’s own mortality using a written task 
(e.g., Rosenblatt et al. 1989, Greenberg et al. 1990). However, the literature has 
demonstrated terror management effects not to be limited to this mortality salience 
manipulation (e.g., passersby walking through a cemetery, Gailliot, Stillman, Schmeichel, 
Maner, and Plant, 2008, or in front of a funeral home, Jonas et al. 2002). Mortality 
salience is especially interesting because many people hold worldviews about literal or 
symbolic immortality, such as an afterlife or legacy within one’s groups (e.g., Greenberg 
1997).  
Though TMT research largely focuses on the effects of mortality salience, the 
worldview defensiveness effects are not limited to mortality salience. In other words, 
other means of threatening one’s cultural worldviews have been found effective in 
increasing defense of cultural worldviews. Major, Kaiser, O’Brien, and McCoy (2007) 
found support for written stimuli about discrimination to Latinos and women on these 
individuals’ self-esteem and victim-blaming outcomes. Effective manipulations for white 
Americans were a prototypicality threat in which data were presented about their numeric 
decline in the population (Danbold and Huo 2015), and responses to an artificially 
darkened versus lightened photo of U.S. President Barack Obama (Willer, Feinberg, and 
Wetts 2016a, also 2016b). Further examples include Willer (2008) on threats of terrorism 




Bush increasing with government-issued terror warnings (Willer 2004), and (also as 
discussed above) increased support for Bush with experimentally manipulated reminders 
of the 9/11 attacks (Landau et al. 2004). Though the terrorism effects could be construed 
as an indirect means of eliciting mortality salience, there is evidence of other worldview 
threat manipulations, especially relating to racial prejudice and insecurity, eliciting 
defensiveness of worldviews. Willer et al. (2016a, also 2016b) found that experimentally-
manipulated racial threats to white Americans increased support for the Tea Party. 
Similar to these research findings, I propose that if the group is somehow threatened, I 
propose that people will think and act in ways that benefit the group — upholding the 
ingroup prosociality worldview embodied in a smoothly functioning task group. 
Cross-culturally, the TMT process appears relevant in collectivistic as well as 
individualistic cultures. Heine, Harihara, and Niiya (2002) found that Japanese 
participants primed with mortality salience responded with more negative evaluations of 
an anti-Japanese essay writer, but only marginally responded on wanting status symbols, 
like more expensive cars. In a comparison of Chinese and American participants, 
mortality salience increased nationalism for Chinese participants, but interestingly, not 
for American participants (Routledge, Juhl, Vess, Cathey, and Liao 2015). 
 
Overall Prediction 
 Because I propose that threat generally promotes ingroup prosocial orientations 





Overall Prediction: Compared to non-threatened individuals, threatened 
individuals will exhibit more ingroup-prosocial behaviors and cognitive and 
social orientations. This will apply for all types of threats, including intergroup, 
existential, intragroup, and intrapersonal. 
 
Support for the overall prediction would support the central proposition that 
threats promote ingroup prosociality. Much existing research appears to support this 
prediction. Empirical support from tests designed to evaluate the theory would 
demonstrate the theory’s viability and allow for further refinement. Support for this 
prediction also suggests practical consequences for behaviors, cohesion, and leadership 
strategies in groups. As discussed above, only the intergroup and existential types of 
threats are explicitly addressed in this research — the intragroup and intrapersonal types 
remain of interest for future work. 
 
More Ingroup Prosociality in Collectivistic Societies 
 
 Members of collectivistic societies tend to think and act more prosocially toward 
their ingroups than members of individualistic societies (see Holistic versus Analytic 
Orientations below). For example, individuals in China might intentionally refrain from 
expressing personal views when they are in groups, unless the group agrees on acceptable 
ways to express them (Bond 1986, as cited in Markus and Kitayama 1991). This 
smoothes interaction, prevents interpersonal conflict, and facilitates task orientation. 
Collectivistic societies are characterized as having high levels of cooperation within their 
groups, but low levels of generalized trust for members of other groups (Simpson and 




also tend to be discriminating about who they want to help, and loyal toward those they 
see as members of their groups (Markus and Kitayama 1991, citing Triandis 1989).  
Derlega, Cukur, Kuang, and Forsyth (2002) found that individuals who thought of 
themselves as more interdependent than independent reacted more negatively when faced 
with group-level international conflict than interpersonal conflict. This suggests greater 
internalization and reaction to threats to one’s group among those with more collectivistic 
orientations, and higher personal investment in the group’s interests. However, this does 
not necessarily mean that members of collectivistic societies are more invested in all 
social groups. While members of collectivistic societies’ collectivistic orientations benefit 
their immediate ingroups, they tend to be less invested in other groups than members of 
individualistic societies are. 
Also, self-concepts tend to be especially relational in collectivistic societies 
(Markus and Kitayama 1991). Their major distinction is that while Western identities are 
detached from context, Eastern identities are situationally bound. Considering the social 
group and its needs as instances of situation and context, these are compelling arguments 
to consider members of collectivistic societies as generally having higher levels of 
ingroup prosociality than members of individualistic societies. 
 
More Threat in Collectivistic Societies 
Existential threats, such as natural disaster, may explain why some cultures tend 
to be tighter than others (compared to looser ones) (Gelfand et al. 2011, also Gelfand 
2014). Tightness describes stronger norms with less tolerance for deviance, and looseness 




Tightness versus looseness (Gelfand et al. 2011) seems to overlap with collectivism (see 
Methods discussion relating to Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 2010). While tightness-
looseness explicitly addresses social control orientations rather than ingroup prosocial 
orientations, the overlap is profound when considering ingroup prosociality as the desired 
end result of social control. I propose that threats at least in part explain why members of 
collectivistic societies tend to be more ingroup-prosocial than members of individualistic 
societies.   
 Following Gelfand et al.’s (2011, also Gelfand 2014) argument, differences in the 
early formation of Eastern and Western societies likely shaped differences in ingroup 
prosociality. For example, coastal Japanese societies have been necessarily concerned 
about tsunami. Food production systems also distinguish societies — Eastern systems, 
such as rice paddies, tend to be relatively communal (e.g., Huntington 1996, Nisbett, 
Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan 2001). Food systems that depend on cooperation mean more 
precarious survival. Conditions where threat is salient, is a frequent challenge for the 
society, or both, may have encouraged values that promote group interests. By 
comparison, threats resulting from natural disaster risk and food production systems may 
not have been as salient in Western societies. Consistent with this, members of Western 
societies tend to value individuality and autonomy more so than members of Eastern 
societies. 
 While both collectivistic (e.g., Eastern) and individualistic (e.g., Western) 
societies experience some threats, threats may be more internalized, or salient, to 
members of individualistic societies. Norms and values shaped by threats may become 




unpublished, citing Ventura, Pattamadilok, Fernandes, Klein, Morais, and Kolinsky 
2008). For example, China’s one-child-per family policy shaped Chinese life over the 
past four decades, amidst the threat of resource shortages resulting from overpopulation. 
 Within some individualistic societies, the valuation of conformity and related 
work attitudes vary by socioeconomic standing (e.g., Kohn 1977[1969]). With poverty 
and homelessness being greater threats to the working class than the middle class, this 
suggests greater collectivism among those with lower, more precarious socioeconomic 
standing. In this, socialization differences have proven adaptive for generations of 
middle- and working-class families in their respective environments. While it would be 
of interest to examine extent of collectivism within societies largely characterized by 
individualism, this work instead aims to compare two respective societies categorized as 
relatively individualistic and collectivistic and assess the role of threat in shaping their 
patterns in ingroup prosociality, specifically in Study 1. 
 Before presenting the Study 1 results that address the main predictions, I assess 
results designed to test two assumptions, first that members of collectivistic societies 
experience more threat than members of individualistic societies, and second that they 
tend to be more ingroup prosocial.  
The present work investigates how experimentally manipulating threat affects 
ingroup-prosocial orientations and behaviors. It also compares experimental results 
across collectivistic and individualistic societies, to assess how differences in threat 
between society types might explain differences in ingroup prosociality. Evaluations of 
various types of threats in the experiments and participant demographics allow for even 





Ingroup Prosociality Outcomes 
Similar to the framing of threats, I consider ingroup prosociality as a broad class 
of orientations and behaviors. I explain three categories of testable outcomes I propose 
reflect ingroup prosociality — holistic versus analytic types of social and cognitive 
orientations, upholding status orders in groups, and promoting the legitimacy of power in 
groups.  
Holistic versus Analytic Orientations (Study 1) 
I define holism as the tendency to consider the larger system and interrelation of 
parts globally, rather than sub-parts or individual roles locally, or analysm. This largely 
follows Nisbett et al.’s (2001) theory, which Choi et al. (2007) use to inform their 
Analysis-Holism scale. I propose that holism is an ingroup prosocial orientation, or 
worldview, because it promotes focus on and orientation toward the larger context or 
group, and is especially characteristic of members of collectivistic societies (discussed 
further below). If members of collectivistic societies tend to be more ingroup prosocial as 
well as holistic, then holism may be an instance of ingroup prosociality. Study 1 is 
designed to test this possibility.  
I argue that several other cognitive and social orientations are in the spirit of 
holism. Specifically, interdependence (Singelis 1994), group orientation (Schooler 1990), 
and potentially, as discussed above (e.g., Benard and Doan 2011), sense of cohesion (e.g., 
feeling like part of the group). Study 1 will assess both measures designed to assess 
holism specifically (e.g., Choi et al. 2007, Triandis and Gelfand 1998) as well as other 




orientation (SVO, Van Lange 1999), which includes a hypothetical exchange task with a 
hypothetical partner. 
The ingroup prosociality constructs I propose do not simply reflect unselfishness 
versus selfishness. As I specified in terms of ingroup prosociality broadly, they are 
specific to a reference ingroup, and the orientations have concrete ways they benefit the 
ingroups. A low-status individual endorsing social dominance orientation beliefs (SDO, 
Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Malle, 1994) is not self-serving, because status-
disadvantaged persons would be promoting their own low status, and attaining status is 
normally desirable (Anderson, Hildreth, and Howland 2015). I also return to the example 
of Chinese behavior (from Bond 1986, as cited in Markus and Kitayama 1991), in which 
individuals in groups intentionally refrain from expressing personal views, unless the 
group agrees on acceptable ways to express them. If the individual were not focused on 
or oriented toward the group, this could diminish smoothness of the interaction, ability to 
manage without interpersonal conflicts, or task orientation. Success of the task group is 
especially relevant to the group studies, because in status research in group processes, a 
necessary scope condition is that groups are task oriented, and can succeed or fail at the 
task (e.g., Berger, Fişek, Norman, and Zelditch 1977).  
This brings us to the first specific prediction: 
 
Prediction 1: Compared to non-threatened individuals, threatened individuals 
will exhibit more ingroup-prosocial cognitive and social orientations. 
 
Support for this prediction would be consistent with the cross-cultural differences 




shaping differences in ingroup prosociality between collectivistic and individualistic 
societies, whether historically, continuously, or both. This follows my first assumption, 
that members of collectivistic societies experience more threat than members of 
individualistic societies. In other words, comparing Indians to Americans, I assume a 
higher baseline level of threat (in the absence of any exceptional situation, such as the 
experimental manipulations). This may then result in my second assumption addressed 
below, that members of individualistic societies exhibit more ingroup prosociality than 
members of collectivistic societies. 
 Members of collectivistic societies tend to be more holistic than members of 
individualistic societies (e.g., Nisbett et al. 2001, Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, and 
Larsen 2003). Kitayama et al. (2003) found that Easterners were especially likely to 
attend to context — they were more accurate in judging relative lengths of lines, while 
Westerners were more accurate in judging absolute lengths of lines. Though not 
necessarily causal, they also found that individuals who lived temporarily with the 
opposite culture type responded more like their host culture. Masuda and Nisbett (2001) 
found similar evidence on perception for responses to animations of underwater scenes 
and images of wildlife. Self-concept and social identity literatures also reflect greater 
interdependence among members of collectivistic societies (e.g., Markus and Kitayama 
1991; Yuki 2003). Based on the cross-cultural research I review, I test another initial 
assumption before presenting results for the predictions. My second initial assumption is 
that members of collectivistic societies will exhibit more ingroup-prosocial cognitive and 
social orientations than members of individualistic societies (particularly holism and 




 While the TMT literature discussed above mainly addresses American and 
European participants, the Routledge et al. (2015) finding of mortality salience effects on 
nationalism for Chinese but not American participants suggests that ingroup prosociality 
responses to threats may differ between cultures. Despite the nationalism result unique to 
Chinese participants in Routledge et al. (2015), many studies found other support for 
increased ingroup prosociality among Americans and Europeans toward their country 
under threat (e.g., Routledge and Arndt 2008, Herrera and Sani 2013). Below I offer two 
alternative competing predictions. 
Threat beyond normal levels may be more effective in increasing prosociality for 
members of individualistic societies than members of collectivistic societies. I propose 
that threat has historically shaped differences in ingroup prosociality between societies, 
particularly for collectivistic societies. Because members of collectivistic societies have 
likely been exposed to more threat, I predict that their net response to additional threats 
will be lower than that for members of individualistic societies. In other words, I would 
expect members of individualistic societies to be more responsive, or sensitive to threats. 
If members of collectivistic societies tend to be less responsive, or less sensitive, to 
threats, I predict: 
 
Prediction 2A: Threat will increase ingroup prosocial cognitive and social 
orientations more for members of individualistic societies than for members of 
collectivistic societies. 
 
 For members of individualistic societies, whose baseline levels I propose are 
relatively low for both threat and ingroup prosociality, it is worth noting that there is 




 It is also possible that because threat is more salient to members of collectivistic 
societies, they will be more responsive to threats, and their ingroup prosociality will 
increase more. This is consistent with the self-concept and social identity literatures 
mentioned above (e.g., Markus and Kitayama 1991; Yuki 2003), as well as the control 
systems theories of self addressed further above (ACT and ICT). If this alternative is the 
case, I predict: 
 
Prediction 2B: Threat will increase ingroup prosocial cognitive and social 
orientations more for members of collectivistic societies than for members of 
individualistic societies. 
 
Predictions 2A and 2B are competing predictions, and will provide insight into 
threat and ingroup prosociality cross-culturally. We would expect a greater threat 
difference for members of individualistic societies mathematically if baseline threat 
levels are higher for members of collectivistic societies (my first initial assumption), and 
there is relatively little room to increase. I expect counter-factual modeling to help isolate 
culture and threat effects (see Analyses). Prediction 2B is plausible if members of 
collectivistic societies are more motivated to mobilize against threats than members of 
individualistic societies.  
Though the Prediction 2A and Prediction 2B explanations are not mutually 
exclusive, they assess two possibilities. The two possibilities are that members of 
individualistic and collectivistic societies, respectively, are especially responsive to 
threats. 
While existing literature suggests that some threats promote some prosociality 




prosociality outcomes and evaluated them as components of a broad process. Work in 
TMT captures some of this, but no known work yet addresses ingroup prosociality as a 
broad worldview or basic group processes such (status and power). Cultural context may 
play a strong role, and Study 1 investigates this in terms of threats and ingroup prosocial 
orientations. The focus now turns to Study 2 and Study 3, which assess the theory in 
terms of status and power processes central to the group processes literature.  
 
Status in Groups (Study 2) 
My treatment of status in groups is consistent with the expectation states and 
status characteristics traditions founded by Berger and colleagues (e.g., Berger et al. 
1977). Status is esteem and influence in a group, and this results in expectations for the 
competence and worth of people’s contributions to the group. For a given characteristic, 
there are positive and negative states that vary depending on cultural values — such as 
male valued over female. States may also be specific to the situation, such as an ability 
score. I propose that upholding the group’s status order is an ingroup-prosocial 
worldview because following competent guidance increases a task group’s chances of 
succeeding.  
The combined expectation states (EST) and status characteristics (SCT) research 
program generally has two scope conditions and four assumptions (e.g., Ridgeway and 
Correll 2003 in DeLamater 2003, citing Berger et al. 1977). The two scope conditions are 
collective orientation of the group and task orientation, and the four assumptions are 
salience, burden of proof, sequencing, and aggregation. An extension and fifth 




and Wagner 1985, and Berger, Fişek, Norman, and Wagner 1998). Standardization of 
methods, known as the standard experimental setting (SES), have developed along with 
the EST and SCT research program from the beginning with Berger and colleagues (e.g., 
Berger et al. 1977). Notably, Troyer (2002) created a computerized version of the SES, 
which largely shaped the methods for Study 2 and Study 3 in the present research, and 
has been used in other related research (e.g., Kerns manuscript in progress). 
Behavioral deference is the standard measure of status, such that those higher in 
status get more deference from others (e.g., Berger et al. 1977). Extensive research has 
supported EST and SCT and found that individuals defer more to high-status persons 
than low-status persons in groups (e.g., Webster and Rashotte 2010). I assume that the 
EST and SCT theories hold, and I expect to observe consistent response patterns in my 
study. I test the status outcomes by status manipulation condition before presenting 
results for the predictions. 
 If a smoothly operating status order is an ingroup prosocial worldview, then 
people should adhere to it more so under threat than not under threat. For low-status 
individuals, this conflicts with the fundamental desire to attain social status (extensive 
literature review by Anderson, Hildreth, and Howland 2015, see also Willer 2009). 
However, Anderson, Srisvastava, Beer, Spataro, and Chatman (2006) found that self-
perceptions of status are quite accurate, and they propose that this is because overly 
positive status evaluations decrease acceptance by the group. From this perspective, a 
low-status group member behaving in ways more consistent with their low status (e.g., 
deferring more to high-status group members) should result in them being more accepted, 




Anderson, Willer, Kilduff, and Brown’s (2012) experiment found that people sometimes 
prefer lower-status positions in groups, particularly when they believed they were less 
valuable to the group and others expected poorer performance from them. I suggest that 
threatening situations may further promote these beliefs.  
 Under threat, I predict that low-status group members will defer more than usual, 
further reinforcing their low status. High-status members may then be more inclined to 
defer less, or lead. This will result in a greater difference in amounts of deference 
between low-status and high-status group members when threatened than when not 
threatened. I predict: 
 
Prediction 3: When threatened, the difference in status outcomes for low-status 
task partners compared to high-status task partners will be greater than when not 
under threat. This is such that threat increases deference to high-status partners 
and evaluations of them as high-status, and decreases deference to low-status 
partners and evaluations of them as high-status. 
 
 
 I predict greater magnitude of these status differences under threat because the 
more group members adhere to its prestige or deference order, the more likely it is to 
have favorable outcomes. For example, people may be more likely to seek expert 
guidance under threat. In task groups differentiated by status, specific efforts to maximize 
task performance in threatening situations could be low-status persons deferring more to 
high-status persons, and high-status persons deferring less to low-status persons. Acting 
in ways that promote favorable group outcomes make these ingroup prosocial behaviors. 
 Support for Prediction 3 would suggest that adhering to status orders is an 
ingroup-prosocial worldview shaped by threat. However, these behavioral outcomes do 




be necessary to ask individuals why they acted as they did, but as suggested in the terror 
management theory literature, defending worldviews when threatened seems to be an 
unconscious process (e.g., Greenberg et al. 1997). Instead, to assess whether individuals 
internalize worldviews about status orders more so under threat, evaluating orientations 
toward these status orders should provide some insight. In terms of Prediction 3, I also 
assess participant ratings of the partner’s status. I discuss orientations related to status 
orders in more detail below. 
I propose that the change to status processes in threatening situations as in 
Prediction 3 not only applies to ingroup prosocial behaviors within groups, but also 
orientations. Major et al. (2007, as cited in Major and Kaiser 2017) present worldview 
threat theory (WVT), in which people seek consistency between their status ideologies 
and their personal experiences. While Major et al. (2007) assess self-esteem and victim-
blaming consequences, the present work investigates specific behaviors and orientations 
proposed as instances of prosociality. Jost and Hunyady (2005) present several system-
justifying ideologies, including meritocracy, social dominance orientation, and political 
conservatism (see Jost and Hunyady 2005, 261, Table 1). In this work I focus on social 
dominance orientation, which is preference for social hierarchies (SDO, Pratto et al. 
1994).  Depending on the ingroup, these ideologies may be considered ingroup prosocial. 
I also assess feelings of cohesion (e.g., feeling part of the group) as potentially reflecting 
ingroup prosociality. I propose that these orientations increase under threat, regardless of 
the person’s status in the group. 
Following the logic of Prediction 3, but in terms of orientations that uphold status 





Prediction 4: Threatened individuals prefer status orders more than non-
threatened individuals. 
 
Support for this prediction would demonstrate how threat shapes status-relevant  
and cohesion orientations as instances of ingroup prosociality and ingroup prosocial 
worldviews. It is possible to act in the practical interest of the group (i.e., by behaviorally 
adhering more strongly to the status order), but not necessarily internalize this 
orientation. By including both behavioral and orientation outcomes in my theory, I allow 
more room for refinement. For example, if ingroup prosocial behaviors but not 
orientations increased with threats to the group, this would diminish support for the 
ingroup prosociality worldview explanation based on TMT (e.g., Greenberg et al. 1997). 
While this work does not address group processes cross-culturally, there is reason 
to speculate that these status processes would be impacted by cultural context. This 
considers them along with the holistic-type ingroup prosocial behaviors and orientations 
addressed in Study 1. Markus and Kitayama (1991, 230, note 3) offer insight into these 
processes in their discussion of nonconformity:  
For Japanese, nonconformity is a privilege afforded only to selected, talented 
individuals whose deviance from the norm of interdependence is implicitly 
sanctioned by the rest of society. For Americans, nonconformity is regarded as 
every individual’s birthright. (Markus and Kitayama 1991, 230, note 3) 
 
Also, Torelli, Stoner, and Puente (2014) presented evidence that persons higher in 
individualism define status in terms of competence, while persons higher in collectivism 
consider warmth along with competence (specifically comparing U.S. Americans with 
Latin Americans). While not addressed directly in the present experiments, cross-cultural 




have implications for the legitimacy of power structures in groups. These cross-cultural 
dynamics remain to be tested in future work. However, for example, if Japanese society 
faces more threats than American society does, and Japanese individuals are more likely 
to adhere to and prefer status orders, this would lend further support to Prediction 3 and 
Prediction 4. 
 I now turn to legitimacy of power processes in groups, which are closely tied to 
status processes. 
 
Power in Groups (Study 3) 
My third study assesses how threat affects behaviors and orientations that 
promote the legitimacy of power structures in groups. Though related to status orders, 
promoting the legitimacy of power is distinct from upholding status orders, which Study 
2 was addressed. I present theory about status and the legitimacy of power, and explain 
how I expect threat to shape these processes. For individuals in low-power positions (all 
participants in Study 3), I propose that these behaviors are acting in ways to change the 
power structure (e.g., voting to join a coalition against a powerful actor), and these 
orientations are assessment of the legitimacy of those in a position of power. 
 Power in groups is the ability to control resources (e.g., Emerson 1962) and to 
exercise one’s will despite others’ resistance (Weber 1968, 16.A).4 Power is distinct from 
status, because power comes from a structural position or title, while status reflects 
esteem and influence. Network exchange theory (NET, Markovsky, Willer, and Patton, 
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1988, as cited by Lucas, Younts, Lovaglia, and Markovsky 2001) predicts power 
differentials depending on position within a resource network. Study 3 specifically 
presents a strong power network, in which low-power actors compete to make deals with 
the high-power actors (Willer 1987, as cited by Emanuelson and Willer 2015). Network 
exchanges illustrate how power manifests in the ability to exclude others from desired 
resources (Lucas et al. 2001, citing Markovsky et al. 1988). In the social world, power 
and status tend to be positively correlated, but they are not necessarily. Thye’s (2000) 
findings illustrate the interrelation of status and power — resources that appeared to be 
from a high-status person were more valued than those appearing to be from lower-status 
persons, making the high-status individuals more powerful. 
 Relevant worldviews address who should hold power and how that power should 
be exercised. Legitimacy of power is the belief that the power is used or held in ways that 
are good or correct, which Walker, Thomas, and Zelditch (1986) describes as propriety. 
Zelditch (2001) considers power-prestige and legitimacy in terms of expectation states, 
such that status and the legitimacy of power tend to be congruent, or consistent with one 
another. Work by Ridgeway and colleagues (e.g., Ridgeway 1982, as cited by Lucas, 
Kerns, and Lovaglia manuscript in progress) found that status expectations and 
perceptions extend to prosocial versus selfish motivations toward groups, such that we 
favorably associate high-status individuals with ingroup prosociality, and unfavorably 
associate low-status individuals with selfishness.  
Considering these findings and the theoretical framing of the legitimacy of power, 
Lucas et al. (manuscript in progress) predict that power is more likely to be viewed as 




other words, if we view high-status holders of power as using power more competently 
and prosocially, and low-status holders as using it more incompetently and selfishly, then 
status informs perceptions about the legitimacy of power (Lucas et al. manuscript in 
progress). Of potential interest, threats coming from outside the group but exploited by a 
powerful actor in the group may be considered as indirect coercion, while threats coming 
directly from the powerful actor may be considered direct coercion (Emanuelson and 
Willer 2015). This work examines indirect coercion, though direct coercion would be of 
interest for future work. Lucas et al. (manuscript in progress) found general support for 
powerful low-status actors being perceived as less legitimate than powerful high-status 
actors.5 While Benard (2012) did not find that threat increased support for centralized 
leadership, other findings do suggest this (e.g., Willer 2004). Based on this literature, I 
adopt the initial assumption that high status increases treatment of powerful actors as 
legitimate, and low status decreases treatment of powerful actors as legitimate. As with 
the initial assumptions in Study 1 and Study 2, I assess support for this assumption before 
presenting support for Prediction 5. 
Assuming that we view high-status actors holding power as more legitimate than 
low-status actors holding power, I propose that, similar to the status processes (Study 2 
outcomes), threat will make these processes more prominent. I expect that legitimate 
(high-status) actors will be especially successful in attaining resources when under threat, 
and illegitimate (low-status) actors will be especially unsuccessful in attaining resources 
when under threat. This also applies considering others’ perceptions of legitimacy as a 
                                                
5 Though results for Lucas et al. (manuscript in progress) generally did not support especially low 
legitimacy evaluations about fictitious low-status actors when they acted selfishly, this may have been due 




resource. I further consider others’ perceptions of the actor’s legitimacy as orientations 
consistent with the proposed ingroup prosociality worldview about the legitimacy of 
power. 
I propose that promoting the legitimacy of power is an ingroup prosocial 
worldview, much like upholding group status orders. Following Lucas et al. (manuscript 
in progress), if powerful high-status actors are expected to use and perceived as using 
power more competently and prosocially, and powerful low-status actors are expected to 
use power and perceived as using power more incompetently and selfishly, then acting 
prosocially means enabling high-status actors in positions of power, and disabling low-
status actors in positions of power. Acceptance of a competent powerful actor’s power 
and compliance with his or her demands benefits the ingroup by maintaining a stable 
power structure in which all actors attain necessary resources (see Study 3 methods 
description in Chapter 7). I expect orientations to work in a similar way, as evaluations of 
the powerful actor’s legitimacy, because these reflect internalization of the proposed 
ingroup prosociality worldview. 
Though people may be motivated to seek power similarly to how they seek status 
(e.g., Anderson et al. 2015 on status), there are similar reasons why people do not seek 
power. For example, Anderson et al. (2006) discuss motivation to maintain one’s own 
likability as a reason for not self-enhancing to increase status. Power additionally has the 
element of force — those low in power may not have the means to attain more power, 
despite their desire to. I argue that ingroup prosocial worldviews about the legitimacy of 
power are as fundamental as the other ingroup prosocial worldviews I address in this 




describe their findings in terms of power. They found evidence interpretable as nurses 
having self-serving motives for attaining power, such that nurses rated their relative 
power position as more legitimate when upwardly mobile than when downwardly mobile. 
However, their reference group is not specified beyond nurses as a general group. 
Following my theory, I propose that if they had asked about legitimacy in terms of the 
entire medical profession as a group, the nurses would have responded such that they 
promoted legitimacy in ways that benefit the medical profession as a whole, not only 
nurses, even if it means occupying lower power positions. 
Following the assumption that low-status actors are perceived to hold and use 
power less legitimately than high-status actors, I predict that this difference will be more 
prominent when the ingroup is threatened. In terms of threats to groups and this 
relationship between status and the legitimacy of power, I predict: 
 
Prediction 5: Threat increases treatment (including evaluation) of high-status 
powerful actors as legitimate, and decreases treatment of low-status powerful 
actors as legitimate, and in this, the difference in how legitimate individuals treat 
powerful low-status actors compared to powerful high-status actors will be greater 
than when not under threat. 
 
Support for Prediction 5 would suggest promoting the legitimacy of power as both 
ingroup prosocial behaviors and orientations, and as an ingroup prosocial worldview that 
is activated under threat. In other words, the legitimacy of power helps group function, 
and commitment to the legitimacy of power increases under threat. As in the Study 2 
predictions for behaviorally upholding status orders and having consistent cognitive and 
social orientations, the legitimacy of power processes also address both behavior and 




(see Study 3 methods description in Chapter 7), but this does not necessarily mean that 
this worldview has been internalized. Questions in Study 3 are designed to address 
perception of legitimacy of power, and the extent to which the behavioral and cognitive 
and orientation results align will be used to assess the proposed theory. 
It is of interest to consider motivations for exercising power (e.g., Benard 2012). 
Barclay and Benard (2013) suspect that selfish motives affected those in their most 
powerful experimental condition. Dubois, Rucker, and Galinsky (2015) found that sense 
of power, but not status, promoted unethical behavior, but they distinguish unethical 
behavior from selfish behavior. Following the legitimacy discussion above, it is likely 
that people will attribute more selfish motivations to low-status than high-status actors 
exercising power. This is consistent with Prediction 5. 
Individuals’ exercise of power when given the opportunity may also reveal 
interesting aspects of the relationship between threat and upholding the legitimacy of 
power. If the worldview of legitimate power is internalized and amplified under threat, 
then under threat, compared to nonthreatening conditions, it follows that individuals low 
in status would exercise less power and individuals high in status would exercise more 
power. Study 3 includes questions designed to assess these possibilities, based on 
preliminary analyses of Study 2 (see Chapter 8 for more details about these questions). 
 
Summary 
Chapter 1 reviewed the theory and literature that inform the predictions the three 
studies are designed to test, drawing on terror management theory (TMT) and other 




prediction, that threats to groups increase ingroup prosocial orientations and behaviors. 
Study 1 addresses social and cognitive orientations such as holism, Study 2 addresses 
upholding status orders in groups, and Study 3 addresses promoting the legitimacy of 
power in groups. The next chapter, Chapter 2, provides an overview of the methods, data, 







Chapter 2: Methods, Data, and Analyses Overview 
 
In this chapter, I present an overview of the methods, data, and analyses used in the three 
experimental studies. Chapter 3 details methods, data, and analyses for Study 1. Chapter 
5 details methods, data, and analyses for Study 2. Chapter 7 details methods, data, and 
analyses for Study 3. 
 
Methods Overview 
Experimental designs allow us to infer causation about threat manipulations 
(versus non-threat control manipulations) on ingroup prosociality outcomes. Random 
assignment of participants across the experimental conditions prevents systematic 
differences across condition groups. This allows us to infer that the difference in 
treatment between the experimental conditions is what caused any differences in 
outcomes observed. Qualtrics online survey software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT) allows for 
random assignment of instrument versions that correspond to the experimental 
conditions. The Turkitron web service (turkitron.com) is used for participant screening 
(to help ensure eligibility and prevent multiple responses). This service also allows for 
randomization of survey links administered. If demographic or other characteristics are 
unevenly distributed across conditions, these can be controlled for statistically (see 
Analyses below). Because of demographic differences across conditions in Study 1 
(discussed more extensively in Chapter 3), Studies 2 and 3 rely instead on the Turkitron 




across conditions than Study 1 did. However, there were still potentially problematic 
differences, especially for Study 2 (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 7). For all studies, when 
conditions begin to reach quotas for valid case counts, I adjusted condition selection 
procedures as appropriate. 
 All studies and pretests were administered using Qualtrics. All participants were 
recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service (MTurk, https://www.mturk.com). 
Participants were asked to ensure that they were in a quiet space free of distractions while 
participating and that they had time to complete the study in one sitting. Protocol 
information and lists of variables used in the analyses for each study are available in the 
Appendices. The protocol information includes participant instructions as well as the 
exact wording of questions asked. 
 
Cultural Representation 
Study 1 used two samples: American participants, representing members of an 
individualistic society, and Indian participants, representing members of a collectivistic 
society. Study 2 and Study 3 only included American participants. 
 I chose Americans in the United States for my individualistic society samples. 
The United States and India appear to vary culturally on important aspects of social 
orientation, and are practical choices, as discussed below. The United States had a high 
score of 91 on the individualism-collectivism dimension of Hofstede’s Value Survey 
Module (VSM) (Hofstede et al. 2010). I chose Indians in India for my collectivistic 
society samples. India’s score on the VSM was 48 (Hofstede et al. 2010). This is notably 




Sinha, Verma, and Sinha 2001, citing Hofstede 1980). Intuitively, an East Asian country 
might illustrate collectivism better than India. When Tu et al. (2011) compared 
questionnaire responses between India, China, Brazil, and Russia, India scored highest in 
individualism. While China scored notably lower than India at 20, Japan scored 42 
(Hofstede et al. 2010). However, in Gelfand et al.’s (2011) 33-country study of tightness-
looseness, India scored 11, higher (tighter) than all but two countries, Pakistan and 
Malaysia — the United States scored 5.1. Also notably, Tu, Lin, and Chang (2011) found 
that based on a survey of CEOs in Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the BRIC countries), 
India appears the most individualistic, while China appears the most collectivistic. 
 As of a 2009 survey, the United States and India were the two most represented 
nations on MTurk (56% and 36% respectively, Ross, Irani, Silberman, Zaldivar, and 
Tomlinson 2010). Though MTurk samples are convenience samples, some research 
found that the MTurk convenience samples are more representative of the U.S. 
population than convenience samples from laboratory studies (e.g., Huff and Tingley 
2015). MTurk allows researchers to restrict recruitment by country, which makes it 
feasible to have separate listings that ensure appropriate representation from both 
countries. To maximize influence of the target culture, the task description listing for 
both American and Indian samples stated that participants were required to have native-
born parents (second-generation). However, Ross et al. (2010) noted demographic 
differences between the U.S. and Indian MTurk populations — for example, 28% of 
Indian MTurk workers worked on MTurk to make ends meet, but only 14% of U.S. 




controlling statistically where appropriate, especially when comparing U.S. and Indian 
data.6  
 MTurk pays in cash for both the United States and India. This makes the payment 
incentives comparable across my samples, which is important for the studies that appear 
to pay based on performance. China would have been a poor choice in this respect 
because it pays in Amazon credit, and Amazon access is limited in China, so the Amazon 
credit incentive would be worth little. Studies for both countries were in English, and I 
listed fluency in English as a requirement for participation. In Pavlick et al.’s (2014) 
study of MTurk users’ language translations from six Indian languages to English, they 
state that because most MTurk tasks are English-only, they assume that there are few 
non-English speakers on MTurk. 
 
 
Threat Manipulation Methods Pretesting 
The threat manipulation methods pretesting process was thorough with multiple 
stages of revisions that ultimately shaped the study instruments. This pretesting 
manipulated threat (different types of threats versus non-threat control conditions) using a 
writing prompt salience manipulation based on priming procedures. Priming is a short-
term process where stimuli (often occurring quickly and below the conscious level) affect 
subsequent cognition, attitudes, or behavior. Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Magee (2003) 
used priming to induce behavior consistent with either having power over others or not, 
depending on whether the participant was asked to write about a time they experienced 
                                                
6 Control variable analyses include some demographic and social attitude variables, but not individual VSM 





power or a time when someone else had power over them. The threat manipulations in 
this work are based on the standard mortality salience manipulation from the terror 
management theory (TMT, e.g., Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Chatel 
1992) literature, and also the seminal manipulation for priming a sense of power 
(Galinsky et al. 2003). By simply engaging with the target stimulus, research has found 
outcomes consistent with relevant situations in the social world. In the TMT literature, 
writing about what happens to one’s body when one dies is a standard threat 
manipulation (as mortality salience, e.g., Rosenblatt et al. 1989 as cited in Hackney 
2011:55). A common control condition is writing about what happens to one’s body 
when watching television (e.g., Greenberg et al. 1997). 
The TMT literature has similarly primed mortality salience by asking participants 
to write in detail about their own deaths, and found that morality salience increased 
defensiveness about cultural worldviews in various ways (e.g., Greenberg et al. 1997). 
Some researchers have used a distracting task between the experimental manipulation 
and outcome measures of interest as a means of solidifying the manipulation (e.g., 
Greenberg, Arndt, Simon, Pyszczynski, and Solomon 2000, as cited in Shatil 2012). This 
is explained as the necessary suppression of death-related thoughts (e.g., Greenberg et al. 
2000). Due to time and resource limitations, a distracting task was included in Study 1, 
but not Studies 2 and 3. 
 In my salience manipulations, I first briefly described the threat and stated that 
some people find it threatening. I then asked participants to think about this threat — 




experience it — and to write about it in detail. This is the language for intergroup threat 
as competition over resources, for example: 
 
People are sometimes members of groups that must compete with other groups 
for scarce resources. Think of a time when you were part of a group, and your 
group had to compete with another group to obtain resources that were not very 
available (scarce). If you do not remember a time when you have experienced 
this, please imagine what it would be like to experience competing with another 
group for scarce resources. Please write in detail about your experience, or 
imagined experience. What were you thinking and feeling? 
 
I adapted this language for the other threats and control prompts — competition 
for rank or power within one’s group (intragroup), deviance or defector within one’s 
group (intragroup), natural disaster (existential), questioning one’s prosocial group 
member identity (intrapersonal), and terrorism (both intergroup and existential); the non-
threat control conditions were one’s day yesterday (neutral, based on Galinsky et al. 
2003) and one’s next big examination (averse event not specifically threatening to the 
ingroup, McGregor et al. 1998, as cited in Shatil 2012).  
The standard mortality salience manipulation was not included because it is a 
relatively indirect threat to social groups. Despite this, mortality might be treated as an 
existential threat to a group, especially if considering how members of a group are no 
longer alive and able to participate, this may threaten the structure of the group (see 
Castano, Yzerbyt, and Paladino 2002 on entitativity). Considering that mortality salience 
could be a threat to some extent, using the standard mortality salience manipulation as a 
control for the social group threat conditions described above could have been 
problematic. The standard TMT control manipulation about bodily experience watching 




experiences described above because they did not mention any bodily experiences. The 
control conditions were written such that they do mention social experiences. 
I asked pretest participants to write in detail about one of the threat or prompts as 
described above. The later pretesting rounds used a focused-thinking-question format, 
which I continued to use for the main studies. These questions asked the participant to 
write at least 100 characters about each of three separate questions addressing what they 
think and how they feel about the situation. Referring to the manipulation situation, the 
questions were as follows: 
 
What do you think about this experience? (100 character minimum) 
What do you think this experience would be like for you? (100 character 
minimum) 
How would you feel about this experience? (100 character minimum) 
 
 I then asked the participants several scale-formatted questions about how threatened they 
felt personally and how threatened they felt in terms of several of their social groups 
(e.g., family, nation). I included measures of sense of cohesion and other relevant 
outcomes, such as anxiety. I also asked participants to identify their most important social 
groups in a brief open-ended section to help ensure culturally appropriate reference 
groups are included in the instruments. During initial pretesting, some respondents 
expressed relief and gratitude when presented with a control condition situation that 
specified a low level of threat. For the final pretesting and study instruments, there were 
no mentions of threats in the control prompts, making them true control conditions.  
In comparing results across the final pretested prompts, terrorism and natural 




threat and group threat for both American and Indians. Indices designed to reflect 
personal feelings of threat and sense of group threat were developed using factor 
analyses, and tested as highly reliable (Chronbach’s α > 0.90).  
Because terrorism and natural disaster are social and nonsocial in nature, 
respectively, and the pretesting elicited responses across cultures (therefore likely 
culturally relevant), they are used for Study 1. And because samples from both countries 
responded in the pretesting and in some ways in Study 1, these threat manipulations 
inform the Study 2 threat manipulations. The Study 2 threat manipulations are similar to 
Study 1, but they incorporate the group task scoring situation, such that competition with 
other groups did or did not affect earnings. The same is true for Study 2 informing Study 
3 — the threat manipulations are similar, but Study 3 incorporates an existential threat 
similar to Barclay and Benard 2013, which affects group performance and pay, and there 
is no intergroup competition as in Study 2.  
All main study participants responded to three guided-thinking questions about 
the threat manipulation prompt (designed to encourage thoughts and feelings about the 
situation). Specific threat manipulations for the studies are described in more detail in 
later chapters (Chapter 3 for Study 1, Chapter 5 for Study 2, and Chapter 7 for Study 3). 
While the threat manipulations used are similar in their priming and guided-thinking 
format, Study 2 and 3 are distinct because the threats directly relate to the behavioral 
group tasks and ostensibly affect participants’ abilities to earn a high score and high 
payment on MTurk. Consistent results across different types of threat manipulations 
would suggest their validity and demonstrate that threat (and potentially the ingroup 






My initial pretesting data included written responses that were assessed 
qualitatively, and quantitative questionnaire responses that were analyzed in terms of the 
direction and magnitude of responses. These were used to develop threat manipulations 
for Study 1 and the later studies, as described above. 
Initial power analyses demonstrated that 30 participants per experimental 
condition would be adequate for each of the three studies to detect a difference of one 
standard deviation between the groups (ranging from 4 to 8 different groups), at a power 
level of .80 and alpha level of 0.05 (findit fpower, in Stata v.13). However, this may be 
too large of a difference to expect, so 30 cases per condition may be too conservative, and 
I may need more than 30 participants per condition. Because the pretesting results 
revealed distinct effects (though with only 10 per condition), and due to resource 
limitations (i.e., funds for participant payments), I use an effect size of half of a standard 
deviation difference (effect size 0.5) between two means at power level 0.80 (α = 0.05). 
Based on these factors, I determined that 51 participants per experimental condition 
would be appropriate (e.g., power in Stata v.13). This is a greater cell size than what 
many related studies in the literature use (e.g., Barclay and Benard 2013), and so is less 
likely to commit a Type II error (see also ResearchGate question and answer posts, 
2014). 
While data in Study 2 and Study 3 are randomly dropped to ensure even numbers 
of participants in each condition within the respective samples, no further measures were 




have been dropping cases from each individual analysis. However, this would have 
undermined comparability, because the sample for each analysis could have been 
different, in addition to the already missing data. Condition counts were most often 
uneven for questions probing about suspicion-related behavior, which were only asked of 
participants who indicated some type of suspicion. Numbers of valid cases in each 
condition for each variable are included in the tables. This limitation most affects 
collapsed analyses in Study 2 and Study 3 that compare both low- and high-status non-
threat conditions with both low- and high-status threat conditions.  
 Data were excluded from analyses if participants failed to answer critical 
questions about their experimental manipulation correctly, or if they indicated that 
suspicion about the purpose of the study affected their behavior in a specific way or led 
them to act as though it were not real. Data from participants were also excluded and they 
were not paid if there was reason to suspect they did not take the study seriously (e.g., 
off-topic or inattentive written responses and missing questions designed to check if they 
were paying attention). A reasonable data rejection rate for these studies is around 20%. 
The participant counts only include valid cases. 
 Initially I intended for manipulation check questions critical to decisions about 
keeping data in the sample to include those about the threat manipulations. However, 
given the responses collected (see more details about manipulation checks in the results 
presented below), I decided to be lenient about these. I was surprised to find that correct 
as well as condition-consistent responses were not more common, especially in the group 
studies where the threat elements were built into the task instructions. For the group 




higher or lower contrast sensitivity ability than themselves, because this is a 
straightforward and well-established manipulation in the literature (e.g., Berger et al. 
1977). Missing this manipulation would demonstrate too much inattentiveness to the 
experiment. Considering the threat manipulations, similar decision was made about the 
humor manipulation used in an experimental study on status and use of humor (Kerns 
manuscript in progress) — as in the results presented below, participants performed 
better on the status manipulation checks than the humor manipulation checks. 
 All three studies included general attention check questions, specific questions 
about the experimental manipulations (manipulation checks), probes for suspicion about 
the purpose of the research, and for Study 2 and Study 3, further questions about 
believing and acting as though the situation and other participants were real. In addition 
to data inclusion criteria, I help ensure validity of the data by excluding registrants that 
have already participated in a study in this series. While this method was largely 
effective, inconsistent MTurk ID entry and potentially the Turkitron system resulted in 
imperfect implementation. However, this is not known to affect more than a trivial 
number of cases in the final Study 1 sample, and none in the final Study 2 or Study 3 
samples. 
I included a brief questionnaire before the main Study 1 instrument to confirm at 
least second-generation nativity and English proficiency. At the end of all three studies, I 
included a question that expressed the need for accurate data, and asked participants to 
indicate honestly if they might not fit the eligibility criteria. This clearly stated that they 
would be paid for having completed participation regardless of their response. Previous 




had some success using this honesty screening method — a few participants selected the 
option indicating they were not part of the target population and in the study by mistake 
or for some other reason. 
 
Analyses Overview 
For each of the studies and pretests, I conducted tests of the differences of means 
or proportions across the experimental conditions to ensure there were no problematic 
differences in demographic variables (e.g., notably more women in one condition than 
the others). For continuous variables, these were one-way ANOVAs, and for indicator 
variables, these were chi-square tests. I created condition indicator variables to assess 
differences between them, and used post-regression estimation contrast tests of 
differences of means or proportions (test in Stata v.13). If there were statistically 
significant differences for one or more variables, I assessed models that control for these 
variables statistically. Differences approaching statistical significance were considered as 
well. Also, demographic variables such as education level and social class are treated as 
continuous analysis. 
 Directional tests accommodated one-tailed tests where possible, and otherwise, 
less conservative criteria were used to account for the predictions. For example, because 
the F-distribution used in post-regression estimation tests is one-sided, p-values in the 
direction predicted were evaluated at the 0.10 significance level to approximate the 
results that would have been obtained with a one-tailed t-test of the difference of means 




Because chi-square tests do not accommodate control variables, sometimes 
indicator variables were treated as means and assessed with controls using ANOVA. The 
post-estimation method following regression models allows for control variables in the 
estimation regression. 
The criteria for statistical tests are as follows: 
Differences of means/proportions and coefficients for these differences: 
• t- and z-tests were evaluated as one-tailed if in the direction 
predicted/expected/assumed (hereafter predicted), with the two-tailed p-value 
divided in half, and the threshold for statistical significance was <0.05 
• t-tests were evaluated as two-tailed if opposite of the direction predicted or no 
prediction, and the threshold for statistical significance is <0.05 
• For both one- and two-tailed t-tests, p<0.10 approaches statistical significance 
 
Differences in proportions across conditions (indicator variables), difference in status 
coefficients by threat: 
 
• chi square tests were evaluated at <0.10 if in the direction predicted. For these, 
<0.20 approaches statistical significance 
• chi square tests were evaluated at <0.05 if opposite of the direction predicted or 
no prediction. For these, <0.10 approaches statistical significance 
 
Post-estimation difference of regression margins, one-way ANOVA: 
 
• F-tests comparing two means or margins were evaluated with the threshold <0.10 
if in the direction predicted. For these, <0.20 approaches statistical significance 
• F-tests were evaluated with threshold <0.05 if opposite of the direction predicted 
or no prediction (e.g., whether means vary across conditions, a one-way 
ANOVA). For these, <0.10 approaches statistical significance 
 
To test whether Americans or Indians are more responsive to threat in Study 1, I 
evaluated the interaction term between low status and threat in linear regression models 
(all outcomes were continuous). These results are interpretable as whether threat has a 
greater effect on ingroup prosociality for Americans or Indians. For Study 2 and Study 3, 




suest procedure in Stata. The suest procedure in Stata allows us to assess whether 
coefficients differ significantly across two different models. In Study 2 and Study 3, these 
results are interpretable as whether the status effect is amplified by threat (i.e., whether 
the threat model has a statistically larger status coefficient than the non-threat model 
does).  
In the event a variable was dropped from a model (e.g., due to colinearity), results 
were presented for the remaining model. For variables that have unanimous responses, 
and therefore uniform responses across conditions, analyses including control variables 
were not conducted. For example, this was the case when all participants in the final 
balanced Study 2 sample indicated that they would be interested in participating in a 
future study. 
The analyses presented sometimes only highlight the most theoretically relevant 
results, such as a single interaction term or coefficient from a larger model. Providing 
thorough detail about all of the statistical results would not be feasible without an 
extremely long appendix. Further information about statistical results, including full 
regression models, control-adjusted means and proportions, and variables used to 
construct scales are available from the author upon request. 
Though some variables were recoded or otherwise arithmetically manipulated to 
create summary measures, for ease of interpretation, no variables are transformed to 
increase normality for statistical analyses. 
For the tables presenting results, some include standard notation to indicate the 
level of statistical significance. When this notation is included, it considers the 




distributions), and follows these conventions: ✝ for p <0.10 or equivalent; * for p <0.05 
or equivalent; ** for p <0.01 or equivalent; *** for p <0.001. Some tables also include 
gray shading of cells to indicate when results are opposite of the predicted pattern. 
Standard deviations are not provided for indicator variables, so these cells are left blank. 
 
Summary 
This chapter provided a brief overview of the methods to be used in the main 
studies, cultural representation considerations, details about threat manipulation 
pretesting, information about data used in the studies, analyses, and statistical 






Chapter 3: Study 1 Methods, Data, and Analyses (Holistic 
versus Analytic Social and Cognitive Orientations) 
 
In this chapter, I describe the methods, data, and analyses for Study 1, on holistic versus 
analytic social and cognitive orientations. I include related constructs that reflect ingroup 
prosocial cognitive and social orientations as well. 
I begin my presentation of Study 1 results by assessing my initial assumptions 
that members of individualistic societies experience more threat and that they tend to be 
ingroup prosocial. I predict more holistic, or collectivistic, cognitive and social 
orientations under threat (Prediction 1), and that Americans will be more responsive to 
threats than Indians (Prediction 2A). However, alternatively, Indians could be more 
responsive to threats than Americans (Prediction 2B).  
 The study was presented as about social situations and survey responses to 
prevent suspicion about its true purpose. The questionnaire took about 45 minutes to 
complete and paid $4.25 via MTurk. Participants within each sample (U.S. and India) 
were randomly assigned to one of the three threat conditions using randomization within 
Qualtrics. 
 Preliminary questions screened for eligibility and asked about perception of the 
country’s society and the relative importance of social groups. Social groups addressed 
were one’s country, family group, and workplace group. Country self-concept was also 
included, because it was the reference group for the threat manipulation. Four questions 
were designed to reflect the collectivism versus individualism and tightness versus 




country’s society valuing people as part of social groups compared to as individuals, and 
how strict or lenient the country is about social norms. The series of questions about 
social group importance allowed for comparison before and after the threat manipulation, 
and the cultural questions allowed for theoretically relevant explanatory variables in 
some of the regression models. 
 
Study 1 Threat Manipulations 
Each participant received either a threatening or non-threatening social situation, 
representing the threat and control manipulations, respectively. The participant’s country 
was the reference group, with high risk of either natural disaster or terrorist attack as the 
threatening situation. Simply imagining being a citizen of one’s country was the control 
situation. The language between the countries and threat conditions was identical, except 
the threat conditions included a middle section with additional detail specific to the 
threat. The language for each condition’s situation is as follows: 
 
[Control situation] 
Consider your country as one of your social groups, where you are a citizen. 
 
Imagine in detail living as a citizen of your country. Really imagine yourself in 
this situation. 
 
[Natural disaster threat] 
 





Imagine your country has a high risk of experiencing a natural disaster. 
Examples include earthquake, hurricane, flood, and tsunami. Experiencing a 
natural disaster would threaten your country. 
 




Consider your country as one of your social groups, where you are a citizen. 
 
Imagine your country has a high risk of experiencing a terrorist attack from 
another group. Examples include bombing, airplane hijacking, shooting, and 
cyber attack. Experiencing a terrorist attack from another group would threaten 
your country. 
 




I then asked for written responses to focused questions about the situation. I 
required at least 100 characters in their own words to maximize their engagement. 
Originality was specified as a requirement for these responses because some participants 
(especially from India) plagiarized their responses from internet sources. I address this in 
more detail in the Study 1 Discussion in Chapter 4. These guided thinking questions are 
as follows: 
 
What do you think about this experience generally?  
What do you think this experience would be like for you personally? 
How would you feel about this experience? 
 
The questions were in boldface font to draw attention to how they differed from 




Consistent with the terror management literature (e.g., Greenberg et al. 2000), I 
included a distraction task immediately following the threat manipulation, which I used 
as an opportunity to address the demographic questions. Greenberg et al. (2000) found 
that worldview defense was strongest after an opportunity for suppression of death-
related thoughts (a distracting task being the opportunity), while emotional responses 
tended to be strongest immediately following the mortality salience manipulation. 
Because ingroup prosociality more strongly reflects worldview defense, I included a 
distracting task after the manipulation in Study 1. 
 
Study 1 Outcome Measures 
See Appendix 1 for protocol information and exact wording of questions asked. 
As outcome measures for Study 1, I assessed holism as well as several other constructs 
that reflect relevant ingroup prosocial cognitive and social orientations. I measured 
holistic versus analytic cognitive orientation using the Analysis-Holism Scale (Choi et al. 
2007). Choi et al.’s (2007) measure includes causality, attitude toward contradictions, 
perception of change, and locus of attention dimensions. An example question from the 
locus of attention dimension is extent of agreement with “It is more important to pay 
attention to the whole than its parts” (Choi et al. 2007). I also measured social orientation 
using items Lucas and Schooler (2012, unpublished) based on Schooler’s (1990) 
conceptualization of individualism versus group-orientation. An example question from 
Lucas and Schooler (2012, unpublished) based on Schooler (1990) is extent of agreement 
with “Feeling accepted, interdependent, and interconnected with the social groups that 




individual.” I also used measures of individualism and collectivism as horizontal 
(emphasizing equality) and vertical (accepting inequality) dimensions defined by 
Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, and Gelfand (1995, also as cited in Triandis and Gelfand 
1998). Triandis and Gelfand (1998) demonstrated that these horizontal and vertical 
individualism and collectivism constructs apply not only to individuals in the United 
States (citing Singelis et al. 1995), but also to those in Korea. An example question from 
Singelis et al. 1995 (also in Triandis and Gelfand 1998) from the horizontal (non-status-
differentiated) dimension is “To me, pleasure is spending time with others.” 
If threatened individuals exhibit higher levels of holism and relational 
orientations, this would support Prediction 1. If these differences are greater for 
Americans than Indians, they would support Prediction 2A; if they are greater for Indians 
than Americans, they would support 2B. 
To test the validity of the threat manipulations, all participants were asked a series 
of questions about how threatened they feel, both personally and in terms of their 
country. These questions are based on the highly reliable indices developed in pretesting 
(Chronbach’s α > 0.90). 
 Control variables (e.g., demographics) are used for control and counter-factual 
analyses (see Analyses section). See Appendix 1 for a list of control and outcome 
measures included in the Study 1 analyses. 
Study 1 Methods Continued 
Before debriefing, participants were provided an opportunity to admit to not being 




debriefed. Provided they were otherwise determined eligible (see screening information 
above) and participation was satisfactory, they were paid via MTurk. 
 
Study 1 Data 
My final data include 328 cases, with 54-55 in each experimental condition. The 
conditions are defined by country (United States or India) and threat condition (no threat, 
natural disaster, and terrorism). I excluded data if I determined they were likely to be of 
poor quality (e.g., not paying adequate attention) or ineligible in the first place. However, 
unlike Study 2 and 3 (which were deception studies), I do not exclude participants based 
on indicating suspicion about the purpose of the study or that it somehow affected 
behavior. While the Turkitron eligibility screening system was largely effective, 
inconsistent MTurk ID entry and potentially Turkitron system itself resulted in imperfect 
implementation. However, this is not known to affect more than a trivial number of cases 
in the final Study 1 sample. 
Assessment of the Samples 
With 54-55 cases in each experimental condition, the condition counts are very 
close for comparison. Even if counts were notably uneven (as is possible when there are 
missing data points), because there are no crosses or combinations of Study 1 conditions, 
this would not be an issue. In other words, analyses only test one threat manipulation at a 
time, and do not collapse the threat conditions. By comparison, for Study 2 and Study 3, 





I observed several differences in demographics and initial attitudes between my 
experimental condition groups. In theory, random assignment should have evened most 
of these out. There were also a few more differences between the countries than I 
expected. Because of my concern about confounding variables, I carefully examined 
control models that attempt to further isolate the effects of my experimental variables. All 
of these statistical comparisons are two-tailed. 
 













Demographic, Cultural, and Data Quality 
Variables mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
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Table 1B. Study 1 Demographic, Cultural, and Data Quality Variables: India 
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The following variables differ across conditions: estimate of time it took to 
participate, such that those in the terrorism condition report taking the longest (F-test 
across all conditions for both countries, F = 5.510, p = 0.004; t-tests for both countries 
between control condition and natural disaster, t = -2.876, p = 0.004, and natural disaster 
and terrorism, t = -2.571, p = 0.011; for the U.S. overall F-test F = 3.030, p = 0.051, 
control and natural disaster t = -1.711 p = 0.090, control and terrorism t = -2.337 p = 
0.021; for the India overall F-test F = 3.808 p = 0.024, control and terrorism t = -2.535, p 
= 0.013, natural disaster and terrorism t = -1.852, p = 0.067), rating of one’s country 
promoting groups’ interests, such that those in the control conditions rate this highest 
(control and natural disaster conditions for both countries, t = 2.026, p = 0.044; control 
and natural disaster conditions for the U.S. only, t = 2.127, p = 0.036; and the F-test 
across all U.S. conditions approached statistical significance, F = 2.356, p = 0.098), 
gender, such that there are more men in the natural disaster condition (for the U.S. 
comparison of natural disaster and terrorism, chi square = 4.03, p = 0.045), rated 
importance of one’s family group, such that Indians in the control and natural disaster 
conditions rate this highest (for India control and natural disaster t = -1.997, p = 0.049, 
and for natural disaster and terrorism t = 1.841, p = 0.069), frequency of using MTurk 
to make basic ends meet, such that those in natural disaster report more of this (for the 
U.S. natural disaster and terrorism, t = 1.824, p = 0.071), and racial/ethnic minority 
group indicated, such that there are more minorities in terrorism (for the U.S. 
comparison of proportions across all conditions, chi square = 6.392, p = 0.041, and 




The following variables differ across countries (for all conditions unless otherwise 
specified — several also varied when only comparing the control conditions): gender 
such that there are more men among Indians (z = -4.160, p <0.001, consistent with Ross 
et al. 2010), highest education in household such that Indians reported more education 
(t = -11.478, p <0.001, consistent with Ross et al. 2010), social class such that Indians 
rate themselves higher in social class (t = -11.990, p <0.001), time estimate such that 
Indians report taking longer in the study (t = -6.543, p >0.001), attention score such that 
Indians miss more attention check questions (t = 2.810, p =0.005), and age in years, such 
that Indians are younger (t = 3.362, p = 0.001). While the difference between Indians and 
Americans for reported frequency of using MTurk earnings to make basic ends meet is in 
the direction expected based on Ross et al. (2010), such that Indians do this more often, it 
is not statistically significant (all conditions, t = -1.194, p = 0.234). This result does not 
statistically support this cross-cultural socioeconomic expectation. 
Initial Cross-cultural Assumptions about Pre-manipulation Attitudes and 
Perceptions 
These cross-cultural comparisons are two-tailed and for all conditions. Several 
also vary when only comparing the control conditions. The following variables differ 
across countries in the expected direction: Compared to Americans, Indians indicated 
that the following groups are more important to them: country (t = -7.286, p <0.001), 
their country in terms of self-concept (t = -7.579, p <0.001), their workplace group (t = 
-8.790, p <0.001), and their family group (t = -3.854, p <0.001). Indians also report that 
their country promotes the interests of groups more so (t = -7.269, p <0.001), their 




country promotes the interests of individuals less so (t = -3.558, p <0.001), and that 
their country tolerates those who break norms less so (t = -1.757, p = 0.080). 
The following cross-cultural comparisons are inconsistent with the initial 
assumptions: country promoting individuals’ interests (more so for Indians, t = -3.558, 
p <0.001 two-tailed), and the comparison approached significance for country tolerance 
of deviance (more so for Indians, t = -1.757, p = 0.080 two-tailed).  
Two data quality measures varied significantly cross-culturally, despite data 
quality screening efforts: attention check question score (such that Americans score 
higher, t = 2.810, p = 0.005 two-tailed) and self-reported completion time estimate 
(such that Indians report taking longer, t = -6.543, p <0.001 two-tailed). 
 
Data Acceptance and Quality 
 My final Study 1 data included 328 cases, with 54-55 in each experimental 
condition. As discussed above, I excluded data from the final sample if I determined they 
were likely to be of poor quality (e.g., not paying adequate attention) or ineligible in the 
first place. I had about the same rejection of data from paid cases across the United States 
and India (about 3% and about 2%, respectively), but I rejected proportionally more of 
the Indian submissions without pay (<1% and about 10%, respectively). Though no 
Study 1 cases were not rejected due to the participant indicating that suspicion about the 
purpose of the study affected their behavior, percentages indicating this are 3.67% for the 
full sample, 4.91% for Americans, and 2.44% for Indians.7 These rates are relatively low 
                                                





considering the data rejection rates for the group studies, and that a reasonable data 
rejection rate is around 20% for group processes laboratory studies. Because there was no 
deception involved in Study 1, believability is not as much of a concern. Despite this, 
because accepted Indians still failed attention check questions at a higher rate, this could 
have somehow biased my results. I address analyses that control for some demographics 
and other variables in my results and discussion (Chapter 4).  
 
Study 1 Analyses 
Analyses for Study 1 use a combination of Stata statistical software and SPSS. 
The linear interaction term analyses especially use SPSS. The comparisons of 
demographics and outcome measures across conditions use difference of means tests and 
regression analyses for continuous measures as described in the Analyses Overview 
section in Chapter 2. When difference of means comparisons included control variables 
(Study 1 control models specified below), the coefficient of the experimental condition 
(country group or threat manipulation) within a linear regression model or a post-
estimation test of differences of marginal means represents this statistical comparison. If 
main analyses are regression models, control variables were simply added for the 
analyses that include control variables. 
To test my first initial assumption, that Indians experience higher levels of threat 
at baseline than Americans do, I compared the means of threat manipulation check scores 
for the control conditions across the two country groups. Differences of means that are 
statistically significant, such that Indians report higher levels of threat than Americans, 




To test my second initial assumption, that Indians are more ingroup prosocial at 
baseline than Americans are, I compared the means of ingroup prosocial orientation 
outcome scores for the control conditions across the two country groups. Differences of 
means that are statistically significant, such that Indians express higher levels of ingroup 
prosociality than Americans, would support my second initial assumption. 
 To test Prediction 1, that threats increase ingroup prosocial orientations, within 
each country group, I tested for differences in means between the non-threat control 
condition and each of the respective threats (one comparison for natural disaster and 
another for terrorism). Differences of means that are statistically significant, such that the 
threat conditions have scores indicating greater ingroup prosociality, would support 
Prediction 1. 
 To test competing Predictions 2A and 2B, whether Americans or Indians exhibit 
stronger ingroup prosociality responses to threats, analyses assessed the linear interaction 
term between a country indicator (Indian) and threat condition indicator (either natural 
disaster or terrorism, tested separately against the control condition). If the interaction 
term is statistically significant in the direction indicating greater ingroup prosocial 
responses among Americans, this would support Prediction 2A (greater American 
responsiveness). If the ingroup prosociality outcome is such that high scores reflect more 
ingroup prosociality, a statistically significant interaction term that is negative would 
support Prediction 2A. Conversely, if the interaction term is statistically significant in the 
direction indicating greater ingroup prosocial responses among Indians, this would 
support Prediction 2B (greater Indian responsiveness). A statistically significant positive 




prosociality. Because of the competing predictions, no direction is assumed for these 
predictions — statistical tests are presented as two-tailed and no threshold adjustments 
are made for one-tailed distributions (e.g., F and chi-square). 
Specific to Study 1, in comparing the American and Indian MTurk users, I 
assessed the ability of counter-factual modeling to isolate nationality effects on the 
ingroup prosociality outcomes (e.g., Gangl 2010). This can potentially assess how 
individuals with demographic characteristics consistent with their true nationality would 
respond if only their nationality differed. These are worthwhile analyses to examine 
because it is not practical to randomly assign participants to collectivistic versus 
individualistic types of societies. In the counter-factual analyses, I used the Oaxaca-
Blinder linear decomposition technique in Stata (findit oaxaca). These models test the 
statistical significance of three terms: (1) endowments, which represent characteristics of 
members of the respective groups, (2) coefficients, which represent the sole effect of 
group membership, and (3) the interaction between the endowments and characteristics 
(see Jann 2008 and Gangl 2010). Because these models test competing predictions 2A 
and 2B together, I present all of these statistical results as two-tailed. 
Study 1 Control Models 
I expressed concern concern that the demographics and attitudes varying across 
conditions as described in the initial sample assessment could confound the results testing 
the main predictions. To address this, some of my analyses controlled for these 
potentially confounding variables. To preserve the validity of the cross-cultural analyses, 
I separated the control models into categories that distinguish whether the control 




likely to reflect ingroup prosociality (e.g., importance of one’s country). I specify these 
control models in detail below: 
 
• Uneven condition (UC):  
• completion time estimate, frequency of using MTurk to make basic ends 
meet, gender, and racial/ethnic minority status 
• Uneven condition plus culture (UCC): 
•  UC variables plus: question about country promoting groups’ interests 
and question about importance of family group (pre-manipulation) 
• Inconsistent and data quality between countries (IDQ): 
•  UC variables plus: question about country promoting individuals’ 
interests and tolerance of those who break norms, and attention check 
score  
• Consistent between countries (CBC):  
• UCC and IDQ variables plus: highest education in household, social class, 
age in years, importance of country and workplace groups, country self-
concept, and question about country enforcing strict norms.8 
 
 
Further, to examine how effects of these demographic and attitudinal measures 
may vary by country, cross-cultural models also included an interaction variant of the 
above CBC (Consistent between Countries) model. That is, in addition to a country main 
effect and main effects for each control variable, for each of these control variables there 
was an additional term with the country indicator (1 for India, 0 for the United States). 
This set of country-interaction controls is denoted as:  
 
• Consistent Between Countries Interaction (CBC-I).  
• CBC variables plus interaction terms for each of these with a country 
indicator (1 for India, 0 for United States). 
 
                                                
8 Though social class was not addressed in Ross et al. 2010, including this variable may be considered 
culture-consistent is consistent with their finding that Indians reported higher levels of education than 
Americans (and as observed in the Study 1 data). However, in Ross et al. (2010), compared to Americans, 




The CBC-I model was included for tests of the initial cross-cultural assumptions, 
cross-cultural comparison of results across the control conditions, and the country and 
threat interaction models. It was not used in the counter-factual decomposition models, 
because including interaction terms between culture and demographic characteristics 
would be not appropriate — those models decompose model effects into endowments, 
coefficients, and interactions between endowments and coefficients. Where CBC-I could 
not be used because the outcome variable was included directly or indirectly as a 
predictor, a similar IDQ-I model was substituted (and this substitution is noted when 
relevant). In the event the statistical software excluded any control variables due to 





Chapter 4:  Study 1 Results and Discussion 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the results from Study 1, on holism and other related 
ingroup prosocial cognitive and social orientations. 
 Results somewhat support Prediction 1, and they suggest that terrorism is a more 
effective threat manipulation than natural disaster for both Americans and Indians. While 
there is potential evidence of cross-cultural differences in threat responses, and results 
suggest that Prediction 2A (greater American response) is supported more so than 
Prediction 2B (greater Indian response), the ability to draw cross-cultural conclusions is 
limited. Especially considering some results in the opposite direction predicted for 
Indians, I discuss the possibility that the observed results reflect self-serving motivations 
more so than the ingroup-prosocial ones originally proposed. 
 Study 1 models including control variables follow below. See Chapter 3 for more 
information about these variables. 
 
• Uneven condition (UC):  
• completion time estimate, frequency of using MTurk to make basic ends 
meet, gender, and racial/ethnic minority status 
• Uneven condition plus culture (UCC): 
•  UC variables plus: question about country promoting groups’ interests 
and question about importance of family group (pre-manipulation) 
• Inconsistent and data quality between countries (IDQ): 
•  UC variables plus: questions about country promoting individuals’ 
interests and tolerance of those who break norms, and attention check 
score  
• Consistent between countries (CBC):  
• UCC and IDQ variables plus: highest education in household, social class, 
age in years, importance of country and workplace groups, country self-
concept, and question about country enforcing strict norms. 
 
• Consistent Between Countries Interaction (CBC-I).  
• CBC variables plus: interaction terms for each of these with a country 





As noted in Chapter 4, where CBC-I cannot be used because the outcome variable 
is included directly or indirectly as a predictor, a similar IDQ-I model was used as a 
substitute (and this substitution is noted when relevant). In the event the statistical 
software excludes any of these variables due to colinearity, results from the remaining 




I first address two initial assumptions about cross-cultural differences in 
experiences of threat and ingroup prosociality. My first initial assumption is that Indians 
feel and experience more baseline threat than Americans. These comparisons between 
Indians and Americans in the control conditions unexpectedly suggest that Americans 













Table 2. Cross-cultural Comparisons across Control Conditions 
 
Cross-cultural comparisons across 
control conditions Americans (control) Indians (control) 
Outcome mean sd n mean sd n 
Country importance (pre-
manipulation) 5.815*** 1.290 54 6.648*** 0.756 54 
Country self-concept (pre-
manipulation) 42.702*** 10.695 47 50.736*** 5.725 53 
Workplace group importance (pre-
manipulation) 5.019*** 1.631 54 6.296*** 0.690 54 
Family group importance (pre-
manipulation) 6.481 1.041 54 6.630 0.808 54 
Country values groups’ interests 
(collectivism) 5.094*** 1.114 53 5.926*** 0.843 54 
Country has strict norms (tightness) 4.148*** 1.642 54 5.556*** 1.160 54 
Country values individuals’ interests 
(individualism) 4.000* 1.401 53 4.538* 1.244 52 
Country tolerant of deviants 
(looseness) 3.060 1.114 50 3.220 1.360 50 
Causality component of analysm-
holism (scale) 31.189* 6.023 53 33.404* 5.661 52 
Attitude toward contradictions 
component of analysm-holism (scale) 31.462 5.443 52 31.096 5.825 52 
Perception of change component of 
analysm-holism (scale) 27.827* 5.823 52 24.704* 6.790 54 
Locus of attention component of 
analysm-holism (scale) 28.778** 5.929 54 32.462** 5.829 52 
Combined holism scale (without 
perception of change) 91.373* 11.449 51 96.959* 12.462 49 
Group orientedness scale 12.679*** 3.304 53 15.255*** 3.676 51 
Individual orientedness Q: 
consequences to self versus group 4.778 1.462 54 5.056 1.433 54 
Individual orientedness Q: freedom 
versus conformity 5.463 1.328 54 5.296 1.550 54 
Individual orientedness Q: whether 
social groups can be morally good or 
bad 2.963*** 1.791 54 4.566*** 1.927 53 
Independence scale 75.000 9.659 52 78.260 11.547 50 
Interdependence scale 69.479*** 12.973 48 81.569*** 11.751 51 
Difference between interdependence 
and independence scales 6.632** 15.890 47 -2.875** 11.429 48 
Horizontal individualism scale 28.250 4.677 52 29.500 5.337 54 
Vertical individualism scale 20.185*** 6.642 54 24.472*** 4.614 53 
Horizontal collectivism scale 25.528*** 5.535 53 29.759*** 4.601 54 
Vertical collectivism scale 26.074*** 4.902 54 30.537*** 4.705 54 
Combined individualism scale 48.288*** 9.461 52 54.943*** 8.308 53 
Combined collectivism scale 51.547*** 9.168 53 60.296*** 8.282 54 
Country importance (post-
manipulation) 5.741*** 1.443 54 6.704*** 0.743 54 
Change in country importance (pre- 
to post-manipulation) -0.074✝  0.610 54 0.056✝  0.302 54 
Workplace group importance (post-
manipulation) 5.000*** 1.602 54 6.204*** 1.016 54 
Change in workplace group 
importance (pre- to post-




Cross-cultural comparisons across 
control conditions Americans (control) Indians (control) 
Outcome mean sd n mean sd n 
Family group importance (post-
manipulation) 6.481* 1.077 54 6.815* 0.479 54 
Change in family group importance 
(pre- to post-manipulation) 0.000* 0.389 54 0.185* 0.675 54 
Country self-concept (post-
manipulation) 42.642*** 10.762 53 50.885*** 6.691 52 
Change in country self-concept (pre- 
to post-manipulation) -0.404 2.551 47 0.333 3.309 51 
Feel personally threatened (scale) 26.020 15.914 51 24.612 13.135 49 
Feel country threatened (scale) 37.283* 12.235 53 31.846* 14.075 52 
Feel threatened for country (Q) 4.509** 1.660 53 3.442** 2.014 52 
Situation personally threatening (Q) 2.315 1.527 54 2.278 1.595 54 
Situation threatening to country (Q) 2.685 1.882 54 2.648 1.885 54 
 
 
Results for the feeling group (country) threatened scale and the specific 
question about feeling one’s country is threatened were both statistically significant in 
the opposite direction predicted (t = 2.114, p = 0.037 and 2.960, p = 0.004, respectively, 
both two-tailed). Results were not statistically significant, though in the opposite 
direction predicted for the feeling threatened personally scale and for two manipulation 
check questions, how threatening the participant rates the situation personally and to their 
country, respectively (t = 0.481, p = 0.631; t = 0.123, p = 0.902; t = 0.102, p = 0.912, 
respectively, all two-tailed). When controlling for culture-related variables (the UCC, 
CBC, and CBC-I models), statistical support for these findings tends to decrease (in both 
directions). Notably, the result for feeling personally threatened in the CBC-I model 
becomes statistically significant in the direction predicted, such that Indians feel more 
threatened at baseline (t = 2.521, p = 0.015). In the UC and IDQ models for the feeling 
country threatened scale, the country effect only approaches statistical significance (t = -




 These results suggest some support opposing the predicted pattern — rather than 
Indians feeling more threatened at baseline, Americans tend to feel more threatened at 
baseline, though not in the CBC-I control models. I discuss these comparisons as baseline 
comparisons because I only consider participants in the nonthreatening control 
conditions. From this, we can infer how Americans and Indians tend to feel in the 
absence of threat. Only when controlling for the cultural variables and interactions with 
country (India indicator) in the CBC-I model did Indians express feeling more threatened 
personally. This result is consistent with cultural variables explaining why Indians feel 
more threatened, but the other models we would expect to also provide statistical support 
do not (UCC and CBC). Therefore we cannot assume that Indians tend to feel more 
threatened personally or at the group level (country as the group in Study 1). The 
questions focusing on the threat manipulations examine how Indians and Americans 
respond to these manipulations in terms of feeling threatened, and yield similarly non-
supporting results. 
 On the whole, these results do not support my first initial assumption. Below I 
address my second initial assumption, that Indians exhibit more ingroup prosociality than 
Americans at baseline (i.e., in the control conditions). 
 My second initial assumption is that Indians exhibit more baseline ingroup-
prosociality than Americans. Though many results support this second initial assumption, 
I find mixed evidence. There is statistical support that Indians tend to be more ingroup 
prosocial, but also statistical support for Indians being less ingroup prosocial in some 
ways. Most of these results in the opposite direction predicted relate to attitudes about 




baseline ingroup prosociality levels among Indians warrants some amount of 
reconsideration, it is plausible that Indians tend to express stronger social attitudes than 
Americans do.9 As in the results testing the first initial assumption, when controlling for 
culture-related variables (the UCC, CBC, and CBC-I models), statistical support for these 
findings also tends to diminish (in both directions). For measures taken before the threat 
manipulation, comparisons include all conditions. For measures taken after the threat 
manipulation, comparisons only include the control conditions. 
I first evaluate general cohesion and ingroup importance measures taken before 
the threat manipulation. As outlined above, compared to Americans, Indians indicated 
that their country is more important to them (t = -7.286, p <0.001), their country is 
more important to their self-concept (t = -7.579, p <0.001), their workplace group is 
more important to them (t = -8.790, p <0.001), and that their family group is more 
important to them (t = -3.854, p <0.001).10 The control models supporting this 
conclusion for country importance and overall country self-concept were consistent with 
the above findings, and for the workplace importance and family importance outcomes, 
control model findings were consistent for all except the CBC-I models. For workplace 
importance and family importance, the CBC-I model no longer reached statistical 
significance, though remained in the direction predicted (t = 1.545, p = 0.303 and t = 
1.147, p = 0.296, respectively). Also as above, many control model results were in the 
direction predicted, and some were supported statistically. 
For the cultural perception measures taken before the threat manipulation, results 
are mixed, but perhaps suggest that Indians tend to express stronger attitudes than 
                                                
9 See discussion of satisficing and acquiescence below (e.g., Krosnick 1991). 




Americans do. While Indians express more so than Americans that their country 
promotes groups’ interests over individuals’ interests (t = -7.269, p<0.001) and that 
their country has strict norms (t = -7.739, p<0.001) as expected, unexpectedly the 
Indians also expressed more so that their country promotes individuals’ interests more 
so than groups’ interests (t = -3.558, p <0.001, two-tailed) and the result approaches 
statistical significance for rating that their country is tolerant of those who break 
cultural norms (t = -1.757, p = 0.080, two-tailed).11 For the tolerant of breaking cultural 
norms measure, results in the UC control model only approach statistical significance (t = 
1.743, p = 0.082, two-tailed), and the result in the UCC control model does not approach 
statistical significance (t = 0.772, p = 0.442). These measures, in order, are consistent 
with collectivism, tightness, individualism, and looseness, respectively.  
I then evaluate this second initial assumption in terms of the ingroup prosocial 
orientations tested in Study 1. These comparisons only include control conditions. 
Ingroup prosociality outcomes that were statistically significant in the direction predicted 
were the causality dimension of holism (t = -1.941, p = 0.028), the locus of attention 
dimension of holism (t = -3.224, p = 0.001), the overall holism scale (excluding 
perception of change) (t = -2.336, p = 0.011), group orientedness (t = -3.761, p <0.001), 
interdependence (t = -4.864, p <0.001), difference between independence and 
interdependence (t = 3.258, p = 0.001), horizontal collectivism (t = -4.303, p <0.001), 
vertical collectivism (t = -4.826, p <0.001), combined horizontal and vertical 
collectivism (t = -5.182, p <0.001), post-manipulation country importance (t = -4.360, 
                                                
11 This comparison is not statistically significant for the control conditions only (t = -0.160, p = 0.249, two-
tailed). These control condition only results that include control variables also generally provide less 




p <0.001), post-manipulation workplace group importance (t = 04.662, p <0.001), 
post-manipulation family group importance (t = -2.078, p = 0.021), change in family 
group importance pre- to post-manipulation (t = -1.747, p = 0.042), and post-
manipulation overall country self-concept (t = -4.723, p <0.001). Change in country 
importance pre- to post-manipulation approaches statistical significance in the 
direction predicted (t = -1.400, p = 0.083). Variables not statistically significant, though 
in the direction predicted are agreement with a statement reflecting individual-
orientedness (versus group-orientedness), “Freedom to think what I may think is more 
important than accepting and agreeing with the beliefs and views held by those in the 
social groups to which I belong,” and change in country self-concept pre- to post-
manipulation (t = 0.600, p = 0.275 and t = -1.228, p = 0.111, respectively).  
While these results remain consistent for many of the control models, most 
control model changes decrease statistical support, especially for the models that include 
cultural attitudes and perceptions that were exhibited as predicted (UCC, CBC, and CBC-
I models). With one exception, these models decrease statistical support for all results 
initially in the direction predicted.12 The exception is change in country self-concept 
                                                
12 For the locus of attention dimension of holism, the CBC and CBC-I models are no longer statistically 
significant (and the CBC model is in the opposite direction expected; for the overall holism scale 
(excluding perception of change), the UCC, CBC, and CBC-I models are no longer statistically significant 
(and the CBC model is also in the opposite direction expected); for group orientedness the CBC model is 
no longer statistically significant; for the difference between independence and interdependence, the CBC 
and CBC-I models are no longer statistically significant; for horizontal collectivism the CBC model is no 
longer statistically significant; for vertical collectivism the CBC model is no longer statistically significant 
and the CBC-I model approaches statistical significance in the opposite direction expected (t = -1.996, p = 
0.051); for combined collectivism the CBC and CBC-I models are no longer statistically significant (and 
the CBC-I model is in the opposite direction expected); for post-manipulation country importance, the CBC 
and CBC-I models are no longer statistically significant (and the CBC model is in the opposite direction 
expected); for change in country group importance, the UC and IDQ-I models no longer approach 
statistical significance; for post-manipulation workplace group importance the CBC model is no longer 
statistically significant (and is in the opposite direction expected); for post-manipulation family group 





pre- to post-manipulation, which is not statistically significant (though in the direction 
predicted), but approaches statistical significance in the IDQ-I model (t = 1.468, p = 
0.074). Also of interest, horizontal individualism changes from not statistically 
significant in the opposite direction predicted to statistically significant in the direction 
predicted in the CBC-I model (t = -1.748, p = 0.043). This observation is not surprising 
because the UCC, CBC, and CBC-I models control for cultural attitudes and perceptions 
(e.g., pre-manipulation importance of country), which I propose reflect historical threat 
and in part explain increased ingroup prosociality among Indians. Changes for the other 
control models are minor, but perhaps notably, for change in country importance pre- to 
post-manipulation, the UC model support no longer approaches statistical significance (t 
= 1.263,  p = 0.105), and in the IDQ model agreement with a statement reflecting 
individual-orientedness (same one as above) changes to the opposite direction predicted 
(t = 0.274,  p = 0.785 two-tailed). 
Ingroup prosociality outcomes that are statistically significant in the opposite 
direction predicted are for the perception of change dimension of holism (t = 2.258, p = 
0.013, two-tailed), agreement with a statement reflecting individual-orientedness, 
“Only individuals, not social groups, can be morally good or bad” (t = -4.459, p < 0.001, 
two-tailed), vertical individualism (t = -4.773, p < 0.001, two-tailed), and combined 
horizontal and vertical individualism (t = -3.832, p <0.001, two-tailed). Several other 
outcomes are not statistically significant, though in the opposite direction predicted: the 
attitudes toward contradictions dimension of holism (t = 0.330, p = 0.742, two-tailed), 
                                                                                                                                            
family group importance the CBC-I model only approaches statistical significance (t = 1.459, p = 0.074); 





agreement with a statement reflecting individual-orientedness, “In considering whether a 
given outcome is good or bad, I am more likely to be affected by its particular effect on 
me than on the social groups to which I belong” (t = -0.997, p = 0.321, two-tailed), 
independence (t = -1.549, p = 0.125, two-tailed), horizontal individualism (t = -1.281, p = 
0.203, two-tailed), and pre- to post-manipulation change in workplace group importance 
(t = 0.532, p = 0.596, two-tailed).  
While many of these control model results remain consistent with the results that 
were initially in the opposite direction predicted, as in the supporting predictions above 
the UCC, CBC, and CBC-I models tend to decrease the statistical support for these 
conclusions. Perhaps notably, the results for agreement with a statement reflecting 
individual-orientedness (effect on one’s social group) remain statistically significant 
across all control models. Notably, the UC model for independence becomes statistically 
significant (t = 2.013,  p = 0.047, two-tailed), and approaches significance in the IDQ 
model (t = 1.715,  p = 0.090, two-tailed). Also notably, the UC and IDQ models only 
approach statistical significance, along with the original result (t = -1.714, p = 0.090 and t 
= -1.941, p = 0.056, respectively, both two-tailed). 
These results suggest that while there is some evidence for increased baseline 
ingroup prosociality among Indians compared to Americans, it is plausible that they tend 
to express stronger social attitudes, and control model results suggest these may be 
largely explained by cultural attitudes and perceptions. Because we only find some 
evidence supporting this initial assumption, we cannot assume that Indians generally 
express more ingroup prosociality. This does not impede interpretation of the tests of the 




within country groups, and in interaction with country as well as other variables. 
However, when addressing potential cross-cultural implications and returning to the 
proposed theoretical relationships between threats and ingroup prosociality, some of 
these results are inconsistent with the initial assumptions and warrant further 
consideration. These results also suggest that cultural variables as in the CBC control 
models may help to explain differences in threat responses that may arise. 
Overall, these results somewhat support my second initial assumption, though 
there is some statistical support in the opposite direction. 
 
Prediction 1: Threat Increases Ingroup Prosociality 
Prediction 1 states that threats to groups increase ingroup prosociality. While both 
Americans and Indians experience increases in some ingroup prosociality outcomes, the 
exact outcomes differ, and Indians unexpectedly experience some decreases. 
 
Prediction 1: United States 
 
I compare outcomes for the nonthreatening control condition with the natural 
disaster and terrorism threat conditions, respectively. While statistical support is limited, 
terrorism is more effective than natural disaster in eliciting ingroup prosocial responses 
among Americans. A particularly notable outcome is support for the locus of attention 
dimension of holism in the terrorism condition, and how this remains consistent across 
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Natural Disaster (U.S.) 
Comparing Americans in the natural disaster condition with Americans in the 
control condition, none of the comparisons differ statistically on any of the ingroup 
prosociality outcome measures. Many patterns are in the direction predicted, while some 
are not. Results not statistically significant though in the direction predicted are the 
causality dimension of holism (t = -0.333, p = 0.370), perception of change dimension of 
holism (t = -1.089, p = 0.140), locus of attention dimension of holism (t = -0.751, p = 
0.227), overall holism scale (excluding perception of change) (t = -0.490, p = 0.313), 
agreement with a statement reflecting individual-orientedness “In considering whether a 
given outcome is good or bad, I am more likely to be affected by its particular effect on 
me than on the social groups to which I belong” (t = -0.331, p = 0.371), agreement with 
another statement reflecting individual-orientedness “Freedom to think what I may think 




the social groups to which I belong” (t = -1.180, p = 0.121), vertical individualism (t = 
1.010, p = 0.158), horizontal collectivism (t = -0.143, p = 0.443), combined individualism 
(t = 0.512, p = 0.305 ), pre- to post-manipulation change in workplace group importance 
(t = -0.003, p = 0.499), pre- to post-manipulation change in family group importance (t = 
-0.275, p = 0.392), and pre- to post-manipulation change in country self-concept (t = -
0.305, p = 0.381). 
 Results not statistically significant, though in the opposite direction predicted (all 
two-tailed) are the attitudes toward contradictions dimension of holism (t = 0.015, p = 
0.988), group-orientedness (t = 1.199, p = 0.233), agreement with a statement reflecting 
individual-orientedness “Only individuals, not social groups, can be morally good or 
bad” (t = -1.215, p = 0.227), independence (t = -0.471, p = 0.639), interdependence (t = -
0.470, p = 0.640), difference between independence and interdependence (t = -0.473, p = 
0.637), horizontal individualism (t = -0.403, p = 0.688), vertical collectivism (t = 0.261, p 
= 0.795), combined vertical and horizontal collectivism (t = 0.037, p = 0.971), post-
manipulation country importance (t = 1.589, p = 0.115), pre- to post-manipulation change 
in country importance (t = 0.865, p = 0.389), post-manipulation workplace group 
importance (t = 0.523, p = 0.602), post-manipulation family group importance (t = 1.128, 
p = 0.262), and post-manipulation country self-concept (t = 1.085, p = 0.281). 
 Notably, in the control models, some of the natural disaster results for Americans 
approach statistical significance in the direction predicted. This is the case for the 
causality dimension of holism (CBC model, t = 1.541, p = 0.064), the perception of 
change dimension of holism (UCC model, t = 1.428, p = 0.079), agreement with a 




more important than accepting and agreeing with the beliefs and views held by those in 
the social groups to which I belong” (UC and UCC models, t = 1.339, p = 0.092 and t = 
1.506, p = 0.068, respectively), and combined horizontal and vertical collectivism 
(CBC model, t = 1.355, p = 0.090). 
 In the control models, some of the results remain not statistically significant, 
though they change direction. Results that remain not statistically significant but change 
from opposite of the direction predicted to the direction predicted are for the attitudes 
toward contradictions dimension of holism (UC and UCC models), interdependence 
(UCC model), difference between independence and interdependence (UCC and CBC 
models), vertical collectivism (UCC and CBC models), combined horizontal and vertical 
collectivism (UC and UCC models), post-manipulation family group importance (UCC 
model), post-manipulation country self-concept (UCC model), and pre- to post- change in 
country self-concept (UCC and IDQ models).  
Results that remain not statistically significant but change to the opposite 
direction predicted in control models were for the locus of attention dimension of holism 
(IDQ model), overall holism scale (excluding perception of change) (IDQ model), 
agreement with a statement reflecting individual-orientedness “In considering whether a 
given outcome is good or bad, I am more likely to be affected by its particular effect on 
me than on the social groups to which I belong” (UCC and CBC models), horizontal 
collectivism (IDQ model), and pre-to-post-manipulation change in workplace group 






Comparing Americans in the natural disaster condition with Americans in the 
control condition, some results are statistically significant or approach statistical 
significance in the direction predicted. Results are statistically significant in the direction 
predicted for the locus of attention dimension of holism (t = -1.951, p = 0.027) and 
post-manipulation importance of workplace group (t = -1.907, p = 0.030). Results 
approach statistical significance for the overall holism scale (excluding perception of 
change) (t = -1.640, p = 0.052) and pre-to-post-manipulation change in family group 
importance (t = -1.343, p = 0.092). 
As in the natural disaster results, some of the results that are not statistically 
significant or approaching statistical significance are in the direction predicted, while 
some are not. Results not statistically significant, though in the direction predicted are the 
causality dimension of holism (t = -0.259, p = 0.398), attitudes toward contradictions 
dimension of holism (t = -0.623, p = 0.267), agreement with a statement reflecting 
individual-orientedness “In considering whether a given outcome is good or bad, I am 
more likely to be affected by its particular effect on me than on the social groups to 
which I belong” (t = -0.118, p = 0.453), independence (t = 0.390, p = 0.349), difference 
between independence and interdependence (t = 0.203, p = 0.420), vertical individualism 
(t = -0.756, p = 0.226), horizontal collectivism (t = -0.199, p = 0.421), combined 
individualism (t = 0.520, p = 0.302), post-manipulation country importance (t = -0.260, p 
= 0.398), pre-to-post-manipulation change in country importance (t = -0.169, p = 0.433), 




post-manipulation family importance (t = -0.102, p = 0.460), post-manipulation country 
self-concept (t = -0.859, p = 0.196), and pre-to-post-manipulation change in country self-
concept (t = -1.170, p = 0.123). One outcome did not differ in any direction between the 
control and threat conditions: agreement with a statement reflecting individual-
orientedness “Freedom to think what I may think is more important than accepting and 
agreeing with the beliefs and views held by those in the social groups to which I belong” 
(t = 0.000, p = 1.000, two-tailed). 
Results not statistically significant, though in the opposite direction predicted (all 
two-tailed) are the perception of change dimension of holism (t = 0.726, p = 0.470), 
group-orientedness (t = 0.180, p = 0.858), agreement with a statement reflecting 
individual-orientedness “Only individuals, not social groups, can be morally good or 
bad” (t = -1.374, p = 0.172), interdependence (t = 0.008, p = 0.994), horizontal 
individualism (t = -0.300, p = 0.765), vertical collectivism (t = 0.685, p = 0.495), and 
combined horizontal and vertical collectivism (t = 0.277, p = 0.783). 
Notably, in the control models, some of the results become statistically significant 
in the direction predicted. This is the case for the overall holism scale (excluding 
perception of change) (UCC model, t = 1.694, p = 0.047) and the pre-to-post-
manipulation change in work group importance (UC model, t = 1.952, p = 0.027). 
Pre-to-post-manipulation change in work group importance approaches statistical 
significance in the UCC and IDQ models (t = 1.623, and p = 0.054 and t =1.654, p = 
0.051). 
Some results lose statistical support in the control models. Outcomes that change 




attention dimension of holism (IDQ model, t = 1.611, p = 0.056) and post-manipulation 
workplace group importance (UC, IDQ, and CBC models, t = 1.494, p = 0.069; t = 1.344, 
p = 0.091; and t = 1.469, p = 0.073, respectively). Some control models also change from 
approaching statistical significance to no longer approaching statistical significance. This 
is the case for the overall holism scale (excluding perception of change) (IDQ model) and 
the pre-to-post-manipulation change in family group importance (UC and IDQ models). 
 
Prediction 1: India 
For Indians there are some results in the direction predicted, but the most 
statistically notable ones are different than those that are statistically notable for 
Americans. In general, the terrorism manipulation appears most effective, as it does for 
the Americans, and Indians in the terrorism threat conditions tend to be less 
individualistic than those in the control condition. There are also some noteworthy results 
in the opposite direction predicted. 
 
Table 3B: Study 1 Outcomes: India 
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Natural Disaster (India) 
Comparing Indians in the natural disaster condition with Indians in the control 
condition, none of the comparisons are statistically significant in the direction predicted. 
One result approaches statistical significance, agreement with a statement reflecting 
individual-orientedness “Only individuals, not social groups, can be morally good or 
bad” (t = 1.444, p = 0.076). Many patterns are in the direction predicted, while some are 
not. Results not statistically significant, though in the direction predicted are causality 
dimension of holism (t = -0.290, p = 0.386), attitudes toward contradictions dimension of 
holism (t = -0.211, p = 0.417), perception of change dimension of holism (t = -2.233, p = 
0.110), locus of attention dimension of holism (t = -0.207, p = 0.419), overall holism 
scale (excluding perception of change) (t = -0.399, p = 0.368), agreement with a 
statement reflecting individual-orientedness “In considering whether a given outcome is 
good or bad, I am more likely to be affected by its particular effect on me than on the 
social groups to which I belong” (t = 0.351, p = 0.364), interdependence (t = -0.473, p = 
0.319), horizontal individualism (t = 1.053, p = 0.148), vertical individualism (t = 0.847, 
p = 0.200), horizontal collectivism (t = -0.179, p = 0.429), vertical collectivism (t = -
0.235, p = 0.407), combined individualism (t = 1.166, p = 0.123), combined collectivism 
(t = -0.228, p = 0.410), post-manipulation country importance (t = -0.132, p = 0.448), 




manipulation change in workplace group importance (t = -0.271, p = 0.394), and pre-to-
post-manipulation change in country self-concept (t = -0.472, p = 0.319). 
Unexpectedly, pre-to-post-manipulation change in family group importance is 
statistically significant in the opposite direction predicted (all two-tailed), such that 
Indians in the natural disaster condition exhibit a slight decrease in expressed family 
importance, while Indians in the control condition exhibited an increase (t = 2.263, p = 
0.026). Other outcomes are not statistically significant, though also in the opposite 
direction predicted. These are group orientedness (t = 0.383, p = 0.703), agreement with a 
statement reflecting individual-orientedness “In considering whether a given outcome is 
good or bad, I am more likely to be affected by its particular effect on me than on the 
social groups to which I belong” (t = -0.200, p = 0.842), independence (t = -0.596, p = 
0.553), difference between independence and interdependence (t = -0.702, p = 0.484), 
pre-to-post-manipulation change in country importance (t = 0.903, p = 0.363), post-
manipulation family group importance (t = 0.154, p = 0.878), and post-manipulation 
country self-concept (t = 0.032, p = 0.974). 
In the control models, the Indian natural disaster result for individualism changes 
from not statistically significant to approaching statistical significance in the direction 
predicted (UCC model, t = -1.387, p = 0.085). Also, the result for post-manipulation 
country self-concept changes from not statistically significant in the opposite direction 
predicted to not statistically significant in the direction predicted in the UC, IDQ, and 
CBC models, and the result for the post-manipulation family group importance also does 




In three control models for agreement with a statement reflecting individual-
orientedness “Only individuals, not social groups, can be morally good or bad,” the result 
no longer approaches statistical significance in the direction predicted (UCC, IDQ, and 
CBC models). Some results also change from not statistically significant in the direction 
predicted to not statistically significant in the opposite direction predicted. This is the 
case for the attitude toward contradictions dimension of holism (CBC model), perception 
of change dimension of holism (CBC model), locus of attention dimension of holism (UC 
model), horizontal collectivism (UCC model), vertical collectivism (UCC and CBC 
models), combined horizontal and vertical collectivism (UCC and CBC models), post-
manipulation workplace group importance (UCC model), and pre-to-post-manipulation 
change in workplace group importance (UCC and IDQ models). 
Terrorism (India) 
Comparing Indians in the terrorism condition with Indians in the control 
condition, some results are statistically significant in the direction predicted. Results are 
statistically significant in the direction predicted for difference between independence 
and interdependence (t = 1.827, p = 0.036), horizontal individualism (t = 1.765, p = 
0.040), vertical individualism (t = 1.718, p = 0.045), and combined horizontal and 
vertical individualism (t = 2.057, p = 0.021). Results not statistically significant, though 
in the direction predicted are group orientedness (t = -0.979, p = 0.165), agreement with a 
statement reflecting individual-orientedness “In considering whether a given outcome is 
good or bad, I am more likely to be affected by its particular effect on me than on the 
social groups to which I belong” (t = 0.069, p = 0.473), agreement with a statement 




good or bad” (t = 0.213, p = 0.416), independence (t = 0.92, p = 0.179), interdependence 
(t = -0.442, p = 0.330), post-manipulation workplace group importance (t = -0.407, p = 
0.342), and pre-to-post- manipulation change in workplace group importance (t = -0.377, 
p = 0.354). 
Some results are in the opposite direction predicted (all two-tailed). Pre-to-post-
manipulation change in country importance is statistically significant in the opposite 
direction predicted (t = -9.611, p <0.001), such that Indians in the terrorism condition 
exhibit a slight decrease in expressed country importance, while Indians in the control 
condition exhibit a slight increase. The difference for pre-to-post-manipulation change 
in family group importance approaches statistical significance in the opposite direction 
predicted (t = 1.872, p = 0.065), such that Indians in the terrorism condition exhibited no 
change in expressed family importance, while Indians in the control condition exhibited 
an increase. Several results are not statistically significant, though in the opposite 
direction predicted. These results are for the causality dimension of holism (t = 0.226, p = 
0.822), attitudes toward contradictions dimension of holism (t = 0.183, p = 0.855), 
perception of change dimension of holism (t = 0.079, p = 0.937), locus of attention 
dimension of holism (t = 0.928, p = 0.356), overall holism scale (t = 0.635, p = 0.527), 
agreement with a statement reflecting individual-orientedness “Freedom to think what I 
may think is more important than accepting and agreeing with the beliefs and views held 
by those in the social groups to which I belong” (t = -0.276, p = 0.783), horizontal 
collectivism (t = 0.530, p = 0.597), vertical collectivism (t = 0.246, p = 0.806), combined 
collectivism (t = 0.433, p = 0.666), post-manipulation country importance (t = 0.958, p = 




manipulation change in country self-concept (t = 0.351, p = 0.729), and post-
manipulation family group importance (t = 0.841, p = 0.402). 
None of the control models increase statistical support for the predictions for 
Indians and the terrorism manipulation. Perhaps notably, results that were not statistically 
significant in the opposite direction predicted change to not statistically significant in the 
direction predicted in the CBC model for the perception of change component of holism 
and agreement with a statement reflecting individual-orientedness (“In considering 
whether a given outcome is good or bad, I am more likely to be affected by its particular 
effect on me than on the social groups to which I belong”). 
Some of the control model results decrease statistical support for the predictions 
for Indians and the terrorism manipulation. Results change from statistically significant to 
approaching significance (still in the direction predicted) for horizontal individualism 
(IDQ model, t = -1.328, p = 0.094), vertical individualism (UC, IDQ, and CBC models, t 
= -1.644, p = 0.052; t = -1.610, p = 0.056; t = -1.31, p = 0.097, respectively), and 
combined horizontal and vertical individualism (CBC model, t = -1.307, p = 0.098). 
Results change from statistically significant to not statistically significant (though still in 
the direction predicted) for difference between independence and interdependence (UC, 
UCC, IDQ, and CBC models), horizontal individualism (CBC model), and vertical 
individualism (UCC model). Some results also change from not statistically significant in 
the direction predicted to not statistically significant in the opposite direction predicted. 
This is the case for agreement with a statement reflecting individual-orientedness “In 
considering whether a given outcome is good or bad, I am more likely to be affected by 




agreement with a statement reflecting individual-orientedness “Only individuals, not 
social groups, can be morally good or bad” (UCC, IDQ, and CBC models), 
interdependence (IDQ and CBC models), post-manipulation workplace importance (CBC 
model), and pre-to-post-manipulation change in workplace importance (IDQ model). 
Some control model results increase support for conclusions in the opposite 
direction predicted. Notably, the result for post-manipulation country importance 
changes from not statistically significant in the opposite direction predicted to statistically 
significant (CBC model, t = -2.397, p = 0.009). Also, the result for pre-to-post-
manipulation family group importance changes from not statistically significant in the 
opposite direction predicted to approaching statistical significance (CBC model, t = -
2.397, p = 0.019, two-tailed). One result decreases support for these conclusions in the 
opposite direction predicted — this is for pre-to-post-manipulation change in country 
importance, which changes from statistically significant to approaching significance (UC 
model, t = -1.901, p = 0.061, two-tailed). 
 
Competing Predictions 2A and 2B: American versus Indian Responsiveness to Threats 
Predictions 2A and 2B are competing predictions about whether Americans or 
Indians respond to threats with more ingroup-prosociality. They are framed as competing 
predictions because the two opposite outcomes have theoretically relevant explanations. 
First, for Prediction 2A, which predicts that Americans will be more responsive than 
Indians, this could be because Americans have lower baseline threat levels than Indians 
do, likely due to higher levels of historical threat in India. However, if Indians have 




therefore they would be more responsive than Americans (Prediction 2B). Though these 
explanations are not mutually exclusive, defining them in advance allows for more 
informed testing and framing of the proposed theory. For these reasons, statistical tests 
are two-tailed. 
Linear Interaction Term Analyses 
 Linear interaction term results support Prediction 2A more so than Prediction 2B. 
However, as in the Prediction 1 results, statistical evidence is limited. Considering the 
directions of results regardless of statistical significance, Americans are more responsive 
to terrorism, with 17 of 26 interactions in the direction favoring 2A, and Indians are more 
responsive to natural disaster, with 19 of 26 interactions in the direction favoring 2B.  
I discuss these results in detail below. Only results in the corresponding direction 
(regardless of statistical significance) are addressed in the respective 2A and 2B sections. 
In the tables below, cells shaded gray represent results in the direction supporting 
Prediction 2B. 
 
Table 4A: Linear Interaction Models Results for Study 1 Outcomes: Natural 
Disaster 
 
Natural Disaster: Linear interaction model analyses: country indicator (India = 1, US = 0) * threat 
interaction term, model also includes respective main effects 
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Natural Disaster: Linear interaction model analyses: country indicator (India = 1, US = 0) * threat 
interaction term, model also includes respective main effects 
Outcome 
Interaction 




Err.     
 
Interaction 












holism (scale) 0.254 1.594 0.16 0.873 212 -0.014 
Perception of change 
component of analysm-
holism (scale) 0.363 1.736 0.21 0.835 211 0.052 
Locus of attention 
component of analysm-
holism (scale) -0.699 1.752 -0.40 0.690 213 0.054 
Combined holism scale 
(without perception of 
change) -0.429 3.734 -0.11 0.909 202 0.027 
Group orientedness scale 0.567 1.053 0.54 0.591 210 0.119 
Individual orientedness 
Q: consequences to self 
versus group -0.041 0.392 -0.11 0.916 218 -0.005 
Individual orientedness 
Q: freedom versus 
conformity -0.397 0.375 -1.06 0.291 218 0.010 
Individual orientedness 
Q: whether social groups 
can be morally good or 
bad 0.985✝  0.524 -1.88 0.062 217 0.078 
Independence scale 0.233 3.336 0.07 0.944 203 0.008 
Interdependence scale 2.444 3.594 0.68 0.497 202 0.207 
Difference between 
interdependence and 
independence scales 0.070 4.521 0.02 0.988 190 0.071 
Horizontal individualism 
scale -1.510 1.443 -1.05 0.297 214 -0.006 
Vertical individualism 
scale 0.316 1.679 0.19 0.851 215 0.160 
Horizontal collectivism 
scale 0.005 1.471 0.00 0.997 217 0.123 
Vertical collectivism 
scale 0.519 1.480 0.35 0.726 218 0.149 
Combined individualism 
scale 1.118 2.498 -0.45 0.655 211 0.096 
Combined collectivism 
scale 0.469 2.660 0.18 0.860 217 0.165 
Country importance 
(post-manipulation) 0.505 0.337 1.50 0.136 217 0.198 
Change in country 
importance (pre- to post-
manipulation) 0.034 0.121 0.28 0.778 217 0.020 
Workplace group 
importance (post-
manipulation) 0.269 0.371 0.72 0.470 218 0.186 
Change in workplace 
group importance (pre- 
to post-manipulation) 0.038 0.188 0.20 0.841 218 -0.012 
Family group 
importance (post-
manipulation) 0.248 0.252 0.98 0.326 218 0.054 
Change in family group 




Natural Disaster: Linear interaction model analyses: country indicator (India = 1, US = 0) * threat 
interaction term, model also includes respective main effects 
Outcome 
Interaction 




Err.     
 
Interaction 











(post-manipulation) 2.477 2.707 0.92 0.361 205 0.189 
Change in country self-
concept (pre- to post-
manipulation) 0.122 0.853 0.14 0.886 192 0.004 
(Threat manipulation 
checks)             
Feel personally 
threatened (scale) 6.294 4.150 1.52 0.131 203 0.002 
Feel country threatened 
(scale) 8.125* 3.725 2.18 0.030 211 0.028 
Feel threatened for 
country (Q) 0.813 0.506 1.61 0.110 215 0.037 
Situation personally 
threatening (Q) 0.964* 0.454 2.13 0.035 218 0.312 
Situation threatening to 






Table 4B: Linear Interaction Models Results for Study 1 Outcomes: Terrorism 
 
Terrorism: Linear interaction model analyses: country indicator (India = 1, US = 0) * threat interaction 
term; model also includes respective main effects (not specified in this table) 
Outcome 
Interaction 




Err.     
 
Interaction 









Causality component of 




holism (scale) -0.881 1.516 -0.58 0.562 210 -0.007 
Perception of change 
component of analysm-




Terrorism: Linear interaction model analyses: country indicator (India = 1, US = 0) * threat interaction 
term; model also includes respective main effects (not specified in this table) 
Outcome 
Interaction 




Err.     
 
Interaction 









Locus of attention 
component of analysm-
holism (scale) -3.297* 1.590 -2.07 0.039 213 0.039 
Combined holism scale 
(without perception of 
change) -5.287 3.278 -1.61 0.108 200 0.017 
Group orientedness scale 0.739 0.928 0.80 0.427 212 0.154 
Individual orientedness 
Q: consequences to self 
versus group 0.053 0.396 -0.13 0.894 216 -0.006 
Individual orientedness 
Q: freedom versus 
conformity 0.074 0.365 0.20 0.839 216 -0.011 
Individual orientedness 
Q: whether social groups 
can be morally good or 
bad 0.594 0.517 -1.15 0.252 216 0.103 
Independence scale -1.167 3.338 -0.35 0.727 202 0.002 
Interdependence scale 0.982 3.433 0.29 0.775 198 0.205 
Difference between 
interdependence and 
independence scales -3.334 4.095 -0.81 0.417 190 0.127 
Horizontal individualism 
scale 2.188 1.466 -1.49 0.137 211 0.003 
Vertical individualism 
scale -0.635 1.682 -0.38 0.706 216 0.138 
Horizontal collectivism 
scale -0.671 1.408 -0.48 0.634 214 0.116 
Vertical collectivism 
scale 0.574 1.406 0.41 0.683 216 0.168 
Combined individualism 
scale -2.597 2.586 -1.00 0.316 210 0.080 
Combined collectivism 
scale -0.101 2.475 -0.04 0.967 214 0.180 
Country importance 
(post-manipulation) -0.251 0.339 -0.74 0.460 217 0.093 
Change in country 
importance (pre- to post-
manipulation) -0.147 0.125 -1.18 0.241 217 0.000 
Workplace group 
importance (post-
manipulation) -0.449 0.320 -1.41 0.161 217 0.156 
Change in workplace 
group importance (pre- 
to post-manipulation) -0.166 0.197 -0.84 0.402 217 0.008 
Family group 
importance (post-
manipulation) -0.124 0.206 -0.60 0.547 217 0.020 
Change in family group 
importance (pre- to post-
manipulation) -0.333* 0.148 -2.26 0.025 217 0.010 
Country self-concept 
(post-manipulation) -2.262 2.474 -0.91 0.362 211 0.129 
Change in country self-
concept (pre- to post-
manipulation) -1.306* 0.918 -1.42 0.157 200 -0.004 




Terrorism: Linear interaction model analyses: country indicator (India = 1, US = 0) * threat interaction 
term; model also includes respective main effects (not specified in this table) 
Outcome 
Interaction 




Err.     
 
Interaction 











threatened (scale) 4.885 4.086 1.20 0.233 201 0.026 
Feel country threatened 
(scale) 6.801✝  3.690 1.84 0.067 212 0.023 
Feel threatened for 
country (Q) 1.022* 0.499 2.05 0.042 214 0.042 
Situation personally 
threatening (Q) 0.589 0.439 1.34 0.182 217 0.403 
Situation threatening to 
country (Q) 0.481 0.479 1.00 0.316 216 0.382 
 
Competing Prediction 2A: Greater American Responsiveness to Threats 
 
Interactions were tested between country and each respective type of threat — 
natural disaster and terrorism. This section details results in the direction supporting 
Prediction 2A (greater American responsiveness to threats). As noted above, all tests are 
two-tailed. 
Natural Disaster Interactions Supporting Prediction 2A (Greater American 
Response) 
Only one interaction result is statistically significant in the direction supporting 
Prediction 2A for natural disaster (supporting greater American responsiveness) — pre-
to-post-manipulation change in family group importance (t = -2.084, p = 0.038). 
Some results are not statistically significant, though in the direction predicted: 
causality dimension of holism (t = -0.056, p = 0.956), locus of attention dimension of 
holism (t = -0.399, p = 0.690), overall holism scale (excluding perception of change) (t = 




0.497), and vertical individualism (t = 0.188, p = 0.851). All other results are in the 
direction favoring Prediction 2B. 
 Some results not statistically significant but initially in the direction supporting 
2B change to not statistically significant in the direction supporting 2A in the control 
models. This is the case for post-manipulation family group importance in the UCC 
model, vertical collectivism and combined collectivism for the CBC-I models, attitude 
toward contradictions dimension of holism (UCC model), perception of change 
dimension of holism (UCC, CBC, and CBC-I models), group-orientedness (UCC, CBC, 
and CBC-I models), agreement with a statement reflecting individual-orientedness, “In 
considering whether a given outcome is good or bad, I am more likely to be affected by 
its particular effect on me than on the social groups to which I belong” (UC, UCC, IDQ, 
CBC, and CBC-I models), horizontal collectivism (UC, UCC, CBC, and CBC-I models), 
vertical collectivism (UCC, CBC, and CBC-I models), combined individualism (IDQ and 
CBC models), combined collectivism (UC, UCC, CBC, and CBC-I models), pre-to-post-
manipulation change in country importance (UCC model), and overall post-manipulation 
country self-concept (UCC and CBC models). 
Some control model results decrease support for Prediction 2A. The result for pre-
to-post-manipulation change in family group importance changes from statistically 
significant in the direction supporting 2A to approaching statistical significance in the UC 
model (t = -1.962, p = 0.051) and changes to no longer statistically significant in both the 
IDQ and IDQ-I models. Also, some results that are not statistically significant in the 
direction supporting 2A change to the direction supporting 2B but also not statistically 




overall holism (IDQ and CBC models), independence (UCC model), and interdependence 
(CBC-I model). 
Terrorism Interactions Supporting Prediction 2A (Greater American Response) 
Two results are statistically significant in the direction supporting Prediction 2A 
— for the locus of attention dimension of holism (t = -2.073, p = 0.039) and pre-to-
post-manipulation change in country self-concept (t = -2.258, p = 0.025).  
 Several results are not statistically significant, though in the direction supporting 
Prediction 2A. These are for: overall holism scale (excluding perception of change) (t = -
1.613, p = 0.108), pre-to-post-manipulation change in workplace group importance (t = -
1.422, p = 0.157), post-manipulation family group importance (t = -1.406, p = 0.161), 
causality dimension of holism (t = -0.343, p = 0.732), attitude toward contradictions 
dimension of holism (t = -0.581, p = 0.562), agreement with a statement reflecting 
individual-orientedness, “Freedom to think what I may think is more important than 
accepting and agreeing with the beliefs and views held by those in the social groups to 
which I belong” (t = 0.203, p = 0.839), interdependence (t = 0.286, p = 0.775), difference 
between independence and interdependence (t = -0.814, p = 0.417), horizontal 
collectivism (t = -0.477, p = 0.634), combined collectivism (t = -0.041, p = 0.967), post-
manipulation country importance (t = -0.739, p = 0.460), pre-to-post-manipulation 
change in country importance (t = -1.175, p = 0.241), post-manipulation workplace group 
importance (t = -0.914, p = 0.362), pre-to-post-manipulation change in family group 
importance (t = -0.839, p = 0.402), and post-manipulation country self-concept (t = -
0.602, p = 0.547). All other results are in the direction supporting Prediction 2B (see 




 Some control analyses increase statistical support for Prediction 2A. The result for 
pre-to-post-manipulation change in family group importance changes from not 
statistically significant to statistically significant for the UC model (t = -2.224, p = 0.027, 
and from not statistically significant to approaching statistical significance for the IDQ 
model (t = -1.830, p = 0.069). The result for the overall holism scale (excluding 
perception of change) changes from not statistically significant to approaching statistical 
significance in the UC, UCC, CBC, and CBC-I models (t = -1.762, p = 0.080; t = -1.947, 
p = 0.053; t = -1.892, p = 0.061; t = -1.797, p = 0.075). The result for post-manipulation 
family group importance changes from not statistically significant to statistically 
significant in the UCC model (t = -1.981, p = 0.049). The following results change from 
not statistically significant in the direction supporting 2B to not statistically significant in 
the direction supporting 2A: agreement with a statement reflecting individual-
orientedness, “In considering whether a given outcome is good or bad, I am more likely 
to be affected by its particular effect on me than on the social groups to which I belong” 
(UC, UCC, and CBC-I models) and independence (CBC and CBC-I models). 
 A few control model results decrease support for Prediction 2A. The results for 
pre-to-post-manipulation change in country self-concept change from statistically 
significant to no longer statistically significant or approaching statistical significance in 
any of the control models (excluding CBC and substituting IDQ-I for CBC-I). A few 
results change from not statistically significant in the direction supporting 2A to not 
statistically significant in the direction supporting 2B. This is the case for the causality 




interdependence (CBC-I model), combined collectivism (IDQ model), and post-
manipulation country importance (IDQ and CBC-I models). 
 
Competing Prediction 2B: Greater Indian Responsiveness to Threats 
Interactions were tested between country and each respective type of threat — 
natural disaster and terrorism. This section details results in the direction supporting 
Prediction 2B (greater Indian responsiveness to threats). As noted above, all tests are 
two-tailed. 
Natural Disaster Interactions Supporting Prediction 2B (Greater Indian 
Response) 
One interaction approaches statistical significance in the direction predicted for 
natural disaster for 2B (supporting greater Indian responsiveness) — agreement with a 
statement reflecting individual-orientedness (“Only individuals, not social groups, can 
be morally good or bad”) (t = -1.878, p = 0.062).  
Several results are not statistically significant, though in the direction supporting 
Prediction 2B. These are for the attitudes toward contradictions dimension of holism (t = 
0.160, p = 0.873), perception of change dimension of holism (F = 0.209, p = 0.835), 
group orientedness (t = 0.539, p = 0.591), agreement with two statements reflecting 
individual-orientedness (“In considering whether a given outcome is good or bad, I am 
more likely to be affected by its particular effect on me than on the social groups to 
which I belong” and “Freedom to think what I may think is more important than 




which I belong” respectively) (t = -0.106, p = 0.916 and t = -1.059, p = 0.291, 
respectively), difference between independence and interdependence (t = 0.015, p = 
0.988), horizontal individualism (t = -1.046, p = 0.297), horizontal collectivism (t = 
0.004, p = 0.997), vertical collectivism (t = 0.351, p = 0.726), combined individualism (t 
= -0.448, p = 0.655), combined collectivism (t = 0.176, p = 0.860), post-manipulation 
country importance (t = 1.496, p = 0.136), pre-to-post-manipulation change in country 
importance (t = 0.282, p = 0.778), post-manipulation workplace importance (t = 0.724, p 
= 0.470), pre-to-post-manipulation change in workplace group importance (t = 0.200, p = 
0.841), post-manipulation family group importance (t = 0.984, p = 0.326), post-
manipulation country self-concept (t = 0.915, p = 0.361), and pre-to-post-manipulation 
change in country self-concept (t = 0.143, p = 0.886). All other results are in the direction 
supporting Prediction 2A. 
None of the control model results increase statistical support for Prediction 2B. A 
few control model results change from not statistically significant in the direction 
supporting 2A to not statistically significant in the direction supporting 2B. This is the 
case for the causality dimension of holism (UC and IDQ models), overall holism scale 
(IDQ and CBC models), independence (UCC model), and interdependence (CBC-I 
model). 
Two control model results decrease statistical support for Prediction 2B. For 
agreement with a statement reflecting individual-orientedness (“Only individuals, not 
social groups, can be morally good or bad”), the CBC and CBC-I models no longer 
approach statistical significance. Some results also change from not statistically 




supporting 2A. This is the case for the attitudes toward contradictions dimension of 
holism (UCC model), perception of change dimension of holism (UCC, CBC, and CBC-I 
models), group-orientedness (UCC, CBC, and CBC-I models), agreement with a 
statement reflecting individual-orientedness (“In considering whether a given outcome is 
good or bad, I am more likely to be affected by its particular effect on me than on the 
social groups to which I belong”) (all control models), horizontal collectivism (UC, UCC, 
CBC, and CBC-I models), vertical collectivism (UCC, CBC, and CBC-I models), 
combined individualism (IDQ, CBC, and CBC-I models), combined collectivism (UC, 
UCC, CBC, and CBC-I models), pre-to-post-manipulation change in country importance 
(UCC model), and post-manipulation family importance (UCC, IDQ, and CBC-I 
models). 
 
Terrorism Interactions Supporting Prediction 2B (Greater Indian Response) 
No terrorism interaction results are statistically significant or approach statistical 
significance in the direction supporting Prediction 2B for terrorism (supporting greater 
Indian responsiveness). Some results are not statistically significant, though in this 
direction. These are for perception of change dimension of holism (t = 0.441, p = 0.660), 
group orientedness (t = 0.796, p = 0.427), agreement with two statements reflecting 
individual-orientedness (“In considering whether a given outcome is good or bad, I am 
more likely to be affected by its particular effect on me than on the social groups to 
which I belong” and “Only individuals, not social groups, can be morally good or bad”; t 
= -0.133, p = 0.894 and t = -1.149, p = 0.252, respectively), independence (t = -0.350, p = 




0.377, p = 0.706), vertical collectivism (t = 0.408, p = 0.683), and combined 
individualism (t = -1.005, p = 0.316). All other results were in the direction supporting 
Prediction 2A (see above sections addressing those). 
Some control model results change from not statistically significant in the 
direction supporting 2B to not statistically significant in the direction supporting 2A. 
These are for the causality dimension of holism (IDQ model), interdependence (CBC-I 
model), difference between independence and interdependence (CBC-I model), combined 
collectivism (IDQ model), and post-manipulation country importance (IDQ and CBC-I 
models). 
 
Summary of Linear Interaction Support of Cross-cultural Predictions 
Overall, statistical evidence for both Prediction 2A and Prediction 2B is limited, 
but it generally favors greater American responsiveness. There are more statistically 
noteworthy interaction results for Americans, such that three are statistically significant 
favoring Prediction 2A, while only one approaches statistical significance favoring 
Prediction 2B. Considering the directions results regardless of statistical significance, 
Americans respond more so to terrorism, and Indians respond more so to natural disaster, 
with 17 of 26 interactions for terrorism in the direction favoring Prediction 2A 
(suggesting a stronger reaction among Americans), and 19 of 26 interactions for natural 
disaster in the direction favoring 2B (suggesting a stronger reaction among Indians). 
Taken together, these results suggest that Americans are generally more responsive to 





Counterfactual Linear Decomposition Analyses 
 
I assessed counterfactual regression models using the Oaxaca-Blinder linear 
decomposition technique in Stata (findit oaxaca). These models test the statistical 
significance of three terms: (1) endowments, which represent characteristics of members 
of the respective groups, (2) coefficients, which represent the sole effect of group 
membership, and (3) the interaction between the endowments and characteristics (see 
Jann 2008 and Gangl 2010). The aim was to assess the extent to which characteristics 
from the control models, via endowment effects, explain observed ingroup prosociality 
outcomes. Because these models test competing predictions 2A and 2B, as in the 
interaction term results above, all statistical results are presented as two-tailed. Results 
that are not statistically significant or approaching statistical significance are not 
addressed here, but more information is available from the author upon request. 
 As in the tables presenting the linear interaction results above, cells shaded gray 
represent results that support Prediction 2B, and cells that remain white represent results 
that support Prediction 2A. Statistical significance is not marked because all results 
within these tables are statistically significant or approaching statistical significance, and 
p-values are provided within the tables. 
 
Decomposition Results: Natural Disaster 
 When including control variables as in the models specified above (UC, UCC, 
IDQ, and CBC), there are interesting patterns in the natural disaster endowment results. 




than the UCC and CBC models, none of the endowment effects are statistically 
significant. Control variables included in the UCC and CBC models but not the UC and 
IDQ models are perception of country’s promotion of groups’ interests and importance of 
one’s family group. The CBC models also uniquely include highest education level in 
household, social class, age in years, pre-manipulation country importance, pre-
manipulation work group importance, pre-manipulation overall country self-concept 
scale, and rating of extent to which country is strict toward those who violate norms. 
 
Table 5A: Study 1 Selected Counterfactual Modeling Results: Natural 
Disaster 
 
Selected Counterfactual Modeling Results: Natural Disaster 
Model Component Outcome  Coef.    
Std. 
Err.       z     P>|z| 
UCC Endowment 
Causality component of 
analysm-holism (scale) -5.195 1.947 -2.67 0.008 
CBC Endowment 
Causality component of 
analysm-holism (scale) -3.934 2.274 -1.73 0.084 
UCC Endowment 
Attitude toward 
contradictions component of 
analysm-holism (scale)  -1.031 0.578 -1.78 0.075 
UCC Endowment 
Combined holism scale 
(without perception of 
change) -0.331 0.201 -1.65 0.099 
UCC Endowment Group orientedness scale -4.082 1.763 -2.31 0.021 
UCC Endowment 
Individual orientedness Q: 
consequences to self versus 
group -1.304 0.728 -1.79 0.073 
UCC Endowment Independence scale  -1.778 0.801 -2.22 0.026 
UCC Endowment Horizontal collectivism scale  -3.108 1.425 -2.18 0.029 
UCC Endowment Vertical collectivism scale -0.205 0.096 -2.15 0.032 
UCC Endowment Combined collectivism scale -0.452 0.161 -2.81 0.005 
UCC Endowment 
Country importance (post-
manipulation) -0.147 0.079 -1.86 0.064 
UCC Endowment 
Workplace group importance 
(post-manipulation) -3.210 0.963 -3.33 0.001 
UCC Endowment 
Family group importance 




Selected Counterfactual Modeling Results: Natural Disaster 
Model Component Outcome  Coef.    
Std. 
Err.       z     P>|z| 
UCC Endowment 
Country self-concept (post-
manipulation) 2.864 1.221 2.35 0.019 
              
UC Coefficient 
Perception of change 
component of analysm-holism 
(scale) -2.208 0.696 -3.17 0.002 
UCC Coefficient 
Perception of change 
component of analysm-holism 
(scale) -1.308 0.697 -1.88 0.061 
UC Coefficient Group orientedness scale -2.324 0.782 -2.97 0.003 
UCC Coefficient Group orientedness scale -1.308 0.697 -1.88 0.061 
IDQ Coefficient Group orientedness scale -2.324 0.782 -2.97 0.003 
UC Coefficient 
Individual orientedness Q: 
freedom versus conformity -0.659 0.344 -1.92 0.055 
UCC Coefficient 
Individual orientedness Q: 
freedom versus conformity -0.920 0.379 -2.43 0.015 
UC Coefficient 
Individual orientedness Q: 
whether social groups can be 
morally good or bad -1.099 0.414 -2.65 0.008 
UCC Coefficient 
Individual orientedness Q: 
whether social groups can be 
morally good or bad -1.851 0.996 -1.86 0.063 
IDQ Coefficient 
Individual orientedness Q: 
whether social groups can be 
morally good or bad -4.902 2.129 -2.30 0.021 
CBC Coefficient 
Individual orientedness Q: 
whether social groups can be 
morally good or bad -1.335 0.738 -1.81 0.071 
UC Coefficient Independence scale  -5.678 2.682 -2.12 0.034 
UCC Coefficient Independence scale  -11.604 2.427 -4.78 0.000 
IDQ Coefficient Independence scale  -8.380 2.323 -3.61 0.000 
UC Coefficient Interdependence scale -11.362 3.054 -3.72 0.000 
UCC Coefficient Interdependence scale 6.013 3.245 1.85 0.064 




independence scales -5.488 1.152 -4.77 0.000 
UC Coefficient Vertical individualism scale -6.115 1.254 -4.88 0.000 
UCC Coefficient Vertical individualism scale -5.745 2.570 -2.24 0.025 
IDQ Coefficient Vertical individualism scale -4.760 0.949 -5.02 0.000 
CBC Coefficient Vertical individualism scale -6.484 2.143 -3.03 0.002 
UC Coefficient Horizontal collectivism scale  -4.274 1.133 -3.77 0.000 
UCC Coefficient Horizontal collectivism scale  -4.097 0.971 -4.22 0.000 
IDQ Coefficient Horizontal collectivism scale  -2.330 0.910 -2.56 0.010 
UC Coefficient Vertical collectivism scale -4.243 1.173 -3.62 0.000 
UCC Coefficient Vertical collectivism scale -6.198 1.590 -3.90 0.000 
IDQ Coefficient Vertical collectivism scale -6.793 1.745 -3.89 0.000 
UC Coefficient Combined individualism scale -7.990 1.933 -4.13 0.000 
UCC Coefficient Combined individualism scale -9.414 3.897 -2.42 0.016 
IDQ Coefficient Combined individualism scale -8.894 1.728 -5.15 0.000 
CBC Coefficient Combined individualism scale -8.353 3.281 -2.55 0.011 
UC Coefficient Combined collectivism scale -8.571 2.079 -4.12 0.000 




Selected Counterfactual Modeling Results: Natural Disaster 
Model Component Outcome  Coef.    
Std. 
Err.       z     P>|z| 
IDQ Coefficient Combined collectivism scale -0.664 0.236 -2.81 0.005 
UC Coefficient 
Country importance (post-
manipulation) -1.071 0.238 -4.51 0.000 
UCC Coefficient 
Country importance (post-
manipulation) -1.400 0.251 -5.59 0.000 
IDQ Coefficient 
Country importance (post-
manipulation) -1.371 0.277 -4.95 0.000 
UC Coefficient 
Workplace group importance 
(post-manipulation) -1.327 0.300 -4.42 0.000 
UCC Coefficient 
Workplace group importance 
(post-manipulation) -0.473 0.182 -2.61 0.009 
IDQ Coefficient 
Workplace group importance 
(post-manipulation) -0.520 0.218 -2.38 0.017 
UC Coefficient 
Family group importance 
(post-manipulation) -9.271 1.748 -5.30 0.000 
IDQ Coefficient 
Family group importance 
(post-manipulation) -5.143 1.690 -3.04 0.002 
UC Coefficient 
Country self-concept (post-
manipulation) -7.101 1.848 -3.84 0.000 
UCC Coefficient 
Country self-concept (post-
manipulation) -2.478 0.934 -2.65 0.008 
IDQ Coefficient 
Country self-concept (post-
manipulation) -3.781 1.306 -2.89 0.004 
              
UC Interaction 
Locus of attention component 
of analysm-holism (scale) -1.267 0.565 -2.24 0.025 
IDQ Interaction 
Locus of attention component 
of analysm-holism (scale) -0.355 0.181 -1.96 0.050 
UC Interaction Group orientedness scale -0.437 0.265 -1.65 0.099 
UC Interaction 
Individual orientedness Q: 
freedom versus conformity -3.426 1.922 -1.78 0.075 
UC Interaction 
Individual orientedness Q: 
whether social groups can be 
morally good or bad 5.569 2.295 2.43 0.015 
UC Interaction Interdependence scale  9.234 3.406 2.71 0.007 




independence scales -0.412 0.213 -1.93 0.053 
UCC Interaction 
Horizontal individualism 
scale  -0.401 0.186 -2.16 0.031 
UCC Interaction 
Country importance (post-
manipulation) -0.209 0.087 -2.39 0.017 
CBC Interaction 
Country importance (post-
manipulation) -0.401 0.186 -2.16 0.031 
UCC Interaction 
Change in country 
importance (pre- to post-
manipulation) -0.209 0.087 -2.39 0.017 
UCC Interaction 
Family group importance 
(post-manipulation) -0.305 0.112 -2.73 0.006 
              
(Threat Manipulation Checks) 




Selected Counterfactual Modeling Results: Natural Disaster 
Model Component Outcome  Coef.    
Std. 
Err.       z     P>|z| 
(scale) 
UCC Endowment 
Feel country threatened 
(scale) 4.603 2.008 2.29 0.022 
IDQ Endowment 
Feel country threatened 
(scale) 2.922 1.751 1.67 0.095 
UC Endowment 
Feel threatened for country 
(Q) 0.343 0.159 2.16 0.031 
UCC Endowment 
Feel threatened for country 
(Q) 0.566 0.285 1.98 0.047 
UC Endowment 
Feel personally threatened 
(scale) 4.593 2.516 1.83 0.068 
UCC Endowment 
Situation personally 
threatening (Q) 0.569 0.311 1.83 0.068 
UCC Endowment 
Situation threatening to 
country (Q) 0.766 0.324 2.36 0.018 
              
UCC Coefficient 
Feel personally threatened 
(scale) -6.167 2.791 -2.21 0.027 
IDQ Coefficient 
Feel threatened for country 
(Q) 0.775 0.372 2.08 0.037 
              
UCC Interaction 
Situation personally 
threatening (Q) -0.743 0.333 -2.23 0.026 
UCC Interaction 
Situation threatening to 




 Endowment effects in the natural disaster models are statistically significant in the 
direction favoring Prediction 2A (greater American responsiveness) for the causality 
component of holism (UCC), attitude toward contradictions dimension of holism (UCC), 
overall holism excluding perception of change (UCC and CBC), independence scale 
(UCC), interdependence scale (CBC), horizontal collectivism (CBC) vertical collectivism 
(UCC and CBC), combined collectivism (UCC and CBC), post-manipulation country 
importance (UCC and CBC), post-manipulation workplace group importance (UCC and 




results approaching statistical significance in the direction favoring 2A are causality 
dimension of holism (CBC), group orientedness scale (UCC), agreement with a statement 
reflecting individual-orientedness (“In considering whether a given outcome is good or 
bad, I am more likely to be affected by its particular effect on me than on the social 
groups to which I belong” UCC), horizontal collectivism (UCC), and post-manipulation 
family group importance (UCC).  
Only one endowment effect result for natural disaster is statistically significant in 
the direction favoring Prediction 2B (greater Indian responsiveness) — this is for 
independence minus interdependence (CBC). 
 There are also many statistically significant coefficient results, most in the 
direction favoring Prediction 2A. Statistically significant coefficient results for the 
natural disaster models in the direction favoring Prediction 2A are for group orientedness 
(UC and IDQ), agreement with a statement reflecting individual-orientedness (“Only 
individuals, not social groups, can be morally good or bad” UCC and IDQ), 
independence scale (UC, UCC, and IDQ,), interdependence scale (UC, UCC, and IDQ), 
vertical individualism (UC, UCC, IDQ), horizontal collectivism (UC, UCC, and IDQ), 
vertical collectivism (UC, UCC), combined individualism (UC, UCC, IDQ, and CBC), 
combined collectivism (UC, UCC, and IDQ), post-manipulation country importance (UC, 
UCC, and IDQ), post-manipulation workplace group importance (UC, UCC, and IDQ), 
post-manipulation family group importance (UC and IDQ), and post-manipulation overall 
country self-concept (UC, UCC, and IDQ). Coefficient results approaching statistical 




orientedness (UCC) and agreement with a statement reflecting individual-orientedness 
(“Only individuals, not social groups, can be morally good or bad” UC and CBC).  
Statistically significant coefficient results for the natural disaster models in the 
direction favoring 2B (greater Indian responsiveness) are for the perception of change 
dimension of holism (UCC) and agreement with a statement reflecting individual-
orientedness (“Freedom to think what I may think is more important than accepting and 
agreeing with the beliefs and views held by those in the social groups to which I belong”, 
UC and UCC). Coefficient results approaching statistical significance for the natural 
disaster models in the direction favoring 2B are the attitude toward contradictions 
dimension of holism (CBC), perception of change dimension of holism (UC) and 
independence minus interdependence (UC). 
 There are also some statistically noteworthy interaction results in the direction 
favoring Prediction 2A. Statistically significant interaction results for the natural disaster 
models in the direction favoring 2A are for the locus of control dimension of holism (UC 
and IDQ), group orientedness (UC), post-manipulation country importance (CBC), pre-
to-post-manipulation change in country importance (UCC), and post-manipulation family 
group importance (UCC). Interaction results approaching statistical significance for the 
natural disaster models in the direction favoring 2A are for agreement with a statement 
reflecting individual-orientedness (“Freedom to think what I may think is more important 
than accepting and agreeing with the beliefs and views held by those in the social groups 
to which I belong” UC), agreement with another statement reflecting individual-
orientedness (“Only individuals, not social groups, can be morally good or bad” UC), 




Statistically significant interaction results for the natural disaster models in the 
direction favoring 2B (greater Indian responsiveness) are for independence (UCC) and 
independence minus interdependence (UCC). One of these interaction results approaches 
statistical significance — this is for horizontal individualism (UCC). 
 
 
Decomposition Results: Terrorism 
 When including control variables as in the control models above (UC, UCC, IDQ, 
and CBC), there are again interesting patterns in the endowment results. As in the natural 
disaster models, for the IDQ models, which include fewer explicitly cultural control 
variables than the UCC and CBC models, none of the endowment effects are statistically 
significant. However, unlike the natural disaster results, some UC model results are 




Table 5B: Study 1 Selected Counterfactual Modeling Results: Terrorism 
 
Selected Counterfactual Modeling Results: Terrorism 
Model Component Outcome  Coef.    
Std. 
Err.       z     P>|z| 
UC Endowment Causality component of analysm-holism (scale) 0.954 0.559 1.71 0.088 
CBC Endowment Causality component of analysm-holism (scale) -3.888 1.783 -2.18 0.029 




Selected Counterfactual Modeling Results: Terrorism 
Model Component Outcome  Coef.    
Std. 
Err.       z     P>|z| 
UC Endowment 
Combined holism scale 
(without perception of 
change) 
2.59 1.272 2.04 0.042 
CBC Endowment 
Combined holism scale 
(without perception of 
change) 
-8.134 3.414 -2.38 0.017 
UC Endowment Group orientedness scale 0.955 0.355 2.69 0.007 
IDQ Endowment Group orientedness scale 0.708 0.395 1.79 0.073 
UC Endowment Individual orientedness Q: 
freedom versus conformity 
0.273 0.142 1.93 0.053 
UC Endowment Independence scale  2.316 1.173 1.97 0.048 
UC Endowment Interdependence scale  3.483 1.329 2.62 0.009 
CBC Endowment Interdependence scale  -6.919 3.248 -2.13 0.033 
CBC Endowment Vertical individualism scale  -4.412 1.549 -2.85 0.004 
UC Endowment Horizontal collectivism scale  0.917 0.474 1.93 0.053 
CBC Endowment Horizontal collectivism scale  -3.855 1.327 -2.9 0.004 
CBC Endowment Vertical collectivism scale -2.602 1.203 -2.16 0.031 
UC Endowment Combined individualism scale  1.686 0.985 1.71 0.087 
CBC Endowment Combined individualism scale  -6.613 2.778 -2.38 0.017 
UC Endowment Combined collectivism scale  1.599 0.839 1.9 0.057 
CBC Endowment Combined collectivism scale  -6.456 2.206 -2.93 0.003 
UC Endowment Country self-concept (post-manipulation) 1.22 0.721 1.69 0.091 
CBC Endowment Country self-concept (post-manipulation) -6.104 1.443 -4.23 0 
UCC Endowment Country importance (post-
manipulation) 
-0.261 0.144 -1.82 0.069 
CBC Endowment Country importance (post-
manipulation) 
-0.87 0.162 -5.38 0 
CBC Endowment Workplace group importance 
(post-manipulation) 
-1.16 0.225 -5.16 0 
UCC Endowment Family group importance (post-manipulation) -0.159 0.081 -1.95 0.051 
  
UC Coefficient Causality component of analysm-holism (scale) -2.287 1.041 -2.2 0.028 
IDQ Coefficient Causality component of analysm-holism (scale) -2.256 1.146 -1.97 0.049 
CBC Coefficient Causality component of analysm-holism (scale) -3.834 1.807 -2.12 0.034 
UC Coefficient 
Combined holism scale 
(without perception of 
change) 
-4.291 2.223 -1.93 0.054 
UC Coefficient Group orientedness scale -2.942 0.66 -4.46 0 
UCC Coefficient Group orientedness scale -1.948 0.65 -3 0.003 
IDQ Coefficient Group orientedness scale -2.235 0.653 -3.42 0.001 
UC Coefficient 
Individual orientedness Q: 
whether social groups can be 
morally good or bad 
-1.396 0.366 -3.82 0 
UCC Coefficient 
Individual orientedness Q: 
whether social groups can be 
morally good or bad 




Selected Counterfactual Modeling Results: Terrorism 
Model Component Outcome  Coef.    
Std. 
Err.       z     P>|z| 
IDQ Coefficient 
Individual orientedness Q: 
whether social groups can be 
morally good or bad 
-1.538 0.37 -4.16 0 
CBC Coefficient 
Individual orientedness Q: 
whether social groups can be 
morally good or bad 
-1.276 0.576 -2.21 0.027 
UC Coefficient Interdependence scale  -9.646 2.597 -3.71 0 
UCC Coefficient Interdependence scale  -5.473 2.392 -2.29 0.022 










6.337 3.324 1.91 0.057 
UC Coefficient Vertical individualism scale -2.53 1.265 -2 0.045 
IDQ Coefficient Vertical individualism scale -2.719 1.32 -2.06 0.039 
UC Coefficient Horizontal collectivism scale  -4.427 0.991 -4.47 0 
UCC Coefficient Horizontal collectivism scale  -3.449 1.042 -3.31 0.001 
IDQ Coefficient Horizontal collectivism scale  -3.855 0.997 -3.87 0 
CBC Coefficient Horizontal collectivism scale  -2.519 1.512 -1.67 0.096 
UC Coefficient Vertical collectivism scale -4.863 1.006 -4.84 0 
UCC Coefficient Vertical collectivism scale -2.848 0.958 -2.97 0.003 
IDQ Coefficient Vertical collectivism scale -4.113 1.096 -3.75 0 
UC Coefficient Combined collectivism scale  -9.407 1.724 -5.46 0 
UCC Coefficient Combined collectivism scale  -6.375 1.687 -3.78 0 
IDQ Coefficient Combined collectivism scale  -8.059 1.814 -4.44 0 
CBC Coefficient Combined collectivism scale  -4.508 2.535 -1.78 0.075 
UC Coefficient Country importance (post-
manipulation) 
-0.62 0.255 -2.43 0.015 
IDQ Coefficient Country importance (post-
manipulation) 
-0.551 0.221 -2.49 0.013 
UCC Coefficient Workplace group importance 
(post-manipulation) 
-0.999 0.25 -4 0 
IDQ Coefficient Workplace group importance 
(post-manipulation) 
-1.1 0.246 -4.48 0 
UC Coefficient Family group importance (post-manipulation) -0.496 0.155 -3.19 0.001 
IDQ Coefficient Family group importance (post-manipulation) -0.443 0.17 -2.6 0.009 
UC Coefficient Country self-concept (post-manipulation) -6.713 1.865 -3.6 0 
UCC Coefficient Country self-concept (post-manipulation) -3.512 1.769 -1.98 0.047 
IDQ Coefficient Country self-concept (post-manipulation) -5.494 1.693 -3.25 0.001 
              
UC Interaction Locus of attention component of analysm-holism (scale) -1.809 1.008 -1.79 0.073 
IDQ Interaction Locus of attention component of analysm-holism (scale) -2.102 1.138 -1.85 0.065 




Selected Counterfactual Modeling Results: Terrorism 
Model Component Outcome  Coef.    
Std. 
Err.       z     P>|z| 
UCC Interaction Group orientedness scale -1.143 0.642 -1.78 0.075 
IDQ Interaction Group orientedness scale -1.275 0.592 -2.16 0.031 
UC Interaction Individual orientedness Q: 
freedom versus conformity 
-0.522 0.226 -2.31 0.021 
UC Interaction Independence scale  -3.595 2.036 -1.77 0.077 
UC Interaction Interdependence scale -6.432 2.328 -2.76 0.006 
UCC Interaction Interdependence scale -8.071 2.463 -3.28 0.001 
UC Interaction Vertical indivdualism scale -3.308 1.147 -2.89 0.004 










6.895 3.369 2.05 0.041 
UCC Interaction Country importance (post-manipulation) -0.435 0.242 -1.79 0.073 
UCC Interaction 
Change in workplace group 
importance (pre- to post-
manipulation) 
0.286 0.151 1.89 0.058 
CBC Interaction Causality component of analysm-holism (scale) 5.854 2.347 2.49 0.013 
              
(Threat Manipulation Checks) 
UCC Endowment Situation threatening to country (Q) 0.625 0.321 1.95 0.051 
CBC Endowment Feel personally threatened (scale) 9.738 4.558 2.14 0.033 
              
UC Coefficient Feel threatened for country (Q) 0.765 0.351 2.18 0.029 
UCC Coefficient Feel threatened for country (Q) 0.919 0.377 2.44 0.015 
IDQ Coefficient Feel threatened for country (Q) 0.917 0.364 2.52 0.012 
CBC Coefficient Feel threatened for country (Q) 1.403 0.488 2.88 0.004 
CBC Coefficient Feel country threatened (scale) 11.361 3.964 2.87 0.004 
CBC Coefficient Situation threatening to country (Q) 1.261 0.549 2.3 0.022 
              
UCC Interaction Situation personally 
threatening (Q) 
-0.644 0.338 -1.91 0.056 
UCC Interaction Situation threatening to country (Q) -1.116 0.375 -2.97 0.003 
CBC Interaction Situation threatening to country (Q) -1.593 0.709 -2.25 0.025 
CBC Interaction Feel personally threatened (scale) -16.403 6.134 -2.67 0.007 
CBC Interaction Feel country threatened (scale) -11.046 5.439 -2.03 0.042 







Statistically significant endowment effects in the direction favoring Prediction 2A 
(greater American responsiveness) for the terrorism models are all for the CBC control 
models. These are specifically for the causality component of holism (CBC), overall 
holism excluding perception of change (CBC), interdependence (CBC), vertical 
individualism (CBC), horizontal collectivism (CBC), vertical collectivism (CBC), 
combined individualism (CBC), combined collectivism (CBC), post-manipulation 
country importance (CBC), post-manipulation workplace group importance (CBC), and 
post-manipulation overall country self-concept (CBC). Endowment results approaching 
statistical significance in the direction favoring 2A are both for the UCC model, and for 
post-manipulation country importance (UCC) and post-manipulation family importance 
(UCC). 
There are some endowment results statistically significant for the terrorism 
models in the direction favoring Prediction 2B. This is in contrast to the natural disaster 
models favoring 2B, where only one is statistically significant. Statistically significant 
terrorism results in the direction favoring Prediction 2B (greater Indian responsiveness) 
are for the overall holism scale excluding perception of change (UC), group orientedness 
(UC), independence (UC), and interdependence (UC). Results approaching statistical 
significance for the terrorism models favoring 2B are for the causality component of 
holism (UC), locus of attention component of holism (UC), group orientedness (IDQ), 




may think is more important than accepting and agreeing with the beliefs and views held 
by those in the social groups to which I belong,” UC), horizontal collectivism (UC), 
combined individualism scale (UC), combined collectivism scale (UC), and post-
manipulation overall country self-concept scale (UC). 
Notably, several of the terrorism endowment results that are statistically 
significant or approaching statistical significance change direction between the UC and 
CBC models, such that the UC models tend to support Prediction 2B (more Indian 
responsiveness), while the CBC models tend to support Prediction 2A (more American 
responsiveness). These changes happen for the causality component of holism, overall 
holism scale, interdependence, horizontal collectivism, combined individualism, 
combined collectivism, and post-manipulation overall country self-concept. See results 
reported above for specific statistics.  
Coefficient results that are statistically significant or approaching statistical 
significance for the terrorism models are all in the direction favoring Prediction 2A, 
except for one outcome, independence minus interdependence. Terrorism coefficient 
results statistically significant in the direction favoring 2A (greater American 
responsiveness) are for the causality component of holism (UC, IDQ, and CBC), group 
orientedness (UC, UCC, and IDQ), agreement with a statement reflecting individual-
orientedness (“Only individuals, not social groups, can be morally good or bad” UC, 
UCC, IDQ, and CBC), interdependence (UC, UCC, and IDQ), vertical individualism (UC 
and IDQ), horizontal collectivism (UC, UCC, and IDQ), vertical collectivism (UC, UCC, 
and IDQ), combined collectivism scale (UC, UCC, and IDQ), post-manipulation country 




and IDQ), post-manipulation family group importance (UC and IDQ), and post-
manipulation overall country self-concept (UC, UCC, and IDQ). Results approaching 
statistical significance in the direction favoring Prediction 2A are for overall holism scale 
excluding perception of change (UC), horizontal collectivism scale (CBC), and combined 
collectivism scale (CBC).  
Independence minus interdependence is statistically significant in the direction 
favoring Prediction 2B in the UC model, and approaches statistical significance in the 
UCC model. These are the only statistically noteworthy results in this direction. 
Most interaction results for the terrorism models favor Prediction 2A (greater 
American responsiveness), but two outcomes favor Prediction 2B (greater Indian 
responsiveness).  
Statistically significant interaction results for the terrorism models in the direction 
supporting Prediction 2A are for group orientedness (IDQ), agreement with a statement 
reflecting individual-orientedness (“Freedom to think what I may think is more important 
than accepting and agreeing with the beliefs and views held by those in the social groups 
to which I belong” UC), interdependence (UC, UCC, and IDQ), vertical individualism 
(UC and UCC), and combined individualism scale (UC). Results approaching statistical 
significance in the direction supporting Prediction 2A are for the locus of control 
component of holism (UC and IDQ), group orientedness (UC and UCC), independence 
(UC), post-manipulation country importance (UCC), and pre-to-post-manipulation 
change in workplace group importance (UCC).  
Interaction results for these terrorism models are statistically significant in the 




independence minus interdependence (IDQ). The result for independence minus 
interdependence also approaches statistical significance in this direction in the UCC 
model. 
 
Decomposition Results: Control Conditions Only 
To test the role of the participant’s country on the ingroup prosociality outcomes, 
I conducted linear decomposition analyses only include the control conditions, without 
any threat manipulation conditions. These again use the control models discussed above 
(UC, UCC, IDQ, and CBC). They are also presented as two-tailed. In these models, there 
are statistically significant results for the endowments, coefficients, and interactions. I 
discuss the endowments, coefficients, and then interactions, and how these results support 
Prediction 2A and Prediction 2B. 
 Some endowment results support the assumption of greater Indian ingroup 
prosociality. This is the case for statistically significant models for the locus of attention 
dimension of holism (UC, z =  2.15, p = 0.031), group orientedness (UC, z = 1.99, p = 
0.047), and pre-to-post-manipulation change in country importance (UCC, z = 2.24, p = 
0.025). The result approaches statistical significance in this direction for overall holism 
scale (excluding perception of change) (UC, z = 1.71, p = 0.087), interdependence (UC, z 
= 1.80, p = 0.072), and combined individualism scale (CBC, z = -1.70, p = 0.088).  
More endowment results support greater American ingroup prosociality, against 
the assumption of greater Indian ingroup prosociality. This is the case for statistically 
significant results for the attitude toward contradictions dimension of holism (CBC, z = -




p = 0.038), interdependence (CBC, z = -2.39, p = 0.017), horizontal collectivism (CBC, z 
= -2.04, p = 0.041), vertical collectivism (CBC, z = -2.54, p = 0.011), combined 
collectivism scale (CBC, z = -2.66, p = 0.008), post-manipulation country importance 
(CBC, z = -4.00, p < 0.001), post-manipulation workplace group importance (CBC, z = -
2.73, p = 0.006), post-manipulation family group importance (UCC, z = -2.19, p = 0.029), 
and post-manipulation overall country self-concept (CBC, z = -3.26, p = 0.001). The 
result also approaches statistical significance for the IDQ model for post-manipulation 
workplace group importance (IDQ, z = -1.65, p = 0.098). Notably, most results that 
support greater Indian ingroup prosociality are in in the UC models, and most results that 
support greater American ingroup prosociality are in in the CBC models. 
 Some coefficient results support the assumption of greater Indian ingroup 
prosociality, but more of these support greater American ingroup prosociality. In the 
direction supporting greater Indian ingroup prosociality, coefficients are statistically 
significant for agreement with a statement reflecting individual-orientedness (“Only 
individuals, not social groups, can be morally good or bad” UC, UCC, IDQ, and CBC, z 
= -3.54, p < 0.001; z = -3.43, p = 0.001; z = -3.52, p < 0.001; z = -2.51, p = 0.012), 
independence minus interdependence (UC, z = 2.69, p = 0.007), vertical individualism 
(UC and IDQ, z = -2.09, p = 0.036; z = -2.35, p = 0.019), and combined individualism 
scale (IDQ, z = -2.32, p = 0.020). Also approaching statistical significance in this 
direction are results for independence minus interdependence (UCC, z = 1.92, p = 0.054), 
vertical individualism (UCC, z = -1.72, p = 0.085), and combined individualism scale 




In the direction supporting greater American ingroup prosociality, coefficients are 
statistically significant for group orientedness (UC, UCC, and IDQ, z = -3.16, p = 0.002; 
z = -2.27, p = 0.023; z = -2.57, p = 0.010), interdependence (UC, UCC, and IDQ, z = -
3.10, p = 0.002; z = -2.11, p = 0.035 ; z = -2.03, p = 0.042), horizontal collectivism (UC, 
UCC, and IDQ, z = -4.33, p < 0.001; z = -3.46, p = 0.001; z = -3.37, p < 0.001; z = -2.04, 
p = 0.041), vertical collectivism (UC, UCC, and IDQ, z = -4.01, p < 0.001; z = -2.90, p = 
0.004; z = -2.96, p = 0.003; z = -2.54, p = 0.011), combined collectivism scale (UC, UCC, 
and IDQ, z = -4.80, p <0.001; z = -3.76, p <0.001; z = -3.66, p <0.001), post-manipulation 
country importance (UC and IDQ, z = -4.33, p < 0.001; z = -3.46, p = 0.001; z = -3.37, p 
= 0.001), post-manipulation workplace group importance (UC, UCC, and IDQ, z = -3.85, 
p < 0.001; z = -2.94, p = 0.003; z = -3.05, p = 0.002), post-manipulation family group 
importance (UC and IDQ, z = -2.58, p = 0.010; z = -2.74, p = 0.006), post-manipulation 
overall country self-concept (UC, UCC, and IDQ, z = -3.10, p = 0.002; z = -2.15, p = 
0.032; z = -1.97, p = 0.048). Also approaching significance in this direction is post-
manipulation country importance (UCC, z = -1.66, p = 0.096). 
 Finally, some interaction results are statistically significant or approaching 
statistical significance, and this is the case in both directions. In the direction supporting 
greater Indian ingroup prosociality, interactions are statistically significant for agreement 
with a statement reflecting individual-orientedness (“In considering whether a given 
outcome is good or bad, I am more likely to be affected by its particular effect on me than 
on the social groups to which I belong,” UC and IDQ, z = -2.02, p = 0.043; z = -2.00, p = 
0.046), agreement with another statement reflecting individual-orientedness (“Freedom to 




and views held by those in the social groups to which I belong”, UC, z = -1.99, p = 
0.047), and post-manipulation family group importance (IDQ, 2.09, p = 0.037). 
Approaching significance in this direction are the attitude toward contradictions 
dimension of holism (CBC, z = 1.94, p = 0.052) and the vertical individualism scale (UC, 
z = -1.93, p = 0.054). In the direction supporting greater American ingroup prosociality, 
interactions are statistically significant for the locus of control dimension of holism (UC, 
UCC, and IDQ, z = -2.85, p = 0.004; z = -2.39, p = 0.017; - z = 2.83, p = 0.005). 
Approaching significance in this direction are the overall holism scale excluding 
perception of change (UC, z = -1.85, p = 0.064), interdependence (UCC, z = -1.68, p = 
0.094), post-manipulation country importance (CBC, z = -1.74, p = 0.082), and pre-to-
post-manipulation change in country importance (UCC, z = -1.86, p = 0.063). 
 
 
Cross-cultural Threat Manipulation Checks 
 
Five manipulation-check measures assessed how threatened the participants felt. 
These included a scale addressing personal feelings of threat, a scale addressing group-
level feelings of threat (referencing the country group), the personal threat feeling 
question alone (included in the scale), a question asking how threatening the participant 
feels the manipulation situation is to themselves personally, and a question asking how 
threatening the participant feels the manipulation situation is to their country. As in the 
main results above, these manipulation-check results are presented as one-tailed when in 




There are interesting differences in how Americans and Indians respond to these 
manipulation checks. While statistically Americans in the threat conditions do not report 
feeling more threatened than those in the control conditions, the Indians generally do. 
However, both groups generally acknowledge the threatening situations as threatening. 
For the feeling personally threatened scale, Americans in the natural disaster 
condition do not report feeling more threatened on average — the difference is not 
statistically significant, though in the opposite direction predicted (t = 1.085, p = 0.281 
two-tailed). Americans in the terrorism condition also do not report feeling more 
threatened statistically — the difference is also not statistically significant, though in the 
direction predicted (t = -0.859, p = 0.196). However, the difference for Indians in the 
natural disaster condition approaches statistical significance in the direction predicted (t = 
-1.482, p = 0.071), and for Indians in the terrorism condition, this is statistically 
significant (t = -2.960, p = 0.002). The pattern is similar for the individual question 
about feeling personally threatened within the scale, and still neither result is 
statistically significant. The only notable difference is that the result for Americans in 
both the natural disaster and terrorism condition are in the opposite direction predicted  (t 
= 0.162, p = 0.871; t = 0.134, p = 0.893, respectively, both two-tailed). Results are 
statistically significant in the direction predicted for Indians in both the natural disaster 
and terrorism conditions (t = -2.013, p = 0.024; t = -2.716, p = 0.004), respectively). 
Results for the feeling group threatened scale are again similar to those for the feeling 
personally threatened scale. Results for Americans are again not statistically significant, 
with the natural disaster comparison in the opposite direction predicted and the terrorism 




0.495, respectively). The differences for Indians are statistically significant in the 
direction predicted for both the natural disaster and terrorism comparisons (t = -2.900, p 
= 0.003; t = -2.708, p = 0.004, respectively). 
Both American and Indian response comparisons are statistically significant in the 
direction predicted for the manipulation check questions about the situation. For the 
question about how threatening the participant feels the situation is to them 
personally, this is the case for both countries and threat conditions: Americans in the 
natural disaster condition (t = -5.252, p <0.001), Americans in the terrorism condition (t = 
-7.317, p <0.001), Indians in the natural disaster condition (t = -8.405, p <0.001), and 
Indians in the terrorism condition (t = -9.805, p <0.001). 
There is some statistical evidence of an interaction effect between Indian 
country group and threat manipulation, such that Indians are more responsive. 
While all interaction results with these manipulation check outcomes are in this direction, 
natural disaster interactions for feeling group threatened scale and the question 
about feeling the threat situation is personally threatening are statistically significant 
(t = 2.181, p = 0.030, and t = 2.125, p = 0.035, respectively, both two-tailed). For 
terrorism, the interaction for the feeling personally threatened question is statistically 
significant (t = 2.049, p = 0.042, two-tailed), while the interaction for the feeling group 
threatened scale approaches statistical significance (t = 1.843, p = 0.067, two-tailed). 
Analyses with control variables change some of the statistical conclusions but do 
not change the overall conclusion that Indians respond strongly in both feeling and 
evaluating the situations as threatening, while Americans respond much more strongly in 




For the Americans, results including control variables for natural disaster for the 
feeling personally threatened scale change from not statistically significant in the 
direction predicted to approaching statistical significance in the CBC model (t = 1.403, p 
= 0.083). American results for both natural disaster and terrorism for the group threatened 
scale change from not statistically significant in the opposite direction predicted to not 
statistically significant in the direction predicted in the CBC model. This is the case for 
Americans in the terrorism condition for the feeling threatened question as well.  
For the Indians, results including control variables for natural disaster for the 
personally feeling threatened scale change from approaching statistical significance to 
statistically significant in the direction predicted for all control models (UC, UCC, IDQ, 
and CBC models; t = 1.884, and p = 0.032; t = 2.572, and p = 0.006; t = 2.196, p = 0.016; 
and t = 3.15, and p = 0.003, respectively). For the CBC model only, results change from 
statistically significant in the direction predicted to only approaching statistical 
significance for the terrorism condition with the feeling group threatened scale outcome (t 
= 1.597, p = 0.058) and for the natural disaster condition with the question about the 
manipulation situation’s threat to self (t = 1.622, p = 0.055). 
While including control variables in the analyses generally lessens support for this 
conclusion, some natural disaster interaction results increase statistical support for greater 
Indian responsiveness. While the interaction for the feeling threatened scale for Indians is 
not initially statistically significant, in three of five control models it becomes statistically 
significant (UCC, IDQ, CBC, and CBC-I; t = 2.621, p = 0.009; t = 2.378, p = 0.019; and t 
= 2.613, p = 0.010, respectively, all two-tailed) and in two approaches statistical 




both two-tailed). For the feeling personally threatened question, results in two models 
change from not statistically significant to approaching statistical significance (IDQ and 
CBC; t = 1.853, p = 0.066 and F = 1.825, p = 0.070, respectively, both two-tailed). Some 
of these control results decrease statistical support. For the feel group threatened scale, 
the result for the CBC-I model changes from statistically significant to approaching 
statistical significance (t = 1.946, p = 0.054, two-tailed). For the question about the 
manipulation situation’s threat to the country, results for three control models change 
from statistically significant to not statistically significant (IDQ, CBC, and CBC-I). 
Results including control variables for the terrorism interaction analyses still favor 
greater Indian responsiveness overall, but as with the natural disaster results, generally 
decrease support for this conclusion. Increasing statistical support, for the feeling 
threatened scale, the result for the UCC model changes from not statistically significant 
in the direction favoring greater Indian responsiveness to approaching statistical 
significance (t = 1.798, p = 0.074, two-tailed). The rest of the models decrease support. 
For the feeling personally threatened question, three of the control models change from 
statistically significant to approaching statistical significance (UC, UCC, and IDQ: t = 
1.931, p = 0.055; t = 1.852, p = 0.065; t = 1.722, p = 0.087, respectively, all two-tailed), 
and two become not statistically significant (CBC and CBC-I). For the feeling group 
threatened scale, three control models no longer approach statistical significance (IDQ, 





Decomposition Manipulation Checks 
In evaluating the manipulation checks as outcomes in the linear decomposition 
analyses, results are consistent with the main manipulation check results discussed above, 
suggesting that Indians are overall more responsive in terms of how threatened they felt 
by the manipulations. See above tables for these results. 
Endowment effects in the natural disaster models are statistically significant in the 
direction favoring Prediction 2B for the feeling threatened scale (CBC), feeling group 
threatened scale (UCC), feeling threatened question within the scale (UC and UCC), and 
question how about threatening the situation is to the country (UCC). Endowment results 
for natural disaster approaching statistical significance in the direction favoring 2B are 
the feeling threatened scale (UCC), feeling group threatened scale (UC and IDQ), and 
question about how threatening the situation is to the participant (UCC). Consistent with 
natural disaster results, the endowment effect in the terrorism models is statistically 
significant in the direction favoring 2B (greater Indian responsiveness) for the feeling 
threatened scale (CBC), and it approaches statistical significance in this direction for the 
question evaluating how threatening the situation is to the country (UCC). 
 In the natural disaster models, there are two statistically significant coefficients. 
The coefficient for the feeling threatened scale is statistically significant in the direction 
favoring Prediction 2A (greater American responsiveness) for the UCC model. The 
coefficient for the feeling threatened question is statistically significant in the direction 
favoring Prediction 2B (greater Indian responsiveness) for the IDQ model. In the 
terrorism models, coefficients are statistically significant for the feeling group threatened 




and CBC), and question evaluating how about threatening the situation is to the country 
(CBC). 
 In the natural disaster models, there are two significant interaction effects in the 
direction supporting Prediction 2A (greater American responsiveness) — those for the 
threat situation manipulation check questions (about regarding the situation as threatening 
personally and to one’s country, respectively) in the UCC models. Results are in the same 
direction for the terrorism models — the interaction is statistically significant for the 
feeling personally threatened scale (CBC), feeling group threatened scale (CBC), and 
question evaluating how about threatening the situation is to the country (UCC and 
CBC). Some terrorism results also approach statistical significance in this direction for 
the feeling country threatened question (CBC) and the question evaluating how 
threatening the situation is personally (UCC). 
For interactions, in the control models (without threats) there are two outcomes 
with outcomes statistically significant or approaching significance. Both are in the 
direction supporting greater American ingroup prosociality, which is against the second 
initial assumption. The control interaction was statistically significant for feeling 
threatened scale (CBC), and approaches statistical significance for the feeling group 
threatened scale (CBC). 
 
Study 1 Discussion 
 
Evidence of ingroup prosociality responses to threats to groups is limited, but 
there are some interesting results, especially comparing Americans with Indians. There 




disaster for both Americans and Indians. For Americans, these outcomes were locus of 
attention dimension of holism and post-manipulation rating of workplace group 
importance, and results approaching statistical significance were combined holism and 
pre-to-post-manipulation change in family group importance. For Indians, these 
outcomes were independence minus interdependence, horizontal individualism, vertical 
individualism, and combined individualism. Notably, however, Indians had some 
statistical results in the opposite direction predicted, specifically for pre-to-post-
manipulation change in family group importance (natural disaster, and approaches 
statistical significance for terrorism) and pre-to-post-manipulation change in country 
group importance (terrorism).  
Including control variables in these within-country comparisons, some of the 
natural disaster results for Americans approach statistical significance in the direction 
predicted (none of them did without control variables), and there is no longer statistical 
support for the terrorism change in workplace group importance result, and also for one 
of the terrorism models for overall holism. For Indians, several control models decrease 
support for the prediction. Perhaps notably, one of the control models for natural disaster 
yields a combined individualism scale result that approaches statistical significance in the 
direction predicted. 
Overall, these within-country comparisons somewhat support Prediction 1, that 
threat increases ingroup prosocial cognitive and social orientations such as holism. 
However, statistical support being only minimal and the Indian results in the opposite 




The interaction term results suggest that by comparison, Americans tend to be 
more responsive to threats than Indians, somewhat supporting Prediction 2A over 
Prediction 2B. Considering only the directions of the interaction results, regardless of 
statistical significance, there are more patterns in the direction supporting Prediction 2A 
for terrorism, and more supporting Prediction 2B for natural disaster. Finally, the 
counterfactual analyses further suggest that Americans tend to be more responsive to 
threats, and that demographic and social characteristics may predict Indian responses to 
terrorism threats than their responses to natural disaster threats. Though the Study 1 
results potentially suggest a more nuanced story about threat response and cultural 
context than originally proposed, they do not strongly support either Prediction 2A or 
Prediction 2B, such that Americans or Indians are consistently more responsive to threats. 
However, the results do somewhat support Prediction 2A, especially when considering 
the support for Prediction 2B by comparison. 
 
Theoretical Considerations 
My first initial assumption, that Indians experience more threat and therefore feel 
more threatened to begin with, is not supported. There is some statistical evidence in the 
opposite direction for feeling the group is threatened (both the scale and individual 
questions), such that Americans feel more threatened for their country to begin with. It is 
possible, though, in terms of the present theory, that despite experiencing objectively 
higher levels of threat, they do not feel as threatened, and that this is perhaps an adaptive 




management theory and also the group importance change variables observed in the 
opposite direction predicted, which I discuss further below.  
My second initial assumption, that Indians express higher baseline levels of 
ingroup prosociality, is not supported for several measures. There is again some statistical 
evidence in the opposite direction for some measures, such that Americans exhibit more 
ingroup prosociality to begin with. Further, ingroup prosociality responses to threat 
manipulations appear to depend on the type of threat and which cultural group was 
receiving it. Both countries responded the most to terrorism, and Americans and Indians 
responded on different measures. I also discuss patterns from the decomposition analyses 
in more detail below. 
As discussed above, control variables included in the uneven condition plus 
culture (UCC) and consistent between countries (CBC) models but not the evening 
condition (UC) and inconsistent and data quality between countries (IDQ) models are 
perception of country’s promotion of groups’ interests and importance of one’s family 
group. The CBC models also uniquely include highest education in household, social 
class, age in years, pre-manipulation country importance, work group importance, pre-
manipulation overall country self-concept scale, and extent to which country is strict 
toward those who violate norms. These endowment effect results suggest that when 
controlling for these factors, some of which are arguably fundamental to the respective 
cultures, Americans are more responsive. This somewhat supports the proposed 
explanation behind Prediction 2A — that less exposure to threats historically promotes 
greater responsiveness in the present. This appears to be the case with Americans and 




and social variables play in differences in threat responses between the American and 
Indian societies. 
Analyzing the baseline, or control, threat levels between the countries, we see 
how explaining terrorism threat effects using the UC control model variables tends to 
result in endowment (characteristic) effects supporting greater ingroup prosociality 
effects for Indians. The UC control models, loosely denoting factors unexpectedly 
uneven across experimental conditions, include completion time estimate, frequency of 
using MTurk to make basic ends meet, gender, and racial/ethnic minority status. In 
contrast, the CBC models include factors loosely expected to differ across countries, but 
that still differed across conditions. These CBC models tend to result in endowment 
(characteristic) effects supporting greater ingroup prosociality effects for Americans. The 
CBC models include the UC variables, plus sense of country supporting groups’ interests, 
pre-manipulation family group importance, country supporting individuals’ interests, 
country tolerant of those who break norms, attention check score, and uniquely from the 
other models, highest education in household, social class, age in years, pre-manipulation 
country importance, pre-manipulation workplace group importance, pre-manipulation 
overall country self-concept scale, and country strict toward those who break norms. 
There is also evidence of differences in cross-cultural effects of different types of 
threats in the counter-factual analyses. When looking at the endowment effects, most for 
natural disaster favor 2A, while they are more evenly split between 2A and 2B for 
terrorism. Specifically, all endowment results favoring 2B for terrorism are from the UC 
or IDQ models. In short, we could infer that if Indians had more UC model 




like Americans under terrorism threat, Indians may exhibit more ingroup prosociality. 
Similarly, if Americans had more UC characteristics like Indians under terrorism threat, 
Americans may exhibit more ingroup prosociality. This may suggest that UC 
characteristics explain Indian terrorism responses especially well, that CBC 
characteristics explain American terrorism responses especially well, and that UCC 
characteristics explain American natural disaster responses especially well. 
 The Study 1 results warrant considering the possibility that Indians react less 
dramatically than Americans to threats, at least in terms of ingroup prosociality. 
However, as detailed in the manipulation check analyses, Indians but not Americans 
consistently reported feeling threatened after the threat manipulations, while both Indians 
and Americans acknowledged the threatening situations as threatening. Notably, the 
control analyses diminish statistical support for the Indians feeling more threatened 
following the threat manipulation. Also, in the initial control condition comparison, 
Indians report feeling less threatened than Americans on behalf of their country (for both 
the scale and individual question). I suggest considering these patterns along with some 
of the results in the opposite direction predicted in terms of a potential alternative 
explanation for some of the observed results. 
While both Indians and Americans became more ingroup prosocial in some ways 
following threats, there are some results in the opposite direction for Indians. This pattern 
is especially interesting because it is only evident for change in group-importance types 
of variables among Indians. Also notably, the country outcome is the reference ingroup 
for the study. These measures for Indians were pre-to-post manipulation differences in 




instance of decreased ingroup prosociality, I propose that they could be instead be 
interpreted as part of a coping mechanism that preserves the individual’s self-esteem, 
specifically as distancing from the ingroup. This follows Dechesne et al.’s (2000) finding 
that mortality salience increased people’s distancing from their group when the group 
was perceived as having permeable boundaries (but not when they were perceived as 
impermeable). This explanation is consistent with terror management theory, especially 
in how it frames self-esteem as a worldview defensiveness outcome (e.g., Greenberg et 
al. 1997). While it is possible that participants were motivated to preserve the self-
concept in relation to the group that has been threatened, there is no way to determine if 
this was the case. These findings raise the possibility that participants were responding in 
self-serving ways, and not necessarily defending ingroup prosocial worldviews. I assess 
this possibility in terms of the next two studies as well, and generally in the final 
discussion and conclusion (Chapter 9). 
 
Methodological Considerations 
 The lack of results consistent with the theory across (and within) the cultures 
could be in part due to sampling. I was surprised to find so many demographic and other 
social variables differing between experimental conditions (across and within country 
groups). Some of the variables also seem fundamental to cultural differences between 
individualistic and collectivistic societies. Specifically, pre-manipulation, among the 
Americans, those in the control condition report that their country promotes interests of 
groups (compared to those of individuals) (t = 2.127, p = 0.035, two-tailed). Among the 




family group was more important to them than those in the control condition (t = -1.997, 
p = 0.049, two-tailed), and this comparison approaches statistical significance for the 
terrorism condition (t = 1.841, p = 0.069, two-tailed). Though some of the control models 
adjust for these variables (among others), these are interesting patterns within the 
experimental conditions. I initially considered pooling both threat conditions and 
comparing the control condition to a combined threat condition group within each 
country. However, as I began to analyze the data and notice that results for the different 
types of threats differed a great deal, I decided this would not be appropriate, and the 
individual threats needed to be analyzed alone. 
The outcomes Indians respond most to differ from those for Americans, and as 
discussed above, and some of their responses indicate less ingroup prosociality when 
threatened. While a historical context relatively high in threats may have shaped these 
responses and Indians’ relatively collectivistic culture, the outcomes within a day-to-day 
or one-shot context are not consistently explained by the present theory. Results only 
suggest that Americans tend to respond most ingroup prosocially to threats, and that there 
are potential distancing processes among Indians. As discussed in the data section above, 
while Indians are more collectivistic than Americans, other societies are higher in 
collectivism, such as China (Hofstede 2010). While Indians were included largely for 
logistical reasons, there are still some differences in results between the samples, even 
when including many control variables. It would be of interest to replicate this study with 
Chinese participants, and perhaps to compare India as an intermediate society in terms of 





The findings that suggest finding less support for threat manipulation 
effectiveness among Indians could be an artifact of data quality issues as mentioned in 
Chapter 3. Compared to the Americans, many more Indian cases were discarded due to 
data quality or inattention, the Indians had lower average attention scores, and Indians 
reported taking longer to complete the study. On the completion time, it is possible that 
Indians tended to misreport their completion time more so than Americans, such that 
Indians biased their reported times upward. This would be consistent with the plagiarism 
of written responses occurring primarily with the Indian participants. However, it is also 
possible that the sample of Indians included in the study were especially diligent, and 
because of this took the most time. While the pattern in percentages indicating that 
suspicion affected their behavior across cultures suggests a higher percentage of 
Americans than Indians (4.91% versus 2.44%), they do not differ statistically (z = 1.187, 
p = 0.235, two-tailed). The lower average attention scores for the included Indians 
contradicts the explanation that Indians acted especially diligently, though. A likely 
explanation (and perhaps the simplest) is a language barrier — Indians tend to have a 
non-English first language, while Americans are more likely to have English as their first 
language. Despite this, the data indicate that the Indians were on average paying less 
attention to the study. From this, it is possible that they were acquiescing (simply 
agreeing) or satisficing (simply saying what they thought the researchers wanted to hear) 
(e.g., Krosnick 1991), and reporting feeling more threatened than perhaps they honestly 
did at the end. Consistent with Americans paying more attention, and less likely to 
acquiesce or satisfice, they may have been more honest than the Indians about how 




threatening situations as threatening. However, the ingroup prosociality results suggested 
that Americans may have internalized the threats more, because they tended to react more 
ingroup prosocially to threats than Indians, in at least some ways. 
Plagiarism of written responses was an issue, but almost exclusively among the 
Indian participants. After finding this as an issue in the pretests, this was the reason the 
protocol instructions were revised to specify that participants must write a certain number 
of characters thoughtfully and in their own words. Cases where plagiarism was suspected 
were dropped (and typically not paid) as an attempt to minimize this issue. However, as 
discussed above, this could have led to an Indian sample that was uniquely attentive in 
some ways. In this sense, the control models and counterfactual analyses are great tools 
to help disentangle some of these potential biases. The conclusions largely stand, and 
suggest generally more threat responsiveness among Americans. The noteworthy 
exception is that the UC control model characteristics appear to predict Indian terrorism 
responses notably well. 
 Here I note that while I tested two separate cross-cultural predictions (reflecting 
greater American and Indian responsiveness to threats, respectively, 2A and 2B), there 
are two main reasons I used two-tailed criterion for these statistical tests. First, the same 
exact tests (output models) were used to assess both predictions. Second, the two-tailed 
standard is more conservative, and I predicting effects that I acknowledged could go in 
either direction and are not mutually exclusive, for reasons I discussed in Chapter 1. This 
was a stricter standard than the other directional tests (p < 0.05, one-tailed), but I 




 It is evident that I ran hundreds of models and tests in total. Without control 
variables, there were about 120 threat-comparisons between the two countries and the 
two types of threats, and about 120 interaction models. The analyses including control 
variables increases these counts about sixfold and fivefold, respectively, and the 
counterfactual model count is about equal to the interaction model total. The initial and 
manipulation check analyses are also relevant. Taken together, the total number of tests 
considered as part of the Study 1 results likely exceeds 2,000. Despite this, it is clear that 
I found more than five percent of the total tests statistically significant, more than ten 
percent at least approaching statistical significance, and more than ten percent meeting 
either of these standards in the direction predicted. Perhaps of more importance, I 
inferred potentially meaningful patterns from the results that did arise. These patterns 
suggest that the results likely reflect valid processes in the data, and perhaps the social 
world. Taking this into consideration, a higher threshold for significance (e.g., p < 0.01) 
may be of interest if trying to determine the most prominent results. Notably, the 
manipulation check outcomes were highly statistically significant. 
The political climate in the United States in 2016 is of interest to consider in 
terms of Study 1. These data were collected during the summer months in 2016, before 
the U.S. Presidential election that November. However, some participants did mention 
the upcoming election, and some indicated anxiety about it. It would be interesting to 
conduct a natural experiment as a pre- and post-test of these questions for Americans who 






The statistical results only somewhat support threat effects on ingroup 
prosociality, but they do suggest some interesting patterns, and potential specific ingroup 
prosociality effects that threat influences. Evidence of cross-cultural differences and 
culture in part explaining threat effects is limited. However, the results suggest that 
Americans tend to be more responsive to threats than Indians. While there are several 
noteworthy methodological limitations, I present a potential alternative explanation for 
the results observed, especially those in the opposite direction predicted for change in 
group importance ratings among Indians. This could suggest defensiveness or 
preservation of one’s own self-esteem or ingroup-prosocial self-concept, rather than the 
ingroup. Despite not accommodating the ingroup prosociality worldview as proposed, 





Chapter 5: Study 2 Methods, Data, and Analyses (Adherence to 
Status Orders) 
In this chapter, I describe the methods, data, and analyses for Study 2, on status orders in 
groups. 
Under threat, I predict stronger adherence to status orders in groups (Prediction 3) 
and a stronger preference for status orders (Prediction 4). The procedure was similar to 
Study 1 through the threat manipulation. Participants were screened and pretested (part of 
the status manipulation) before being invited to complete the group task. 
 
Methods 
Study 2 was presented as “Critical Choice and Group Interaction” to prevent 
suspicion about its true purpose. Participants were led to believe they were completing a 
group task that reflects a fictitious ability with a fictitious partner, and that pay for 
participating depended on their performance on the task. It was presented as paying a 
minimum of amount, but paying up to a higher amount based on performance (all 
participants actually received the maximum possible amount). Participation was 
estimated to take about 50 minutes, and the study paid $7 (presented as between $5 and 
$7 depending on group task performance). The study followed a 2x2 design, 
manipulating threat (presented as the other groups performances threatening the ability to 
earn a high payment, versus payments based on absolute performance) and status of the 
partner (high versus low). Participants in the sample (U.S. only) were randomly assigned 





Participants took the same screening questionnaire for both Study 2 and Study 3. 
Participants provided basic demographic information at this point (e.g., highest education 
in household and race/ethnicity). Both men and women were included in Study 2, but 
only women were included in Study 3. Those who did not indicate a gender or selected 
another option were eliminated from the participant pool. Gender was part of the partner 
status manipulation in that it was gender-matched, and including equal numbers of both 
men and women was intended to allow for some ability to determine gender differences 
in experimental effects if they arose. 
At the end of the screening questionnaire, participants were asked if they have 
ever worked with other MTurk workers to complete a HIT, and if so, to describe their 
experience, and provide any comments. All workers, regardless of previous group study 
experience, were invited to provide any further comments about MTurk group studies. 
 Responses to the questions about previous group study experience were screened 
for suspicion expressed about deception used in these studies (e.g., fake partner studies, 
see Rinderknecht 2015). Those who expressed high levels of suspicion or skepticism 
about group studies were eliminated from the participant pool. Those expressing lower 
levels of suspicion or merely acknowledging the existence of deception studies remained 
in the pool, but most were not included in Study 2. 
 
Pretesting 
Following the screener stage and before the group study stage, participants took a 




2016 unpublished). Similar to the group task, this was based on the standard experimental 
setting for status characteristics and expectation states research (e.g., Webster and 
Rashotte 2010 see also Chapter 1 description of these research programs). The pretest 
took about 15 minutes, and paid $0.50 via MTurk. This involved judging whether 
rectangular figures have more black or white space shaded. There was no clear correct 
answer to each problem, and the figures were designed to look ambiguous (pretest images 
retrieved from Riken_Avadur Photobucket media, 2016).  
Participant and partner status were manipulated with the contrast sensitivity 
pretest scores. Participant instructions provided a chart defining below average, average, 
and above average ranges to increase salience of status. Using Turkitron questionnaire 
link randomization, participants were assigned to one of two versions of the questionnaire 
that at the end revealed either a high score (18 out of 20, in the superior range) or a low 
score (7 out of 20, in the poor range). This participant result determined which partner 
result would display during the group task — the partner always had the opposite score, 
creating either a low-self or high-self status order. 
The pretest also functioned to screen out participants likely to experience usability 
issues (e.g., display and connectivity). In hindsight, the pretest instrument would have 
been revised to allow for more response time (the version used required judgments to be 
made within five seconds — if not, the instrument advanced to the next question), and for 
the images to be smaller and more comfortably displayed on many types of devices. 
However, the limited five-second window may have helped to reduce suspicion by not 
allowing participants too much time to inspect the figures and potentially determine that 




were less likely to believe their scores, especially the high ones (at least one pretest 
participant commented on this). For this reason, sampling for Study 2 and Study 3 gave 
preference to participants who I screened as answering all CS pretest questions. Only a 
few men collected later than the rest of the sample to even the condition counts were in 
this group for Study 2. By comparison, the Study 3 sample included both women who 
missed a question and those who did not. Analyses for both Study 2 and Study 3 
evaluated this missed pretest question indicator as a potential control variable. 
 
Group Task Introduction 
The group study interface was designed within Qualtrics to look like it used a 
special plugin to allow for the group connection. The instructions briefly explained this 
fictitious mechanism as within the UMDSURVEY platform (the unchangeable URL for 
Qualtrics surveys through the University of Maryland). Formatting adjustments such as 
font and color changes (the background largely masked the Qualtrics branding at the 
bottom of the screen), and a footer message about the fictitious plugin software version 
and redistribution warning text also served to increase believability. 
 The group study content was adapted from the Troyer (2002) software for the 
standard experimental setting for status characteristics and expectation states research. 
Following initial consent to share demographic and pretest score information with others 
in the group, the instrument confirmed the participant score from the pretest to reinforce 
the status manipulation. The system then began a fictitious partner matching process, 
timed to take about five minutes. In Study 2, the participant always appeared to be 






The fictitious contrast sensitivity ability pretested and discussed in the instructions 
was intended to appear directly related to ability to perform on the partner contrast 
sensitivity task (the group task), making it a salient specific status characteristic. 
Participants were told that pay for the study (awarded a amount of a bonus beyond base 
pay) depended on performance on the task, so this was their incentive to do as well as 
possible. Following expectation states (EST) and status characteristics (SCT) thesoretical 
program (e.g., Berger et al. 1977), I expect low-status participants to defer to the CS 
judgments of high-status partners more so than high-status participants defer to the 
judgments of low-status partners. 
  As mentioned above, the information-sharing consent page confirming the 
participant’s pretest score served to reinforce the participant status manipulation. The 
main partner status manipulation came from a page of information shared about the 
partner, as a brief profile including demographic and pretest score information. All 
partners were presented as 27-year-olds who are United States citizens and matched on 
the participant’s gender, because including only test score information might have 
aroused suspicion. Partners also had what appeared to be a participant code number to 
further increase believability. In the high-self/low-partner status condition, participants 
received a score of 18 out of 20 (above average), and 7 out of 20 for the partner (below 
average). In the low-self/high-partner status condition, the scores were reversed, with 
participants receiving of 7 out of 20 points, and 18 out of 20 for the partner. These scores 




status order, a table including the individual pretest scores was displayed much like at the 
end of the pretest, and along with this both the participant and partner’s pretest scores 
were displayed below. 
 
Threat Manipulation 
Participants then received a threat manipulation similar to the pretests and Study 
1. The situation was presented as directly relevant to the group task — the performance 
pay structure. In the control condition, the payment system was defined as based on 
absolute score ranges, and it was specified that the other groups participating in the study 
did not affect the participant’s group’s ability to earn a high payment. In the threat 
condition, the payment system was defined as based on performing better than other 
groups in the study (percentiles), and it was specified that the other groups threatened the 
participant’s group’s ability to earn a high payment. The payment definition tables are 
presented as follows (along with more detailed explanation):13 
 
                                                
13 Though the right parenthesis is missing for the “above average” row in Figure 1B, this is not expected to 




Figure 1A: Study 2 Payment Table: Control Condition 
PAYMENT	FOR	TEAM	CRITICAL	CHOICE	SCORES	
	 	 	 	 	Required	Team	Score	
	
Total	payment	($5	+	MTurk	bonus	amount)	per	participant	

















Figure 1B: Study 2 Payment Table: Threat Condition 
PAYMENT	FOR	TEAM	CRITICAL	CHOICE	RANKINGS	






















The threat manipulation was further reinforced with guided-thinking questions 
similar to the pretests and Study 1. The control condition situation and guided-thinking 





Control condition text: 
 
This week, a number of groups will complete this study. However, the other 
groups’ performance scores will not affect your group’s payments. The number of 
points your group earns is what determines your payment. When a group in this 
study scores a high number of points, it does not affect the ability of other groups 
to earn a high payment. In other words, the payments are non-zero-sum. 
 
 
What do you think about being a member of your task group in this situation? 
 
What is it like for you personally to be a member of your task group in this 
situation? 
 
How do you feel about being a member of your task group in this situation? 
 
The threat condition situation and questions were as follows: 
 
Threat condition text: 
 
This week, a number of groups will complete this study. The other groups’ 
performance scores threaten your group’s ability to earn a high payment because 
the ranking of your group’s score relative to the other groups is what determines 
your payment. When a group earns a high number of points, it takes away from 
the ability of other groups to earn a high payment. In other words, the payments 
are zero-sum, and high payments are scarce. This is why the other groups 
threaten your group. 
 
 
What do you think about being a member of your task group in this threatening 
situation? 
 
What is it like for you personally to be a member of your task group in this 
threatening situation? 
 






Due to time and resource limitations, and because Study 1 did not present strong 
support for the predictions, Study 2 (and also Study 3) did not include a distracting task 
as terror management research does, and as Study 1 did. Study 2 transitioned 
immediately from the threat manipulation to final instructions for the group task. 
 
Group Task Continued and Conclusion 
The partners appeared to connect over the network and begin the partner contrast 
sensitivity task, which was similar to the pretest. They appeared to share their initial 
responses with each other, and to make a private final judgment. Participants were 
incentivized to do well on the task because their pay appeared to depend on the group 
score. A success or failure task in which actors are motivated to do their best is part of the 
scope conditions of status characteristics and expectation states research (e.g., Berger et 
al. 1977). The partner task included 20 total rounds, 16 of which were pre-programmed to 
disagree with the participant, which served to measure extent of deference to the partner. 
Participants were probed for suspicion about the study with a series of questions. 
Data were excluded from analyses when participants expressed that suspicion most likely 
affected their behavior in concrete ways, when asked, or that they did not act as though 
information about the study was true. Data were also excluded if participants failed to 
acknowledge information consistent with their status manipulation (e.g., a low-status 
participant reporting scoring higher than their partner). As discussed in more detail 
below, the threat manipulation was treated more leniently. Participants were debriefed 




receive the maximum possible payment amount, and were asked not to share details 
about their participants or the payments with others. 
 
Study 2 Data 
My final data include 208 cases, with 52 in each experimental condition, defined 
by self and partner status (self-low/partner-high versus self-high/partner-low) and threat 
versus no threat. Group study data were merged with screener responses and any flags 
noted from the screener and pretest stages. Within each condition, 26 are women and 26 
are men. Because the unbalanced combined condition counts include as many as 62 cases 
and the gender groups within these include as many as 31 cases, the condition and gender 
counts were intentionally balanced. The condition and gender counts were evened by 
randomly dropping cases within each of the eight condition and gender groups. 
Preliminary analyses revealed potential differences in results between men and women, 
so some analyses include only men or women. 
 As discussed above, in selecting participants from the screener and pretest 
results, I gave preference to those most likely to be naïve about fictitious group studies 
(i.e., they did not strongly express suspicion about group studies not being real in 
screener), those who passed attention checks, and those who successfully answered all 
pretest questions (e.g., no major technical issues or missed questions). Because 
participants for both Study 2 and Study 3 were recruited similarly and placed into the 
same pool, these selection procedures were stricter for Study 2, for which most data 




Outcome measures include the behavioral deference and status evaluations 
described above, as well as manipulation checks, and the demographic information 
collected in the screener (e.g., race/ethnicity and social class). 
Data Acceptance and Quality 
I excluded data from the final sample if I determined they were likely to be of 
poor quality, or the participant clearly indicated that suspicion about the study affected 
their behavior. Only one case was excluded (and pay denied) because the participant 
responded inappropriately to written questions. Four submissions were complete or 
nearly complete, but the participant did not submit for payment on MTurk or follow up 
later, so data for these cases were not used. There were 279 total cases collected and paid 
for. Of these cases, 229 were kept by the strictest standards to be included in the final 
data set, for an overall acceptance rate of 82.08%. However, due to the condition 
balancing discussed above, the analyses below use a balanced version of these data that 
includes 208 cases.14  
Data acceptance rates by gender are 84.44% for the women only, and 79.86% for 
the men only. The difference between the women’s and men’s overall acceptance rates 
does not differ statistically (z = 0.998, p = 0.319, two-tailed). In the full sample, rates of 
accepting collected cases does not differ statistically across the conditions for the full 
sample or for the women only (chi square = 3.050, p = 0.384; F = 4.785, p = 0.188), but 
they approach statistical significance for the men only (F = 6.942, p = 0.074). These rates 
range from 76.71% to 87.32% for the full sample, 73.68% to 90.32% for the women, and 
                                                
14 Cases were also considered by more lenient standards, and this more lenient data set includes 264 cases, 
for a 94.62% acceptance rate. While these data are not analyzed in the present report, they may be of 




66.67% to 87.14% for the men. Within the women and men groups, some condition 
comparisons are statistically significant or approaching significance. For the women only 
the difference between conditions 2 versus 4 approaches statistical significance, such that 
cases in condition 4 were less likely to be accepted than condition 2 (chi square = 2.87, p 
= 0.090). For the men only, comparisons between conditions 2 versus 4 and the combined 
status conditions are statistically significant, such that those in the high-status conditions 
were more likely to be kept  (chi square = 4.47, p = 0.034, two-tailed; z = -2.119, p = 
0.034, two-tailed), and the comparison between conditions 2 versus 3 also approached 
statistical significance in the same direction (chi square = 3.77, p = 0.052). 
 
Assessment of the Study 2 Sample 
Control variables (e.g., demographics) were used for control analyses (see 
Analyses section). See Appendix 2 for a list of control and outcome measures included in 
the Study 2 analyses. I found some potentially problematic differences in characteristics 
across the conditions. See description of analyses and tables (full-sample, women only, 
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In the full sample, potentially problematic variables are Hispanic/Latino ethnicity, 
American Indian/Alaska Native ethnicity, White/Caucasian ethnicity, social class, 
indicating “not sure” for previous experience working with other MTurk workers, a flag 
variable indicating potential doubt or further scrutiny about whether to keep the case in 
the data, a flag variable indicating that an issue was experienced during the group study, 
and a flag for one or more missed questions during the pretest. For the Hispanic/Latino 
indicator, the difference in proportions across conditions approaches statistical 
significance (chi square = 7.28, p = 0.063), and the comparison between the combined 
non-threat conditions (1 and 3) and threat condition (2 and 4) is statistically significant (z 
= 2.163, p = 0.031, two-tailed). For the White/Caucasian indicator, proportions do not 
differ statistically across the conditions (F = 4.841, p = 0.184, but the combined threat 
condition contrast is statistically significant (non-threat conditions 1 and 3 versus threat 




approaches statistical significance (chi square = 2.97, p = 0.085). For social class rating, 
means do not differ statistically across the conditions (F = 1.88, p = 0.134), but one 
contrast does (conditions 2 versus 3, F = 4.54, p = 0.034), and two contrasts approach 
statistical significance (the non-threat conditions 1 and 3 versus threat conditions 2 and 4, 
combined means of 3.163 versus 2.904, t = 1.767, p = 0.079, two-tailed; conditions 3 
versus 4, F = 3.79, 0.053). For the flag indicating potential doubt or further scrutiny 
about whether to keep the case in the data, proportions differ statistically across the 
conditions (chi square = 9.197, p = 0.027, as do the combined status condition 
comparison (the low-status conditions 1 and 2 versus high-status conditions 3 and 4, z = -
2.974, p = 0.003, two-tailed). Comparisons approaching statistical significance are 
between conditions 1 versus 3 and conditions 2 versus 3 (both chi square = 2.97 p = 
0.085). For the flag indicating issues experienced during the group study, proportions do 
not differ statistically across the conditions (chi square = 4.396, p = 0.222, though the 
comparison between condition 2 versus 4 approached statistical significance (chi square 
= 3.10, p = 0.076). For the flag indicating one or more missed questions during the 
pretest, proportions differ statistically across the conditions (chi square = 8.320, p = 
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For women only, the only potentially problematic variables are recoded 
completion time estimate and the flag indicating potential doubt or further scrutiny about 
whether to keep the case in the data. For the completion time estimate, means do not 
differ statistically across the conditions (F = 1.56, p = 0.205), though the contrast 
between conditions 1 versus 4 is statistically significant (F = 4.40, p = 0.039). For the 
flag indicating potential doubt or further scrutiny about whether to keep the case in the 
data, the difference in proportions across conditions approaches statistical significance 
(chi square = 7.782, p = 0.051), and the combined status condition comparison is 
statistically significant (the low-status conditions 1 and 2 versus high-status conditions 3 
and 4, z = -2.523, p = 0.012, two-tailed). 
 
Table 6C: Study 2 Demographic and Data Quality Variables: Men Only 
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For men only, these potentially problematic variables are Hispanic/Latino 
ethnicity, White/Caucasian ethnicity, racial/ethnic minority indicated, frequency of using 
MTurk to make basic ends meet, social class, indicating “yes” for previous experience 




scrutiny about whether to keep the case in the data, and a flag for one or more missed 
questions during the pretest. For the Hispanic/Latino indicator, the difference in 
proportions across conditions is statistically significant (chi square = 9.037, p = 0.029), 
and the combined threat condition comparison is statistically significant (the non-threat 
conditions 1 and 3 versus threat conditions 2 and 4, z = -1.957, p = 0.050, two-tailed). For 
the White/Caucasian ethnicity indicator, proportions do not differ statistically across 
conditions (chi square = 5.361, p = 0.147), though the combined threat condition 
comparison approaches statistical significance (z = 1.957, p = 0.050, two-tailed). For 
racial/ethnic minority indicated, proportions do not differ statistically across the 
conditions (chi square = 3.632, p = 0.304), though the combined status condition 
comparison approaches statistical significance (the low-status conditions 1 and 2 versus 
high-status conditions 3 and 4, z = -1.724, p = 0.085). For rated frequency of using 
MTurk to make basic ends meet, means do not differ statistically across the conditions (F 
= 1.08, p = 0.363), though the comparison between conditions 1 versus 4 approaches 
statistical significance (F = 2.88, p = 0.093). For the rating of social class, means do not 
differ statistically across the conditions (F = 1.44, p = 0.235), though the comparison of 
conditions 3 versus 4 is statistically significant (F = 4.13, p = 0.045), and the comparison 
between non-threat conditions 1 and 3 versus threat conditions 2 and 4 approaches 
statistical significance (combined means 3.250 versus 2.904, t = 1.729, p = 0.087). For 
the indicator for responding  “yes” for previous experience working with other MTurk 
workers, proportions do not differ statistically across the conditions (chi square = 3.146, 
p = 0.370), though the comparison between conditions 3 versus 4 approaches statistical 




doubt or further scrutiny about whether to keep the case in the data, proportions do not 
differ statistically across the conditions (chi square = 3.537, p = 0.316), though the 
comparison between the combined status conditions (1 and 2 versus 3 and 4) approaches 
statistical significance (z = -1.682, p = 0.093, two-tailed). For the flag indicating one or 
more missed questions during the pretest, proportions differ statistically across the 
conditions (chi square = 8.667, p = 0.034). As discussed above, the only participants 
flagged for this are a few men whose data was collected later than the rest to reach 
sufficient condition counts. Mean age in years does not differ statistically across the 
conditions, but the comparison between conditions 1 versus 3 is statistically significant 
(F = 5.18, p = 0.025), and the comparisons between conditions 2 versus 3 (F = 3.80, p = 
0.054) and the combined low-status versus combined high-status conditions (t = -1.985, p 
= 0.050, two-tailed) approaches statistical significance 
Other variables that were evaluated but not statistically significant or approaching 
significance in any of the full sample or single-gender comparisons are racial/ethnic 
group indicators for Black or African American (chi square = 1.824, p = 0.610), East 
Asian (chi square = 3.720, p = 0.293), and other (chi square = 2.019, p = 0.568), 
education level (F = 0.35, p = 0.788), indicator for having responded either “yes” or “not 
sure” for previous experience working with other MTurk workers (chi square = 0.562, p 
= 0.905), and flag for comments potentially relating to an issue (F = 2.319, p = 0.509). 
No Study 2 participants in the final balanced sample identify as Native Hawaiian or 
Pacific Islander, South American Indigenous or Native, South Asian, Southeast Asian, or 




administrative issues (e.g., taking the screener more than once) or indicating suspicion 
about group studies during the screener.  
For the American Indian/Alaska Native indicator, proportions do not differ 
statistically across the conditions in the full sample (chi square = 6.058, p = 0.109, and 
though the difference of proportion logistic regression analyses do not reveal any 
statistical differences, initial contrasts using differences of means and linear regression 
did (conditions 1 versus 3, conditions 3 versus 4, and conditions 2 versus 3, all F = 4.08, 
p = 0.045). The same is true for the “not sure” indicator for previous experience working 
on a task with other MTurkers. Proportions do not differ statistically across the conditions 
(chi square = 3.098, p = 0.377), the difference of proportion and logistic regression 
analyses do not reveal any problematic statistical differences, though the initial post-
estimation contrast from a linear regression found a difference approaching statistical 
significance between conditions 3 and 4 (F = 2.75, p = 0.099). These initial results are 




The behavioral measure of deference is whether the participant switches to the 
partner’s answer when their answers disagree. This was programmed to happen several 
times. Switching the answer more often indicates higher partner status. The participant’s 
response for each round is coded as an indicator variable for whether they stayed with 
their original response, and the mean across the 16 programmed-partner-switch rounds is 
the participant-stay-score (a mean between 0 and 1). Higher mean scores indicate less 




 Participants answered several questions about the their own and the partner’s 
status, including ratings of competence, intelligence, value of contributions, influence 
(situational and general impression), and respect (situational and general impression). 
These outcomes were combined into an index (Chronbach’s α = 0.957). Questions from 
the 16-item SDO7 social dominance orientation scale (Ho, Sidanius, Kteily, Sheehy-
Skeffington, Pratto, Henkel, Foels, and Stewart 2015) measure preference for inequalities 
in groups, a social orientation I propose is relevant. Depending on the reference group, 
we can consider these inequalities within or among groups. The scale includes four 
dimensions (pro- and con-trait dominance and antiegalitarianism, respectively). An 
example question (pro-trait dominance) is extent of agreement with “Some groups of 
people are simply inferior to other groups.” Questions also asked about cohesion (feeling 
as part of the group) and wanting to work with members of the group again. These items 
were combined into a single scale with very high reliability (Chronbach’s α = 0.965). 
Items designed to measure cohesion were also asked, including the extent to which the 
participant felt it was important to earn as much as possible, whether they tried their best 
at the task, extent they felt like part of the group, interest in a fictitious future related 
study, and interest in being matched with the partner from Study 2 again. 
Participants then answered several manipulation-check questions, including those 
about personal and group-level feelings of threat (these question lists were validated 
during pretesting and Study 1), and these questions were combined into scales, feeling 
personally threatened (Chronbach’s α = 0.945) and feeling threatened on behalf of one’s 
group, excluding the anxious for the group item (Chronbach’s α = 0.939). Due to a 




asked about feeling anxious for one’s country. This question is not included in the feeling 
group threatened scale, but it is addressed separately in the results. They also answered 
questions about their understanding of the status and threat manipulations. 
 
Study 2 Analyses 
The comparisons of demographics and outcome measures across conditions used 
tests of differences between conditions and regression analyses as described in the 
Analyses Overview section in Chapter 2. For continuous outcome variables, these tests 
accommodated means (e.g., ttest and linear regression), and for indicator outcome 
variables, these tests accommodated proportions (e.g., prtest in Stata and logistic 
regression). When the comparisons between conditions include control variables (control 
models specified below), the coefficient of the experimental condition (status or threat 
manipulation) within a regression model or a post-estimation test of differences of 
marginal means represents this statistical comparison. If the main analyses are initially 
regression models, control variables were simply added for the control model analyses. 
To test the assumption that people defer more to high-status partners than low-
status partners (and occupying the complementary status position), I compared the 
behavioral deference and status rating scores across the status conditions within each 
respective threat condition, and also pooled the results to test both low-status partner 
conditions (non-threat and threat) against both high-status partner conditions. If the 
differences of means are statistically significant such that those in the high-status partner 
conditions exhibit more deference and rate their partners as higher in status than those in 




 To test Prediction 3, that threats increase status-consistent behaviors and 
evaluations, I tested for differences in means between the non-threat threat condition 
within the respective status conditions. Status-consistent responses are more deference 
among participants with high-status partners, and higher evaluations of the partners’ 
status, and the opposite for participants with low-status partners. Statistically significant 
threat comparisons in the predicted directions would support Prediction 3. Differences in 
the threat coefficients by status were also tested using the suest procedure in Stata (help 
suest), to assess whether the threat effect statistically differs between the participants with 
high- compared to low-status partners. The test statistic is chi-square, which is one-tailed. 
Because the test is directional, the statistical significance threshold was adjusted in the 
direction predicted, with p < 0.10 being the threshold for statistical significance, and p 
<0.20 being the threshold for approaching statistical significance. Statistically significant 
differences of coefficients in the direction predicted would support Prediction 3. 
 To test Prediction 4, that threats increase preferences for status orders, I tested for 
differences in means between the non-threat and threat conditions. Statistically 
significant threat comparisons such that preferences for status orders are higher in threat 
conditions would support Prediction 4. 
  
Study 2 Control Models 
Because the findings in the initial assessment of the sample suggest unevenness 
across conditions in potentially problematic ways, I evaluated the outcomes controlling 
for these variables, and compared these results with the main analyses. I included the 




 Full sample controls: 
- Hispanic/Latino indicator 
- American Indian/Alaska Native indicator 
- White/Caucasian indicator 
- Social class rating 
- Previous experience with MTurk group, “not sure” indicated 
- Flag for further evaluation or doubt whether to keep case in data 
- Flag for having issues during the group study 
- Flag for having missed answering at least one question during the pretest 
 
 Women-only controls: 
- Completion time estimate (recoded) 
- Flag for further evaluation or doubt whether to keep case in data 
 
 Men-only controls: 
-  Hispanic/Latino indicator 
- White/Caucasian indicator 
- Racial/ethnic minority indicator 
- Frequency of using MTurk to make basic ends meet 
- Social class rating 
- Previous experience with MTurk group, “yes” indicated 
- Flag for further evaluation or doubt whether to keep case in data 
- Flag for having missed answering at least one question during the pretest 
- Age in years 
 
 
As in Study 1, in the event the statistical software excluded any of these variables due to 
colinearity, results from the remaining model are presented. Also, as discussed above, the 
American Indian/Alaska Native indicator and the previous experience with MTurk group 
“not sure” indicator were included as control variables based on initial analyses that 
found potential statistical issues, though the variables were not ultimately determined to 
be potentially problematic. However, including these variables is not expected to notably 






Chapter 6:  Study 2 Results and Discussion 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the results from Study 2, on status orders in groups. 
The Study 2 results provide only minimal statistical support for the general 
prediction. Most of this support is from manipulation-check questions. Taking the results 
together, they do not clearly support Prediction 3 (increase in adhering to status orders 
under threat), and they do not support Prediction 4 (increase in preference for status 
orders under threat, or for relevant cohesion outcomes). I consider the possibility that the 
results observed reflect self-serving motivations to lessen anxiety about how the threat 
will affect the participant personally through their group’s performance, instead of 
ingroup prosociality worldview motives as originally proposed. 
 The control models for Study 2 are as follows. See Chapter 5 for specific 
information on variables for the control models. 
Full sample controls: 
- Hispanic/Latino indicator 
- American Indian/Alaska Native indicator 
- White/Caucasian indicator 
- Social class rating 
- Previous experience with MTurk group, “not sure” indicated 
- Flag for further evaluation or doubt whether to keep case in data 
- Flag for having issues during the group study 
- Flag for having missed answering at least one question during the pretest 
 
 Women-only controls: 
- Completion time estimate (recoded) 
- Flag for further evaluation or doubt whether to keep case in data 
 
 Men-only controls: 
-  Hispanic/Latino indicator 
- White/Caucasian indicator 
- Racial/ethnic minority indicator 
- Frequency of using MTurk to make basic ends meet 
- Social class rating 




- Flag for further evaluation or doubt whether to keep case in data 
- Flag for having missed answering at least one question during the pretest 
- Age in years 
 
Initial Assumption: Greater deference to higher-status individuals 
I first assess support for the initial assumption that individuals defer more to high-
status than low-status person in groups. See tables below for means by condition. The 
results consistently support this for the proportion of stay responses during the group 
task, which indicate more deference to the partner in the low-status self/high-status 
partner condition than the high-status self/low-status partner condition. In the full sample, 
there are statistically significant differences between the status conditions (1 and 2 
combined versus 3 and 4 combined (t = -17.546, p<0.001), and the status comparisons 
within the non-threat and threat conditions, respectively (1 versus 3, F = 179.77, p 
<0.001; 2 versus 4, F = 130.28, p <0.001). Statistical support does not differ by gender or 
control analyses. 
Results consistently support the initial assumption for the partner status ratings as 
well, with higher scores indicating evaluation of the partner as higher in status. In the full 
sample, there are statistically significant differences between the combined status 
conditions (1 and 3 combined versus 2 and 4 combined, t = 16.025, p<0.001), and the 
status comparisons within the non-threat and threat conditions, respectively (F = 149.73, 
p <0.001; F = 108.14, p <0.001). Again, statistical support does not differ by gender or 
control analyses.  
 Results also consistently support initial the initial assumption for proportion 
indicating preference to be matched with the partner again in a fictitious future study. In 




conditions (z = 7.113, p<0.001), and the status comparisons within the non-threat and 
threat conditions, respectively (both chi square = 5.029, p <0.001). Again, statistical 
support does not differ by gender or control analyses.15 
 Taken together, these results support the initial assumption of greater deference to 
higher-status individuals, and indicate that the status manipulation was effective. 
 
Prediction 3: Increased Adherence to Status Orders under Threat 
Prediction 3 states that when threatened, the difference in status outcomes 
between low-status task partners and high-status task partners will be greater than when 
not under threat. This is such that threat increases deference to high-status partners and 
evaluations of them as higher in status, and decreases deference to low-status partners 
and evaluations of them as higher in status. See tables below for more details about these 
outcomes. The difference of coefficients tables do not include statistical significance 
notation because none of these results are statistically significant or approaching 
statistical significance. 
To test whether the response pattern is such that threatened low-status participants 
are especially positively responsive on the outcomes (i.e., regarding their high-status 
partner as having higher status) and threatened high-status participants were especially 
negatively responsive on their outcomes (i.e., regarding their low-status partner as having 
lower status), I test whether the coefficients differ statistically across two regression 
models using the suest command in Stata. These results are interpretable as whether the 
                                                





status outcomes are amplified due to threat (i.e., larger status coefficients in the threat 
than non-threat models). 
The following tables show means across the experimental conditions. 
 
Table 7A: Study 2 Prediction 3 Outcomes: Full Sample 
 
Study 2 Prediction 













Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
Mean self (stay) 



















52 52 52 51 
Want to be 
matched with 

















conditions (1 and 2) 
Combined high-
status self 
conditions (3 and 4) 
Combined non-
threat conditions (1 
and 3) 
Combined threat 
conditions (2 and 4) 
Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 





















104 103 104 103 
Want to be 
matched with 


















Table 7B: Study 2 Prediction 3 Outcomes: Women Only 
 














Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
Mean self (stay) 



















26 26 26 25 
Want to be 
matched with 

















conditions (1 and 2) 
Combined high-
status self 
conditions (3 and 4) 
Combined non-
threat conditions (1 
and 3) 
Combined threat 
conditions (2 and 4) 
Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 





















52 51 52 51 
Want to be 
matched with 


















Table 7C: Study 2 Prediction 3 Outcomes: Men Only 
 
Study 2 Prediction 













Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
Mean self (stay) 



















26 26 26 26 
Want to be 
matched with 

















conditions (1 and 2) 
Combined high-
status self 
conditions (3 and 4) 
Combined non-
threat conditions (1 
and 3) 
Combined threat 
conditions (2 and 4) 
Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 





















52 52 52 52 
Want to be 
matched with 















The following tables show differences in status coefficients by threat. 
 
Table 8A: Study 2 Differences in Status Coefficients by Threat for Prediction 3 












































2.020 0.156 104 104 
Partner status 
evaluations 




1.610 0.205 104 103 
Want to be 
matched with 








Table 8B: Study 2 Differences in Status Coefficients by Threat for Prediction 3 



































Mean self (stay) 
score during 




0.610 0.434 52 52 






































(scale) 52 51 
Want to be 
matched with 








Table 8C: Study 2 Differences in Status Coefficients by Threat for Prediction 3 



































Mean self (stay) 
score during 




1.510 1.510 52 52 
Partner status 
evaluations 




0.680 0.411 52 52 
Want to be 
matched with 








Stay-switch score: For the proportion of stay responses during the group task, for 




conditions are statistically significant (F =103.40, p <0.001). The threat effects are not 
statistically significant, though in the opposite direction predicted, such that threat 
decreases deference among low-status participants and increases deference among high-
status participants (comparing by threat within the status conditions, conditions 1 versus 
2, F = 0.52, p = 0.471; conditions 3 versus 4, F = 1.62, p = 0.205). The difference in 
status coefficients result is not statistically significant and in the opposite direction 
predicted (chi-square = 2.02, p = 0.156). See initial assumption results above for more 
details on the status effects. 
Gender and Controls: For women only when including control variables, the 
difference in coefficient result remains not statistically significant but changes to the 
direction predicted (chi square = 1.70, p = 0.192). Among men, including control 
variables, the difference in status coefficients by threat approaches statistical significance 
in the opposite direction predicted (chi square = 2.77, p = 0.096).  
These stay-switch score results do not support Prediction 3. 
Partner status rating scale: For evaluations of the partner’s status, the statistical 
conclusions are the same as those for the stay-switch score above. The overall difference 
across conditions is statistically significant (F = 85.98, p <0.001). For the threat 
conditions within the status conditions, results again not statistically significant, though 
the pattern is again in the opposite direction predicted, such that threat decreases low-
status participants’ evaluations of their high-status partners, but threat increases high-
status participants’ evaluations of their low-status partners (conditions 1 versus 2, F = 
0.52, p = 0.473; conditions 3 versus 4, F = 0.18, p = 0.672). The difference of status 




statistically significant and in the opposite direction predicted (chi square = 0.28, p = 
0.594). 
These subjective status evaluation results do not support Prediction 3. 
Preference for same partner again (status): Proportion indicating preference to be 
matched with the partner again in a fictitious future study is assessed as both a status 
outcome and a cohesion outcome (see also Prediction 4 below). Here it is assessed as a 
status outcome. Because I examine it in two different ways, these tests are two-tailed. 
The proportions differ statistically across conditions (chi square = 50.589, p <0.001). The 
estimates are the same for each threat condition within the status conditions, and there is 
no difference in the status coefficients by threat (both chi square = 0.00, p = 1.000). 
Gender and Controls: For the women only, neither result is statistically 
significant, though the low-status threat comparison is in the opposite direction predicted 
(z = 0.595, p = 0.552), and the high-status threat comparison is in the direction predicted 
(z = 0.570, p = 0.569). The difference in status coefficients by threat is not statistically 
significant, though in the direction predicted (chi square = 0.09, p = 0.769). For the men 
only, neither result is statistically significant, though the low-status threat comparison is 
in the direction predicted (z = -0.595, p = 0.552), and the high-status threat comparison is 
in the opposite direction predicted (z = -0.570, p = 0.569). Also, while the difference in 
coefficient result remains not statistically significant, for men it is in the direction 
predicted (chi square = 0.09, p = 0.769).16 
These results for the proportion wanting to be matched with the same partner 
again do not support Prediction 3. 
                                                
16 As previously noted, results including control variables for men alone are not available due to 




Taken together, these results do not support Prediction 3. 
 
Prediction 4: Increased Preference for Status Orders under Threat 
Prediction 4 states that threatened individuals prefer status orders more so than 
non-threatened individuals. I measured this using the social dominance orientation scale 
(SDO7, Ho et al. 2015) as well as some cohesion outcomes (e.g., feeling part of the 
group). I examine wanting to be matched with the partner again as a cohesion outcome; 
above I examined it as a status outcome. 
 
 
Table 9A: Study 2 Prediction 4 Outcomes: Full Sample 
 
Study 2 Prediction 













Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
Social dominance 








51 51 52 51 
Important to 
earn as many 








52 52 52 52 








52 52 52 52 
Felt like part of 








52 52 52 52 
Want to be 
matched with 














Study 2 Prediction 




conditions (1 and 2) 
Combined high-
status self 
conditions (3 and 4) 
Combined non-
threat conditions (1 
and 3) 
Combined threat 
conditions (2 and 4) 
Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
Social dominance 








102 103 103 102 
Important to 
earn as many 








104 104 104 104 








104 104 104 104 
Felt like part of 








104 104 104 104 
Want to be 
matched with 














Table 9B: Study 2 Prediction 4 Outcomes: Women Only 
 














Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
Social dominance 








25 26 26 25 
Important to 
earn as many 








26 26 26 26 








26 26 26 26 


















Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
the group 26 26 26 26 
Want to be 
matched with 








26 26 26 26 
 
 





conditions (1 and 2) 
Combined high-
status self 
conditions (3 and 4) 
Combined non-
threat conditions (1 
and 3) 
Combined threat 
conditions (2 and 4) 
Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
Social dominance 








51 51 51 51 
Important to 
earn as many 








52 52 52 52 








52 52 52 52 
Felt like part of 








52 52 52 52 
Want to be 
matched with 

















Table 9C: Study 2 Prediction 4 Outcomes: Men Only 
 
 
Study 2 Prediction 













Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
Social dominance 








26 25 26 26 
Important to 
earn as many 








26 26 26 26 








26 26 26 26 
Felt like part of 








26 26 26 26 
Want to be 
matched with 








26 26 26 26 
 
 
Study 2 Prediction 




conditions (1 and 2) 
Combined high-
status self 
conditions (3 and 4) 
Combined non-
threat conditions (1 
and 3) 
Combined threat 
conditions (2 and 4) 
Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
Social dominance 








51 52 52 51 
Extent important 
to earn as many 








52 52 52 52 
Extent tried best 








52 52 52 52 
Extent felt like 








52 52 52 52 
Want to be 
matched with 















Social Dominance Orientation Scale: For social dominance orientation, in the full 
sample means do not differ significantly across the conditions (F = 0.55, p = 0.646). 
Comparing by threat within the status conditions, results are not statistically significant, 
though in the direction predicted for the low-status conditions (F = 0.35, p = 0.554), and 
opposite of the direction predicted for the high-status conditions (F = 0.71, p = 0.400). 
Comparing the non-threat conditions combined (1 and 3) to the threat conditions 
combined (2 and 4), the difference is not statistically significant, though in the opposite 
direction predicted (t = 0.177, p = 0.860, two-tailed).  
Gender and Controls: The results for women only are also not statistically 
significant, but unlike the full sample and men only results, the combined threat condition 
means are in the direction predicted (t = -0.322, p = 0.748, two-tailed). In the overall 
results including control variables, results are also not statistically significant, though the 
combined threat condition means are also in the direction predicted (t = 0.34, p = 0.735, 
two-tailed). 
Cohesion Outcomes: I assess group cohesion-related outcomes as part of the 
Prediction 4 analyses. Similar to how Prediction 4 predicts an increase in preference for 
status orders under threat, the general prediction presented in Chapter 1 predicts increase 
an in ingroup prosociality under threat, which these cohesion outcomes reflect. 
Important to earn profit points: For the rating of how important it was to earn as 
many profit points as possible, means across the conditions differ statistically in the full 
sample (F = 4.06, p = 0.008). Comparing by threat within the status conditions, the result 
for the low-status conditions is not statistically significant, though in the direction 




the direction predicted and statistically significant (F = 5.53, p = 0.020). Comparing the 
non-threat conditions combined to the threat conditions combined, the difference is not 
statistically significant, though in the opposite direction predicted (t = 1.484, p = 0.139, 
two-tailed).  
Of potential interest, the combined status comparison is statistically significant 
such that high-status participants rate themselves lower on this measure (t = 2.549, p = 
0.012). The status comparison for the threat conditions is also statistically significant (F = 
9.61, p = 0.002). The difference in status coefficients by threat condition approaches 
statistical significance, such that the threat conditions experience a greater decrease in 
this rating with increasing status than the non-threat conditions do (chi square = 3.34, p = 
0.068).  
Gender and Controls: For men only, means do not differ statistically across the 
conditions (F = 0.41, p = 0.748). Also, their combined threat condition comparison 
values do not differ, and the threat comparison within high-status conditions is not 
statistically significant (F = 0.04, p = 0.850). For women only, the combined threat 
condition comparison approaches statistical significance in the opposite direction 
predicted (F = 1.800, p = 0.075, two-tailed). For both men and women, including control 
variables the low-status threat comparisons remain not statistically significant, but they 
change to the opposite direction predicted (F = 0.17, p = 0.678 and F = 0.11, p = 0.746, 
respectively). For women only, the combined threat comparison result including these 
controls is statistically significant (t = -2.00, p = 0.049). 
Of potential interest, the coefficient comparison result is statistically significant 




including control variables (chi square = 2.44, p = 0.118). For men, the coefficient 
comparison, combined status comparison, and threat condition status comparison results 
are not statistically significant (chi square = 0.07, p = 0.786; t = 1.083, p = 0.281, two-
tailed; and F = 0.90, p = 0.345). 
Tried best at task: For the rating of extent the participant tried their best during the 
task, means across the conditions do not differ statistically in the full sample (F = 1.29, p 
= 0.280). Comparing by threat within the status conditions, the result for the low-status 
conditions approaches statistical significance in the opposite of the direction predicted, (F  
= 2.78, p = 0.097). The result for the high-status conditions is not statistically significant, 
though in the direction predicted (F = 0.06, p = 0.812). Comparing the non-threat 
conditions combined to the threat conditions combined, the result is also not statistically 
significant, though opposite of the direction predicted (t = 1.347, p = 0.179, two-tailed).  
Gender and Controls: For the women only, the low-status threat comparison is not 
statistically significant, though still in the opposite direction predicted (F = 1.70, p = 
0.196). 
Of potential interest, for men only and including control variables, the difference 
in status coefficients between threat and non-threat models approaches statistical 
significance, such that the increase in this rating with status is greater for threatened than 
non-threatened participants (chi-square = 2.83, p = 0.093). However, status comparisons 
within the non-threat and the threat conditions are both not statistically significant (F = 
0.01, p = 0.914; and F = 2.19, p = 0.142, respectively).  
Feel part of the group: For the rating of whether the participant felt like they were 




(F = 4.84, p = 0.003). None of the threat comparisons are statistically significant, though 
the low-status comparison is in the direction predicted (F = 0.13, p = 0.724), and the 
high-status and combined comparisons are in the opposite direction predicted (F = 1.84, p 
= 0.177; and t = 0.689, p = 0.492, two-tailed, respectively). 
Of potential interest, the combined status condition comparison is statistically 
significant such that high-status participants feel less like part of the group (t = 3.544, p = 
0.001, two-tailed), and this is also the case for the status comparison within the threat 
conditions (F = 11.30, p = 0.001). 
Gender and Controls: For women only, the combined threat condition comparison 
remains not statistically significant, though is in the direction predicted (t = -0.506, p = 
0.307). For men only the means do not differ statistically across the conditions (F = 1.73, 
p = 0.165), and all threat comparisons are in the opposite direction predicted. The low-
status threat comparison is not statistically significant, though in the direction predicted 
(F = 0.17, p = 0.679). For men and when including control variables, the high-status 
threat comparison is statistically significant in the opposite direction predicted (F = 4.03, 
p = 0.048). 
Of potential interest, for women only, the non-threat condition status comparison 
is statistically significant such that high-status participants report feeling more like part of 
the group (F = 4.06, p = 0.047). However, none of the status comparisons for men only 
are statistically significant. 
Preference for same partner again (cohesion): As mentioned above, all 
participants in the final sample indicated that they would be interested in a fictitious 




participants that indicated “yes” that they would want to be matched with the same 
partner again as a status evaluation outcome, and now I turn to assessing it as a cohesion 
outcome. Because I examine it in two different ways, these tests are two-tailed. As 
addressed above, proportions for the full sample differ statistically across the conditions 
(chi square = 50.589, p <0.001). The threat condition values within each status condition 
are the same, as are the combined threat condition values. 
Gender and Controls: Results for women alone, though not statistically 
significant, are such that the low-status and combined threat condition comparisons are in 
the opposite direction predicted (z = 0.595, p = 0.552; z = 0.709, p = 0.478), and the high-
status threat comparison is in the direction predicted (z = 0.570, p = 0.569). Results for 
men alone, though also not statistically significant, are in the opposite direction, such that 
the low-status and combined threat condition comparisons are in the direction predicted 
(z = -0.595, p = 0.552 and z = -0.623, p = 0.534), and the high-status threat comparison is 
in the opposite direction predicted (z = 0.570, p = 0.569).17 
 
Study 2 Manipulation Checks 
Several measures were designed to assess the effectiveness of the status and threat 
manipulations. These results suggest that both manipulations were reasonably effective 
within the final sample. Consistent with case selection criteria for the final sample, this 
was more so the case for the status manipulations. Because some of these variables differ 
so little in affirmative responses, difference of status coefficients by threat results are not 
                                                
17 Again, results including control variables for men alone not available due to convergence issues with 




available for some models to missing estimates. Difference of status coefficients by threat 
results are only presented for manipulation check variables if they are statistically 
significant or approaching significance. 
Some single-gender analyses are presented where they differ by gender, and I 
address some full-sample analyses including control variables where they differ from the 
main analyses. None of the single-gender manipulation-check analyses include control 
variables. See Appendix 2 for manipulation-check tables by gender. 
 
 
Table 10: Study 2 Manipulation and Suspicion Checks: Full Sample 
 
Study 2 Manipulation 














Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
Feel personally 
threatened (scale) 
24.176 12.907 26.962 15.053 29.115 18.828 25.320 13.619 
  51   52   52   50 
Feel group threatened 
(scale) 
15.216 9.060 21.462 10.764 18.882 12.198 19.077 11.504 
  51   52   51   52 
Feel anxious for 
country (Q) 
3.712 2.061 3.442 2.118 4.346 1.929 4.385 1.972 
  51   52   52   52 
Extent difficult to earn 
points 
5.038 1.468 5.096 1.257 5.000 1.343 4.750 1.412 
  52   52   52   52 
Self-reported self CS 
score 
7.365 1.344 7.019 0.896 17.558 1.487 17.942 0.235 
  52   52   52   52 
Self-reported self CS 
score (recoded) 
7.365 1.344 7.019 0.896 17.712 1.289 17.942 0.235 
  52   52   52   52 
Self CS score 
compared to national 
avg. 
1.577 0.750 2.038 1.120 5.981 1.038 6.231 0.831 
  52   52   52   52 
Self CS score 
subjective 
1.942 0.998 2.442 1.243 5.673 1.115 5.962 0.969 
  52   52   52   52 
Partner CS score 
reported 
17.885 0.471 17.923 0.269 7.154 0.777 7.096 0.409 
  52   52   52   52 
Partner CS score 
compared to national 
avg. 
6.519 0.610 6.423 0.572 2.212 0.957 2.173 1.061 
  52   52   52   52 
Partner CS score 
subjective 
6.635 0.627 6.481 0.671 2.538 1.244 2.519 1.213 




Study 2 Manipulation 














Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
Correct - pay 
structure Q 
1.000   0.885   0.981   0.865   
  52   52   52   52 
Correct/not sure - pay 
structure Q 
1.000   0.885   0.981   0.904   
  52   52   52   52 
Correct - other groups 
threatening Q 
1.000   1.000   0.981   0.962   
  52   51   52   52 
Correct/not sure - 
other groups 
threatening Q 
1.000   1.000   0.981   0.962   
  52   51   52   52 
Situation personally 
threatening (Q) 
1.615 1.123 3.481 1.915 1.808 1.299 3.250 1.929 
  52   52   52   52 
Situation threatening 
to group (Q) 
1.712 1.160 4.115 1.967 2.000 1.455 4.192 1.961 




0.000   0.885   0.019   0.865   
  52   52   52   52 
Indicated other groups 
threaten 
0.000   1.000   0.019   0.962   
  52   51   52   52 
Any type of suspicion - 
yes 
0.327   0.231   0.423   0.288   
  52   52   52   52 
Any type of suspicion - 
yes/not sure 
0.442   0.385   0.500   0.404   
  52   52   52   52 
Any type of suspicion 
affect behavior - yes 
0.087   0.000   0.077   0.095   
  23   20   26   21 
Any type of suspicion 
affect behavior - 
yes/not sure 
0.174   0.050   0.231   0.143   
  23   20   26   21 
Acted real despite any 
type of suspicion - yes 
1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
  23   20   26   21 
Acted real despite any 
type of suspicion - 
yes/not sure 
1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
  23   20   26   21 
Suspicious about 
partner - yes 
0.423   0.462   0.481   0.442   
  52   52   26   52 
Suspicious about 
partner - yes/not sure 
0.519   0.519   0.538   0.615   
  52   52   52   52 
Suspicion about 
partner affect 
behavior - yes 
0.000   0.000   0.038   0.000   
  23   20   26   21 
Suspicion about 
partner affect 
behavior - yes/not sure 
0.087   0.050   0.269   0.095   
  23   20   26   21 
Acted real despite 
suspicion about 
partner - yes 
1.000   1.000   1.000   0.952   
  23   20   26   21 
Acted real despite 
suspicion about 
partner - yes or not 
sure 
1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
  23   20   26   21 
Suspicious about 
partner info - yes 
0.288   0.231   0.385   0.327   
  52   52   52   52 
Suspicious about 
partner info - yes/not 
sure 
0.346   0.365   0.442   0.462   
  52   52   52   52 
Suspicion about 
partner info affect 
behavior  - yes 
0.056   0.000   0.043   0.000   
  18   19   23   24 
Suspicion about 
partner info affect 
0.111   0.105   0.217   0.042   




Study 2 Manipulation 














Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
behavior - yes/not sure 
Acted real despite 
suspicion about 
partner info - yes 
1.000   1.000   0.909   0.958   
  18   19   22   24 
Acted real despite 
suspicion about 
partner info - yes/not 
sure 
1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
  18   19   22   24 
Final suspicion Q - any 
suspicion affected 
behavior during study 
- yes 
0.000   0.000   0.038   0.019   
  52   52   52   52 
Final suspicion Q - 
whether any suspicion 
affected behavior 
during study - yes/not 
sure 
0.019   0.019   0.115   0.058   
  52   52   52   52 
Number of whether 
suspicious Qs 
indicated yes to 
1.038 1.171 0.923 1.135 1.327 1.382 1.077 1.281 
  52   52   52   52 
Number of whether 
suspicious Qs 
indicated yes/not sure 
to 
1.327 1.309 1.288 1.362 1.596 1.498 1.538 1.275 





Study 2 Manipulation 












(1 and 3) 
Combined threat 
conditions (2 and 
4) 
Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
Feel personally 
threatened (scale) 
25.583 14.033 27.255 16.511 26.670 16.281 26.157 14.321 
  103   102   103   102 
Feel group threatened 
(scale) 
18.369 10.393 18.981 11.795 17.049 10.849 20.269 11.151 
  103   103   102   104 
Feel anxious for 
country (Q) 
3.577 2.084 4.365 1.941 4.029 2.012 3.913 2.091 
  104   104   104   104 
Extent difficult to earn 
points 
5.067 1.360 4.875 1.377 5.019 1.400 4.923 1.342 
  104   104   104   104 
Self-reported self CS 
score 
7.192 1.150 17.750 1.077 12.462 5.312 12.481 5.527 
  104   104   104   104 
Self-reported self CS 
score (recoded) 
7.192 1.150 17.827 0.929 12.538 5.361 12.481 5.527 
  104   104   104   104 
Self CS score 
compared to national 
avg. 
1.808 0.976 6.106 0.944 3.779 2.389 4.135 2.324 
  104   104   104   104 
Self CS score 
subjective 
2.192 1.150 5.817 1.050 3.808 2.150 4.202 2.087 
  104   104   104   104 




Study 2 Manipulation 












(1 and 3) 
Combined threat 
conditions (2 and 
4) 
Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
reported   104   104   104   104 
Partner CS score 
compared to national 
avg. 
6.471 0.590 2.192 1.006 4.365 2.307 4.298 2.298 
  104   104   104   104 
Partner CS score 
subjective 
6.558 0.651 2.529 1.222 4.587 2.280 4.500 2.216 
  104   104   104   104 
Correct - pay 
structure Q 
0.942   0.923   0.990   0.875   
  104   104   104   104 
Correct/not sure - pay 
structure Q 
0.942   0.942   0.990   0.894   
  104   104   104   104 
Correct - other groups 
threatening Q 
1.000   0.971   0.990   0.981   
  103   104   104   103 
Correct/not sure - 
other groups 
threatening Q 
1.000   0.971   0.990   0.981   
  103   104   104   103 
Situation personally 
threatening (Q) 
2.548 1.822 2.529 1.790 1.712 1.212 3.365 1.916 
  104   104   104   104 
Situation threatening 
to group (Q) 
2.913 2.010 3.096 2.041 1.856 1.318 4.154 1.955 




0.442   0.442   0.010   0.875   
  104   104   104   104 
Indicated other groups 
threaten 
0.495   0.490   0.010   0.981   
  103   104   104   103 
Any type of suspicion - 
yes 
0.279   0.356   0.375   0.260   
  104   104   104   104 
Any type of suspicion - 
yes/not sure 
0.413   0.452   0.471   0.394   
  104   104   104   104 
Any type of suspicion 
affect behavior - yes 
0.047   0.085   0.082   0.049   
  43   47   49   41 
Any type of suspicion 
affect behavior - 
yes/not sure 
0.116   0.191   0.204   0.098   
  43   47   49   41 
Acted real despite any 
type of suspicion - yes 
1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
  43   47   49   41 
Acted real despite any 
type of suspicion - 
yes/not sure 
1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
  43   47   49   41 
Suspicious about 
partner - yes 
0.442   0.462   0.452   0.452   
  104   104   104   104 
Suspicious about 
partner - yes/not sure 
0.519   0.577   0.529   0.567   
  104   104   104   104 
Suspicion about 
partner affect 
behavior - yes 
0.000   0.021   0.020   0.000   
  43   47   49   41 
Suspicion about 
partner affect 
behavior - yes/not sure 
0.070   0.191   0.184   0.073   
  43   47   49   41 
Acted real despite 
suspicion about 
partner - yes 
1.000   0.979   1.000   0.976   
  43   47   49   41 
Acted real despite 
suspicion about 
partner - yes or not 
sure 
1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
  43   47   49   41 
Suspicious about 
partner info - yes 
0.260   0.356   0.337   0.279   
  104   104   104   104 




Study 2 Manipulation 












(1 and 3) 
Combined threat 
conditions (2 and 
4) 
Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
partner info - yes/not 
sure   104   104   104   104 
Suspicion about 
partner info affect 
behavior  - yes 
0.027   0.021   0.049   0.000   
  37   47   41   43 
Suspicion about 
partner info affect 
behavior - yes/not sure 
0.108   0.128   0.171   0.070   
  37   47   41   43 
Acted real despite 
suspicion about 
partner info - yes 
1.000   0.935   0.950   0.977   
  37   46   40   43 
Acted real despite 
suspicion about 
partner info - yes/not 
sure 
1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
  37   46   40   43 
Final suspicion Q - any 
suspicion affected 
behavior during study 
- yes 
0.000   0.029   0.019   0.010   
  104   104   104   104 
Final suspicion Q - 
whether any suspicion 
affected behavior 
during study - yes/not 
sure 
0.019   0.087   0.067   0.038   
  104   104   104   104 
Number of whether 
suspicious Qs 
indicated yes to 
0.981 1.149 1.202 1.332 1.183 1.283 1.000 1.207 
  104   104   104   104 
Number of whether 
suspicious Qs 
indicated yes/not sure 
to 
1.308 1.330 1.567 1.385 1.462 1.407 1.413 1.319 





Status Manipulation Checks 
The results presented above testing the initial assumption of greater deference to 
high-status individuals in part serve as status manipulation checks. The variables 
addressed below are designed to measure the extent to which participants acknowledge 
information consistent with their status condition. I also address some of these results that 




Self-reported self contrast sensitivity pretest score: Participants in the final sample 
successfully reported self contrast sensitivity pretest scores consistent with their 
manipulations. The means differed statistically across the conditions (F = 1,586.75, p 
<0.001). Comparing the low-status conditions combined (1 and 2) to the high-status 
conditions combined (3 and 4), the difference is statistically significant in the direction 
expected (t = -68.34, p <0.001). Comparing by status within the threat conditions, the 
results for both the non-threat and threat conditions are statistically significant in the 
direction expected (F = 2,215.17, p <0.001; and F = 2,544.67, p <0.001).  
Of potential interest, in the full sample, patterns for threat manipulation results 
within each status condition have result patterns consistent with Prediction 3, statistically 
significant such that high-status participants report higher scores when threatened (F = 
3.15, p = 0.077), and approaching statistical significance such that low-status participants 
report lower scores when threatened (F = 2.56, p = 0.112). The difference in status 
coefficients by threat condition is statistically significant and consistent with Prediction 3, 
such that there is a greater difference in the direction predicted between the threat 
conditions than the non-threat conditions (chi square = 5.78, p = 0.016). 
 There is a recoded variable that includes a small number of revised responses that 
participants identified as incorrect. The above conclusions hold for the recoded version of 
this variable, except for the low-status threat comparison changes from approaching 
statistical significance to statistically significant (F = 2.88, p = 0.046), and the high-status 
threat comparison is no longer statistically significant (F = 1.28, p = 0.259). 
 Gender and Controls: Of potential interest, for women in the recoded version of 




2.12, p = 0.149). For men only, none of the threat comparisons are statistically 
significant, and the difference of coefficients estimate is not available due to zero 
coefficients. In the recoded version of the variable, and including control variables in the 
full sample, the difference of coefficients only approaches statistical significance (chi 
square = 3.81, p = 0.051). 
Rating of self contrast sensitivity ability against national standard: Participants in 
the final sample also successfully evaluate their own contrast sensitivity ability compared 
to the national average consistent with their manipulations. The means differ significantly 
across the conditions (F = 359.95, p <0.001). Comparing the combined low-status and 
high-status conditions, results are again in the direction expected and statistically 
significant (t = -32.273, p <0.001). Comparing by status within the threat conditions, the 
results for both the non-threat and threat conditions were in the direction expected and 
statistically significant (F = 562.64, p <0.001; and F = 509.88, p <0.001).  
Of potential interest, evaluating this outcome in terms of Prediction 3, in the full 
sample, the threat manipulation within the low-status conditions is statistically significant 
in the opposite direction predicted (F = 6.18, p = 0.014), and it approaches statistical 
significance in the direction predicted in the high-status conditions (F = 1.81, p = 0.180). 
Gender and Controls: Of potential interest, for women only the low-status threat 
comparison is not statistically significant, though in the opposite direction predicted (F = 
2.60, p = 0.110), and for men only, this comparison approaches statistical significance (F 
= 3.90, p = 0.051). Also, for men only the high-status threat comparison does not 




Subjective rating of self contrast sensitivity ability: Participants in the final 
sample also successfully subjectively evaluate their own contrast sensitivity ability 
consistent with their manipulations. The means differ statistically across the conditions (F 
= 195.23, p <0.001). Comparing the combined low-status and high-status conditions, 
results are again in the direction predicted and statistically significant (t = -23.744, p 
<0.001). Comparing by status within the threat conditions, the results for both the non-
threat and threat conditions are in the direction predicted and statistically significant (F = 
306.30, p <0.001; F = 275.55, p <0.001).  
Of potential interest, evaluating this outcome in terms of Prediction 3, in the full 
sample, the effect of the threat manipulation within the low-status conditions is 
statistically significant in the opposite direction predicted (F = 5.50, p = 0.020), and this 
approaches statistical significance in the direction predicted for the high-status 
comparison (F = 1.83, p = 0.178). 
Gender and Controls: Of potential interest, for women only, the high-status threat 
comparison does not approach statistical significance, and for men only, the low-status 
threat comparison is not statistically significant. In the full sample including control 
variables, the overall threat condition comparison approaches statistical significance such 
that threat increases this rating (t = 1.66, p = 0.099). 
Participant-reported partner contrast sensitivity pretest score: Participants also 
reported their partners’ scores. The means differ significantly across the conditions in the 
full sample (F = 7,567.60 p < 0.001). Comparing the combined low-status and high-status 
conditions, results are statistically significant in the direction expected (t = 151.24, p 




threat and threat conditions are statistically significant in the direction expected (F = 
11,250.13, p <0.001; and F = 11,452.65, p <0.001).  
Of potential interest, evaluating this outcome in terms of Prediction 3, in the full 
sample, threat comparisons within the low-status and high-status conditions are not 
statistically significant, though in the direction expected (F = 0.35, p = 0.554; and F = 
0.06, p = 0.813).  
Gender and Controls: Of potential interest, for men only, the means within the 
high-status conditions are not statistically significant, though in the opposite direction 
expected (F = 0.49, p = 0.486). 
Rating of partner contrast sensitivity ability against national standard: Participants 
rated partner contrast sensitivity ability levels compared to the national average 
consistent with their manipulations. The means differ significantly across the conditions 
in the full sample (F = 317.44, p <0.001). Comparing the combined low-status and high-
status conditions, results are statistically significant in the direction expected (t = 37.42, p 
<0.001). Comparing by status within the threat conditions, the results for both the non-
threat and threat conditions are statistically significant in the direction expected (F = 
704.08, p <0.001; and F = 685.35, p <0.001).  
Of potential interest, in the full sample, the threat manipulation within the low-
status conditions the result is not statistically significant, though opposite of the direction 
expected (F = 0.35, p = 0.554). The high-status condition result is also not statistically 
significant, though in the direction expected (F = 0.06, p = 0.813).  
Gender and Controls: Of potential interest, for women only, the means within the 




Subjective rating of partner contrast sensitivity ability: Participants in the final 
sample also successfully subjectively evaluated their partners’ contrast sensitivity ability 
consistent with their manipulations. The means differ statistically across the conditions in 
the full sample (F = 844.67, p <0.001). Comparing the combined low-status and high-
status conditions, results are statistically significant in the direction expected (t = 29.67, p 
<0.001). Comparing by status within the threat conditions, the results for both the non-
threat and threat conditions are statistically significant in the direction expected (F = 
451.87, p <0.001; and F = 422.66, p <0.001).  
Of potential interest, in the full sample, the threat manipulation within the low-
status conditions the result is not statistically significant, though opposite of the direction 
expected (F = 0.64, p = 0426). The high-status condition result is also not statistically 
significant, though in the direction expected (F = 0.01, p = 0.921).  
Gender and Controls: Among the women only, the high-status condition result is 
not statistically significant, though opposite of the direction predicted, but (F = 1.53, p = 
0.219). 
Threat Manipulation Checks 
Feel personally threatened scale: Participants answered questions about how 
threatened they felt personally, and these were combined into a scale. The means did not 
differ statistically across the conditions in the full sample (F = 1.01, p <0.389). 
Comparing the combined non-threat (1 and 3) and threat conditions (2 and 4), results are 
not statistically significant, though opposite of the direction predicted (t = 0.240, p = 
0.811, two-tailed). Comparing by threat within the status conditions, the results for the 




= 0.85, p = 0.357). The results for the high-status conditions are also not statistically 
significant, though in the opposite direction predicted (F = 1.57, p = 0.212). 
Gender and Controls: For the women only, the threat comparison within the low-
status conditions is not statistically significant, though in the opposite direction predicted 
(F = 0.36, p = 0.549). For men only, differences in means across conditions approach 
statistical significance (F = 2.20, p = 0.093). The low-status threat comparison is 
statistically significant in the direction predicted (F = 4.48, p = 0.037). Of potential 
interest, the status coefficients across the threat models differ statistically (chi square = 
6.39, p = 0.012), such that there is a statistically significant positive status effect for the 
non-threatened participants (F = 4.12, p = 0.045), and though not statistically significant, 
the direction suggests a decrease for threatened participants (F = 2.23, p = 0.138). 
 Feel group threatened scale: Participants answered questions about how 
threatened they felt in terms of their task group in the study, and these were combined 
into a scale.18 The difference in the means across the conditions in the full sample is 
statistically significant (F = 2.85, p = 0.039), and results for this outcome support the 
predictions more so than those for feeling personally threatened. Comparing the 
combined non-threat and threat conditions, results are statistically significant in the 
direction predicted (t = -2.100, p = 0.017). Comparing by threat within the status 
conditions, the results for the low-status conditions are statistically significant in the 
direction predicted (F = 8.38, p = 0.004), but the results for the high-status conditions are 
not statistically significant and in the opposite direction predicted (F = 0.01, p = 0.928). 
                                                
18 As noted in Chapter 5, a typographical error in one of the questions, asking how anxious the participant 
feels for his or her country instead of the task group as intended, resulted in this question being excluded 




 Of potential interest, the difference in status coefficients across the threat models 
is statistically significant (chi square = 4.00, p = 0.046), such that there is a positive status 
effect for the non-threatened participants that approaches statistical significance (F = 
4.12, p = 0.045), and though not statistically significant, the direction of results for the 
threatened participants suggests a decrease (F = 2.23, p = 0.138). 
Gender and Controls: For women only, means did not differ statistically across 
the conditions (F = 0.30, p = 0.825), and while all threat comparisons are in the direction 
predicted, none are statistically significant. This is the case for the combined (t = -0.935, 
p = 0.163), low-status (F = 0.60, p = 0.439), and high-status comparisons (F = 0.28, p = 
0.595). Statistical conclusions are the same for men as for the full sample, except, of 
potential interest, the non-threat condition status comparison is statistically significant (F 
= 7.32, p = 0.008). Statistical conclusions are the same for the full-sample analyses 
including control variables, except of potential interest, the difference in status 
coefficients is no longer statistically significant (chi square = 2.54, p = 0.111), and the 
non-threat status comparison no longer approaches statistical significance (F = 2.86, p = 
0.104). 
 How difficult to earn profit points: Participants rated the extent to which it was 
difficult to earn profit points during the task. Participants reporting more difficulty in the 
threat conditions would be consistent with an effective threat manipulation. Also, 
participants reporting more difficulty in the low-status conditions would be consistent 
with an effective status manipulation. In the full sample, the means do not differ 
statistically across the conditions (F = 0.64, p = 0.588). Comparing the combined non-




statistically significant (t = -0.506, p = 0.614, two-tailed). Neither of the threat 
comparisons within the status conditions are statistically significant, with the low-status 
comparison in the direction predicted (F = 0.05, p = 0.831), and the high-status 
comparison is in the opposite direction predicted (F = 0.86, p = 0.354). None of the status 
comparisons are statistically significant, though the combined, non-threat, and threat 
condition comparisons are in the direction predicted (t = 1.013, p = 0.156; F = 0.02, p = 
0.887; F = 1.65,  0.100). 
Gender and Controls: For women only, the high-status threat comparison is in the 
direction predicted, though not statistically significant (F = 0.61, p = 0.437). For men 
only, the low-status threat comparison is in the opposite direction predicted (F = 0.39, p = 
0.531), and the high-status threat comparison is in the direction predicted (F = 0.04, p = 
0.835). Also for men, the threat condition status comparison approaches statistical 
significance in the direction predicted (F = 2.50, p = 0.058). 
 Rating study situation as personally threatening: Participants rated how 
threatening the group task situation was to them personally. All threat comparisons are in 
the direction predicted, such that the threat manipulation increased these ratings. The 
means differ statistically across conditions (F = 18.65, p < 0.001). Comparing the 
combined non-threat and threat conditions, low-status, and high-status conditions, results 
are statistically significant in the direction predicted (t = -7.439, p < 0.001; F = 35.01, p < 
0.001; and F = 20.93, p < 0.001, respectively). 
 Rating study situation as threatening to task group: Participants rated how 
threatening the group task situation was to their task group. As in the personal threat 




the threat manipulation increases these ratings. Means differ statistically across 
conditions (F = 44.962, p < 0.001). Comparing the combined non-threat and threat 
conditions, low-status, and high-status conditions, results are statistically significant in 
the direction predicted (t = -9.942, p < 0.001; F = 53.76, p < 0.001; and F = 44.72, p < 
0.001, respectively). 
Rating feeling anxious for country: It is of theoretical interest to assess how 
participants respond to a reference group other than their task group. For the question 
about how anxious the participant feels for their country (excluded from the group scale 
because the country reference group was a typographical error), results suggest that self 
and partner status predicts this outcome more so than the threat manipulation. Means 
differ statistically across the conditions (F = 2.79, p = 0.041). Comparing the combined 
non-threat and threat conditions, results are opposite of the direction expected, and not 
statistically significant (t = 0.406 p = 0.686, two-tailed). Comparing by threat within the 
status conditions, the results for the low-status conditions are not statistically significant, 
though opposite of the direction predicted (F = 0.46, p = 0.498), and the results for the 
high-status conditions are also not statistically significant, though in the direction 
predicted (F = 0.01, p = 0.923).  
Of potential interest, and as mentioned above, results suggest status effects, such 
that self status increases anxiety expressed for one’s country. In the full sample, the 
combined status condition comparison is statistically significant (t = -2.823, p = 0.005, 
two-tailed). The threat condition status comparison is statistically significant as well (F = 
5.65, p = 0.018), and the non-threat condition status comparison approaches statistical 




Gender and Controls: For women only, the means do not differ statistically across 
conditions (F = 1.66, p = 0.181). Including control variables for the full sample, the 
difference in means across conditions only approaches statistical significance (F = 2.56, p 
= 0.056). Of potential interest, the threat condition status comparison approaches 
statistical significance (F = 2.86, p = 0.094), and the non-threat condition status 
comparison is not statistically significant (F = 2.02, p = 0.158). The same results hold for 
men only (respectively, F = 1.20, p = 0.314; F = 2.81, p = 0.097; and F = 0.70, p = 
0.404). 
Threat Comprehension Results 
Two questions were designed to assess whether the participant comprehended the 
threat conditions. First, they were asked to identify the pay structure of the study, as 
either non-competitive (consistent with the non-threat conditions) or competitive 
(consistent with the threat conditions). Second, they were asked to confirm whether the 
other groups in the study threatened their task group’s ability to earn a high score. Both 
questions had two response options consistent with respective threat conditions, and a not 
sure option. For the correct rates, only correct responses are counted (both incorrect and 
not sure responses are considered incorrect). Though ideally all participants in the final 
sample would have fully comprehend the conditions, it makes sense that as several results 
suggest, correct response rates are lower in the threat conditions. This is because the 
threat version of the instructions were more complex, and perhaps more difficult to 
understand. 
For the proportion of participants responding affirmatively to the study pay 




across conditions (chi square = 157.949, p <0.001). All threat comparisons are 
statistically significant in the direction expected, such that participants in the threat 
conditions are more likely to indicate this response. This is the case for the combined 
threat condition comparison (z = -12.565, p <0.001), the low-status condition threat 
comparison (z = -9.082, p <0.001), and the high-status threat condition comparison (z = -
8.687, p <0.001).19  
Condition consistency of study pay structure: In the full sample, correct responses 
to the question about the study pay structure are less frequent in the threat conditions. The 
proportions differ statistically across conditions (chi square = 11.334, p = 0.010). 
Combining the low- and high-status conditions and comparing by threat, these results are 
statistically significant within both the low- and high-status conditions (z = 3.321, p = 
0.001, two-tailed; z = 2.523, p = 0.012; z = 2.208, p = 0.027. Results are similar when 
considering not sure responses along with the correct ones, though the high-status threat 
comparison only approaches statistical significance (z = 1.682, p = 0.093). 
Gender and Controls: For the women only, the low-status threat comparison is not 
statistically significant  (z = 1.442, p = 0.149, two-tailed). For the men only, proportions 
do not differ statistically across conditions (chi square = 5.361, p = 0.147). Their 
combined threat condition comparison only approaches statistical significance (z = 1.957, 
p = 0.050), and their high-status threat comparison is not statistically significant (z = 
0.595, p = 0.552). When including not sure responses as well as correct ones, for women 
only, the difference in proportions across conditions only approaches statistical 
significance (chi square = 7.782, p = 0.051). For men only, including the not sure 
                                                




responses, the difference in proportions across conditions approaches statistical 
significance (chi square = 6.367, p = .095), and as in their correct proportion, the overall 
threat comparison only approaches statistical significance (z = 1.682, p = 0.093, two-
tailed). When including control variables for the full sample, for the correct indicator, the 
high-status threat comparison only approaches statistical significance (z = -1.74, p = 
0.082, two-tailed).20 For the indicator including not sure responses, the high-status threat 
comparison no longer approaches statistical significance (z = -1.25, p = 0.212).21  
For the proportion of participants indicating “yes” that other groups threaten their 
group’s ability to earn a high profit, these proportions differ statistically across conditions 
(chi square = 195.382, p <0.001). All threat comparisons are statistically significant in the 
direction expected, such that participants in the threat conditions are more likely to 
indicate this response. This is the case for the combined threat condition comparison (z = 
13.971, p <0.001), the low-status condition threat comparison (z = 10.149, p <0.001), and 
the high-status threat condition comparison (z = -9.612, p <0.001).22 
 Condition consistency of other groups threatening in study: Though results for the 
question about the pay structure are not uniform across conditions, performance on the 
question about whether the other groups threaten the participant’s group’s ability to earn 
a high payment is much more consistent. In the full sample, proportions answering this 
question correctly do not differ statistically across the conditions (chi square = 3.688, p = 
0.297), and none of the threat comparisons are statistically significant. Of potential 
                                                
20 The low-status threat comparison result is 0 (omitted), but it remains statistically significant when 
treating the proportion as a mean (F = 4.94, p = 0.027). 
21 The high-status threat comparison result is 0 (omitted), but it remains statistically significant when 
treating the proportion as a mean (F = 6.32, p = 0.013). 




interest, the combined status condition comparison approaches statistical significance, 
such that those in low-status conditions are more likely to answer this question correctly 
(z = 1.736, p = 0.083). Results are exactly the same when including the not sure 
responses. 
Gender and Controls: Of potential interest, the combined status comparison does 
not approach statistical significance for women only or men only (z = 1.414, p = 0.157; z 
= 1.005, p = 0.315; both two-tailed). Treating this outcome as a mean, when including 
control variables for the full sample, the combined status comparison no longer 
approaches statistical significance.23 
Suspicion Checks 
Several questions toward the end of the study were designed to assess whether 
participants were suspicious about certain elements of the study, and if so, to what extent 
they may have affected participants’ behavior in problematic ways. On the whole, 
participants in the final sample did well on these questions, likely because these questions 
were used to screen for inclusion in the sample. The most stringent criterion was that 
participants acted as though the circumstances were real. Despite the participants in the 
final sample having been judged as not problematically suspicious, performance on the 
suspicion items was not perfect. It makes sense that threatened participants would be the 
most suspicious, because the situation is more complex than the non-threatening 
conditions. However, there was not strong evidence of this, or any other problematic 
differences in suspicion across the conditions. As mentioned above, there are only 
                                                





statistically significant differences across conditions in keeping data rates for women 
only, such that low-self-status cases were more likely to be kept. 
For the probing questions about specific types of suspicion, the proportions 
presented are conditional on the participant indicating “yes” or “not sure” about having 
that type of suspicion. This missing data results in some uneven cell sizes. The tables 
above provide the number of participants included in the calculation of each proportion. 
Due to small cell sizes, especially for the conditional outcomes, many analyses 
including control variables are not available. Instead of detailing each instance, I only 
address control analyses that provide evidence contradicting the main analyses, and I 
provide information about treating indicator variables as means when it provides relevant 
information not otherwise available. 
 
General Suspicion 
Indicating this type of suspicion: Participants were first asked if they were ever 
suspicious about anything in the study not actually being as it was presented. Though the 
response pattern is such that high-status/non-threat participants were especially likely to 
indicate “yes”, the proportions do not differ statistically across the conditions (chi square 
= 4.705, p = 0.195. Perhaps notably, the combined threat condition comparison 
approaches statistical significance, such that the non-threat condition has more 
participants indicating “yes” to this suspicion (z = 1.788, p = 0.074, two-tailed). When 
considering the proportion of “yes” as well as “not sure” responses to this question, 





Gender and Controls: For “yes” responses among women only, the difference 
between the combined non-threat and threat conditions and the threat comparison within 
high-status conditions approaches statistical significance, such that threatened 
participants are more likely to say “yes” to this suspicion (z = 1.896, p = 0.058, two-
tailed; F = 1.749, p = 0.080; both two-tailed). No results are statistically significant 
among the women including “not sure” responses, results for the men only, or full sample 
results including control variables. 
 Indicating whether suspicion affected behavior: Among those participants who 
indicated “yes” or “not sure” about being suspicious about anything in the study not 
actually being as it was presented, they were asked if the suspicion affected their 
behavior during the study. For those indicating “yes” to this question in the full sample, 
proportions do not differ across conditions (chi square = 1.900, p = 0.593) nor in any of 
the specific comparisons. The same is true when including the “not sure” responses. 
Gender and Controls: For women only, when including the “not sure” responses, 
the combined status condition comparison is statistically significant, such that high-status 
participants are more likely to respond affirmatively (z = -1.988, p = 0.047, two-tailed).  
Of potential interest, treating the outcome as a mean, when including control variables for 
the full sample, for the “yes” responses the difference in status coefficients by threat 
approaches statistical significance (chi square = 3.05, p = 0.081).24 
 Whether acted as though real: Participants were then asked whether they acted as 
though the circumstances in the study were real. All participants in the full sample (i.e., 
final and balanced and for both genders) said yes. 
                                                





Question about any suspicion affecting study behavior: End of suspicion question 
series. All participants were asked whether any type of suspicion affected their behavior 
during the study. The proportion of participants indicating “yes” did not differ 
statistically across the conditions (chi square = 3.720, p = 0.293). However, the combined 
status condition comparison approaches statistical significance, such that high-status 
participants are more likely to indicate this (z = -1.745, p = 0.081, two-tailed). When 
including “not sure” along with “yes” responses, the difference in proportions across the 
conditions approaches statistical significance (chi square = 6.431, p = 0.092), the 
combined status condition comparison is statistically significant (z = -2.169, p = 0.030, 
two-tailed), and the status comparison within the non-threat conditions approaches 
statistical significance (z = -1.957, p = 0.050, two-tailed). 
 Gender and Controls: No women said yes to this question, and none of their 
comparisons are statistically significant. For men only, for the responses including “yes” 
and “not sure”, the combined threat condition comparison approaches statistical 
significance, such that threatened participants are less likely to indicate this (z = 1.682, p 
= 0.093, two-tailed), and the combined status comparison approaches statistical 
significance such that high-status participants are more likely to indicate this (z = -1.682, 
p = 0.093, two-tailed). When treating the outcome as a mean, in the full sample including 
controls, for the “yes” responses, the combined status comparison no longer approaches 
statistical significance.25 When including both yes and not sure responses, none of the 
                                                




control results are statistically significant, though the non-threat condition status 
comparison no longer approaches statistical significance. 
Summary Suspicion Scale. A suspicion scale was computed to measure how many 
of the four suspicion questions participants indicated suspicion about. The first measure 
is the number of questions they said yes to. Mean scores do not differ statistically across 
conditions (F = 0.97, p = 0.408) or for any specific comparisons. The same conclusions 
hold when computing this scale with both yes and not sure responses (F = 0.65, p = 
0.584). 
 
Specific Types of Suspicion 
Below I present results for specific suspicion about the partner and information 
presented about the partner. 
Suspicion about the Partner. Indicating this type of suspicion: Participants were 
asked whether they were suspicious about the task partner. Proportions indicating yes did 
not differ statistically across the conditions (chi square = 0.388, p = 0.943), and none of 
the specific comparisons are statistically significant. The same is true for the proportions 
including “not sure” responses. 
 Indicating whether suspicion affected behavior: Proportions indicating yes to this 
type of suspicion affecting their behavior did not differ statistically across the conditions 
(chi square = 2.489, p = 0.477), and none of the specific comparisons are statistically 
significant. However, when including not sure responses, the combined status condition 
comparison approaches statistical significance such that high-status participants are more 




 Gender and Controls: No women indicated yes to this question. For the responses 
including not sure for the women and men only, the overall status comparison does not 
approach statistical significance. For women’s yes along with not sure responses, the 
non-threat condition status comparison approaches statistical significance (z = -1.705, p = 
0.088, two-tailed). For the responses including not sure for the men only, the combined 
threat condition comparison approaches statistical significance, such that threatened 
participants are less likely to indicate this (t = 1.868, p = 0.062, two-tailed). 
Whether acted as though real: Participants were then asked whether they acted as 
though the partner was real. Proportions across conditions do not differ statistically (chi 
square = 3.323, p = 0.345), and none of the specific comparisons are statistically 
significant. All participants asked in the final balanced sample indicated either “yes” or 
“not sure” to this question. 
Gender and Controls: Of potential interest, when treating the “yes” outcome as a 
mean, in the full sample analyses including control variables, the high-status condition 
threat comparison is statistically significant such that threatened participants are less 
likely to indicate this (F = 4.51, p = 0.037).26 
Suspicion about the Partner Information. Indicating this type of suspicion: When 
asked whether they were suspicious about any information provided about the task 
partner, the pattern of results suggests that participants in the high-status conditions are 
more likely to say “yes” that they are suspicious in this way, but neither differences 
across the conditions (chi square = 3.069, p = 0.381) nor any of the contrasts are 
                                                




statistically significant. The same statistical conclusions hold when considering both 
“yes” and “not sure” responses. 
Gender and Controls: For men only, for the “yes” response, the threat condition 
and combined status condition status comparisons approach statistical significance, such 
that high-status participants are more likely to indicate this (z = -1.698, p = 0.090; z = -
1.812, p = 0.070; both two-tailed). 
Indicating whether suspicion affected behavior: Proportions indicating “yes” to 
this type of suspicion affecting their behavior do not differ statistically across the 
conditions (chi square = 2.212, p = 0.530), and none of the specific comparisons are 
statistically significant. When including “not sure” along with “yes” responses, the high-
status condition threat comparison approaches statistical significance, such that 
threatened participants are less likely to indicate this (z = 1.805, p = 0.071, two-tailed). 
Gender and Controls: For men only, none said “yes,” and none of the statistical 
results are statistically significant. In the full sample including control variables, the high-
status threat comparison no longer approaches statistical significance. 
Whether acted as though real: Participants were then asked whether they acted as 
though the partner information was real. Proportions across conditions do not differ 
statistically (chi square = 3.302, p = 0.347), and none of the specific comparisons are 
statistically significant. All participants asked in the final balanced sample indicated 
either “yes” or “not sure” to this question. 
Gender and Controls: Treating this outcome as a mean, when including control 




statistical significance such that high-status participants are less likely to indicate this (t = 
-1.78, p = 0.079, two-tailed).27 
 
Study 2 Discussion 
The Study 2 results provide only minimal statistical support for the predictions. 
With these results taken together, there is little evidence that ingroup prosociality 
increased under threat in terms of adherence to status, and essentially no evidence for 
preference for status orders and cohesion. Predictions 3 is only minimally supported, and 
Prediction 4 is not supported. Most of the support for Prediction 3 is from manipulation 
check and cohesion questions. While I consider how methodological limitations may 
explain the lack of statistically noteworthy results in the direction predicted, I also 
address self-serving motivations as a potential explanation for the observed results, such 
that threatened participants’ responses function to relieve personal anxiety about poor 
group performance. Some results suggest that people may attempt to change status orders 
to suit their needs, or that people at least how they think about those status orders. 
 
Theoretical Considerations 
It is interesting to note that there is some evidence that threat decreased 
importance of earning as many points as possible for high-status participants, which is 
perhaps a status-consistent attitude for high-status individuals. There is also potential 
evidence that rating of trying their best at the task decreased with threat for low-status 
                                                




participants, which does not seem status-consistent. Though unanticipated, some of the 
manipulation check results support Prediction 3, but there is also some evidence in the 
opposite direction. I discuss these results in more detail below.  
Ingroup prosociality decreased under threat in a few noteworthy ways. For 
importance of earning as many points as possible, this was the case for high-status 
participants in the full sample. This was also the case for women alone, and this high-
status comparison likely drove the combined status comparison approach statistical 
significance, and this result to become statistically significant when including control 
variables. None of these threat comparisons were statistically significant for men. For the 
rating of trying best at the group task, for the full sample, the low-status threat 
comparison approached statistical significance, such that threatened participants gave 
lower ratings. There is also potential evidence that for high-status men only, threat 
decreased they extent they reported feeling like part of the group. 
Manipulation check results support Prediction 3 for self-reported contrast 
sensitivity score and for high-status participants, rating of self versus the national average 
and subjective rating. These results suggest increased adherence to the status order 
established — the status order became more pronounced for those participants under 
threat. However, notably, the opposite effect took place for low-status participants for the 
rating of self versus the national average and subjective rating, such that threatened low-
status participants evaluated themselves more highly than non-threatened low-status 
participants. This perhaps suggests under threat, an attempt to mentally create a reality in 
which the group as a whole is more competent than it actually is. This makes sense 




group. This mental strategy could potentially be interpreted as an instance of ingroup 
prosociality.  
However, it is possible that inflating self ability evaluations under threat is a more 
practical, self-serving response to the threat as a situation in which it is more difficult 
than usual to earn profit points. There is evidence that both high- and low-status 
participants inflate their relative and subjective ability evaluations under threat. This 
perhaps functions to relieve personal anxiety about poor group performance. If having a 
higher ability level, and therefore likely performing better on the task, buffers anxiety and 
promotes higher self-esteem, then this is consistent how these outcomes are treated in 
terror management theory (TMT, e.g., Greenberg et al. 1997). This does not support the 
ingroup prosociality worldview explanation proposed in terms of TMT, but it does 
support a self-preservation explanation in terms of TMT.  
Another manipulation check finding suggests potential distancing effects, or 
mental strategies to avoid cognitive dissonance. For the question about feeling personally 
threatened, participants in the threat conditions actually reported feeling less personally 
threatened than those in the non-threat conditions. This pattern in the opposite direction 
predicted suggests a possible distancing or denial process from the threat (e.g., Dechesne 
et al. 2000, see also Study 1 discussion in Chapter 4). This is also interesting because 
though the threat manipulation was designed to be threatening to the group, this apparent 
denial happens at the personal level. This further suggests self-serving motivations over 
ingroup prosocial ones. Questions specifically about ingroup importance were not 
included in Study 2 (though they were in Study 1 and Study 3), but a question about the 




responses provide potential evidence consistent with the self-serving explanation. The 
high-status threat comparison approaches statistical significance in this direction for men 
only (and it becomes statistically significant when including control variables). This 
provides some additional support for the self-serving explanation and potential ingroup 
distancing process. 
Finally, because some interesting patterns arose from initial Study 2 analyses 
suggesting greater deference to low-status group members from high-status group 
members when the group is threatened, I include additional questions about hypothetical 
use of power in Study 3. These questions are relevant to findings discussed above, in that 
on the surface they appear self-serving but also suggest that participants may 
intentionally behave in ways to reconcile threatening realities with more agreeable ones 
(e.g., affect control theory). The hypothetical questions are about use of power, are 
framed from the participant’s perspective as if they were in a position with high power. In 
Study 3, all participants were actually in a low-power position. Use of power behaviors 
are of interest to see how they align with ingroup prosocial worldviews about the 
legitimacy of power and maximizing total resources for members of the group. See 
Chapter 7 for details about these research methods. 
 
Methodological Considerations 
Results were not expected to differ between genders, but as discussed above, 
some of them did. Under threat, women were especially status-consistent in terms of 
importance of earning points as a cohesion outcome, while there is potential evidence that 




same-gender partner procedure matching was intended to eliminate this potential status 
differential between partners (a diffuse status characteristic, e.g., Berger et al. 1977), 
responses could have differed simply depending on the partner’s gender. In other words, 
there could have been something about having a man or woman partner that affected 
responses, regardless of the participant’s gender. Those were the only statistical results 
noted. Of potential interest, many directions of result patterns (addressed above, mostly 
not statistically significant) also differed between men and women. 
It would be of interest to repeat this study with a larger sample for more statistical 
power, with same-gender samples for greater homogeneity, and with a manipulation of 
the partner’s gender. A gender manipulation would also be of interest in terms of 
legitimacy in Study 3 (see Chapter 8). However, it is noteworthy that the directions of 
results did not reflect consistent patterns in support of or against the predictions. 
Directions varied across the outcomes, directions and significance varied by gender, and 
this was also the case for the analyses including control variables. This leads me to 
conclude that the lack of statistically significant results indicates a lack of support for the 
predictions more so than a lack of statistical power. This being said, evaluating these 
patterns with larger samples may allow researchers to identify patterns to expect for 
certain behaviors and orientations in future work, and perhaps to develop a more nuanced 
explanation of the relationship between threat and status processes. The decreases in 
ingroup prosociality and potentially increased status-consistent attitudes discussed above 
may be an interesting starting point. 
It is possible that this experiment did not clearly support the predictions because 




manipulation check questions about feeling threatened was not particularly strong, and 
differed between men and women. At least one participant mentioned the relatively low 
dollar amount at stake, implying that a higher dollar amount would have helped them 
become more emotionally invested. It would be of interest to test this with higher stakes 
(within reason, of course). Because of the suggestive results from the manipulation 
checks and cohesion outcomes about mentally constructing more status-consistent 
realities under threat, this seems to be a viable explanation for the lack of results. The 
evidence is not strong enough to determine that the theory does not apply for status 
processes, especially considering the Study 3 results (see Chapter 8). Based on these 
considerations, I suggest that future work aim to further test the Study 2 predictions. 
The exact wording used in the threat compared to the control conditions could 
have conceivably affected participants’ responses. While the control condition refers to 
other groups scoring a high number of points, the threat condition refers to earning. The 
exact phrasing, with earns versus scores, is “When a group earns a high number of points, 
it takes away from the ability of other groups to earn a high payment.” While the words 
are roughly synonyms in this context, it is possible that earning was received more 
positively than scoring, and therefore this diminished the threat response. While it seems 
more likely that the threat manipulation was weak for other reasons, it is possible that this 
inconsistency in wording contributed to the lack of effects observed. 
 Because this study used deception, and participants acting as though the situation 
was real is key to data quality, a noteworthy amount of data were rejected. Analyses only 
include data kept by the strictest standards, and some of these cases were dropped to 




82.08% (229 of 279), and there were no less than 70% accepted within each gender and 
condition combination, with the exception of men in the low-status threat condition 
(66.67%). I address differences in these rates across conditions, to assess whether they 
may have biased results. This being said, I made efforts to be as consistent as possible in 
these decisions, and based on the present and preliminary analyses, I do not expect that 
this notably affected the study conclusions. 
 It is also worth noting that there were a fair number of technical issues with the 
group task, and this contributed to the relatively high data rejection rate. The most 
common comment from participants was issues with the images showing up. A few early 
participants also experienced long wait times for the partner matching stage, before the 
clarity of these instructions was improved. The technical issues could potentially 
undermine the validity of the group task and status manipulations. Though the 
manipulation check results showed that the status manipulation was relatively effective, 
these technical issues still could have undermined the credibility of the scores presented. 
Some participants in the Study 2 and 3 pretest pool reported missing pretest questions due 
to issues with the images showing up. While this is a shortcoming of the data presented, it 
is of interest to consider methodological as well as theoretical reasons why results were 
largely not as predicted.  
 
Summary 
 Study 2 provides only minimal statistical support for Prediction 3, and none for 
Prediction 4. The lack of statistically noteworthy results as predicted may suggest that the 




processes in groups, at least in terms of behavioral responses and most subjective partner 
evaluations. However, there are also some serious methodological limitations, and a 
potential alternative explanation for the results observed. First, this lack of results 
supporting the theory as predicted is potentially explained by weak reception of the threat 
manipulation, as well as the sample being split by gender, and several reported technical 
and graphical issues. Second, there was some evidence for effects in the opposite 
direction predicted that suggest that a self-serving motivation explanation may be more 
appropriate than the proposed explanation about ingroup prosociality worldviews. 
Importantly, both explanations are consistent with terror management theory (TMT). 
Results from Study 3 provide further insight into the status processes Study 2 attempted 




Chapter 7:  Study 3 Methods, Data, and Analyses (Status and 
Promoting the Legitimacy of Power) 
 
In this chapter, I describe the methods, data, and analyses for Study 3, on status and the 
legitimacy of power in groups. 
Under threat, I predict a wider gap in perceptions of legitimacy between low- and 
high-status actors in power (Prediction 5). 
Methods 
Like Study 2, the study was presented to participants as “Critical Choice and 
Group Interaction” to prevent suspicion about the group task and the purpose of the 
research. Participants were led to believe that they were exchanging points with other 
participants in a network, and their payment amount depended on their performance (all 
participants actually received the maximum possible amount). Participation was 
estimated to take about 50 minutes, and the study paid $7 (presented as a $5 minimum, 
with up to $2 via MTurk bonus). This study followed a 2x2 design, manipulating threat 
(threat in instructions versus absence) and status relationship in the group (high-status 
self with low-status other versus low-status self with high-status other). Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. All participants were ostensibly in the 
low-power position. All participants in Study 3 were women from the U.S. By 






The screening process for the Study 3 participants was the same as that for Study 
2, but only included women (Study 2 included approximately equal numbers of both men 
and women), and also some participants who expressed some suspicion about group 
studies on MTurk. There were two reasons for including women only. First, there are 
more U.S. women than men on MTurk (e.g., Ross et al. 2010), and this reflected in a 
larger proportion of women in the screener pool than men. Second, and important for 
dynamics within and participant assumptions about the group, within a four-person 
network group, men and women paired with same-gender powerful actors would be 
likely to make different assumptions about the genders of the other network actors. For 
example, if a woman participant were matched with a fictitious powerful actor partner in 
Position A, she may assume that the other low-status actors in Positions B and C are 
likely to be men, assuming approximately a 50/50 chance that a given participant is a 
man or a woman. Likewise, a man participant with a man partner may assume the other 
participants are women. For the woman participant, she is likely to think men are 
endorsing (or not) a high-power woman’s power, and for the man participant, he is likely 
to think women are endorsing (or not) a high-power man’s power. As the status 
characteristics and expectation states literatures have established, gender functions as a 
diffuse status characteristic (e.g., Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2001). While sharing full 
information about the other group members may have in part resolved this issue, 
believability would have been a notable barrier. The narrative that participants only 




women only in the Study 3 sample was also advantageous because men and women 
sometimes diverged in their response patterns in the Study 2 results, so assessing a more 
homogenous group with higher numbers would increase statistical power. However, this 
comes at the disadvantage of only being able to generalize to women. 
 The Study 3 sample also includes those who expressed some suspicion about 
deception in group studies. However, none of the participants who indicated high levels 
of suspicion were included. Some participants in Study 2 expressed suspicion about the 
study, despite none of them expressing these suspicions in the screener. While including 
these participants may have increased the number of cases rejected due to suspicion, it 
was not expected to significantly undermine the quality of the data. With more time and 
resources devoted to screening, all participants ideally would have been screened as 
likely to be naïve about group studies (e.g., Rinderknecht 2015). It would be of interest to 
compare the data rejection rates due between Studies 2 and 3, and consider how 




As in Study 2, the pretest functions as the status manipulation. Using Turkitron 
questionnaire link randomization, participants were assigned to one of two versions of the 
questionnaire (adapted from Rinderknecht and Doan 2016) that at the end revealed either 
a high score (18 out of 20, in the superior range) or a low score (7 out of 20, in the poor 




group task — the partner always had the opposite score, creating either a low-self or 
high-self status order. 
The Study 3 sample includes some participants who screened as missing one of 
the CS pretest questions. By comparison, Study 2 only includes a few men screened as 
such who participated later. When missing only one question, the manipulation scores of 
7 or 18 are still plausible. However, any participant screened as missing two or more 
questions was eliminated from the participant pool. 
 Because there were initially more women in the pretested participant pool 
assigned to the high-status condition than assigned to the low-status condition, I 
conducted another wave of pretesting and screening to increase the size of the pool. I 
intentionally assigned the low-status condition more often than before (briefly with a 
probability of 1, and then with a probability of 0.667). As a result, it is likely that more 
low-status participants in Study 3 would have expressed suspicion about group studies 
and/or missed a question on the pretest. I included indicator variables for each of these 
flags, and I assessed them as potential control variables. 
 
Group Study 
Eligible participants were invited to participate in a group study, much like the 
Study 2 group study. Some previous nonrespondents from the Study 2 pool were invited 
to participate in Study 3. Participants read instructions about the fictitious network task, 
and learned about power in network structures and negotiating resources. They also 
received information about their pretest performance (self status manipulation), network 




network connection (partner status manipulation). These power and status manipulations 
are described in more detail below 
 
Low-Power Manipulation (All Conditions)  
 
All participants were led to believe they are randomly assigned to a network 
structure and a low-power position within this network (B, along with C and D, see figure 
below) (design of Lucas, Younts, Lovaglia, and Markovsky 2001 as adapted in Lucas et 
al. manuscript in process).  
 
Figure 2. Study 3 Network Structure 
 
 
Solid lines connect negotiation dyads. Position A has three potential dyads, while B, C, 
and D each has only one. In each round, each dyad must decide how to distribute 20 
points. If they are unable to reach an agreement, the points disappear. There are only two 
total agreements allowed each round, meaning at least one of the low-power actors (B, C, 
or D) is left out. There is a point bonus for all actors when all possible agreements take 




 The instructions explained in detail why Position A is the most powerful. Position 
A can largely determine how many points are agreed upon, because A can easily choose 
to accept a better offer from someone else. It is usually better for B, C, or D to try to get 
some points rather than risk being left out, and receiving none. Because A largely 
determines the resource distribution, and whether all possible agreements take place 
(which benefits the whole group), it is clear that A is in a position of power, and B, C, 
and D have little power. 
 One possible limitation to this power manipulation is that low-power actors have 
less information about the interactions throughout the task than high-power actors do, 
because participants only see information about those they are exchanging with. Lawler, 
Thye, and Yoon (2008, as cited in Lucas and Schooler 2012, unpublished), propose that 
having more information about exchanges in one’s network promotes commitment to the 
group. I believe that the high-power actor’s knowledge advantage reasonably comes with 
the high-power position, and it may serve to make power more salient. To help increase 
believability, I showed (fictitious) total numbers of points earned by each network 
member at the end of the series of rounds. 
 
Status Manipulation 
As described above, in the pretesting stage, participants learned their own contrast 
sensitivity ability score out of 20, along with information scoring standards (7 being a 
poor score, 18 being superior). At the beginning of the group task, when consenting to 
share their demographic and score information with the fictitious others, their score and 




 Once participants were assigned to a network in the group study portion, they read 
in the instructions that partners directly connected will learn each other’s demographic 
and score information. Because the participant was always assigned to position B, the 
participant learned information about the high-power actor in position A. To create a 
status order as in Study 2, position A is presented as having the opposite level of score 
the participant does — Position A is high-status with 17 points out of 20 for participants 
in the low-self-status condition, and Position A is low-status with 7 points out of 20 for 
participants in the high-self-status condition. As in Study 2, the actor in Position A was 
presented as a 27-year-old matched on the participant’s gender, because including only 
test results might have aroused suspicion. 
 
Threat Manipulation 
Participants then received a threat manipulation similar to Study 1 and Study 2. 
Like Study 2, the situation was presented as directly relevant to the group task — the 
threat condition presented a risk of undermining the group’s ability to earn a high 
payment. This is an existential type of risk integrated as part of the group task, based on 
Barclay and Benard (2013). 
  In the control condition, there was no mention of any threat to the group. In the 
threat condition, there was a given percentage chance presented before each round that all 
group resources (profit points) would be eliminated, and as a result no one would earn 






Before each round of exchange, a risk level from 0-100% will be established. It 
changes every round. This risk level is the chance that all resources are 
eliminated for that round — meaning that all participants and the group as a 
whole will earn zero points for that round. This is a threat to your group. It 
simulates situations in the social world like destruction of group resources at the 
hands of hostile out-groups, loss of food due to overuse of natural resources, and 
failure to respond effectively to natural disasters like hurricanes, floods, or forest 
fires. You will know that there is a chance of this happening, and what the risk is 
at the beginning of each round. 
 
 
The threat manipulation was further reinforced with guided-thinking questions 
similar to Study 1 and Study 2. The control condition situation and guided-thinking 
questions (each requiring a written response of at least 100 characters) are as follows: 
 
Control condition text: 
 
Each round, members of your network group are negotiating how to distribute 
pools of resources. If group members agree, up to two exchanges can take place. 




What do you think about being a member of your task group in this situation? 
 
What is it like for you personally to be a member of your task group in this 
situation? 
 
How do you feel about being a member of your task group in this situation? 
 
 
The threat condition situation and questions are as follows: 
 





Each round, members of your network group are negotiating how to distribute 
pools of resources. If group members agree, up to two exchanges can take place. 
The more exchanges that take place, the more points all members of the network 
group earn. 
 
However, each round there is a 0-100% chance that all resources from that round 
will be eliminated. This means that all participants and the group as a whole will 
earn zero points for that round. This is a threat to your group, and simulates 
situations like destruction of group resources by hostile out-groups, loss of food 
due to overuse of natural resources, and failure to respond effectively to natural 
disasters like hurricanes, floods, or forest fires. 
 
 
What do you think about being a member of your task group in this threatening 
situation? 
 
What is it like for you personally to be a member of your task group in this 
threatening situation? 
 




Like Study 2 and for the same reasons, Study 3 did not include a distracting task 
between the threat and group task — the threat manipulation transitioned immediately to 
final instructions for the group task. 
 
Procedures Continued 
Participants were given a summary of the network task instructions, including 
condition-relevant reminders (position in network, response type results, and rules 
reflecting the threat manipulation). They completed five rounds of negotiation exchanges, 
and are led to anticipate another set of five rounds (though these do not happen). The 
simulated high-power actor in Position A was programmed to demand progressively 




one of the rounds. Participants answered a series of questions about the task and 
impressions of their partner, and were given the opportunity to vote for or against joining 
a coalition to remove some of A’s power for the following rounds. After this, participants 
were asked manipulation-check questions and debriefed. 
 
Study 3 Data 
 The final, balanced Study 3 sample includes data from 204 participants. Study 3 
includes data from women only (Study 1 and Study 2 were mixed-gender), and they were 
selected later from the same pool of potential participants as most of the Study 2 
participants. As in Study 2, preference was given to those not indicating suspicion about 
the validity of group studies on MTurk, but the Study 3 sample was more inclusive of 
these participants because of retention challenges toward the end of this data collection. 
Participants in the group study were required to complete both the screener and pretest 
beforehand. As in Study 2, group study data were merged with screener responses and 
any flags noted from the screener and pretest stages. 
 The criteria for keeping data in the final sample were also loosened as in Study 2. 
I determined that it was not reasonable to expect great success with threat manipulation 
checks, so I was lenient with these. I reassessed these data rejection criteria during the 
data analysis process. These decisions highlight how the threat instructions were likely 
more complex for the participants, so it makes sense that they were more difficult to 
describe accurately. By keeping only the most attentive participants in the threat 
conditions (the ones who can describe them most accurately) and having more lenient 




However, because these decisions were made consistently across the conditions, this was 
not expected to severely undermine the quality of the data. I assessed responses to 
questions about the threat and status manipulations in the manipulation checks section in 
Chapter 8. 
 
Data Acceptance and Quality 
Of all collected cases (excluding those resulting from administrative error, and 
without any balancing across conditions), the acceptance rate by the strictest standards 
did not vary statistically across conditions (chi square = 3.420, p = 0.331). The overall 
acceptance rate is 91.91%. The rate for condition 1 is 93.55%, condition 2 is 89.47%, 
condition 3 is 88.14%, and condition 4 is 96.49%. However, the acceptance rate by looser 
standards is higher, at 96.60%. This rate accepted some participants who expressed that 
suspicion affected their behavior in certain ways or they did not act as though real. For 
the looser acceptance outcome, the difference across conditions approached statistical 
significance (chi square = 7.271, p = 0.064). The looser acceptance rates are as follows: 
condition 1 is 100%, condition 2 is 96.49%, condition 3 is 91.52%, and condition 4 is 
98.25%. 
I explain my balancing procedures for the final, balanced sample for Study 3. 
Between 51 and 58 cases per condition were accepted by the strictest standards. For 
condition 1 (low-status participant with high-status partner, without threat), the count was 
58, for condition 2 (low-status self with threat) it was 51, for condition 3 (high-status self 
without threat) it was 52, and for condition 4 (high-status self with threat) it was 55. 




conditions were roughly balanced. Instead, I randomly drop cases from the final sample, 
such that each condition has 51 total cases, to balance the final sample. This is the same 
approach used within each gender-experimental condition group in Study 2.  
 
Assessment of the Study 3 Sample 
See Appendix 3 for a list of control and outcome measures included in the Study 
3 analyses. In the final balanced sample, a few variables were uneven across conditions, 
which could have been potentially problematic in terms of isolating causality. See the 
tables and description of analyses below. 
 
 
Table 11: Study 3 Demographics and Data Quality 
 
Study 3 Demographics 













Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
Hispanic/Latino 
indicator 
0.078   0.059   0.039   0.059   




0.020   0.039   0.059   0.020   
  51   51   51   51 
Black/African 
American indicator 
0.059   0.078   0.098   0.098   
  51   51   51   51 
East Asian indicator 
0.020   0.000   0.000   0.059   
  51   51   51   51 
White/Caucasian 
indicator 
0.941   0.902   0.902   0.863   
  51   51   51   51 
Other race/ethnicity 
indicator 
0.000   0.020   0.000   0.020   
  51   51   51   51 
Racial/ethnic minority 
indicator 
0.157   0.176   0.176   0.176   
  51   51   51   51 
How often use MTurk 
to make basic ends 
meet 
4.863 1.456 4.961 1.822 4.706 1.487 4.549 1.604 




Study 3 Demographics 













Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
Highest education in 
household 
3.725 2.040 3.902 2.394 3.804 2.136 3.392 1.823 
  51   51   51   51 
Social class rating 
3.275 1.078 3.176 0.974 3.157 1.027 3.294 0.986 
  51   51   51   51 
Age in years 
37.647 10.974 40.490 13.949 40.686 11.153 37.235 11.803 
  51   51   51   51 
Indicates worked w/ 
other MTurkers - yes 
0.275   0.471   0.431   0.529   
  51   51   51   51 
Indicates worked w/ 
other MTurkers - 
yes/not sure 
0.549   0.647   0.569   0.667   
  51   51   51   51 
Indicates worked w/ 
other MTurkers - not 
sure 
0.275   0.176   0.137   0.137   
  51   51   51   51 
Self-reported 
completion time est. in 
minutes (recoded) 
50.660 21.855 47.440 13.539 48.843 11.890 50.140 11.949 
  50   50   51   50 
Flag for issues noted 
during study 
0.020   0.039   0.020   0.059   
  51   51   51   51 
Flag for comment 
indicating potential 
issue at end of group 
study 
0.137   0.157   0.235   0.294   
  51   51   51   51 
Flag - potential 
doubt/further scrutiny 
about keeping data 
0.039   0.176   0.059   0.059   
  51   51   51   51 
Flag for missed 
questions/technical 
trouble during pretest 
0.373   0.216   0.392   0.235   
  51   51   51   51 
Flag for suspicion 
about group studies 
indicated during 
screener 
0.235   0.157   0.020   0.098   




0.980   1.000   0.980   1.000   
  51   51   51   51 
Tried best during 
study 
1.000   0.980   0.980   1.000   
  51   51   51   51 
 
 
Study 3 Demographics 
and Data Quality 
Combined low-
status self 








(1 and 3) 
Combined threat 
conditions (2 and 
4) 
Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
Hispanic/Latino 
indicator 
0.069   0.049   0.059   0.059   




0.029   0.039   0.039   0.029   
  102   102   102   102 
Black/African 
American indicator 
0.069   0.098   0.078   0.088   




Study 3 Demographics 
and Data Quality 
Combined low-
status self 








(1 and 3) 
Combined threat 
conditions (2 and 
4) 
Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
East Asian indicator 
0.010   0.029   0.010   0.029   
  102   102   102   102 
White/Caucasian 
indicator 
0.922   0.882   0.922   0.882   
  102   102   102   102 
Other race/ethnicity 
indicator 
0.010   0.010   0.000   0.020   
  102   102   102   102 
Racial/ethnic minority 
indicator 
0.167   0.176   0.167   0.176   
  102   102   102   102 
How often use MTurk 
to make basic ends 
meet 
4.912 1.642 4.627 1.541 4.784 1.467 4.755 1.720 
  102   102   102   102 
Highest education in 
household 
3.814 2.215 3.598 1.986 3.765 2.079 3.647 2.132 
  102   102   102   102 
Social class rating 
3.225 1.024 3.225 1.004 3.216 1.050 3.235 0.977 
  102   102   102   102 
Age in years 
39.069 12.569 38.961 11.556 39.167 11.114 38.863 12.960 
  102   102   102   102 
Indicates worked w/ 
other MTurkers - yes 
0.373   0.480   0.353   0.500   
  102   102   102   102 
Indicates worked w/ 
other MTurkers - 
yes/not sure 
0.598   0.618   0.559   0.657   
  102   102   102   102 
Indicates worked w/ 
other MTurkers - not 
sure 
0.225   0.137   0.206   0.157   
  102   102   102   102 
Self-reported 
completion time est. in 
minutes (recoded) 
49.050 18.159 49.485 11.877 49.743 17.481 48.790 12.776 
  100   101   101   100 
Flag for issues noted 
during study 
0.029 0.170 0.039 0.195 0.020 0.139 0.049 0.217 
  102   102   102   102 
Flag for comment 
indicating potential 
issue at end of group 
study 
0.147   0.265   0.186   0.225   
  102   102   102   102 
Flag - potential 
doubt/further scrutiny 
about keeping data 
0.108   0.059   0.049   0.118   
  102   102   102   102 
Flag for missed 
questions/technical 
trouble during pretest 
0.294   0.314   0.382   0.225   
  102   102   102   102 
Flag for suspicion 
about group studies 
indicated during 
screener 
0.196   0.059   0.127   0.127   




0.990   0.990   0.980   1.000   
  102   102   102   102 
Tried best during 
study 
0.990   0.990   0.990   0.990   






These analyses identified potentially problematic variables as the indicator for 
“not sure” having previous experience working in a group on MTurk, a flag variable 
indicating potential doubt or further scrutiny about whether to keep the case in the data, a 
flag variable indicating comments about a potential issue at the end of the group study, a 
flag variable indicating suspicion expressed about group studies during the screener, and 
a flag variable indicating missed questions or technical trouble during the pretest. 
Because earlier cases may have been more likely to be flagged for quality review after 
the group study, later cases may be more likely to have been flagged during the screener 
or pretest, and some conditions filled faster than others, these last three variables should 
be interpreted with caution. 
For the proportion indicating “yes” to having previous experience working in a 
group on MTurk, the comparison across all conditions approaches statistical significance 
(chi square = 7.435, p = 0.059). Differences are statistically significant between 
conditions 1 versus 2, 1 versus 4, and the combined non-threat and threat conditions (1 
and 3 versus 2 and 4) (chi square = 4.12, p = 0.042; chi square = 6.70, p = 0.010; z = -
2.124, p = 0.034, two-tailed). For the proportion indicating “not sure” to having previous 
experience working in a group on MTurk, proportions across the conditions do not differ 
statistically (chi square = 4.325, p = 0.228), but the differences between conditions 1 
versus 3 and 1 versus 4 approach statistical significance (chi square = 2.84, p = 0.092 for 
both comparisons). For the proportion providing comments about a potential issue at the 
end of the group study, proportions across the conditions do not differ statistically (chi 
square = 4.917, p = 0.178), but the combined status condition comparison is statistically 




4 approaches statistical significance (chi square = 3.57, p = 0.059). For the proportion 
flagged for potential doubt or further scrutiny about whether to keep the case in the data, 
proportions across the conditions differ statistically (chi square = 7.893, p = 0.048). The 
comparison between conditions 1 versus 2 is statistically significant (chi square = 4.20, p 
= 0.041), and the comparisons between conditions 2 versus 4 and 2 versus 3, and the 
combined non-threat and threat conditions approach statistical significance (chi square = 
3.10, p = 0.078; chi square = 3.10, p = 0.078; z = -1.773, p = 0.076, two-tailed). For the 
proportion flagged for expressing suspicion about group studies during the screener, 
proportions across the conditions differ statistically (chi square = 11.461, p = 0.009). 
Comparisons between conditions 1 versus 3, 2 versus 3, and 1 versus 4, and the 
comparison between the combined low-status and high-status conditions are statistically 
significant (chi square = 6.62, p = 0.010; chi square = 4.26, p = 0.039; chi square = 3.27, 
p = 0.070; z = 2.939, p = 0.003, two-tailed). For the proportion flagged for missed 
questions or technical trouble during the pretest, proportions do not differ statistically 
across the conditions (chi square = 6.025, p = 0.110). Comparisons between conditions 1 
versus 2, 3 versus 4, and 2 versus 3 approach statistical significance (chi square = 2.97, p 
= 0.085; chi square = 2.87, p = 0.090; chi square = 3.67, p = 0.055), and the combined 
status non-threat and threat condition comparison is statistically significant (z = 2.436, p 
= 0.015, two-tailed). 
 Other characteristics examined but not statistically significant across conditions or 
in any contrasts in the full (balanced) sample are Hispanic/Latino indicator (chi square = 
0.708, p = 0.871), American Indian/Alaska Native (chi square = 1.627, p = 0.653, Black 




p = 0.568), indicator for any racial or ethnic minority indicated (any option other than 
White or Caucasian) (chi square = 0.104, p = 0.991), education level (F = 0.65, p = 
0.5829), frequency of using MTurk to make basic ends meet (F = 0.56, p = 0.641), social 
class (F = 0.23, p = 0.873), completion time estimate (recoded version) (F = 0.44, p = 
0.725), flag for yes or not sure indicated for having previously worked with other 
MTurkers on a task (chi square = 2.139,  p = 0.544 ), and flag for potential participant 
issue (e.g., having to restart or reporting another problem during the study — with very 
serious cases being rejected from the final sample) (chi square = 1.627, p = 0.653). Age 
in years age (F = 1.18, p = 0.320), correct response to the attention check question (chi 
square = 2.020, p = 0.568), and whether the participant reported trying their best during 
the study (chi square = 2.020, p = 0.568) were also considered, and determined not to be 
problematic. No participants in the full, balanced sample identified as Native Hawaiian or 
Pacific Islander, South American Indigenous or Native, South Asian, Southeast Asian, or 
West Asian or Middle Eastern, and none were flagged for identification code match or 
other administrative issues on the participant’s end. 
For the East Asian indicator, proportions did not differ statistically across the 
conditions in the full sample (chi square = 6.120, p = 0.106), and though the difference of 
proportion logistic regression analyses did not reveal any statistical differences, initial 
contrasts using differences of means and linear regression did (conditions 2 versus 4, and 
conditions 3 versus 4, both F = 4.64, p = 0.032). These initial results are why East Asian 








Outcome measures assessed perceptions of legitimacy of the power structure, 
acting according to this legitimacy structure, and motivations for exercising power. The 
primary behavioral indicator of perceived legitimacy of power was the proportion of 
participants voting for or against joining a coalition to remove some of the powerful 
partner’s power. The instructions specified that all three low-power actors (B, C, and D) 
must vote in favor of the coalition for it to take place. The figure below shows the 
coalition structure: 
 




This structure would ensure more points on average for the low-power actors (B, C, and 
D), but it does not allow for the bonus points when all possible exchanges take place. If 
actor A uses the power competently in the standard structure, everyone, including the 
low-power actors, would end up with more points. Because of this, the low-power actors 
should only vote to join the coalition if they do not trust actor A to use it competently. As 
in Lucas et al. (manuscript in progress), I expect this to reflect perceptions of legitimacy. 
 A higher proportion of participants with low-status partners voting in favor of 
joining a coalition than participants with high-status powerful partners would suggest that 




Participants voted and confirm their vote after a series of questions about the 
partner’s legitimacy, both before and after the network exchange. Voting both before and 
after allows distinction between participants’ expectations and perceptions of legitimate 
use of power, and confirming the votes after questions reflecting attitudes about the high-
power actor and the situation allows for determination of whether answering these 
questions affected the participants’ voting behaviors. 
Perceptions and expectations of legitimacy were measured with ratings of how 
fairly, legitimately, competently and according to the rules the participant expected the 
powerful actor to use their power before the task, and how the partner used their power 
after the task. As in Study 2, questions also asked about cohesion (feeling as part of the 
group) and wanting to work with the partner again. Several of these measures were 
combined into scales. The pre-group task perception of partner legitimacy scale 
(Chronbach’s α = 0.919 includes the following partner expectation items: partner 
motivated to benefit group during task, network positions structured how they should be, 
partner should be in high-status position, partner use power in ways to benefit group, 
partner use power appropriately, partner use power fairly, partner use power selfishly 
(reverse-coded), partner use power competently, partner use power according to informal 
rules and norms, partner use powers in way should use it, partner is competent, trust 
partner, rating of partner’s contrast sensitivity ability, and wanting to work with the 
partner again. These corresponding measures are also computed for the post-group task 
partner legitimacy scale (Chronbach’s α = 0.937). Three individual legitimacy items did 




separately. These are (both pre- and post-group task): partner motivated to benefit self 
during task, extent think partner use power, and partner use power to benefit self. 
 Another behavioral indicator of acceptance of power measured was quantity (total 
or average) of points the participant offered to the partner during the negotiations. 
Offering more points to the high-power partner (while demanding fewer for oneself) 
would reflect deference to the partner’s power. I predict that participants will act 
according to the legitimacy structure, such that low-status participants will accept fewer 
points than high-status participants, and this difference will be greater under threat 
(Prediction 5). This was considered alongside the measures of points offered. Participants 
were asked about perceptions of A’s motives for using power, particularly selfishness 
versus ingroup prosociality. High-status participants with low-status Partner A attributing 
more selfishness to A than low-status participants with high-status Partner A would also 
support Prediction 5. Support for these predictions would suggest greater adherence to 
legitimacy of power as a worldview when under threat. 
 As in Study 1 and Study 2, scales are computed from questions also address 
feeling personally threatened (Chronbach’s α = 0.948) and feeling threatened in terms of 
the group (Chronach’s α = 0.950). 
Because some interesting patterns arose from initial Study 2 analyses suggesting 
greater deference to low-status group members from high-status group members when 
the group is threatened, I included additional questions about hypothetical use of power. 
Among these are rating of extent to which the participant would use power, using it 
prosocially, using it selfishly, and a hypothetical point offer to the partner as if the power 




one’s group when under threat. Responses to questions about cohesion (i.e., feeling part 
of one’s group) may also provide insight. 
 
Study 3 Analyses 
As in Study 2, the comparisons of demographics and outcome measures across 
conditions used tests of differences between conditions and regression analyses as 
described in the Analyses Overview section in Chapter 2. For continuous outcome 
variables, these tests accommodated means (e.g., t-test and linear regression), and for 
indicator outcome variables, these tests accommodated proportions (e.g., prtest in Stata 
and logistic regression). When the comparisons between conditions included control 
variables (control models specified below), the coefficient of the experimental condition 
(status or threat manipulation) within a regression model or a post-estimation test of 
differences of marginal means represented this statistical comparison. If the main 
analyses were initially regression models, control variables were simply added for the 
control model analyses.  
To test my initial assumption that people treat high-status partners as more 
legitimate than low-status partners (and occupying the complementary status position), I 
compared the behavioral (e.g., voting) and legitimacy rating scores across the status 
conditions within each respective threat condition, and also pooled the results to test both 
low-status partner conditions (non-threat and threat) against both high-status partner 
conditions. If the differences of means are statistically significant such that those in the 




their partners as higher in legitimacy than those in the low-status positions, these results 
would support this initial assumption.  
 To test Prediction 5, that threats increase status-consistent legitimacy behaviors 
and evaluations, I tested for differences in means between the non-threat and threat 
conditions within the respective status conditions. Status-consistent responses are treating 
with more legitimacy and ratings of higher legitimacy among participants with high-
status partners, and the opposite for participants with low-status partners. Statistically 
significant threat comparisons in the predicted directions would support Prediction 5. 
Differences in the threat coefficients by status were also tested using the suest procedure 
in Stata (help suest), to assess whether the threat effect statistically differs between the 
participants with high- compared to low-status partners. The test statistic is chi-square, 
which is a one-tailed test. Because the test is directional, the statistical significance 
threshold is adjusted in the direction predicted, with p < 0.10 being the threshold for 
statistical significance, and p <0.20 being the threshold for approaching statistical 
significance. Statistically significant differences of coefficients in the direction predicted 
would support Prediction 5. 
  
Study 3 Control Models 
Based on the above results assessing the Study 3 sample, the following variables 
were included in control analyses, which were compared with the main results: 
 - East Asian indicator 
 - Previous MTurk group participation “yes” indicator 
- Previous MTurk group participation “not sure” indicator 




- Flag for potential doubt or further scrutiny about whether to keep the case in the 
data 
- Flag for expressing suspicion about group studies during the screener 
- Flag for missed questions or technical trouble during the pretest 
 
As in Study 1 and Study 2, in the event the statistical software excluded any of 
these variables due to colinearity, results from the remaining model were presented. As 
discussed above, East Asian was included based on differences between conditions found 
in initial analyses. Including this variable was not expected to decrease the validity of 





Chapter 8:  Study 3 Results and Discussion 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the results from Study 3, on the legitimacy of power 
structures in groups. All participants were led to believe they were in a position of low 
power, while their partner is in a position of high power.  
Results provide a great deal support for Prediction 5, that threat increases the 
promotion of power legitimately held (by high-status actors), and that high-status 
participants with powerful low-status partners especially respond. There is also some 
support for more general ingroup prosociality and cohesion effects under threat. Further, 
there is some potential evidence that low-status participants with powerful high-status 
partners are opposed to their partner’s power before the group task, but after they were 
more so in favor of it. The results suggest that high-status participants are especially 
invested in promoting the legitimacy of power, and they perhaps felt indignant about the 
low-status partner’s powerful position and selfish behavior. By comparison, the pattern in 
results for low-status participants suggests that their responses were more so practical in 
terms of the network task than internalizing a worldview about the legitimacy of power 
by status. I consider an alternative explanation to the ingroup prosociality worldview 
about the legitimacy of power, such that participants act in self-interested ways to 
maximize their own profit points. 
Variables included in the control models are as follows: 
- East Asian indicator 
 - Previous MTurk group participation “yes” indicator 
- Previous MTurk group participation “not sure” indicator 
- Flag for comment indicating potential issue at end of group study 
- Flag for potential doubt or further scrutiny about whether to keep the case in the 
data 




- Flag for missed questions or technical trouble during the pretest 
 
Initial Assumption: Status increases Legitimacy 
 I first test my initial assumption that high status increases treatment of powerful 
actors as legitimate, and low status decreases treatment of powerful actors as legitimate. 
The results somewhat support this assumption (especially for subjective legitimacy 
evaluations), and they are detailed below. Unless otherwise specified, conclusions did not 
change when including control variables in these analyses. See tables below for means 
across conditions and condition combinations. 
 Legitimacy Evaluation Scale: For the scale summarizing partner legitimacy 
evaluations before the group task, low-status participants evaluated their high-status 
partners as more legitimate than high-status participants evaluated their low-status 
partners (combined means t = 8.169, p < 0.001, two-tailed; non-threat means F = 34.00, p 
< 0.001; threat means (F = 32.17, p < 0.001). For the scale summarizing partner 
legitimacy evaluations after the group task, the results also statistically support the 
assumption (combined means t = 5.280, p < 0.001, two-tailed; non-threat means F = 8.62, 
p = 0.004; threat means F = 20.97, p < 0.001). For the change in these legitimacy ratings 
from before to after the task the non-threat condition status comparison approaches 
statistical significance (F = 2.81, p = 0.095). 
 Vote for a coalition before the group task: Participants received four total 
opportunities to vote in favor of or against a coalition against the powerful actor — twice 
before the group task, and twice after (and ostensibly before another series of rounds). 




their perceptions of legitimacy, and again after (in case answering those questions affects 
thinking about the powerful actor and in turn voting). 
 For the first vote before the group task, there were no statistically significant 
differences by status condition (combined proportions z = 0.000, p = 1.000; non-threat 
proportions z = 0.204, p = 0.839; threat proportions z = -0.198, p = 0.843). The non-threat 
condition status comparison was in the opposite direction expected, while the threat 
condition status comparison was in the direction expected. Including control variables, 
the overall status comparison remains not statistically significant, though is in the 
opposite direction expected (z = -0.46, p = 0.643, two-tailed). Statistical conclusions are 
the same for the second vote before the group task, but the combined status means 
changes to the direction expected, and the threat means are the same (combined 
proportions z = -0.421, p = 0.674; non-threat proportions z = 0.606, p = 0.545; threat 
proportions z = 0.000, p = 1.000). Including control variables, the overall status 
comparison remains not statistically significant, though is in the opposite direction 
expected (z = -0.17, p = 0.868, two-tailed). Of potential interest, for the non-threat 
condition status comparison, the difference approaches statistical significance such that 
high-status participants are more likely to change in this way (z = -1.758, p = 0.079).28 
Otherwise, proportions changing votes before the task do not differ by status, and neither 
do rates for changing from no to yes or from yes to no. 
For an indicator of whether the participant ever voted in favor of a coalition 
before the group task, the status comparisons are not statistically significant, but the 
comparison within the non-threat conditions is in the opposite direction expected (z = -
                                                




0.402, p = 0.687, two-tailed), and both the threat condition and overall status 
comparisons are in the direction expected (z = 0.201, 0.421; z = -0.140, p = 0.445). 
Including control variables, status comparisons remain not statistically significant, but the 
combined status condition comparison is in the opposite direction expected and 
approaches statistical significance (z = -0.45, p = 0.654), and the non-threat condition 
status comparison changes to the direction expected  (z = -0.66, p = 0.510). 
Vote for a coalition after the group task: For the first vote after the group task, the 
status comparison is statistically significant in the direction predicted for the threatened 
participants (z = -1.805, p = 0.018). Results are not statistically significant, though in the 
direction predicted for the combined status condition proportions (z = -0.563, p = 0.287), 
and in the opposite direction predicted for the non-threatened participants (z = 0.991, p = 
0.322, two-tailed). Including control variables, the threat condition status comparison 
approaches statistical significance (z = 1.39, p = 0.082). Statistical conclusions are the 
same for the second vote after the group task (combined proportions z = -0.704, p = 0.12; 
non-threat condition proportions z = 0.991, p = 0.322 two-tailed; threat condition 
proportions z = -2.012, p = 0.022; threat condition proportions when including controls z 
= 1.63, p = 0.052). Potentially of interest, rates of changing votes after the task do not 
differ by status, and neither do rates for changing from no to yes or from yes to no.  
For an indicator of whether the participant ever voted in favor of a coalition 
before the group task, both the threat condition and combined status comparisons are in 
the direction expected, and the threat condition comparison is statistically significant  (z = 




non-threat condition status comparison is not statistically significant, though in the 
opposite direction expected (z = 0.794, p = 0.428, two-tailed). 
These results somewhat support my initial assumption. 
Changes in votes pre- to post- group task: There are no statistical differences by 
status for changes to the first vote pre-group task to the first vote post-group task 
combined proportions z = -1.159, p = 0.247; non-threat proportions z = -1.217, p = 0.224; 
threat proportions z = -0.414, p = 0.679; all two-tailed). For changing from no to yes, 
results approach statistical significance in the direction expected for the non-threat status 
comparison (z = -1.485, p = 0.069). The combined status comparison is not statistically 
significant but also in the direction expected (z = -0.407, p = 0.342), and the threat 
condition status comparison is also not statistically significant, though in the opposite 
direction expected (z = 0.839, p = 0.302, two-tailed). Including control variables, the 
threat condition status comparison no longer approaches statistical significance in the 
direction expected (z = 1.17, p = 0.121). For changing from yes to no, results are not 
statistically significant, though in the direction expected for all status comparisons 
(combined proportions z = 1.010, p = 0.156; non-threat proportions z = 1.005, p = 0.157; 
threat proportions z = 0.586, p = 0279).29 
 For whether participants changed from the second vote pre-group task to the 
second vote post-group task, there are no statistical differences by status (non-threat 
comparison z = -0.829, p = 0.406; threat comparison z = -0.427, p = 0.670; combined 
status comparison z = 0.594, p = 0.553; all two-tailed). Status comparisons are in the 
direction expected except for the proportion switching from no to yes for the threatened 
                                                




participants. The comparison for switching from no to yes for non-threatened participants 
is statistically significant in the direction expected (non-threat proportions z = -1.844, p = 
0.065). The rest of these results are not statistically significant for changing the second 
vote pre- to post-task. The combined status comparison is in the direction expected (z = -
0.420, p = 0.337), and the threat condition status comparison is in the opposite direction 
expected (z = 1.151, p = 0.250). All comparisons for changing the second vote from yes 
to no are in the direction expected but not statistically significant (combined proportions z 
= 1.010, p = 0.156; non-threat proportions z = 1.005, p = 0.157; threat proportions z = 
0.586, p = 0.279). Including control variables, for changing the second vote from no to 
yes, the non-threat condition status comparison, is no longer statistically significant (z = 
1.27, p = 0.203). 
For an indicator of whether the participant ever voted in favor of a coalition 
(either before or after the group task), the non-threat condition, threat condition, and 
combined status comparisons are all in the direction expected, but none are statistically 
significant (non-threat conditions z = -0.209, p = 0.417; threat conditions z = -1.122, p = 
0.131; combined status comparison z = -0.913, p = 0361). 
 These results somewhat support the initial assumption. 
 Hypothetical Point Offers to Partner: One of the questions designed to measure 
perceptions of the partner’s legitimacy asked the participant to submit a fictitious point 
offer to the partner, similar to what is done during the group task. The participant must 
allocate 20 points between themselves and the partner. For this outcome before the group 
task, results are in the opposite direction predicted, such that low-status participants with 




partners. The result for the combined means is statistically significant (t = -2.272, p = 
0.024, two-tailed), the result for the non-threat means is not statistically significant (F = 
2.35, p = 0.127), and the result for the threat means approaches statistical significance (F 
= 2.78, p = 0.097). Including control variables, the threat condition status comparison no 
longer approaches statistical significance in the opposite direction predicted (F = 2.49, p 
= 0.116). For this outcome after the group task, none of the results are statistically 
significant, though they remain in the opposite direction expected for both the combined 
means and non-threat means (combined means t = -0.278, p = 0.391; non-threat means F 
= 0.54, p = 0.463), but they are in the direction expected for the threat means (F = 0.12, p 
= 0.732). Of potential interest, when comparing this outcome before and after the group 
task, the differences are in the direction expected, such that high-status participants with 
low-status partners decrease their offers more so than low-status participants with high-
status partners. The comparisons are statistically significant for the combined means and 
threat means (combined means t = 2.018, p = 0.023; threat means F = 3.41, p = 0.066), 
but not the non-threat means (F = 1.01, p = 0.316). A similar question following this one 
both before and after the group task asks participants to submit a hypothetical offer as if 
the power roles were reversed (i.e., the participants now has power over A). See the 
Prediction 5 analyses for further results for this outcome. 
 Only the pre-to-post change part of these results somewhat supports the initial 
assumption. Otherwise, these results do not support the initial assumption, and even 
provide some evidence in the opposite direction. 
 Mean points offered to the partner during the task: Status results for the mean 




for the combined and threat condition means, such that low-status participants with high-
status partners offer their partners more points than high-status participants with low-
status partners. This is statistically significant for the threatened participants (F = 5.78, p 
= 0.017) but not for the combined means (t = 1.025, p = 0.153). The status result for the 
non-threat conditions is not statistically significant, though in the opposite direction 
expected (F = 0.88, p = 0.350). 
 These results somewhat support the initial assumption. 
 Proportion of partner offers participant accepts: Status results for the proportion 
of partner offers the participant accepts are in the same direction and of the same 
statistical significance as those for the mean points offered. The proportion of offers 
accepted is greater for low-status participants with high-status partners than high-status 
participants with low-status participants for the threat condition results. This is 
statistically significant for the threat condition results (F = 4.25, p = 0.041), and not 
statistically significant but in the same direction for the combined results (t = 0.884, p = 
0.189). The status result for the non-threat conditions is not statistically significant , 
though in the opposite direction predicted (F = 0.64, p = 0.423). 
 Proportion who want to be matched with partner again: Because I assess this 
measure as both a status and cohesion outcome, these statistical tests are two-tailed. 
Status comparisons for the proportion of participants indicating they would want to be 
matched with the same partner again (Partner A) are in the direction expected. The 
combined and threat condition status comparisons are statistically significant (z = 2.041, 
p = 0.041; z = 2.287, p = 0.022), and the non-threat condition comparison is not (z = 




longer statistically significant (z = -1.60, p = 0.109), and the threat condition status 
comparison only approaches statistical significance (z = 1.78, p = 0.075). 
 These results somewhat support the initial assumption. 
 I now assess some legitimacy-related outcomes that were not included in the 
overall legitimacy perception scale for internal validity reasons. 
 Partner being motivated to benefit self: expectation and perception: For the 
participant’s expectation of the partner’s self motivation before the group task, these 
status results are not statistically significant, but in the opposite direction expected, such 
that low-status participants with high-status partners expect these partners to be more 
self-motivated (therefore less legitimate) than high-status participants with low-status 
partners (combined means t = 0.440, p = 0.660, two-tailed; non-threat condition means F 
= 2.20, p = 0.140; threat condition means F = 0.74, p = 0.392). For this rating after the 
group task, these results are again not statistically significant and in the opposite direction 
expected (combined means t = 0.968, p = 0.334, two-tailed; non-threat condition means F 
= 1.49, p = 0.223; threat condition means F = 0.02, p = 0.889). Of potential interest, 
changes in these ratings pre- to post-group task are not statistically significant but in the 
opposite direction expected for the combined and threat condition comparison, such that 
the decrease in points, indicating less perceived legitimacy, is greater in the high-status 
condition, but are in the direction expected for the non-threat condition comparison, such 
that the decrease in points is lower in the high-status condition (combined mean changes t 
= 0.258, p = 0.797, two-tailed; non-threat condition mean changes F = 0.37, p = 0.542; 




 Partner using power: expectation and perception (reverse-coded): For the pre-
group-task expectation of the partner to use power for the threat conditions, results are 
not statistically significant, though in the direction expected (F = 0.98, p = 0.323). This is 
such that low-status participants with high-status partners expect them to use the most 
power. The result for the non-threat and comparisons is statistically significant in the 
opposite direction expected, (F = 4.74, p = 0.031), and the combined comparison is not 
statistically significant though in the same direction (t = 0.834, p = 0.406, two-tailed). For 
this measure after the group task (perception of using power), these results are not 
statistically significant, though in the same directions as before the group task (threat 
condition F = 0.08, p = 0.772; non-threat condition means F = 0.13, p = 0.715; combined 
means t = 0.055, p = 0.956, two-tailed). Of potential interest, changes in these ratings 
from before to after the group task for the non-threat condition comparison approach 
statistical significance in the direction expected (less of a decrease in points for high-
status participants with low-status partners) (F = 2.45, p = 0.119), and are not statistically 
significant but in the same direction for the combined comparison (t = -0.677, p = 0.250). 
The results for threat condition mean comparisons are not statistically significant though 
in the opposite direction expected (F = 0.36, p = 0.552. 
 Partner using power in ways that benefit self personally: expectation and 
perception (reverse-coded): I expect that high-status partners will be less associated with 
using power in selfish ways than low-status partners. A limitation of these measures that 
rate use of power in a certain way is that they could potentially be confounded with using 
power in itself, which I expect more of for high-status persons than low-status persons 




outcomes, this measure is also reverse-coded (such that higher scores reflect less of this 
use of power, and more legitimacy). Using power to benefit oneself is expected to be a 
less legitimate use of power than using it to benefit the group. For the rating of this 
expectation before the group task, results are in the opposite direction expected, with the 
combined and non-threat comparison statistically significant (t = 2.439, p = 0.008, two-
tailed; F = 8.37, p = 0.004), and the threat condition comparison not statistically 
significant (F = 0.33, p = 0.564). For the rating of how the partner used power in this way 
during the group task, none of the comparisons are statistically significant, though they 
are in the opposite direction expected (combined means t = 0.795, p = 0.428, two-tailed; 
non-threat condition means F = 0.29, p = 0.590; threat condition means F = 0.33, p = 
0.566). Of potential interest, for the change in these ratings from before to after the group 
task, the status comparisons for these mean changes are in the opposite direction 
expected, such that the point decrease is smaller for high-status participants with low-
status partners, indicating more legitimacy. The difference approaches statistical 
significance for the combined threat condition status comparison (t = -1.664, p = 0.098, 
two-tailed), is statistically significant in this direction for the non-threat condition status 
comparison (F = 5.23, p = 0.023), and is not statistically significant for the threat 
condition status comparison (F = 0.01, p = 0.939). When including control variables, the 
combined comparison no longer approaches statistical significance (t = 1.31, p = 0.192, 
two-tailed), and the non-threat condition comparison approaches statistical significance 





Prediction 5: Increased Promotion of Legitimate Power under Threat 
Prediction 5 states that threat increases treatment of high-status powerful actors as 
legitimate, and decreases treatment of low-status powerful actors as legitimate, and in 
this, the difference in how legitimate individuals treat powerful low-status actors 
compared to powerful high-status actors will be greater under threat than when not under 
threat. 
Unless otherwise specified, including control variables in these analyses does not 
change the conclusions. 
 
Table 12: Study 3 Outcomes 
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Table 13: Study 3 Differences in Status Coefficients by Threat 
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Vote for a coalition before the group task: As explained above, participants 
received four total opportunities to vote in favor of or against a coalition against the 
powerful actor — twice before the group task, and twice after (and ostensibly before 
another series of rounds). Before and after the task, participants voted once before a 
series of questions about perceptions of legitimacy, and once after, in case answering 
those types of questions affected their thoughts or behaviors. 
 For the first vote before the group task, proportions do not vary statistically 




statistical significance in the direction predicted for the high-status participants (voting on 
low-status partners), such that these participants are more likely to vote in favor of a 
coalition when under threat (z = -1.592, p = 0.056). The difference in proportions for low-
status participants is not statistically significant, though in the opposite direction 
predicted (voting on high-status partners) (z = -1.194, p = 0.233, two-tailed). The 
difference in coefficients between the status models by threat (using suest) is not 
statistically significant, though in the direction predicted (chi square = 0.08, p = 0.777). 
Of potential interest, the difference between the combined threat condition means is 
statistically significant, such that threatened participants were more likely to vote in favor 
of the coalition (z = -1.970, p = 0.049, two-tailed). 
For the second vote before the group task, the proportions also do not vary 
statistically across the conditions (chi square = 4.776, p = 0.189). The low-status 
participant threat comparison approaches statistical significance and remains in the 
opposite direction predicted (z = -1.788, p = 0.074, two-tailed). The high-status 
participant threat comparison remains not statistically significant and in the direction 
predicted (z = -1.188, p = 0.117). The difference in coefficients between the threat 
models by status is not statistically significant and in the opposite direction predicted (chi 
square = 0.19, p = 0.667). Of potential interest, the difference between the combined 
threat condition means remains statistically significant, such that threatened participants 
are more likely to vote in favor of the coalition (z = -2.103, p = 0.036, two-tailed). 
Including control variables, the low-status threat comparison no longer approaches 




tailed). Of potential interest, when including control variables, the combined threat 
comparison only approaches statistical significance (z = 1.68, p = 0.092, two-tailed). 
The proportion of changes between the first and second votes before the group 
task does not differ statistically across the conditions (chi square = 4.190, p = 0.242). 
However, the threat comparison between the low-status conditions approaches statistical 
significance, such that those in the threat condition changed votes more often (z = -1.958, 
p = 0.050, two-tailed). Proportions for the high-status conditions are the same (z = 0.000, 
p = 1.000, two-tailed). The difference in coefficients between the status models by threat 
is not statistically significant (chi square = 1.87, p = 0.171). Including control variables, 
the low-status threat comparison no longer approaches statistical significance (z = 1.59, p 
= 0.112, two-tailed).30 
For the proportion changing this vote from no to yes, proportions do not differ 
statistically across the conditions (chi square = 4.068, p = 0.254). However, the threat 
comparison between the low-status conditions is statistically significant in the opposite 
direction expected, such that those in the threat condition were more likely to change to a 
yes vote against the high-status partner (z = -2.040, p = 0.041, two-tailed). Proportions for 
the high-status conditions are not statistically significant, though also in the opposite 
direction predicted (z = 0.459, p = 0.647). The difference of the status coefficients 
between models by threat is not statistically significant (chi square = 0.68, p = 0.410). 
Treating the outcome as a mean, including control variables, the low-status threat 
comparison is not statistically significant in the opposite direction predicted (F = 1.64, p 
                                                




= 0.202).31 For the proportion changing this vote from yes to no, proportions do not differ 
statistically across conditions (chi square = 2.040, p = 0.564) or by any of the threat 
comparisons, though they were in the direction predicted (low-status conditions, z = -
0.586, p = 0.558; high-status conditions z = -1.005, p = 0.315). The difference in 
coefficients between the status models by threat does not differ statistically (chi square = 
0.33, p = 0.567). Including control variables does not change these conclusions.32 
For an indicator for whether the participant ever voted in favor of a coalition 
before the group task, proportions do not differ statistically across the conditions (chi 
square = 5.863, p = 0.118). Proportions for the threat comparison within the low-status 
conditions are statistically significant in the opposite direction predicted (z = -1.981, p = 
0.048, two-tailed). This comparison for the high-status conditions approaches statistical 
significance in the direction predicted (z = -1.386, 0.083). The difference in coefficients 
between the status models by threat is in the opposite direction predicted and not 
statistically significant (chi square = 0.18, p = 0.671). Of potential interest, the difference 
between the combined threat condition means is statistically significant, such that those 
in the threat conditions are more likely to have voted in favor before the task (z = -2.381, 
p = 0.017). Including control variables, the low-status threat comparison is no longer 
statistically significant in the opposite direction predicted (z = 1.62, p = 0.106, two-
tailed). Of potential interest, including control variables, the combined threat condition 
comparison only approaches statistical significance (z = 1.92, p = 0.055, two-tailed). 
 These results somewhat support Prediction 5 for high-status participants voting 
against their low-status partners. However, patterns in changes in pre-task votes tend to 
                                                
31 Logistic regression estimate not available. 




be in the opposite direction predicted. Also notably, overall, threatened participants are 
more likely to vote in favor of the coalition. 
Vote for a coalition after the group task: For the first vote after the group task, 
proportions do not differ statistically across the conditions (chi square = 4.910, p = 
0.179). Threat results for both low-status and high-status participants are in the direction 
predicted. The high-status result is statistically significant (z = -1.999, p = 0.023), while 
the low-status result is not (z = 0.794, p = 0.428, two-tailed). The difference of the status 
coefficients between models by threat is statistically significant in the direction predicted, 
such that participant status decreases this proportion for non-threatened participants and 
increases it for threatened participants (chi square = 3.88, p = 0.049). Only the status 
comparison within the threat conditions is statistically significant (see the initial 
assumption results above). 
For the second vote after the group task, the statistical conclusions are the same as 
the first post-task vote. Proportions do not differ statistically across the conditions (chi 
square = 5.932, p = 0.115). The threat comparison for high-status participants is 
statistically significant in the direction predicted (z = -2.206, p = 0.014), and the low-
status result is not statistically significant though in the same direction (z = 0.794, p = 
0.214). Also as in the first post-task vote, the difference of the status coefficients between 
models by threat is statistically significant in the direction predicted, such that participant 
status decreases this proportion for non-threatened participants and increases it for 
threatened participants (chi square = 4.48, p = 0.034). Only the overall status comparison 





As in the pre-task votes, the proportion of changes between the first and second 
votes after the group task do not differ statistically across the conditions (chi square = 
2.255, p = 0.521), or for any of the specific comparisons (low-status conditions z = -
1.428, p = 0.153); high-status conditions F = 0.586, p = 0.558).33 The difference in 
coefficients between the status models by threat is not statistically significant (chi square 
= 0.33, p = 0.567). For the proportion changing this vote from no to yes, proportions do 
not differ statistically across the conditions (chi square = 1.015, p = 0.798) or by any of 
the specific comparisons. The threat comparison within the low-status conditions is in the 
opposite direction predicted (z = 1.005, p = 0.315, two-tailed), and proportions for both 
the threat and non-threat high-status conditions are the same (z = 0.000, p = 1.000, two-
tailed). The difference in coefficients between the status models by threat is not 
statistically significant (chi square = 0.00, p = 1.000).34  Including control variables, the 
high-status threat comparison is not statistically significant, though in the direction 
predicted (z = 0.67, p = 0.251).35 For the proportion changing this vote from yes to no, 
proportions do not differ statistically across conditions (z = 2.040, p =0.564), or by any of 
the specific comparisons. The threat comparison for low-status participants is not 
statistically significant, though in the direction expected (z = -0.586, p = 0.279). The 
threat comparison for high-status participants is also not statistically significant, though 
opposite of the direction expected (z = -1.005, p = 0.315). The coefficients between the 
                                                
33 The logistic regression control model is not available for the low-status threat comparison. 
34 Treating the outcome as a mean, the result is nonzero (chi square = 0.34, p = 0.561). 
35 The low-status threat comparison logistic regression result is not available, and the difference of status 




threat models by status do not differ statistically (chi square = 0.33, p = 0.567). These 
conclusions do not change when including control variables.36 
For an indicator for whether the participant ever voted in favor of a coalition after 
the group task, the difference in proportions do not differ statistically across the 
conditions (z = 4.843, p = 0.184). Both the low-status and high-status threat comparisons 
are in the direction predicted, and the high-status comparison is statistically significant (z 
= -2.012, p = 0.022), while the low-status comparison is not (z = 0.596, p = 0.276). The 
difference of the status coefficients between models by threat is statistically significant in 
the direction predicted, such that participant status decreases this proportion for non-
threatened participants and increases it for threatened participants (chi square = 3.40, p = 
0.065). Only the status comparison within the threat conditions is statistically significant 
(see the initial assumption results above). 
 These results largely support Prediction 5. 
Changes in votes pre- to post- group task: As in the pre- and post-task votes, 
the proportion of changes between the first vote before and after the task does not differ 
statistically across the conditions (chi square = 2.013, p = 0.570). The high-status 
condition threat comparison is not statistically significant (z = 0.579, p = 0.562), and the 
proportions for low-status participants are the same (z = 0.000, p = 1.000). The difference 
in coefficients between the status models by threat is not statistically significant (chi 
square = 0.31, p = 0.578). As in the proportion changing at all, results for specific no to 
yes and yes to no changes also do not differ across conditions, nor were any of the 
specific comparisons statistically significant. For the proportion of no to yes changes 
                                                




between the first vote before and after the task, these do not differ statistically across the 
conditions (chi square = 2.981, p = 0.395), and none of the threat comparisons were 
statistically significant. For the low-status conditions, the difference is in the opposite 
direction predicted (z = -1.485, p = 0.138, two-tailed). For the high-status conditions, the 
difference is in the direction predicted (chi square = 0.839, p = 0.201). The difference in 
coefficients between the status models by threat is in the opposite direction predicted and 
not statistically significant (chi square = 2.66, p = 0.103. For the proportion of yes to no 
changes between the first vote before and after the task, these also do not differ 
statistically across the conditions (chi square = 2.040, p = 0.564), and none of the threat 
comparisons are statistically significant. For the low-status conditions, the threat 
comparison is in the direction expected (F = -0.586, p = 0.279). For the high-status 
conditions, the difference is opposite of the direction expected (z = -1.005, p = 0.315, 
two-tailed). The coefficients between the status models by threat do not differ statistically 
(chi square = 0.33, p = 0.567). 
As in the pre- and post-task votes, and the pre-to-post comparison for the first 
vote, the proportion of changes between the second vote before and after the task did not 
differ statistically across the conditions (chi square = 0.07, p = 0.786) nor in any of the 
threat comparisons (low-status comparison z = 0.215, p = 0.830; high-status comparison z 
= 0.618, p = 0.537; combined threat comparison z = 0.594, p = 0.553; all two-tailed). For 
the proportion of no to yes changes between the second vote before and after the task, 
these do not differ statistically across the conditions (chi square = 4.761, p = 0.190). For 
the low-status conditions, the difference approaches statistical significance in the 




conditions, the difference is not statistically significant, though also opposite of the 
direction expected (z = 1.151, p = 0.250, two-tailed). The difference of the status 
coefficients between models by threat is statistically significant in the opposite direction 
expected, such that participant status increases this proportion for non-threatened 
participants and decreases it for threatened participants (chi square = 4.30, p = 0.038). 
Only the status comparison for the non-threat conditions is statistically significant (see 
the initial assumption results above). Including control variables, the low-status 
comparison no longer approaches statistical significance in the opposite direction 
expected (z = 1.21, p = 0.225), and the difference of the status coefficients by threat is no 
longer statistically significant in the opposite direction predicted (chi square = 7.64, p = 
0.363). For the proportion of yes to no changes between the second vote before and after 
the task, these also do not differ statistically across the conditions (chi square = 0.33, p = 
0.567, and none of the threat comparisons are statistically significant. For the low-status 
conditions, the difference is in the direction expected (z = -0.586, p = 0.279) and for the 
high-status conditions, the difference is opposite of the direction expected (z = -1.005, p = 
0.315, two-tailed). The coefficients between the status models by threat do not differ 
statistically (chi square = 0.33, p = 0.567).  
For an indicator for whether the participant ever voted in favor of a coalition 
either before or after the group task, the difference in proportions does not differ 
statistically across the conditions (chi square = 2.688, p = 0.442). Proportions for the 
threat comparison for the low-status conditions are in the opposite direction predicted 
though not statistically significant (z = -0.420, p = 0.674, two-tailed). This comparison 




(F = -1.331, p = 0.092). The difference in coefficients between the status models by 
threat is in the direction predicted but not statistically significant (chi square = 0.46, p = 
0.496). 
 These results provide some support for Prediction 5. 
 Legitimacy Evaluation Scale: For the scale summarizing partner legitimacy 
evaluations before the group task, the means differ statistically across the conditions (F = 
22.08, p < 0.001). Comparing the condition means by threat, results are not statistically 
significant, with the comparison for high-status participants (with low-status partner) in 
the direction predicted (F = 0.12, p = 0.734), and the low-status participant comparison in 
the opposite direction predicted (F = 0.32, p = 0.572). The difference in coefficients 
between the status models by threat  is not statistically significant though in the opposite 
direction predicted (chi square = 0.03, p = 0.861). 
For this scale with corresponding evaluations after the group task, means again 
differ statistically across the conditions (F = 10.66, p < 0.001). The threat comparison for 
high-status participants is statistically significant in the direction predicted (F = 3.74, p = 
0.055). The threat comparison for low-status participants is not statistically significant, 
though in the opposite direction predicted (F = 0.090, p = 0.758). The difference in 
coefficients between the status models by threat is not statistically significant, though in 
the direction predicted (chi square = 1.30, p = 0.254). 
Results for the change in this evaluation from before the group task to after the 
group task follow the same pattern as those for the post-task measure, though the overall 
difference in means changes across conditions is not statistically significant (F = 1.75, p 




in the direction predicted (F = 3.92, p = 0.049). The threat comparison for the low-status 
participants is not statistically significant, though in the opposite direction predicted (F = 
0.03, p = 0.863). The difference in coefficients between the status models by threat is not 
statistically significant, though in the direction predicted (chi square = 1.63, p = 0.202). 
These results somewhat support Prediction 5, especially for evaluations of low-
status partners (by high-status participants) after the group task. 
Hypothetical Point Offers to Partner: As explained above, one of the questions 
designed to measure perceptions of the partner’s legitimacy asked the participant to 
submit a fictitious point offer to the partner, similar to what was done during the group 
task. The participant must allocate 20 points between themselves and the partner. For this 
outcome before the group task, the means across conditions do not differ statistically (F = 
1.88, p = 0.135), and none of the threat comparisons are statistically significant. The 
comparison for low-status participants is in the direction predicted (making offers to 
high-status partners, F = 0.19, p = 0.665) and the comparison for high-status participants 
is in the opposite direction predicted (making offers to low-status partners, F = 0.32, p = 
0.572). The difference in coefficients between the status models by threat is not 
statistically significant, though in the opposite direction predicted (chi square = 0.01, p = 
0.924). 
For this outcome after the group task, means again do not differ statistically  
across the conditions (F = 0.41, p = 0.744), and none of the threat comparisons are 
statistically significant. Means for the low-status conditions are the same (F = 0.00, p = 
1.000), and means for the high-status conditions are in the direction predicted (F = 0.41, 




statistically significant, though in the direction predicted (chi square = 0.59, p = 0.443). 
Including control variables, the low-status threat comparison is not statistically 
significant, though in the direction predicted (F = 0.00, p = 0.946), and the high-status 
threat comparison approaches statistical significance in the direction predicted (F = 1.96, 
p = 0.163). 
For the change before to after the group task for this outcome, the means again 
did not vary statistically across the conditions (F = 1.95, p = 0.123), and none of the 
threat comparisons were statistically significant. The low-status comparison is in the 
opposite direction predicted (F = 0.18, p = 0.674) and the high-status comparison is in the 
direction predicted (F = 1.60, p = 0.208). The difference in coefficients between the 
status models by threat is in the direction predicted but not statistically significant (chi 
square = 0.36, p = 0.548). Including control variables, the overall differences in the mean 
changes across conditions approaches statistical significance (F = 2.35, p = 0.074), and 
the high-status threat comparison is statistically significant (F = 3.05, p = 0.083). 
These results do not provide any statistical support for Prediction 5, though some 
results were in the direction predicted. 
Mean points offered to the partner during the task: For the mean number of 
points participants offered to the partner during the group task, the difference in these 
means across the conditions approaches statistical significance (F = 2.60, p = 0.054). For 
both the low- and high-status participants, the threat comparison for the high-status 
participants is statistically significant in the direction predicted (F = 5.88, p = 0.016) but 
not the low-status participants (F = 0.84, p = 0.361). The difference of the status 




such that participant status increases (while partner status decreases) this mean for non-
threatened participants and decreases it for threatened participants (chi square = 5.66, p = 
0.017). Only the status comparison for the threat conditions is statistically significant (see 
the initial assumption results above). 
These results support Prediction 5. 
Proportion of partner offers participant accepts: For the proportion of partner 
offers the participant accepts, the proportions do not differ statistically across the 
conditions (F = 1.79, p = 0.150). As in the mean points offered during the task, threat 
comparisons within the status conditions are in the direction predicted. The threat 
comparison for the low-status conditions is statistically significant (F = 3.70, p = 0.056), 
while the high-status comparison is not (F = 0.88, p = 0.349). The difference of the status 
coefficients between models by threat is statistically significant in the direction predicted, 
such that participant status increases (while partner status decreases) this proportion for 
non-threatened participants and decreases it for threatened participants (chi square = 4.16, 
p = 0.041). However, only the status comparison for the threat conditions is statistically 
significant (see the initial assumption results above). Including control variables, the 
overall differences in this proportion across the conditions approaches statistical 
significance (F = 2.21, p = 0.089). 
These results support Prediction 5. 
Wanting to be matched with the same partner again: As in Study 2, I consider 
wanting to be matched with the same partner again as both a partner status evaluation and 
a group cohesion outcome. Here I consider it as a status outcome. Because I consider 




outcome, results suggest better reception of a high-status partner than a low-status partner 
in the position of power, rather than feeling more cohesive with any partner following 
threat (as initially predicted). The differences in proportions across the conditions 
approach statistical significance (chi square = 7.073, p = 0.070). The low-status 
proportions are the same (z = 0.000, p = 1.00, two-tailed), and the high-status threat 
comparison approaches statistical significance such that threat decreases this outcome (z 
= 1.695, p = 0.090, two-tailed). The status coefficients by threat do not differ statistically 
(chi square = 1.51, p = 0.220), though the pattern is in the opposite direction predicted. 
As noted above, the status comparison is statistically significant, but not the non-threat 
condition comparison. When including control variables, the high-status threat 
comparison no longer approaches statistical significance (z = 0.98, p = 0.326). Treating 
the outcome as a mean, when including control variables, the differences in proportions 
across conditions no longer approach statistical significance (F = 1.35, 0.259).  
I now assess some legitimacy-related outcomes that were not included in the 
overall legitimacy perception scale for internal validity reasons. 
Partner being motivated to benefit self: expectation and perception: For the 
pre-group task evaluation of to what extent the participant thinks the partner is motivated 
to benefit themselves, means do not differ statistically across the conditions (F = 1.01, p 
= 0.388). Threat comparisons for both the low- and high-status participants are opposite 
of the direction predicted. The high-status threat comparison approaches statistical 
significance in the opposite direction predicted (F = 1.97, p = 0.162), and the low-status 
threat comparison is not statistically significant (F = 0.88, p = 0.351). The difference of 




opposite direction predicted (chi square = 2.78, p = 0.096), such that both status 
comparisons are in the opposite direction predicted. However, neither status comparison 
within either of the threat conditions is statistically significant (see initial assumption 
results above). Including control variables, the difference of the status coefficients 
between models by threat no longer approaches statistical significance in the opposite 
direction predicted (chi square = 2.44, p = 0.118). 
For the post-group task evaluation of to what extent the participant thinks the 
partner was motivated to benefit themselves, the means again do not vary statistically 
across the conditions (F = 0.52, p = 0.669). Threat comparisons for both low- and high-
status participants are not statistically significant, though in the opposite direction 
predicted (F = 0.15, p = 0.697; F = 0.48, p = 0.490). The combined non-threat and threat 
condition means are the same (F = 0.00, p = 1.000). The difference in coefficients 
between the status models by threat is not statistically significant, though also in the 
opposite direction predicted (chi square = 0.59, p = 0.441). Including control variables, 
the combined threat condition comparison is not statistically significant, but in the 
direction such that threatened participants rate the partner as more ingroup prosocial (t = 
0.01, p = 0.993, two-tailed). 
For the change in this evaluation from before to after the group task, means again 
do not statistically differ across the conditions (F = 0.45, p = 0.717). For both the low- 
and high-status participants, these changes are not statistically significant, though in the 
direction expected (F = 0.47, p = 0.496; F = 0.82, p = 0.367). The difference in 
coefficients between the status models by threat is also not in statistically significant, 




These results do not support Prediction 5, and provide some evidence in the 
opposite direction. 
Partner using power: expectation and perception: For the pre-group task 
evaluation of to what extent the participant expects the partner to use power, means do 
not differ statistically across the conditions (F = 1.93, p = 0.125). Threat comparisons for 
both low- and high-status participants are in the direction predicted. The low-status 
participant (with high-status partner) threat comparison is statistically significant such 
that participants expect the partner to use more power when threatened (F = 3.17, p = 
0.076), and high-status participant (with low-status partner) threat comparison 
approaches statistical significance, such that participants expect the partner to use less 
power when threatened (F = 1.92, p = 0.167). The difference of the status coefficients 
between models by threat is statistically significant in the direction predicted (chi square 
= 5.09, p = 0.024). Only the status comparison for the non-threat conditions is 
statistically significant, and this is in the opposite direction expected (see initial 
assumption results above). Including control variables, the overall comparison of means 
across the conditions approaches statistical significance (F = 2.23, p = 0.086). 
For the post-group task evaluation of to what extent the participant expects the 
partner to use power, means again do not differ statistically across the conditions (F = 
0.15, p = 0.927), and none of the threat comparisons are statistically significant. The low-
status threat comparison is in the opposite direction predicted (F = 0.00, p = 0.985). The 
high-status threat comparison is in the direction predicted (F = 0.46 p = 0.499). The 
difference in coefficients between the status models by threat is not statistically 




Including control variables, the low-status threat comparison remains not statistically 
significant, though changes to the direction predicted (F = 0.00, p = 0.979). 
For the change in this evaluation from before to after the group task, mean 
changes again do not statistically differ across the conditions (F = 1.09, p = 0.355). 
Threat comparisons for both the low- and high-status are in the direction expected. Thee 
low-status comparison approaches statistical significance (F = 2.45, p = 0.119), and the 
high-status comparison is not statistically significant (F = 0.36, p = 0.552). The 
difference in coefficients between the status models by threat approaches statistical 
significance in the direction expected (chi square = 2.37, p = 0.124). Only the non-threat 
condition status comparison approaches statistical significance (see initial assumption 
results above). Including control variables, the difference in coefficients between the 
status models by threat is statistically significant in the direction expected (chi square = 
4.62, p = 0.032). 
These results somewhat support Prediction 5 for the pre-task expectations of the 
partner using power.  
Partner using power in ways that benefit self personally: expectation and 
perception: As explained above, using power to benefit oneself is expected to be a less 
legitimate use of power than using it to benefit the group. For the rating of this 
expectation before the group task (reverse-coded), means differ statistically across the 
conditions (F = 3.56, p = 0.015). Both the low-status and high-status participant threat 
comparisons are in the direction predicted. The high-status comparison is statistically 
significant (F = 4.62, p = 0.033), while the low-status comparison is not (F = 0.03, p = 




significant in the direction predicted (chi square = 2.72, p = 0.099). However, only the 
status comparison for the non-threat conditions is statistically significant, and this was in 
the opposite direction expected (see initial assumption results above). 
For the rating of this perception after the group task (reverse-coded), means do 
not differ statistically across the conditions (F = 1.44, p = 0.233). The threat comparison 
for the low-status conditions approaches statistical significance in the direction predicted 
(F = 1.87, p = 0.173). The threat comparison for the high-status conditions is not 
statistically significant, though in the opposite direction predicted (F = 1.80, p = 0.181). 
The difference in coefficients between the status models by threat is not statistically 
significant, though in the direction predicted (chi square = 0.00, p = 0.982). Of potential 
interest, the difference in the combined threat condition means approaches statistical 
significance, such that threatened participants have this perception more so (F = -1.928, p 
= 0.055, two-tailed).  
For the change in this evaluation from before to after the group task, mean 
changes again do not statistically differ across the conditions (F = 1.76, p = 0.155). Both 
the low-status and high-status participant threat comparisons are not statistically 
significant, though in the direction predicted (F = 1.66, p = 0.200; F = 0.86, p = 0.355). 
The difference in coefficients between the status models by threat approaches statistical 
significance in the direction expected (chi square = 2.49, p = 0.115). 
These results somewhat support Prediction 5. 






I assess two further categories of analyses. First, I look at general ingroup 
prosociality and cohesion outcomes as ingroup prosocial orientations. Next, following 
initial Study 2 analyses (see Chapter 6 discussion), I assess how participants express 
intent to use power, and how this relates to my theoretical framing of threats to groups, 
ingroup prosociality, and group processes. As in the main analyses above, these 
conclusions do not change when including control variables unless otherwise specified. 
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Evaluating General Ingroup Prosociality and Cohesion Outcomes 
These analyses assess the extent to which the Study 3 results align with the 
overall prediction of this dissertation research, that threat increases ingroup prosociality 
and feelings of cohesion toward the group. This general prediction is presented in 
Chapter 1 before the predictions specific to each study. 
 
General Ingroup Prosociality 
Participant motivated to benefit self during group task (reverse-coded): For 
the participant’s pre-task rating of how motivated they are to benefit themselves 
personally during the group task, means do not differ statistically across the conditions (F 
= 1.90, p = 0.130). Comparing the non-threat to the threat condition within each status 
condition, comparisons for both low- and high-status participants (with high- and low-




status participants is statistically significant (F = 2.85, p = 0.093), while the low-status 
comparison is not (F = 0.82, p = 0.366). The overall threat condition comparison 
(including both low- and high-status for each) is also statistically significant in the 
direction predicted (t = -1.819, p = 0.035). 
For the participant’s post-task rating of how motivated they were to benefit 
themselves personally during the group task, means again do not differ statistically across 
the conditions (F = 1.90, p = 0.130). Both the low-status and high-status threat 
comparisons are not statistically significant, though they are in the direction predicted (F 
= 1.62, p = 0.205; F = 1.35, p = 0.247). The overall threat condition comparison is 
statistically significant in the direction predicted (t = -1.730, p = 0.043). 
For the pre-to-post-group task change in participant’s rating of motivation to 
benefit themselves personally during the group task, the mean changes also do not differ 
statistically across the conditions (F = 0.95, p = 0.417), and none of the threat 
comparisons are statistically significant. The threat comparison for the low-status 
conditions is in the direction expected (F = 0.36, p = 0.549), and the threat comparison 
for the high-status conditions is in the direction expected (F = 0.12, p = 0.727). The 
overall threat condition comparison is not statistically significant, though in the direction 
expected (t = -0.192, p = 0.424). 
 These results somewhat support the overall prediction. 
Participant motivated to benefit group during group task: For the 
participant’s pre-task rating of how motivated they are to benefit their group during the 
group task, means do not differ statistically across the conditions (F = 1.55, p = 0.204). 




direction predicted (F = 2.51, p = 0.115; means F = 2.09, p = 0.150). The overall threat 
condition comparison is statistically significant in the direction predicted (t = -2.154, p = 
0.016). 
For the participant’s post-task rating of how motivated they were to benefit their 
group during the group task, means again do not differ statistically across the conditions 
(F = 0.86, p = 0.462). Both the low- and high-status threat comparisons are in the 
direction predicted but not statistically significant (F = 1.05, p = 0.308; F = 1.25, p = 
0.264). The overall threat condition comparison approaches statistical significance in the 
direction predicted (t = -1.524, p = 0.065). 
For the pre-to-post-group task change in participant’s rating of motivation to 
benefit their group during the group task, mean changes do not differ statistically across 
the conditions (F = 0.25, p = 0.863). All of the threat comparisons are not statististically 
significant, though in the opposite direction predicted (low-status mean changes F = 0.27, 
p = 0.607); high-status mean changes F = 0.12, p = 0.734; overall threat condition mean 
changes t = 0.605, p = 0.546, two-tailed). 
These results somewhat support the overall prediction. 
 
Cohesion  
Participant feels like part of the network group: For the pre-group task rating 
of how much the participant feels like part of the network group, means do not differ 
statistically across the conditions (F = 0.55, p = 0.649). The threat comparisons are not 




1.09, p = 0.298; high-status means F = 0.15, p = 0.701; combined threat condition means 
t = -1.009, p = 0.157). 
For the post-group task rating of how much the participant feels like part of the 
network group, means again do not differ statistically across the conditions (F = 0.63, p = 
0.594). The threat comparisons are again not statistically significant, though in the 
direction predicted (low-status means F = 1.14, p = 0.287; high-status means; F = 0.06, p 
= 0.813; combined threat condition means t = -0.925, p = 0.178). 
For the pre-to-post-group task change in rating of how much the participant feels 
like part of the network group, mean changes do not differ statistically across the 
conditions (F = 0.89, p = 0.448). The low-status and combined threat comparisons are not 
statistically significant, though in the direction expected (F = 0.05, p = 0.820; t = -0.070, 
p = 0.472). The high-status threat comparison is also not statistically significant, though 
in the opposite direction expected (F = 0.02, p = 0.889). 
These results do not provide statistical support for the overall prediction, though 
most are in the direction predicted. 
Participant evaluates network group as personally important: For the pre-
group task rating of how personally important the network group is, means do not differ 
statistically across the conditions (F = 1.64, p = 0.182). Both low- and high-status threat 
comparisons are in the direction predicted. The low-status threat comparison is 
statistically significant (F = 3.07, p = 0.081), while the high-status threat comparison is 
not (F = 0.07, p = 0.795). The combined threat condition comparison approaches 




For the post-group task rating of how personally important the network group is, 
means again do not differ statistically across the conditions (F = 0.94, p = 0.424). The 
low-status and combined threat comparisons approach statistical significance in the 
direction predicted (F = 2.64, p = 0.106; t = -1.358, p = 0.088), while the high-status 
comparison is not statistically significant, though in the same direction (F = 0.08, p = 
0.772). 
For the pre-to-post-group task change in rating of how personally important the 
network group is, mean changes do not differ statistically across the conditions (F = 1.91, 
p = 0.130). The low-status, high-status, and combined threat comparisons are not 
statistically significant, though in the direction expected (F = 0.01, p = 0.925; F = 0.01, p 
= 0.925, t = -0.132, p = 0.448). Of potential interest, the combined status condition 
comparison (including both non-threat and threat conditions) is statistically significant 
such that the decrease is greater in the high-status conditions (t = 2.400, p = 0.009). The 
non-threat and threat status comparisons both approach statistical significance in this 
direction (both F = 2.85, p = 0.093).  
 These results mostly support the overall prediction. 
 
As in Study 2, I consider wanting to be matched with the same partner again as 
both a partner status evaluation and a group cohesion outcome. Here I consider it as a 
cohesion outcome. Because I consider both treatments, I use statistical test criteria 
consistent with two-tailed tests. For the proportion of participants indicating they would 
want to be matched with the partner again, results are consistent with better reception of a 
high-status partner than a low-status partner in the position of power, rather than feeling 




the conditions approach statistical significance (chi square = 7.073, p = 0.070). The low-
status proportions are the same (z = 0.000, p = 1.00, two-tailed), and the high-status threat 
comparison approaches statistical significance such that threat decreases this outcome (z 
= 1.695, p = 0.090, two-tailed). As noted above, the status comparison is statistically 
significant in this direction for the threat conditions but not the non-threat conditions. The 
comparison between the combined threat condition groups is not statistically significant, 
but in the direction such that threat decreases this outcome (z = 1.193, p = 0.233, two-
tailed). When including control variables, the high-status threat comparison no longer 
approaches statistical significance (z = 0.98, p = 0.326, two-tailed). Treating the outcome 
as a mean, when including control variables, the differences in proportions across 
conditions no longer approach statistical significance (F = 1.35, 0.259).  
 
How the Participant Would Exercise Power 
A further series of outcomes are designed to assess the extent to which the 
participant would exercise power if given the opportunity. These questions were added 
after evaluating initial Study 2 results, in which threat sometimes appeared to increase 
evaluations of low-status partners. I expect that participants will report extent of 
exercising power consistent with their status in the group, that these patterns will become 
more pronounced under threat, ingroup prosocial use of power will increase under threat, 
and selfish use of power will decrease under threat. However, as addressed earlier in this 
chapter, specific uses of power could be confounded with overall use of power. The first 
three questions ask the participant, as if they were in the powerful position (that 




selfish and group-oriented they would be. The fourth question asks for a hypothetical 
point offer, as in the question assessed above, but this one reflects the hypothetical 
scenario where the participant is in a powerful position. Finally, I assess how the 
powerful offers differ from the low-power offers addressed above, and how these 
outcomes compare before and after the group task. 
 Participant use of power if in powerful position: For the pre-group task 
hypothetical rating of how much the participant would use their power, means do not 
differ statistically across the conditions (F = 0.83, p = 0.481). I first address the 
expectation that high-status participants use more power. The threat condition and 
combined status comparisons are not statistically significant, though in the opposite 
direction expected (F = 2.47, p = 0.118; t = 1.114, p = 0.267, two-tailed), and the non-
threat status comparison means are the same (F = 0.000, p = 1.000). Threat does not have 
the predicted effects on this rating — the low-status and high-status threat comparisons 
are not statistically significant, though in the opposite direction expected (F = 0.52, p = 
0.472; F = 0.73, p = 0.396). The combined threat condition comparison is also not 
statistically significant, though in the direction such that threat decreases this rating (t = 
0.093, p = 0.926, two-tailed). The difference in coefficients between the status models by 
threat is not statistically significant, though in the opposite direction expected (chi square 
= 1.25, p = 0.263). Including control variables, the combined threat comparison remains 
not statistically significant, though changes direction (t = 0.27, 0.789, two-tailed), and the 
threat condition status comparison approaches statistical significance in the opposite 




For the post-group task hypothetical rating of how much the participant would use 
their power, means again do not differ statistically across the conditions (F = 0.68, p = 
0.564). The status and threat comparisons are in the same direction as in the pre-group 
task ratings, and remain not statistically significant. The non-threat status comparison 
means are the same (F = 0.000, p = 1.000), and the threat status comparison is in the 
opposite direction expected (F = 2.03, p = 0.156). The combined threat condition status 
comparison is in the opposite direction expected (t = 1.009, p = 0.314, two-tailed). Threat 
comparisons for the low-status (F = 0.37, p = 0.543) and high-status conditions (F = 0.66, 
p = 0.417) are opposite of the direction expected. The combined threat condition status 
comparison is not statistically significant, but again in the direction such that this rating 
decreases with threat (t = 0.144, p = 0.886, two-tailed).  
For the pre-to-post-group task change in hypothetical rating of how much the 
participant would use their power, mean changes do not differ statistically across the 
conditions (F = 0.02, p = 0.995). The threat and combined status comparisons are not 
statistically significant, though in the direction expected (non-threat status comparison F 
= 0.07, p = 0.795; combined threat condition status comparison t = -0.185, p = 0.427). 
The non-threat status comparison mean changes are the same (F = 0.000, p = 1.000. The 
threat comparison results are not statistically significant, though in the direction expected 
for both the low-status and high-status comparisons (F = 0.03, p = 0.862; F = 0.01, p = 
0.931). The combined threat condition comparison is also not statistically significant, but 
in the direction such that the increase is less in the threat conditions (t = 0.062, p = 0.951, 
two-tailed). Including control variables, the combined threat condition comparison 




These results do not statistically support expectations about status-consistent use 
of power or the overall prediction, though many results are in the direction expected. 
 Participant use of power in ways that benefit group if in powerful position: 
For the pre-group task hypothetical rating of how much the participant would use their 
power in this way, means do not differ statistically across the conditions (F = 1.66, p = 
0.177). The non-threat condition and combined status comparisons are in the direction 
expected. The non-threat comparison approaches statistical significance (F = 1.90, p = 
0.170) while the combined comparison does not (t = -0.051, p = 0.480). The threat 
condition status comparison is not statistically significant, though in the opposite 
direction expected and (F = 1.70, p = 0.194). Comparing by threat, the low-status threat 
comparison is statistically significant (F = 4.73, p = 0.031), such that threatened 
participants say they would exercise their power more ingroup prosocially. Though this is 
inconsistent with the prediction that low-status participants will use less power, it is 
consistent with more ingroup prosociality. The combined threat condition comparison is 
not statistically significant, though in the direction suggesting more ingroup prosocial use 
of power under threat (t = -1.174, p = 0.242, two-tailed). The high-status threat 
comparison is not statistically significant, though in the opposite direction expected (F = 
0.26, p = 0.613). Of potential interest, the difference of the status coefficients between 
models by threat approaches statistical significance in the opposite direction expected, 
such that this rating increases with participant status for non-threatened participants, and 
decreases with participant status for threatened participants (chi square = 3.65, p = 
0.056). Only the non-threatened status difference approaches statistical significance in the 




conditions approaches statistical significance (F = 2.56, p = 0.056), the threat condition 
status comparison is statistically significant in the direction expected  (F = 3.22, p = 
0.075), and the difference in status coefficients by threat is statistically significant (chi 
square = 4.62, p = 0.032). 
 For the post-group task hypothetical rating of how much the participant would use 
their power prosocially, means do not differ statistically across the conditions (F = 1.04, 
p = 0.377). The non-threat condition status comparison is not statistically significant, 
though in the direction expected but (F = 0.27, p = 0.603), and the threat condition and 
combined status comparisons are also not statistically significant, though in the opposite 
direction expected (F = 2.44, p = 0.120; t = 0.736, p = 0.463, two-tailed). The low-status 
threat comparison is no longer statistically significant, though in the same direction as the 
pre-task rating (F = 2.22, p = 0.138). The high-status threat comparison is in the opposite 
direction expected and (F = 0.35, p = 0.552). The combined threat condition comparison 
is not statistically significant, though in the direction expected (t = -0.630, p = 0.265). 
Including control variables, the low-status threat comparison is statistically significant in 
the direction expected (F = 2.78, p = 0.097). 
For the pre-to-post-group task change in hypothetical rating of how much the 
participant would use their power prosocially, mean changes did not differ statistically 
across the conditions (F = 2.093, p = 0.606). The threat condition status comparison is 
not statistically significant, though in the direction expected (F = 0.08, p = 0.781). The 
non-threat condition and combined status comparisons are not statistically significant, 
though in the opposite direction expected (F = 1.24, p = 0.266; t = 0.989, p = 0.324, two-




direction expected (low-status mean changes F = 0.86, p = 0.354; high-status mean 
changes F = 0.01, p = 0.926; combined threat condition mean changes t = 0.724, p = 
0.470, two-tailed). Including control variables, the high-status threat comparison is not 
statistically significant, though changes to the direction expected and (F = 0.00, p = 
0.964, two-tailed). 
 These results somewhat support the overall prediction. 
Participant use of power in ways that benefit self if in powerful position: For 
the pre-group task hypothetical rating of how much the participant would use their power 
in this way, the difference in means across the conditions approaches statistical 
significance (F = 2.59, p = 0.054). The threat condition and combined status comparisons 
are not statistically significant, though in the direction expected (F = 1.41, p = 0.237; t = -
0.753, p = 0.226), and the non-threat condition status comparison is also not statistically 
significant, though in the opposite direction expected  (F = 0.01, p = 0.914). All threat 
comparisons are in the direction expected , such that threat decreases selfish use of 
power. The low-status and combined threat condition comparisons are statistically 
significant. (F = 5.89, p = 0.016; t = 2.521, p = 0.006), while the high-status comparison 
is not (F = 1.28, p = 0.259). Including control variables, the difference in means across 
the conditions no longer approaches statistical significance (F = 1.78, p = 0.152). 
For the post-group task hypothetical rating of how much the participant would use 
their power selfishly, the difference in means across the conditions is not statistically 
significant (F = 1.51, p = 0.212), and none of the status comparisons are statistically 
significant. The non-threat and combined status comparisons are in the opposite direction 




the same (F = 0.00, p = 1.000). As in the pre-group task results, all threat comparisons 
are in the direction expected, such that threat decreases selfish use of power. The low-
status and combined threat condition comparisons are statistically significant (F = 3.14, p 
= 0.078; t = 2.020, p = 0.045), while the high-status comparison is not (F = 1.15, p = 
0.284). 
For the pre-to-post-group task change in hypothetical rating of how much the 
participant would use their power selfishly, the difference in mean changes across the 
conditions is not statistically significant (F = 1.48, p = 0.222). All status comparisons are 
in the opposite direction expected. The threat condition and combined comparisons 
approach statistical significance (F = 3.11, p = 0.079; t = 1.875, p = 0.062, two-tailed), 
while the non-threat comparison does not (F = 0.078, p = 0.379). Threat comparisons are 
not statistically significant, though they are all in the opposite direction expected (low-
status mean changes F = 0.93, p = 0.337; high-status means changes F = 0.01, p = 0.936; 
combined mean changes t = -0.733, p = 0.464, two-tailed). Including control variables, 
the high-status threat comparison is not statistically significant, though in the direction 
expected (F = 0.19, p = 0.667). 
These results mostly support the overall prediction. 
Hypothetical offer to partner if in powerful position: For the pre-group task 
hypothetical point offer to the partner if the participant were in a powerful position, 
means do not differ statistically across the conditions (F = 1.88, p = 0.135). I first address 
the expectation that high-status participants assert more power in their point offers by 
offering fewer points. The status comparison is not statistically significant for the non-




comparison for the threat conditions and combined status conditions are also not 
statistically significant, though in the opposite direction expected (F = 1.21, p = 0.272; t = 
-1.029, p = 0.305, two-tailed). Threat comparisons for the low-status means and the high-
status means are not statistically significant, though in the opposite direction expected (F 
= 0.19, p = 0.660; F = 1.21, p = 0.272). 
For the post-group task hypothetical point offer to the partner if the participant 
were in a powerful position, means again do not differ statistically across the conditions 
(F = 1.75, p = 0.159). The status comparison for the non-threat conditions and combined 
status conditions are not statistically significant, though in the opposite direction expected 
(F = 1.16, p = 0.283; t = -0.498, p = 0.619, two-tailed). The status comparison for the 
threatened conditions is also not statistically significant, though in the direction expected 
(F = 0.13, p = 0.714). The threat comparison for the low-status participants is not 
statistically significant, though in the opposite direction predicted (F = 0.47, p = 0.495). 
The threat comparison for the high-status participants is statistically significant in the 
direction expected (F = 4.52, p = 0.035). Of potential interest, the combined threat 
condition comparison is statistically significant, such that participants in the threatened 
conditions offer fewer points (t = 1.991, p = 0.048, two-tailed). 
For the pre-to-post-group task change in hypothetical point offer to the partner if 
the participant were in a powerful position, the difference in mean changes across the 
conditions is statistically significant (F = 2.84, p = 0.039). The non-threat status 
comparison is not statistically significant, though in the opposite direction expected (F = 
0.93, p = 0.337). The threat condition and combined status comparisons are both in the 




3.01, p = 0.084), while the combined status comparison is not (t = 0.539, p = 0.295). The 
threat condition comparison for the low-status participants is not statistically significant, 
though in the opposite direction predicted (F = 0.03, p = 0.867). The high-status threat 
comparison is statistically significant in the direction predicted (F = 8.21, p = 0.005). Of 
potential interest, the combined threat condition comparison is statistically significant, 
such that there is an increase in points offered for non-threatened participants and a 
decrease in points offered for threatened participants (t = 2.134, p = 0.017). This result 
appears to be driven by the high-status threat comparison. Also of potential interest, the 
difference in status coefficients across the threat models approaches statistical 
significance, such that the non-threatened participants experience an increase in points 
offered, and the threatened participants experience a decrease in points offered (chi 
square = 3.69, p = 0.055). As noted above, the status effect for this change is only 
statistically significant for the threat conditions (a decrease). 
 These results somewhat support the overall prediction. 
Difference between the hypothetical (low-power) and hypothetical high-
power point offers to the partner: These outcomes measure the discrepancy between 
hypothetical point offers to the partner from a low-power versus a high-power position 
(with the partner in the opposite power position). For the difference in these offers before 
the group task, mean differences do not differ statistically across the conditions (F = 0.48, 
p = 0.694). All status comparisons are not statistically significant, though they are in the 
direction expected (specifically for both the non-threatened and threatened participants 
and for the combined threat conditions, F = 1.25, p = 0.266; F = 0.14, p = 0.704; t = -




are not statistically significant, though in the opposite direction predicted (F = 0.30, p = 
0.586; F = 0.04, p = 0.850).  
For the difference in these offers after the group task, mean differences also do 
not differ statistically across the conditions (F = 0.27, p = 0.847). The status comparison 
within the non-threatened conditions and the combined status condition comparison are 
not statistically significant, though the results change to the opposite direction expected 
(F = 0.06, p = 0.809; t = 0.159, p = 0.874, two-tailed). The status comparison within the 
threatened conditions is also not statistically significant, though in the direction expected 
(F = 0.54, p = 0.465). The threat comparison within the low-status conditions is not 
statistically significant, though in the opposite direction expected (F = 0.23, p = 0.629). 
The threat comparison within the high-status conditions is also not statistically 
significant, though in the direction expected (F = 0.55, p = 0.458). 
For the pre-to-post-group task change in the difference of these offers, mean 
changes do not differ statistically across the conditions (F = 0.69, p = 0.558). For the 
status comparisons within the non-threatened and threatened conditions and the combined 
status condition comparison, the status difference is in the direction expected, such that 
the negative difference is greater for the high-status participants. This approaches 
statistical significance for the non-threatened participants (F = 1.80, p = 0.181), and does 
not for the threatened and combined comparisons (F = 0.15, p = 0.701; t = 1.225, p = 
0.111). Both the low-status and high-status threat comparisons are not statistically 





 These results only somewhat statistically support the overall prediction. Notably, 
the pooled threat comparison for being motivated to benefit the group before the task is 
statistically significant, and the comparisons approach statistical significance within the 
low-status and high-status conditions. 
 
Study 3 Manipulation Checks 
Several measures were designed to assess the effectiveness of the experimental 
manipulations. As in the results presented above, condition 1 represents low-status 
without threat, condition 2 is low-status with threat, condition 3 is high-status without 
threat, and condition 4 is high-status with threat. Results from models including control 
variables are presented when statistical conclusions differ from the main results. See 
Appendix for more information about these measures. 
 
Table 15: Study 3 Manipulation and Suspicion Checks 
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Rating of Partner A 
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Answered Q about 
risk of losing all points 
in a round correctly 









51 51 51 51 
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(1 and 3) 
Combined threat 
conditions (2 and 
4) 
Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
earning any points in a 
round correctly for 
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Power Manipulation Checks 
All participants were ostensibly assigned to the same power structure, in which 
they have low power, and another participant (Partner A) has high power. 
 For the question asking the participant to describe their power position by rating 
the extent of power they themselves held in their network position, means do not differ 
statistically across the conditions (F = 0.70, p = 0.554), and no specific comparisons are 
statistically significant.  
 For the question asking the participant to describe Partner A’s power position by 
rating the extent of power their Partner A held in their network position, there are some 
noteworthy differences across and between the conditions. Means differ statistically 
across the conditions (F = 3.33, p = 0.021). The threat comparison among low-status 
participants is statistically significant such that threatened participants rated their (high-
status) partner as more powerful (F = 8.87, p = 0.003). The status comparison within the 
threat conditions is statistically significant such that high-status participants rate their 
(low-status) partner as less powerful (F = 5.67, p = 0.018). The difference in status 
coefficients by threat is statistically significant such that threat increases this rating for 
low-status participants, and decreases it for high-status participants (chi square = 7.22, p 
= 0.007). As noted above, the status comparison is only statistically significant for the 
threatened participants. 
 Participants were asked to identify in a multiple-choice question how the task 
networks are assigned. It was specified during the instructions that these assignments are 
random. This question was designed to assess whether participants understood this 




correctly, and another indicator specifies whether the participant either answered this 
question correctly or indicated they were not sure. For both of these measures, the 
proportions differ statistically across the conditions (chi square = 19.165, p < 0.001; chi 
square = 22.645, p <0.001). All status comparisons are statistically significant such that 
more of the high-status participants answer this question correctly (or indicate they are 
not sure). This is the case for non-threat condition status comparisons (z = -2.194, p = 
0.028, two-tailed; z = -2.918, p = 0.004, two-tailed), threat condition status comparisons 
(z = -3.774, p <0.001, two-tailed; z = -3.732, p <0.001, two-tailed), and the combined 
status comparison (z = -4.221, p <0.001, two-tailed; t = -4.707, p <0.001, two-tailed). 
When including control variables for the correct indicator, the non-threat condition status 
comparison only approaches statistical significance (z = 1.79, p = 0.074, two-tailed). 
 These results suggest that while the power manipulation was generally effective, 
there is some interest evidence that experimental manipulations affected understanding of 
the partner’s power and how the network positions were assigned. 
 
Status Manipulation Checks 
For the participant’s self-report of their contrast sensitivity score, means differ 
statistically across conditions (F = 3,179.90, p <0.001), and all status comparisons are 
statistically significant in the direction expected. This is the case for the non-threat 
condition status comparison (F = 4,830.14, p <0.001), the threat condition status 
comparison (F = 4,707.76, p <0.001), and the combined status condition comparison (t = 




 For the participant’s rating of their contrast sensitivity score against the national 
standard, means differ statistically across conditions (F = 214.61, p <0.001), and all 
status comparisons are statistically significant in the direction expected. This is the case 
for the non-threat condition status comparison (F = 280.68, p <0.001), the threat 
condition status comparison (F = 362.10, p <0.001), and the combined status condition 
comparison (t = -25.200, p <0.001). Also, within the high-status conditions, the threat 
comparison approaches statistical significance such that these threatened participants rate 
themselves higher (F = 3.47, p = 0.064). 
 For the participant’s subjective rating of their contrast sensitivity score, means 
differ statistically across the conditions (F = 102.66, p <0.001), and all status 
comparisons are statistically significant in the direction expected. This is the case for the 
non-threat condition status comparison (F = 113.82, p <0.001), the threat condition status 
comparison (F = 193.45, p <0.001), and the combined status condition comparison (t = -
17.211, p <0.001). Also, the threat comparison within the low-status conditions is 
statistically significant, such that the rating is lower for these threatened participants (F = 
4.90, p = 0.028). There is also a statistically significant difference in the status 
coefficients by threat, such that participant status increases this rating more so for 
threatened participants (chi square = 5.33, p = 0.021). 
 For the participant’s report of their partner’s contrast sensitivity score, means 
differ statistically across conditions (F = 1,144.97, p <0.001), and all status comparisons 
are statistically significant in the direction expected. This is the case for the non-threat 




comparison (F = 1,718.64, p <0.001), and the combined status condition comparison (t = 
58.317, p <0.001). 
For the participant’s rating of their partner’s contrast sensitivity score against the 
national standard, means differ statistically across conditions (F = 401.74, p <0.001), and 
all status comparisons are statistically significant in the direction expected. This is the 
case for the non-threat condition status comparison (F = 575.12, p <0.001), the threat 
condition status comparison (F = 629.72, p <0.001), and the combined status condition 
comparison (t = 34.789, p <0.001). 
For the participant’s subjective rating of their partner’s contrast sensitivity score, 
means differ statistically across conditions (F = 224.75, p <0.001), and all status 
comparisons are statistically significant in the direction expected. This is the case for the 
non-threat condition status comparison (F = 307.39, p <0.001), the threat condition status 
comparison (F = 366.48, p <0.001), and the combined status condition comparison (t = 
25.956, p <0.001). 
These results suggest that the status manipulation was successful. The results also 
present some interesting evidence that suggests that threat affects perception of status in 
some ways. 
 
Threat Manipulation Checks 
For the scale addressing how personally threatened the participant feels, means 
across conditions do not differ statistically (F = 1.36, p = 0.256). Threat comparisons are 
in the direction expected. The high-status comparison is statistically significant (F = 3.39, 




p = 0.793), and the combined threat condition comparison (including both low- and high-
status conditions) approaches statistical significance (t = -1.481, p = 0.070). When 
including control variables, the high-status threat comparison only approaches statistical 
significance (F = 2.40, p = 0.123, two-tailed). 
 For the scale addressing how threatened on behalf of the task group the 
participant feels, the differences in the means across the conditions is statistically 
significant (F = 2.79, p = 0.042). Threat comparisons are in the direction expected. The 
high-status and combined comparisons are statistically significant (F = 4.69, p = 0.032; t 
= -1.481, p = 0.070), the low-status threat comparison is not statistically significant (F = 
1.24, p = 0.268). When including control variables, the differences in the means across 
the conditions only approach statistical significance (F = 2.21, p = 0.088). 
 For the question about the extent to which the participant evaluates the group task 
situation as personally threatening, means differ statistically across the conditions (F = 
3.94, p = 0.009). All threat comparisons are in the direction expected. The threat 
comparison within the high-status conditions and the combined threat conditions are 
statistically significant (F = 9.19, p = 0.003; t = -3.284, p = 0.001), and the threat 
comparison within the low-status conditions approaches statistical significance (F = 2.58, 
p = 0.055). 
 For the question about to what extent the participant evaluates the group task 
situation as threatening to the group, means differ statistically across the conditions (F = 
5.81, p = 0.001), and all threat comparisons are statistically significant in the direction 




6.29, p = 0.013), the threat comparison within the high-status conditions (F = 10.83, p = 
0.001), and the combined threat condition comparison (t = -4.115, p <0.001). 
 The question asking how difficult it was to earn profit points during the task is 
evaluated as a threat manipulation check question because the threat manipulation 
ostensibly makes it more difficult to earn points. The overall comparison of means across 
conditions approaches statistical significance (F = 2.38, p = 0.070). The threat 
comparison within the low-status conditions is in the opposite direction expected and not 
statistically significant (F = 0.18, p = 0.675). Both the high-status and combined threat 
comparisons are in the direction expected. The high-status comparison is statistically 
significant and the combined threat comparison approaches statistical significance (F = 
6.33, p = 0.013; t = -1.472, p = 0.071). The combined threat comparison result appears to 
be driven by the high-status comparison. Also, within the threat conditions, the status 
comparison is statistically significant, such that these high-status participants indicate 
more difficulty earning profit points (F = 4.15, p = 0.043). There is also a statistically 
significant difference in the status coefficients by threat, such that high participant status 
(with low partner status) increases this rating for threatened participants and decreases it 
for non-threatened participants (chi square = 4.37, p = 0.037). However, as noted above, 
only the threat condition status comparison is statistically significant. When including 
control variables, the difference in status coefficients by threat only approaches statistical 





Threat Comprehension Results 
As in Study 2, two questions were designed to assess whether the participant 
comprehended the threat conditions. First, they were asked to identify the circumstances 
under which it was possible for members of the network group not to earn any points 
during a given round. For the non-threat conditions, this was when group members could 
not agree on any point distributions, and for the threat conditions, this also included when 
the group resources were eliminated for that round (mentioning that there was a risk 
every round). Second, they were asked to affirm whether there was a risk of all points for 
the network group being eliminated each respective round (true for the threat condition 
participants). Both questions had an alternative response consistent with the threat and 
non-threat conditions, and a “not sure option.” For the correct rates, only correct 
responses are counted (both incorrect and not sure responses are considered incorrect). 
Though ideally all participants in the final sample would fully comprehend the threat 
manipulations, it makes sense that as several results suggest, proportions of correct 
responses are lower in the threat conditions. This is because the threat version of the 
instructions is more complex, and perhaps more difficult to understand. 
For the proportion of participants responding affirmatively to group resources 
being eliminated for that round as a way the group could not earn any points in a round, 
these proportions differ statistically across conditions (chi square = 60.333, p <0.001). 
All threat comparisons are statistically significant in the direction expected, such that 
participants in the threat conditions are more likely to indicate this response. This is the 




condition threat comparison (z = -5.384, p <0.001), and the high-status threat condition 
comparison (t = -5.598, p <0.001). 
For the correct answer indicator for the question about what determines if 
participants earn no points in a round, the difference in proportions across the conditions 
is statistically significant (chi square = 8.466, p = 0.037), and results suggest threat 
effects, such that those in the threat conditions are more likely to answer this question 
correctly. These results are unexpected because the threat situation was more complex, 
and perhaps because of that more difficult to comprehend. However, these results suggest 
that the control condition may have actually been more ambiguous for participants. 
Results in this direction are statistically significant for the threat comparison within the 
high-status conditions and the combined threat comparison (F = 2.272, p = 0.023, two-
tailed; z = -2.892, p = 0.004, two-tailed), and it approaches statistical significance for the 
threat comparison within the low-status condition (F = -1.818, p = 0.069, two-tailed). 
When including not sure responses in addition to correct ones, proportions do not differ 
statistically across the conditions (chi square = 4.728, p = 0.193). Threat comparisons are 
in the same direction. The combined threat condition comparison is statistically 
significant (z = -2.162, p = 0.031, two-tailed), the high-status threat comparison 
approaches statistical significance (z = -1.659, p = 0.097, two-tailed), and the low-status 
threat comparison is not statistically significant (z = -1.401, p = 0.161, two-tailed). 
Including control variables for the yes proportion, the combined threat comparison only 
approaches statistical significance (z = 2.70, p = 0.007, two-tailed), and the low-status 
threat comparison no longer approaches statistical significance (z = 1.04, p = 0.300, two-




including control variables, the difference in proportions across conditions only 
approaches statistical significance (F = 2.41, p = 0.068). 
I further evaluate this question about what determines if participants earn no 
points in a round with the entire collected data sample, to investigate whether data 
rejection systematically affected these manipulations. These results suggest that this was 
not the case. For the correct response indicator, statistical conclusions in the full collected 
sample are the same as in the balanced sample of accepted data. Proportions differ 
statistically across the conditions (chi square = 13.437, p = 0.004), both the threat 
comparison within the high-status conditions and the combined threat condition 
comparison are statistically significant (z = -3.145, p = 0.002; t = -3.490, p = 0.001, two-
tailed), and the low-status comparison approaches statistical significance (t = -1.791, p = 
0.073, two-tailed). For the indicator including both correct and not sure responses, 
proportions across conditions approach statistical significance (chi square = 7.377, p = 
0.061). All threat comparisons are in the same direction as in the analyses above. The 
high-status and combined threat condition comparisons are statistically significant (z = -
2.252, p = 0.024 z = -2.634, p = 0.008, two-tailed), and the low-status threat comparison 
is not statistically significant (z = -1.476, p = 0.140). 
For the proportion of participants responding “yes” that there is a risk of losing all 
points for that round with each respective round, these proportions differ statistically 
across conditions (chi square = 21.412, p <0.001). All threat comparisons are statistically 
significant in the direction expected, such that participants in the threat conditions are 




comparison (z = -4.481, p <0.001), the low-status condition threat comparison (z = -
2.377, p = 0.009), and the high-status threat condition comparison (z = -3.961, p <0.001). 
For the correct answer indicator for the question about whether there is a risk of 
all points being eliminated for a round, the difference in proportions across the conditions 
is statistically significant (chi square = 10.929, p = 0.012). All status comparisons are 
statistically significant such that those in the threat conditions are more likely to answer 
this question correctly. This is the case for the threat comparison within the low-status 
conditions (z = -2.377, p = 0.018, two-tailed), threat comparison within the high-status 
conditions (z = -2.012, p = 0.044, two-tailed), and combined threat condition comparison 
(z = -3.096, p = 0.002, two-tailed). When including not sure responses in addition to 
correct ones, proportions do not differ statistically across the conditions (chi square = 
3.589, p = 0.309, and while all threat comparisons are in the same direction, none are 
statistically significant. This is the case for the threat comparison within the low-status 
conditions (z = -1.482, p = 0.139, two-tailed), threat comparison within the high-status 
conditions (z = -0.673, p = 0.501, two-tailed), and combined threat condition comparison 
(z = -1.537, p = 0.124, two-tailed). When including control variables for the correct 
responses only, the high-status threat comparison is no longer statistically significant (z = 
1.58, p = 0.115, two-tailed). When including control variables for the correct responses 
along with the not sure responses, the low-status threat comparison becomes statistically 
significant (z = 2.33, p = 0.020, two-tailed) and the combined threat comparison 
approaches statistical significance (z = 1.84, p = 0.065, two-tailed). 
I also evaluate this question about risk of point loss during a round with the entire 




manipulations. These results suggest that this was not the case. For the correct response 
indicator, results in the full collected sample are the same as in the balanced sample of 
accepted data. The difference in proportions across the conditions is statistically 
significant (chi square = 18.691, p < 0.001). All status comparisons are statistically 
significant. This is the case for the threat comparison within the low-status conditions (z 
= -3.224, p = 0.001, two-tailed), threat comparison within the high-status conditions (z = -
2.820, p = 0.005, two-tailed), and combined threat condition comparison (z = -4.280, p 
<0.001, two-tailed). When including not sure responses in addition to correct ones, 
proportions do not differ statistically across the conditions (chi square = 4.849, p = 
0.183), and results are in the same direction, but only the combined status comparison is 
statistically significant (z = -2.116, p = 0.035, two-tailed), and the threat comparison 
within the low-status conditions approaches statistical significance (z = -1.872, p = 0.061, 
two-tailed). The threat comparison within the high-status conditions is not statistically 
significant (z = -1.105, p= 0.269, two-tailed). When including control variables for the 
correct along with the not sure responses, the low-status threat comparison becomes 
statistically significant (z = 2.28, p = 0.023). Of potential interest, when treating this 
outcome as a mean and including control variables and, the difference in proportions 
across conditions approaches statistical significance (F = 2.13, p = 0.098). 
 
Suspicion Checks 
 Several questions were designed to assess participants’ suspicion. The measures 
and how they differed across experimental conditions are discussed below. All 




each type of suspicion were only asked of those who indicated “yes” or “not sure” to 
being suspicious in this way. Results for the difference of status coefficients by threat are 
not available for most of these variables due to missing estimates (i.e., means of 0). The 
proportions provided for these probing questions only include those participants asked. 
The tables above provide the number of participants included in calculating each 
proportion. 
Ever suspicious (first question): For the first question about being suspicious 
about anything in the study (which all participants were asked), proportions indicating 
“yes” do not differ statistically across the conditions (chi square = 5.343, p = 0.148). 
However, the threat comparison within the high-status conditions is statistically 
significant, such that threatened participants are less likely to indicate this (z = 1.990, p = 
0.047, two-tailed). The status comparison within the non-threat conditions approaches 
statistical significance, such that high-status participants are more likely to indicate this (z 
= -1.788, p = 0.074, two-tailed). Including “not sure” responses along with the “yes” 
ones, the difference in the status coefficients by threat approaches statistical significance 
(chi square = 2.97, p = 0.085). When including control variables for the yes outcome 
only, the non-threat condition status comparison no longer approaches statistical 
significance (z = 1.48, p = 0.140, two-tailed). When including control variables for the 
yes along with not sure responses, the non-threat condition status comparison becomes 
statistically significant (z = 2.03, p = 0.042, two-tailed). When treating the yes along with 
not sure indicator as a mean, and including control variables, the difference in 




Whether this suspicion affected behavior: Participants who indicated either “yes” 
or “not sure” that they were suspicious about anything in the study were asked whether 
the suspicion affected their behavior. For proportion of participants indicating “yes” to 
this question, the proportions do not differ statistically across conditions (chi square = 
2.798, p = 0.424). When treating this outcome as a mean, the difference in the status 
coefficients by threat approaches statistical significance such that the non-threat mean 
increases with threat and the threat mean decreases with threat, but no individual 
comparisons are statistically significant (chi square = 3.09, p = 0.079).37 When including 
“not sure” as well as “yes” responses, these proportions also do not differ statistically 
across conditions (chi square = 4.473, p = 0.215), though the non-threat condition status 
comparison approaches statistical significance such that high-status participants are more 
likely to indicate this (z = -2.051, p = 0.040, two-tailed). 
 Whether acted as though real: All asked participants indicated “yes” that they 
acted as though the circumstances of the study were real. 
Whether any suspicion affected behavior during study (final question): As a final 
suspicion question, all participants were asked whether any type of suspicion affected 
their behavior during the study. No participants responded “yes” to this question. The 
proportion of participants indicating “not sure” does not differ statistically across 
conditions (chi square = 0.67, p = 0.567), and no specific comparisons are statistically 
significant. 
 
                                                




Summary Suspicion Scale 
 A suspicion scale was computed to measure how many of the four suspicion 
questions participants indicated suspicion about. The first measure is the number of 
questions they said “yes” to. Means do not differ statistically across conditions (F = 1.06, 
p = 0.368) or any specific comparisons. When computing this scale with both “yes” and 
“not sure” responses, means also do not differ statistically across the conditions (F = 
1.28, p = 0.284). However, the status comparison within the non-threat conditions 
approaches statistical significance such that high-status participants indicate more 
suspicion (F = 3.53, p = 0.062), and in turn, the difference in status coefficients by threat 
also approaches statistical significance (chi square = 2.84, p = 0.092). When including 
control variables for the yes scale only, the non-threat condition status comparison is 
statistically significant (F = 4.45, p = 0.036) such that high-status participants indicate 
more suspicion, and the difference in status coefficients by threat approaches statistical 
significance (chi square = 3.29, p = 0.070). When including control variables for the scale 
for both yes and not sure, the non-threat condition status comparison also becomes 
statistically significant (F = 5.65, p = 0.019), and the high-status threat comparison 
approaches statistical significance such that threatened participants indicate less suspicion 
(F = 3.09, p = 0.080). 
 
Specific Types of Suspicion  
Below I present results for specific suspicion about the partner and information 




Suspicion about the group members: All participants were asked if they were 
suspicious about whether any of their group members were real. The proportion 
indicating “yes” do not differ statistically across the conditions (chi square = 2.03, p = 
0.154), and no specific comparisons are statistically significant. The same is true for the 
proportion including “not sure” as well as “yes” responses (chi square = 1.881, p = 
0.597).  
 Whether this suspicion affected behavior: Participants who indicated either “yes” 
or “not sure” that they were suspicious about the group members were asked whether the 
suspicion affected their behavior. The proportion indicating “yes” does not differ 
statistically across the conditions (chi square = 1.922, p = 0.589), and no results available 
for specific comparisons are statistically significant. The same is true for the proportion 
including “not sure” as well as “yes” responses (chi square = 2.137, p = 0.544). 
 Whether acted as though real: The proportion of asked participants indicating 
“yes” does not differ statistically across conditions (chi square = 2.888, p = 0.515), and 
no specific comparisons are statistically significant. All asked participants indicated 
either “yes” or “not sure” to this question. 
Suspicion about information about the group members: All participants were then 
asked if they were suspicious about any information provided about the group members. 
The proportion indicating “yes” does not differ statistically across the conditions (chi 
square = 1.546, p = 0.672), and no specific comparisons are statistically significant. The 
same is true for the proportion including “not sure” as well as “yes” responses (chi square 
= 1.25, p = 0.263). When including control variables for the yes responses only, the high-




are less likely to indicate this (z = -2.29, p = 0.022, two-tailed). When including control 
variables for the “yes” responses as well as the “not sure” responses, the non-threat 
condition status comparison approaches statistical significance such that high-status 
participants are more likely to indicate this (z = 1.92, p = 0.055, two-tailed), and the 
threat comparison for high-status participants approaches statistical significance (z = -
1.92, p = 0.055, two-tailed). 
Whether this suspicion affected behavior: Participants who indicated either “yes” 
or “not sure” that they were suspicious about information provided about the group 
members were asked whether the suspicion affected their behavior. The proportion 
indicating “yes” does not differ statistically across the conditions (chi square = 1.759, p = 
0.624), and no specific comparisons are statistically significant. The same is true for the 
proportion including “not sure” as well as “yes” responses (chi square = 1.934, p = 
0.586). When including control variables for the yes and not sure indicator, the threat 
condition and combined status comparisons approach statistical significance such that 
high-status participants are more likely to indicate this (z = 1.79, p = 0.073, two-tailed; z 
= 1.83, p = 0.067). 
Whether acted as though real: The proportion of asked participants indicating 
“yes” does not differ statistically across conditions (chi square = 2.430, p = 0.488), and 
no specific comparisons are statistically significant. All asked participants indicated 





Study 3 Discussion 
The Study 3 experiment results provide a great deal more support for the 
predictions than Study 1 or Study 2 do. The results suggest that high-status participants 
with powerful low-status partners especially respond to threats, and that low-status 
participants regard the high-status partner as less legitimate before the task than during 
and after. Though minimal, there is also some evidence of increased ingroup prosocial 
orientations under threat, especially before the group task. 
 Results among high-status participants were notably strong for the coalition 
voting results and post-task subjective legitimacy rating scale. Perhaps also notably, the 
assumption about coalition voting reflecting legitimacy was not supported, such that 
high-status participants (with low-status partners) did not vote more often in favor of the 
coalition against the powerful actor. An interesting pattern emerged with threat and pre-
task voting, such that threat generally increased the proportion of these votes, regardless 
of the status condition. This suggests that a powerful actor is not as likely to be viewed as 
legitimate (i.e., they should not be in that position) when the group is threatened, no 
matter who the powerful actor is (high- or low-status). Despite this, there is a great deal 
of evidence that when threatened, the powerful actor is viewed less favorably when they 
are low in status. The results also somewhat support the status-based legitimacy 
assumptions tested in Lucas et al. (manuscript in progress). 
 The results for voting in favor of a network coalition changed from before to after 
the network task. While there no statistically significant voting results were consistent 




possibility that acting in a low-power position, and ostensibly having resources withheld 
to some extent by a powerful actor, mobilizes defense of the ingroup prosocial worldview 
of promoting the legitimacy of power, and therefore results in action (votes in favor of 
the coalition). This was the case to some extent for the low-status participants voting 
before the task (though voting patterns did change from before to after the task).  
 There is also some evidence for ingroup prosocial orientations increasing under 
threat, especially before the group task. Notably, the pooled threat comparison for being 
motivated to benefit the group before the task is statistically significant, and the 
comparisons approach statistical significance within the low-status and high-status 
conditions. Also, among the low-status participants, the threatened participants indicated 
that the task group was more important to them — this was statistically significant before 
the group task, and approached statistical significance after the task. 
Results highlight how status characteristics, and therefore properties of 
legitimacy, may vary by context. That is, the extent to which legitimacy is in the eye of 
the beholder. For example, a political leader may have culturally or subculturally valued 
traits, like being white, male, or liberal, and depending on the constituents’ values, be 
perceived as more or less legitimate. Willer et al.’s (2016a, also 2016b) work 
demonstrating experimental support for threat to white racial identity strengthening Tea 
Party support is a relevant example. Another illustration of this relative legitimacy is how 
following 9/11, increased compliance with U.S. Homeland Security’s TSA travel rules 
might be considered ingroup prosociality. However, criticism of overzealous TSA agents, 
full-body scanning at airports, and a recent Homeland Security investigation highlights 




alarming rate of dangerous items were missed during screening, e.g., Bonner 2015). If 
these programs were perceived as more legitimate (for example, if the scanning 




While the results provide a great deal of support for Prediction 5, that threats 
increase promotion of the legitimacy of power, I consider how the pattern of results 
suggest a potential alternative explanation, self-serving motivations. This is consistent 
with patterns in the Study 1 and Study 2 results (Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, respectively). 
Specifically, while behaviors are observed among both low-status participants (with high-
status partners) and high-status participants (with low-status partners), there is more 
evidence of threat affecting related attitudes, or orientations, for the high-status 
participants. I propose that high-status participants are especially motivated to promote 
the legitimacy of power, and perhaps experience indignation when faced with a powerful 
low-status actor (especially when they act selfishly). By comparison, low-status 
participants’ responses to the powerful high-status actor under threat are more so 
consistent with practical responses to the threat situation, such that they are trying to 
maximize their personal profit score. 
A potential nuance of the theory is that high-status participants may experience 
indignation when faced with a powerful low-status actor (especially when they act 
selfishly). This indignation may come from an interaction between a threatening situation 




selfishly). The low-status partner in the high-status position is inconsistent with an 
ingroup prosocial legitimacy of power worldview, so it may have elicited the strongest 
results for this reason. The threatened high-status participants indicated that it was more 
difficult to earn points than those in the non-threat conditions. This was not the case for 
the low-status participants, which suggests the high-status participants especially 
internalized the threat. The result for post-task legitimacy evaluations was statistically 
significant in the direction predicted for the high-status participants but not the low-status 
participants. High-status participants may also feel most invested in the power structure, 
and feel that they themselves deserve the high-power position more so than their low-
status partner. Before the task, high-status participants indicated that during the task, they 
would be more selfish, and also potentially more group-oriented, but interestingly, this 
was not the case for ratings after the task. Behavioral responses among high-status 
participants, such as some voting outcomes, mean number of points offered to the 
partner, and post-task hypothetical point offers from a position of power are consistent 
with this pattern. By comparison, the low-status participants may not have seen the high-
status partner occupying and acting somewhat selfishly in the powerful position as 
problematic (and therefore they may have reacted more practically to the threat situation). 
Notably, partner selfishness evaluations do not particularly support this explanation for 
the high-status participants. Further consistent with this explanation, proportionally fewer 
threatened high-status participants wanted to work with the same partner again, compared 
to these same non-threatened participants. In future research, it would be of interest to see 




For low-status participants, their responses seemed more practical and less 
worldview-oriented compared to the high-status participants. As mentioned above, high-
status participants indicated that it was more difficult to earn points when threatened, 
while this was not the case for low-status participants. This suggests that low-status 
participants did not internalize the threat as much as the high-status participants did, and 
perhaps specifically did not internalize it as much in terms of an ingroup prosociality 
worlview for the legitimacy of power. There was interesting evidence that their 
impressions of their powerful high-status partner improved from before the task to during 
and after. Interestingly, they rated the powerful high-status partner as more powerful 
when threatened. Voting patterns among low-status participants became more favorable 
toward their high-status partner from before to after the task. There is also potential 
evidence that before the task (but not after), low-status participants (with high-status 
partners) think the partner is less motivated to benefit themselves under threat. While the 
low-status participants may have anticipated the powerful high-status actor abusing their 
power, during and after the task, they may have determined that the powerful high-status 
actor’s behavior was not so problematic. Before the task, the low-status participants 
expected their partner to use more power when threatened than not threatened, but this 
was not the case after the task. Also the threat comparison within low-status participants 
for the pre-to-post-task change in this rating approaches statistical significance. This 
pattern is also evident in the higher proportion of offers low-status participants accepted 
under threat.  
There is some evidence that participants may have become more ingroup 




benefit the group before the task is statistically significant, and the comparisons approach 
statistical significance within the low-status and high-status conditions. I note that these 
patterns are especially among the low-status participants, and that they may have become 
more generally ingroup prosocial, but not necessarily in terms of the legitimacy of power. 
For their pre-task ratings for hypothetical use of power (as though in a powerful 
position), they indicated that would use if less selfishly and more in ways that benefit the 
group when threatened than non-threatened. There was also evidence that threatened low-
status participants are less motivated to benefit the self after the task. Only threatened 
low-status participants rated the network group as more important (both pre- and post-
task), but this wasn’t the case for high-status participants. In previous discussion points, I 
suggested the possibility of using behavior to reconcile worldviews with situations in the 
social world, consistent with affect control theory (ACT, e.g., Owens 2002). This pattern 
of results strongly supports the general prediction of this work. However, the question 
remains why these patterns were not more consistent with the other questions, or with the 
high-status participants responding to the same questions. It is also interesting how the 
results supporting greater cohesion under threat tend to be before the task but not after. 
This suggests a potential coping strategy once faced with the powerful actor’s selfish 
before. 
As in Study 2, there are interesting results for some of the manipulation check 
questions. Specifically, some of the Study 3 status manipulation check questions yield 
results consistent with increased adherence to status orders under threat. This is 
consistent with Prediction 3, as tested in Study 2. By comparison, some of these Study 2 




performing poorly. Of potential interest, the status manipulation was not directly relevant 
to performance on the Study 3 task, but it was for Study 2. Methodological limitations of 
the Study 2 threat manipulation are discussed in Chapter 6, and advantages of the Study 3 
threat manipulation are discussed in this chapter and Chapter 9. 
Some questions originally designed as manipulation checks revealed interesting 
patterns relevant to the proposed theory. Specifically, threatened high-status participants 
evaluated themselves as having higher contrast sensitivity ability compared to the 
national average (approached statistical significance) and threatened low-status 
participants subjectively evaluated themselves as having lower contrast sensitivity ability. 
These are similar to results observed in Study 2. There were also interesting patterns in 
the results for perception of the partner as powerful. Under threat, low-status participants 
(with high-status partners) view their partner as more powerful, and when threatened, the 
high-status participants with low-status partners view their partner as less powerful. 
Taken together, these manipulation check results suggest that participants may have been 
trying to create a more legitimate reality internally, such that status differentials are 




As mentioned above, the Study 3 threat design and threat manipulation likely 
engaged the participants more so than Study 1 and Study 2 did. Not only did participants 
experience having resources withheld by a powerful actor (who took more resources for 




eliminated. The explanatory language for participants unique to Study 3 likely improved 
this reception:  
[The percentage risk] simulates situations in the social world like destruction of 
group resources at the hands of hostile out-groups, loss of food due to overuse of 
natural resources, and failure to respond effectively to natural disasters like 
hurricanes, floods, or forest fires. 
 
Compared to Study 2, the threat manipulation checks indicate greater 
effectiveness of this manipulation, so this may in part explain the more supportive results 
from Study 3. Further adding to the situation’s salience was the relative instability of the 
power structure, because it ostensibly can change via group member vote. I discuss 
instability in more detail as a potential confound below. 
A potential confound with powerful positions and use of power in Study 3 is that 
of selfishness, exploitation, or abuse of the power. The instructions specify that the 
partner has a negotiation advantage, and the partner simulation is programmed to 
progressively demand more and more than their fair share of points. During the group 
task, the somewhat selfish behavior the participants observed may have been interpreted 
as not only use of power, but abuse of power. This presents a noteworthy limitation in 
how use of power was presented to participants. It would be of interest in future work to 
only present holding a position of power, and if using power, in ways that are 
interpretable as neutral or ingroup prosocial (e.g., declaring war against an enemy nation 
on behalf of one’s country). 
Another potential limitation, or confound, with the Study 3 threat condition is that 
of relief or gratitude, especially the sentiment after a near-miss. After finding out they 
missed the elimination of all points for a round each time, they may have begun to feel 




been of interest to assess this possibility, but the Study 3 data do not include any. Also 
notably, while voting before the task could help to assess expectations for legitimacy, 
informing participants of this possibility of the power structure changing as a result of 
their votes could introduce intragroup threat via instability (e.g., Barclay and Benard 
2013). As I discussed above in terms of intragroup threat, it seems possible that 
instability undermines the legitimacy of power. Perhaps this helps to explain why the 
threat manipulation in Study 3 seemed especially effective. Notably, from before to after 
the group task in Study 3, coalition voting results followed the predictions more so after 
than before. However, measures were not designed to assess feelings of intragroup threat 




These results somewhat support the predictions, that persons more strongly 
promote legitimate power structures when under threat. However, alternatively, they 
suggest that self-serving motivations may be at play, such that high-status participants are 
especially indignant about powerful low-status actors, and that low-status participants 
respond in ways more practical to the situation. Low-status participants may also exhibit 






Chapter 9:  Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I discuss the results from the three experiments, and based on these results 
I present some conclusions. I address how my findings inform the proposed theory about 
threats promoting ingroup prosociality, a potential alternative explanation in which self-
serving motivations shape responses to threats, and potential directions for future 
research. 
 
Evaluating the Results 
Results from the experiments only somewhat support the proposed theory that 
threats to groups increase ingroup prosociality via ingroup prosociality worldviews. 
While there are potential explanations (especially due to methodological limitations) for 
some results that do not provide statistical support for predictions and even some in the 
opposite direction, such that these results do not necessarily disconfirm the theory, I 
consider alternatives to the proposed theory. The present results suggest a potential 
alternative explanation that focuses on self-serving motivations for relationships observed 
between threats and ingroup prosocial behaviors and orientations. In any case, the results 
suggest the need for further research. 
There are two main conclusions I draw from this research. First, there is evidence 
of threats to groups affecting both behaviors and orientations (many of which I propose 
reflect ingroup prosociality), so these warrant consideration together as defensive 
responses to threats. Second, when threatened, people especially react in ways that 




especially invested in promoting the legitimacy of power, and may react to powerful low-
status actors with indignation, especially when they are able to or actually act selfishly. In 
terms of potential interventions for political or military leadership, this work stresses the 
importance of perceived status for perceived legitimacy of power, especially under threat. 
Though statistical support was minimal, the Study 1 results suggest that threat 
promotes some ingroup prosocial orientations, such as holism among Americans and 
lower individualism among Indians, that terrorism is more effective in eliciting threat 
responses than natural disaster, and that there may be some interesting differences in 
threat responses by culture. The Study 1 results were generally more consistent with 
Prediction 2A, which predicted greater responsiveness to threatening situations among 
Americans, compared to Prediction 2B, which predicted greater Indian responsiveness. 
Notably, Indians became less ingroup prosocial in some ways when threatened, 
specifically on pre-to-post manipulation changes in country and family group importance. 
The group studies, Study 2 and Study 3, allow us to separate practical responses 
to threats (i.e., increased effort to earn profit points) with internalizing ingroup prosocial 
orientations about status orders and the legitimacy of power, respectively. While the 
results for status orders (Study 2) largely did not support the predictions, to a great extent 
both types of results for promoting the legitimacy of power did (Study 3). 
From the Study 2 results, there were no supporting results for the outcomes 
predicted, and there were only some suggestive results that threat changed some attitudes 
in status-consistent ways. The results that did provide minimal support for the predictions 




Though low-status participants reported decreased contrast sensitivity ability scores when 
threatened, their subjective ability evaluations increased. 
The Study 3 results suggest that threat increases several outcomes that indicate 
promotion of legitimate power structures, such that high-status individuals should be in 
positions of power, and low-status individuals should not. Results suggest that high-status 
participants with powerful low-status partners especially internalize the legitimacy of 
power worldview, and that low-status participants regarded the high-status partner as less 
legitimate before the task than during and after. There is also some evidence that threat 
increases general ingroup prosocial and cohesion orientations.Based on the results, the 
most prominent ingroup prosociality worldview was upholding the legitimacy of power 
structures, both behaviorally and mentally. I initially proposed that ingroup prosociality, 
as concrete group processes outcomes — social and cognitive orientations, status, and 
power — may be considered broadly as a cultural worldview as in terror management 
theory (e.g., Greenberg et al. 1997). While statistical evidence is notably limited for all 
but the legitimacy of power outcomes. Specifically, this was for the orientation outcomes 
(see Study 1 and Study 3 results), status-related attitudes (see Study 2 and Study 3 
results), and promoting the legitimacy of power (both behaviorally and mentally, Study 3 
results).  
Based on my findings, especially Study 3, I propose considering outcomes 
fundamental the group processes literature, such as status and power processes, as 
potentially part of ingroup prosocial worldviews. The Study 3 findings demonstrated 
clear worldviews about the legitimacy of power, and these are closely tied to status 




about how groups should function, especially locus of attention holism for Americans 
and lower individualism among Indians, were supported in Study 1 as well. This 
combination of findings across contexts (and cultures, to some extent) supports both 
orientations and behaviors that benefit ingroups as part of the ingroup prosociality 
category. However, the potential self-serving explanation, discussed in more detail 
below, is a potential limitation to this framing.  
 
Self-serving Explanation 
The results somewhat support the initially proposed theory, but suggest a possible 
alternative explanation, which is self-serving motivations for responses to threats. I 
briefly highlight the reasons for this explanation below, and suggest future research 
specific to this explanation. As in the tests of the predictions for the proposed theory, not 
all results were statistically significant or even in direction supporting this explanation. 
However, some of the patterns in the results are consistent with this explanation, which is 
of interest to consider in further developing theory about threats and behaviors and 
orientations that relevant to group contexts. 
In Study 1, there is evidence of threatened Indians distancing from their country 
and family ingroups from before the manipulation to after the manipulation. In Study 2, 
threatened low-status participants subjectively evaluate themselves as higher in status 
than they do when not threatened. Though there is evidence in Study 3 consistent with 
both high- and low-status participants promoting the legitimacy of power, patterns of 
results suggest that the high-status participants (with powerful low-status partners) are 




personally indignant or as though they deserve the powerful position themselves. Also in 
Study 3, responses that appear more generally ingroup prosocial tend to be more so 
before the group task than after the group task. During the group task, the powerful actor 
acts somewhat selfishly, so this behavior likely to be received as illegitimate could 
explain differences in participants’ responses from before to after the task. 
I discuss this self-serving explanation in terms of terror management theory 
below. Of significant interest, preserving self-esteem is a fundamental motive addressed 
by terror management theory (TMT, e.g., Greenberg 1997). While the originally 
proposed theoretical framing largely draws on terror management theory, this alternative 
self-serving explanation is not directly compatible with the originally proposed 
motivation to uphold ingroup prosocial worldviews. However, of significant interest, the 
alternative explanation supports TMT as well. Also, this does not preclude overlap 
between these two types of motivations, however, such as when the self-concept is 
strongly invested in group membership and an ingroup prosocial identity. I discuss this 
further below in terms of implications for the self-concept. 
A promising next step to test this self-serving explanation for responses to threat 
would be to use a public goods or commons dilemma situation (e.g., Brewer and Kramer 
1986). Responses within a short period of time would be especially interesting, because 
the group’s well-being is less directly related to the individual’s well-being. The studies 
presented, especially the group studies (2 and 3) have considerable overlap between 
behaviors and orientations that benefit the self and behaviors and orientations that benefit 
the group. Patterns of findings in the present work have raised the possibility of self-




discrepancies between low- and high-status participant responses, especially in Study 3. 
If further research supports the self-serving explanation over the ingroup prosociality 
worldview explanation, perhaps it would be theoretically fruitful to consider the self-
serving motivations as self-preserving worldviews, and the Study 3 threat scenario as a 
situation in which they are especially likely to arise. Another relevant concept is that of 
altruism. It may be of interest to measure the extent to which individuals act altruistically, 
as to disentangle practical behaviors from ones enacted to benefit the group. Of 
significant interest, the participants in my studies appear to have reacted defensively to 
ingroup threats, at least in some ways. I discuss my findings in terms of terror 
management theory (TMT) in more detail below. 
 
Terror Management Theory 
My proposed theory is essentially a specific application of terror management 
theory (TMT, e.g., Greenberg et al. 1997), in which I specify that ingroup prosocial 
worldviews are threatened, and that under this type of threat, people think and behave in 
ways that defend those worldviews (ingroup prosocially). One big question is how well 
TMT does to explain the present results. As for my ingroup prosociality worldview 
explanation, the results only somewhat support this, and some patterns in results 
challenge it, instead suggesting that self-serving motivations explain the results observed. 
As for TMT, the theory recognizes actively buffering anxiety by preserving one’s self-
esteem as a worldview defense strategy (e.g., Greenberg et al. 1997). Facing a threat to a 
smoothly functioning ingroup. The Study 2 and Study 3 results suggest that people 




of profit ostensibly depends on performance in the task group. These are not limited to 
behaviors (such as not offering as many points to a less legitimate powerful actor), but 
also orientations. If people are motivated to avoid cognitive dissonance, they will 
acknowledge attitudes consistent with what they see as reality. This is evident in the post-
task legitimacy ratings in Study 3 among the high-status participants. To act practically in 
terms of their performance, they need only exhibit behaviors such as offering fewer 
points and voting in favor of a coalition. The less legitimate ratings of the low-status 
partner when threatened suggest a sense of indignation about the low-status partner 
holding this position and perhaps also acting somewhat selfishly. 
It remains an open question whether we would expect to see mortality salience 
(MS) effects when applied to the present research questions (e.g., Greenberg et al. 1997). 
In other words, substituting the threat salience manipulations I used (along with 
situational ones for the group studies) with MS. Based on the present results, and 
especially if favoring the self-serving explanation over the ingroup-prosocial worldview 
explanation, I argue that this is plausible. Mortality salience (MS) could indirectly refer 
to ways the group could be harmed, but perhaps there would be stronger responses in 
terms of group-relevant behaviors if mortality salience were primed at the individual 
level. While TMT research has shown that MS activates ingroup prosocial cultural scripts 
(e.g., Gailliot, Stillman, Schmeichel, Maner, and Plant 2008), it is unclear whether self-
serving motivations would dominate when competing with ingroup prosocial worldviews. 
As discussed above, measuring public goods or commons dilemma outcomes may be 




Further, it would be of interest to evaluate the extent to which psychometric 
constructs, especially personal need for structure (PNS), shape ingroup prosocial 
responses to threats (e.g., Landau et al. 2006, citing Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, and 
Moskowitz, 2001). This would be an especially profound contribution if it bridged these 
individual psychological processes relating to PNS and TMT with group processes within 
sociological social psychology. This raises the possibility that we may especially see 
ingroup prosocial responses to threats among persons already high in a relevant 
orientation, such as importance of one’s ingroup, and that the originally proposed ingroup 
prosociality worldview explanation may only apply to persons who already feel their 
ingroup is highly important to them. This would presumably apply for other related 
ingroup prosocial orientations. This is a potential refinement of the originally proposed 
theory. 
Some TMT work engages social identity theory explicitly (e.g., Pyszczynski et 
al.1997, citing Tajfel and Turner 1979). I reviewed several TMT studies in Chapter 1 that 
address threats to ingroups, ingroup prosociality outcomes, or both (e.g., Dechesne et al. 
2000; Landau et al. 2004; Willer, Feinberg, and Wetts 2016). However, I sought to test 
ingroup prosociality as a broad worldview applying across various situations, including 
ones designed to test traditional group processes outcomes relating to status and power. 
Instead, though, the self-serving motivation may be a more viable explanation for the 
results observed. Despite this, and as mentioned above, it would be of interest to explore 
whether the ingroup prosociality processes under threat depend on the self-concept, or 






Implications for the Self-concept 
To what extent do ingroup prosocial identities and worldviews overlap? As I 
discuss in my literature review, Affect Control Theory (ACT) predicts that when the self 
and the situation are inconsistent, individuals are motivated to try to change the situation 
to lessen the dissonance they feel (e.g., Owens 2002). Identity Control Theory (ICT) is 
similar to ACT, but rather than specifying behavioral outcomes in the social world, it 
specifies self-level negotiation of the internal identity (Smith-Lovin and Robinson 2006). 
This warrants consideration in terms of the present theory, especially with results from 
Study 1 supporting increased workplace group importance for Americans and results 
from Study 3 supporting increased importance of the ingroup and motivation to benefit it. 
There are further results of interest that raise the possibility of behaviorally constructing a 
more ingroup prosocial reality. First is the finding among threatened low-status partners 
evaluating themselves as higher in status (and therefore likely more helpful to the group) 
in Study 2, in the absence of other support for Prediction 2 on status outcomes. Second is 
the Study 3 finding among low-status participants about hypothetical use of power before 
the group task, such that under threat these participants indicate that they would use their 
power more prosocially and less selfishly. An ingroup prosocial self-concept is likely 
consistent with the ingroup prosociality worldview that I propose and have argued is 
fundamental. 
How can we explain the motivation to maintain an ingroup prosocial self-
concept? As I discuss above, I argue that it is not purely practical, but about maintaining 




only observed behavioral outcomes. However, most of the outcomes observed that 
support the predictions are orientations. Within the control systems theories of identity, 
we seek consistency between reality and either our behavior or self-concept. Within 
TMT, we seek consistency with our worldviews, or orientations about how the world 
should work. I argue that orientations include both behaviors and orientations, which both 
ACT and ICT address, and TMT would consider as a worldview. Some results support 
the initially proposed theory that they are ingroup prosocial, while some results suggest 
they tend to be self-serving.  
Desire to avoid cognitive dissonance seems to be an individual-level explanation 
(Festinger 1957), but considering worldviews, whether ingroup prosocial or self-
motivated, has further sociological implications. Perhaps, then, these control systems 
theories of identity, TMT, and the bridge I propose with group processes and cultural 
considerations, have more in common than initially thought. There is evidence that 
suggests participants do not want to think badly of their own ingroup, so they either act to 
change it (evidence of voting behaviors in Study 3 and low-status participants inflating 
their own status in Study 2) or distance themselves (some evidence in Indian group 
importance from Study 1, less importance of earning points among high-status 
participants and potentially less importance of task group among low-status participants 
from Study 2). 
These points about cognitive dissonance raise the possibility that self-serving 
motivations could take priority over the group. However, similar to the point about a 
scope condition sometimes identified for TMT effects (e.g., PNS, e.g., Landau et al. 




promoting one’s own self-esteem could mean thinking of oneself as a better group 
member (i.e., ICT), and perhaps acting in ingroup prosocial ways that affirm this self 
concept (i.e., ACT). Essentially, more strongly enacting an ingroup prosocial identity 
would necessarily benefit the ingroup. As mentioned above in terms of the scope of TMT 
effects, comparing threat effects on ingroup prosociality among group members who 
differ in extent of ingroup prosocial self-concept would be of significant interest for 
future research. 
While within the scope of the proposed theory and relevant to theories about the 
self-concept, the present research did not examine intrapersonal threats. These are threats 
to the ingroup prosocial self-concept in terms of one’s own evaluation of the self as a 
good group member. This type of threat is more about having doubts, more subjective, 
than concrete threats to the worldview (e.g., the existential threat where points can get 
taken away, following Barclay and Benard 2013). If threatening the self-concept of a 
group member (intrapersonal threat), we may expect to see defensive reactions involving 
the self, identity, or self-concept (following the terror management theory literature, e.g., 
Greenberg et al. 1997, see also Major et al. 2007). Research that addresses intragroup 
threat specifically will be able to test this empirically as part of the proposed theory.  
 
Considering Threats Broadly 
The results appear to support the predictions for existential threats more so than 
intergroup threats. However, the case for this would be stronger if Americans had 
responded to the Study 1 natural disaster manipulations more so than the terrorism 




be considered as an intergroup type of threat as well, because the threat was presented as 
coming from an outgroup. Considering this, along with the potential methodological 
limitations of the Study 2 threat manipulation (which may not have been very effective), 
the results do not justify ruling out intergroup threat as relevant to the present theory. As 
mentioned above, the supporting results of the terrorism manipulation in Study 1 
(particularly for Americans) still allow for the possibility that intergroup threat caused at 
least some amount of the observed ingroup prosociality response. 
Considering these results and the initial broad theoretical framing of threats, at 
this point there is no clear rationale to narrow the types of threats to groups in terms of 
the present theory. The four types of threats to groups highlighted in Chapter 1 were 
intergroup, existential, intragroup, and intrapersonal. Future research could pursue a 
replication of Study 2 with a more salient intergroup manipulation to help to make a 
determination about the relevance intergroup threat. For the time of being, I maintain that 
it remains plausible that nearly all types of threats to groups apply in terms of testing the 
present theory and further theoretical development.  
It is important to address how this work had the strongest support for the 
predictions for the outcome evaluations of the status-informed legitimacy of power 
structures under existential threat. When threats and the interests of the group conflict 
with one another, it makes sense that ingroup prosocial behaviors would be responsive to 
the threat. For example, if a group faced risk of famine, they would focus on feeding 
themselves rather than competing with other groups, but if the group faced competition 
for a food source from a rival group, they may let some of their own starve to secure the 




comment about Tajfel 1971 in Chapter 1). But in terms of ingroup prosocial orientations, 
such as holism, which do not directly relate to practical responses to the challenge the 
group faces, responses to the famine and intergroup example threats may be more 
uniform. And following this, status- consistent expectations about the legitimacy of 
power under threat could increase under threat even when the legitimacy of power is not 
salient in the specific situation, as it was in Study 3. These would be interesting research 
questions to test. 
While intergroup and existential types of threats were examined in the present 
studies, the intragroup and intrapersonal threat types were not addressed explicitly. While 
there is currently no reason to suppose that these types of threats would not result in some 
type of ingroup prosociality response, they highlight the potential advantage of 
considering self-concept outcomes relevant to the threats. See discussion of implications 
for the self-concept above. 
  
Cross-cultural Considerations 
Another big question is how much support there is for the cross-cultural 
explanation for differences in responses to threats. I propose that we may see these social 
structuring processes at their most basic level with collectivistic (e.g., Eastern) versus 
individualistic (e.g., Western) types of societies. In other words, how members of a 
society respond to threat in the present is shaped by fundamental cultural characteristics 
(such as self-rated importance of one’s country), which are arguably shaped by historical 
levels of threat (e.g., Gelfand et al. 2011, see Chapter 1). The Study 1 linear 




they suggest that demographic and social characteristics (e.g., gender and frequency of 
using MTurk to make basic ends meet) predict Indian responses to terrorism more so than 
responses to natural disaster. However, as discussed in the Study 1 results (Chapter 4), 
there is little support for the cross-cultural assumptions of higher baseline feelings of 
threat and ingroup prosociality for Indians compared to Americans. While there are some 
results that suggest cultural differences in threat and ingroup prosociality processes, the 
results observed are only suggestive, and further investigation is needed to make any 
meaningful inferences. The results only somewhat suggest the possibility that cultural 
sensitivity may be warranted when evaluating ingroup prosociality responses (or lack 
thereof) on certain outcomes. Threat responses unique to Indians in Study 1 include lower 
levels of individualism (post-manipulation measures) and less importance of their country 
and family groups (from pre-to-post manipulation). Threat responses unique to 
Americans in Study 1 include the locus of attention dimension of holism and increased 
workplace group importance. 
Though cross-cultural comparisons may be fruitfully included in future work, the 
present results do not suggest much theoretical promise for culture explaining responses 
to threats. This is especially due to the lack of support for the cross-cultural assumptions 
about higher baseline feelings of threat and ingroup prosociality for Indians compared to 
Americans. To assess the extent to which ingroup prosocial orientations such as holism 
shape subsequent ingroup prosociality responses (as orientations or behaviors in groups), 
a promising strategy may be to experimentally prime the orientation (such as holism), 




would eliminate any confounding variables across cultures that were not previously 
measured or accounted for. 
The threats manipulated in Study 1 were about the real-life country and real 
potential threats, natural disaster and terrorism, while the Study 2 and Study 3 threats 
were more situational, and likely more salient. However, I note that the threat description 
within Study 3 said that the point-elimination threat simulated real existential threats like 
natural disaster. It would be of interest to see if Indians respond to these situational 
threats differently than they did to the more abstract ones. A structure like Study 3 might 
be most revealing of cross-cultural differences, as it yielded the most supporting results. 
However, a noteworthy limitation is that the Study 3 sample only included American 
women.  
 Given that the TMT literature (e.g., Heine et al. 2002), and to some extent Study 
1, have demonstrated cross-cultural differences in threat processes, it remains plausible 
that these differences may extend to the group processes outcomes I propose as instances 
of ingroup prosociality. Specifically, Torelli et al. (2014) find that a seemingly 
fundamental group process, status, has different meanings depending on cultural context 
— primarily as competence among North Americans (individualistic), and more so as 
warmth among Latin Americans (collectivistic). However, Cohen et al. (2004) finds that 
among a sample of American college students, mortality salience increases support for 
charismatic leaders (and interestingly, decreases support for relationship-oriented 
leaders). It would be of interest to see what characteristics inform status evaluations the 
most when threat is salient compared to when it is not, and how this might differ across 




leadership styles, are normative, as Torelli, Leslie, Stoner, and Puente (2014, citing 
Matsumoto, Kasri, and Kooken, 1999) discuss how emotional displays of warmth 
encouraged in Latin American cultures may be discouraged in East Asian cultures. 
 
 
Remaining Questions and Limitations 
The biggest lingering question is probably why there was no uniform threat 
response across the studies as predicted. I believe it is safe to conclude that limited 
statistical power was not the reason for such limited evidence for some of the predictions. 
If this was the case, we would have expected to have more results than actually observed 
in the direction predicted and perhaps more just shy of statistical significance. As 
discussed in the chapters presenting results from each of the studies, methodological 
limitations and potential confounds are among these considerations 
As discussed in the Study 1 results, one aspect of the group experience not 
addressed explicitly in this work is the permeability of group boundaries (e.g., Dechesne 
et al. 2000 citing Tajfel 1978). This refers to the how easily group members can leave or 
join the group. Dechesne et al. (2000) found that when the boundary is perceived as 
permeable, and the group is criticized, mortality salience increases the extent to which 
people distance themselves from their group. Though the University was the reference for 
Dechesne et al. (2000), and country was the reference group for Study 1, which is likely 
perceived as more enduring than the groups in Study 2 and Study 3. The task groups in 
Study 2 and Study 3 are like those considered in group processes research (e.g., Berger et 




This finding from Dechesne et al. (2000) raises interesting questions in terms of 
the present theory. First, at what point will people prioritize themselves over the group 
when the group boundary is perceived as permeable? This could be interpreted as 
someone abandoning or betraying the group (intragroup threat), and perhaps it could even 
inspire the otherwise ingroup prosocial group members to do the same. Would threat 
increase or decrease ingroup prosociality when group boundaries are relatively 
permeable? Considering the ingroup prosociality decrease for some outcomes among the 
Indians, this could perhaps suggest a process in the reverse direction proposed, consistent 
with the Dechesne et al. (2000) finding. These may also be interesting processes to 
examine cross-culturally. 
Another question that remains is why the American participants in Study 1 and 
those in Study 2 (all Americans) did not consistently report feeling threatened, despite 
them acknowledging that the situations in their conditions were threatening. It could be 
due to potential distancing effects as mentioned above. However, I consider the relative 
effectiveness of the respective threat manipulations as an explanation. Evidence is 
relatively limited that threat consistently promotes ingroup prosocial orientations and 
status-consistent behaviors and orientations for Study 1 and Study 2. It is possible that 
priming through an engaging writing task as in Study 1, and adding the element of a 
competitive group task in Study 2, may not have been very effective threat 
manipulations. As discussed above, at least one participant in Study 2 relatively low 
financial stakes may have diminished responses. However, while Study 2 appeared to 
have monetary performance incentives, while Study 1 paid at a flat rate — it was 




provided more support for the proposed theory than Study 2 did. Based on my 
experimental results, the Study 3 manipulation, risk of points being eliminated for a 
round, and that affecting the profit, appears to have been the most effective of these threat 
manipulations. Salience of threats may promote desired prosociality outcomes, but this is 
not likely when the threat or source does not appear legitimate (e.g., Barclay and Benard 
2013), so perhaps the threats in Study 1 and Study 2 were perceived as less legitimate 
than the threat in Study 3. 
Further considering the question about manipulation effectiveness, the threats 
used in Study 1 include existential (natural disaster) and existential along with intergroup 
(terrorism), and Americans (as well as Indians) were most responsive to terrorism. The 
Study 2 threat was intergroup (competition), and the Study 3 threat was existential (risk 
of round points being eliminated). The existential threat in Study 3 had the strongest 
response, and considering terrorism as an existential threat, this is consistent with the 
threat effects observed for Americans in Study 1. As noted in Chapter 8, the Study 3 
threat manipulation could have potentially been so effective in part because it described 
the threat risk as symbolizing many types of threats, and some of the threats mentioned 
may have become salient to participants. These findings also speak to the TMT 
methodology — a distracting task was not needed to elicit defensive responses in in 
Study 3, and to some extent Study 2 (e.g., Greenberg et al. 2000). Study 1 used a 
distracting task (demographic questions) between the manipulation and outcome 
measures. See discussion about this below. 
It may be of interest to assess results only including participants correctly 




to understand the situation is, such selections could bias the samples and undermine the 
validity of results. Specifically, those in the threat conditions would be different in some 
ways from those in the non-threat conditions. This was part of the reasoning for using 
relatively lenient data rejection criteria regarding the threat conditions, along with not 
rejecting an unreasonable amount of data (ideally no more than 20% of collected cases 
per study). However, unexpectedly, those in the Study 3 non-threat conditions most often 
incorrectly answered questions about the threat manipulations. This is perhaps because 
the situation seemed ambiguous to those in the non-threat conditions, at least in terms of 
the manipulation check questions asked. In all of the studies, I intentionally did not stress 
to participants that non-threatened situations were especially non-threatening or safe, as 
not to have those feelings affect responses more so than simply the absence of threat. 
Study 1 was the only study to include a distracting task (demographic questions) 
after the threat manipulation, following the terror management theory (TMT) tradition 
(Greenberg et al. 2000). Due to time limitations, Study 2 and Study 3 moved straight 
from the threat manipulations (also solidified with a focused writing task) to the group 
tasks. It remains unclear whether participants would actively seek to suppress thoughts 
about their group being threatened, as in death thought suppression in TMT. However, 
because we saw noteworthy results in Study 3, this is perhaps an argument that the 
distraction task is not essential for this research. So in this respect, group processes 
research may diverge from TMT, such that threats simply promote ingroup prosociality 
in some situations. Future work could seek to determine whether thought suppression is 
involved in the present ingroup threat processes, as TMT work has found for death-




There are also some limitations in terms of generalizability. Study 2 and Study 3 
only included Americans, and Study 3 only included women. Ideally this work would 
have tested ingroup prosocial behaviors in groups across cultures and consistently 
included both genders. However, based on the Study 1 findings, there was reason to 
expect Americans to respond more ingroup prosocially than Indians on the group tasks. 
The Study 3 sample was the most homogenous (only American women), and it yielded 
the most results consistent with the predictions. Active prevention of the data quality 
challenges similar to those encountered in Study 1 would be necessary if using a similar 
format or cross-cultural design. Controlling for demographic variables would be 
important if ever attempting to compare behavioral experimental data across cultures, and 
these variables are essential for counter-factual analyses. Though the Study 1 analyses 
never explicitly compared men and women (though gender was included in some control 
models), results from the group studies, Study 2 and Study 3, do not provide clear 
evidence that men and women respond much differently in these situations. If anything, 
as discussed above, the gender of the gender-matched partners in Study 2 may have 
functioned as a diffuse status characteristic (e.g., Berger et al. 1977), despite not 
differentiating the participant and the partner. 
Despite my initial concerns about including participants who expressed suspicion 
about MTurk group studies during the screener increasing data rejection rates (see 
Rinderknecht 2015), this was not the case. Study 2 did not include any participants 
flagged as initially suspicious, and the overall data acceptance rate was 82.08%, while for 
Study 3, which did include some of these participants, the overall data acceptance rate 




that led to a higher rate of data rejection, the inclusion of these cases in the Study 3 
sample was not greatly detrimental to the data acceptance rate for the group study. 
Finally, a limitation of the group studies, Study 2 and Study 3, is that we cannot 
disentangle one’s own status and the status of their partner. That is, with the structure of 
the conditions, participants with high-status partners are low in status, and participants 
with low-status partners are high in status. By comparison, an experiment on status and 
use of humor (Kerns manuscript in progress) assigns all participants a middle-range, or 
average, ability score, and only experimentally manipulates the partner’s status (as either 
lower or higher). Despite this limitation, the status structure used is advantageous for two 
reasons. First, it tests the effects of status structures, rather than simply the partner’s 
position. While it would be of interest to isolate the effect of the partner’s status, the 
participant’s status is of interest as well, and a bigger differential in status between the 
partner and participant would be expected to yield relatively strong results. Second, when 
both group members are considering their group’s prospects of success or failure, the two 
contrast sensitivity scores given (CS) average the same. This means that all task groups in 
Study 2 (and Study 3, though this is less salient) had the same total (or average) of CS 
scores between the partner and the participant (8 and 17, average of 12.5). Based on these 
scores, each group should have the same prospect of success, and would therefore be on 
equal footing when encountering a threat, compared to the partner-only status 







Future work may pursue replications and extensions of the existing studies as 
discussed above. In particular, including intragroup and intrapersonal threat types would 
be of interest. Evaluating whether they are clearly supported or not supported would help 
to refine the theory. The present studies have demonstrated some evidence that both 
existential and intergroup threats elicit ingroup prosociality responses. 
As discussed above and in terms of Study 3, variations of group processes status 
orders appear essential to refining the theory. In future research replicating Study 3, it 
would be of interest to see how low-status participants respond to a low-status partner in 
power. It would also be of interest to isolate responses to the partner’s status, leaving the 
participant’s status constant (e.g., Kerns manuscript in progress, see Study 2 discussion in 
Chapter 6 and Remaining Questions and Limitations section above). Gender is potentially 
an appropriate status manipulation to use in this context, because it does not directly 
relate to ability score. This would help to assess different possibilities in terms of the 
theory, specifically: (1) whether high-status actors with low-status partners in positions of 
power are simply more invested in the power structure because feel that they themselves 
deserve the high-power position more so than their low-status partner, (2) the low-status 
partner in the high-status position is inconsistent with an ingroup prosocial legitimacy of 
power worldview and therefore elicited especially strong responses, (3) responses are 
especially oriented toward attaining profit points when both the participant and the 
partner are low in status, or (4) there are other processes at work. 
Future work may consider other relevant worldviews, such as following rules and 




Lovaglia 2014). Fairness, justice, and trust are closely related social psychological and 
group processes concepts that could be tested as outcomes using the present framework. 
Self-esteem is relevant in terms of the self-serving explanation for results and TMT work 
(e.g., Greenberg et al. 1997). As mentioned above, altruism is especially of interest as a 
purely ingroup prosocial worldview and outcome. Another potentially relevant set of 
concepts essentially untouched by this work  concepts related to cognitive demand and 
cognitive effort. Threat could interact with these kinds of cognitive processes such that a 
known but familiar problem-solving strategy would be preferable over a less familiar but 
potentially more promising problem-solving strategy. These types of cognitive processes 
could also potentially compete with ingroup prosocial worldviews and orientations, and 
there could be interesting implications for ingroup prosociality. Future research could 
also address cultural and gender comparisons that may have limited cross-cultural (Study 
1) and mixed-gender comparisons (Study 1 and Study 2). 
Future work may also make further use of natural experiments, as Willer (2004) 
did in measuring support for President George W. Bush before and after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. Another relevant factor to explore in terms of these research questions is 
strategies of communicating threat messages. An example is public service 
announcements (PSAs) from the country’s government. To get citizens to comply with 
requests, or even orders (e.g., evacuation orders), knowing what aspects of threats people 
are most responsive to, and how exactly they tend to respond, would be invaluable. For 
example, under threat, Study 1 unexpectedly suggests that some people may express that 
their ingroups are less important to them, and Study 3 suggests that the legitimacy of 




the need for leadership perceived as legitimate, for example, to optimize reception of a 
PSA from a country’s president to the country’s citizens. As Barclay and Benard (2013) 
found, ingroup prosociality responses are not as likely when the threat or source does not 
appear legitimate. 
As discussed above, the limited payment amounts offered in these studies, as well 
as potential issues with Indians satisficing and acquiescing (e.g., Krosnick 1991) suggest 
that in-person lab studies would be an ideal setting for cross-cultural comparison. Though 
much more demanding of time and resources, increasing homogeneity of samples (such 
as only including university students), having native language instructions and 
clarification available, improving believability (especially for group studies with 
deception), and offering higher payments, in-person lab studies would be advantageous 
and serve as a valuable next step in refining the proposed theory. 
 
Conclusions 
The studies provide some evidence supporting my proposed theory, but the 
support could actually help point to a more nuanced threat and ingroup prosociality 
relationship than the more cohesive one I proposed. Evidence is strongest for Study 3 on 
promoting the legitimacy of power structures among high-status group members. Study 3 
also suggests some support for generally ingroup prosocial and cohesive orientations. 
There are some results for status-related attitudes (Study 2), and some results for ingroup 
prosocial orientations (such as holism) when threat is salient (Study 1). Notably, the 




ingroup prosociality than Indians are, and both countries respond the most to terrorism 
threats. 
Considering inconsistencies between results for different types of threats, and that 
intragroup and intrapersonal threat types have not yet been explicitly addressed in terms 
of ingroup prosociality, I conclude that while this research provides some support for my 
theory, at this point it does not strongly support a broad theory of threats to groups and 
ingroup prosociality. Therefore it may be premature to define the scope of situations this 
theory covers. This being said, the present studies demonstrated both orientation and 
behavioral ingroup prosociality outcomes resulting from threat, so this suggests that 
considering ingroup prosociality broadly as this work does may be worthwhile. The 
results from my experiments inform two main conclusions: that threat (1) affects both 
behaviors and orientations (many proposed to reflect ingroup prosociality), which 
warrant consideration together as defensive responses to threats, and (2) increases 
promoting the legitimacy of power based on status in some situations. 
Despite the lack of firm support for the proposed theory, this research presents 
several potentially promising findings, especially in terms of the legitimacy of power, and 
suggests even more potential directions for future research. It also raises the possibility of 
an alternative explanation, self-serving motivations, for observed outcomes under threat. 
This work serves as an informative starting point on the relationship between threats to 
social groups and ingroup prosociality as exhibited in group processes research. The 
basic research findings presented here may apply to more specific situations, but only 







Appendix materials are listed by study (Appendix 1 for Study 1, Appendix 2 for Study 2, 
and Appendix 3 for Study 3). Protocol information provided is from the latest version of 
each study (protocols may have been adjusted slightly during the data collection 
processes). Some notes intended for the researcher were added, revised, or removed for 
clarity and readability. Lists of variables (and summary statistics provided in the main 
body) do not include component variables of scales. Information about these variables 






Appendix 1: Supplemental Information for Study 1 
 
Study 1 List of Variables Analyzed and Mnemonics Used 




Variable Mnemonic min max 
Causality component of analysm-
holism (scale) AH_C_CausalityScale 13 42 
Attitude toward contradictions 
component of analysm-holism 
(scale) AH_ATC_AttContScale  15 42 
Perception of change component 
of analysm-holism (scale) AH_PC_PercChangeScale  12 42 
Locus of attention component of 
analysm-holism (scale) AH_LA_LocusAttnScale  15 42 
Combined holism scale (without 
perception of change) AH_Overall_Scale_noPC 59 126 
Group orientedness scale GroupOrientedness_Scale  3 21 
Individual orientedness question: 
consequences to self versus group IGO_2_R  1 7 
Individual orientedness question: 
freedom versus conformity IGO_4_R  1 7 
Individual orientedness question: 
whether social groups can be 
morally good or bad IGO_6_R 1 7 
Independence scale Independent_Sing_Scale  45 105 
Interdependence scale Interdependent_Sing_Scale  37 105 
Difference between 
interdependence and independence 
scales INDminusINT_fromScales -46 60 
Horizontal individualism scale Horizontal_Individualism_Scale  14 36 
Vertical individualism scale Vertical_Individualism_Scale  4 36 
Horizontal collectivism scale Horizontal_Collectivism_Scale  8 36 
Vertical collectivism scale Vertical_Collectivism_Scale 6 36 
Combined individualism scale Combined_Individualism_Scale  22 71 
Combined collectivism scale Combined_Collectivism_Scale 21 72 
Country importance (post-
manipulation) COUNTRYIMP2_corrected  1 7 
Change in country importance 
(pre- to post-manipulation) CHANGE_IN_COUNTRYIMP_corrected  -2 1 
Workplace group importance 
(post-manipulation) WORKP2_corrected  1 7 
Change in workplace group 
importance (pre- to post-
manipulation) CHANGEinWORKIMP_corrected_calc -3 4 
Family group importance (post-
manipulation) FAMILY2_corrected  2 7 
Change in family group 
importance (pre- to post-
manipulation) CHANGEinFAMILYIMP_corrected_calc -2 4 
Country self-concept (post-




Variable Mnemonic min max 
Change in country self-concept 
(pre- to post-manipulation) COUNTRY_SELFCONCEPT_CHANGE -15 14 
        
Feel personally threatened (scale) FEELTHREATENED_SCALE  14 80 
Feel country threatened (scale) FEEL_GROUPTHREATENED_SCALE  9 63 
Feel threatened for country 
(question) TC6THREATMC  1 7 
Situation personally threatening 
(question) THREATMANIPCHK2  1 7 
Situation threatening to country 
(question) THREATMANIPCHK3 1 7 
        
Country importance (pre-
manipulation) COUNTRYIMP1_corrected 1 7 
Country self-concept (pre-
manipulation) Overall_CountrySelfConcept_Scale_PRE_1 8 56 
Workplace group importance (pre-
manipulation) WORKP1_corrected 1 7 
Family group importance (pre-
manipulation) FAMILY1_corrected 2 7 
How often use MTurk to make 
basic ends meet (screener) EndsMeet 1 7 
Highest education in household 
(screener) EducHH 1 8 
Social class rating (screener) SocialClass 1 5 
Country values groups’ interests 
(collectivism) CGRP_corrected 1 7 
Country values individuals’ 
interests (individualism) CSTRCT_corrected 1 7 
Country has strict norms 
(tightness) CIND_corrected_REV 1 6 
Country tolerant of deviants 
(looseness) CTOL_corrected_REV 1 6 
Number attention check questions 
correct ATTENTIONSCORE 1 3 
Self-reported estimate of time to 
complete in minutes (recoded) timevar     
Gender GenderRec 0 1 
Age in years AGEYEARS_rec 18 69 
Racial/ethnic minority indicator 








Study 1 Protocol Information 
 
 






MTurk Listing — Survey: Situation Experiences and Social Attitudes — About 50 
minutes 
 
Brief Listing Description: Survey about situation experiences and social attitudes for a 
research study, about 50 minutes - $4.25. Must live in U.S. (/India), be U.S. (/Indian) 
citizen, self and parents born in & [character limit] mostly lived in U.S. (/India), 90%+ 
HIT acceptance, fluent in English, at least 18 years old 
 
Keywords: survey, research, questionnaire, study 
 
 
24 hour maximum allotted for completion, HIT expiration after 5 days, auto-approval for 
payment after 30 days 
 
 
Workers do not need to be Master Workers 
HIT approval rate is 90% or greater 






***Please note that you may only participate in this study once, and having previously 
participated in similar studies may mean you are ineligible for this study. The Turkitron 
website is used to screen Worker IDs for eligibility. If you have further questions about 
your eligibility, please contact the researchers at ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com. 
 
 
This research is run by Social Science Researchers at the University of Maryland to 
investigate situation experiences and survey responses. The research will involve 
questions about you (demographics), imagining and answering questions about an 
assigned situation, and survey questions about your social attitudes and feelings. The 





You are invited to participate in this study if you currently live in the United States 
(India), both you and your parents or guardians were born in the United States 
(India), and lived in the United States (India) for most or all of your lives. You must 
be fluent in English, and have an MTurk acceptance rate of at least 90%. You must 
be 18 or older to participate. 
 
The study must be completed in one sitting (session). Though 24 hours are allotted for the 
study, it is only expected to take about 50 minutes. The extra time is provided to allow 
time for resolution in case there are technical issues or other concerns. 
 
Please make sure you are in a quiet space free from distractions during participation, and 
please make sure you have time to do the study in one sitting. 
 
At the end of the survey, you will receive a code to paste into the box below to receive 
credit for taking our survey. Follow the link below to complete the study. 
 
Make sure to leave this window open as you complete the survey. When you are 
















Thank you for your interest in participating in this study. 
 
***Please note that you may only participate in this study once, and having previously 
participated in similar studies may mean you are ineligible for this study. The Turkitron 
website was used to screen your Worker ID for eligibility. If you have further questions 
about your eligibility, please contact the researchers at ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com. 
 
Please read the following carefully. You are encouraged to retain a copy of this 
information. You may electronically save, print, or request a copy of this information for 
your records.  
 
This research is run by Social Science Researchers at the University of Maryland to 




this study if you currently live in the United States (/India), both you and your parents 
were born in the United States (/India) and have lived in the United States (/India) for 
at least most of your lives. You must be fluent in English, and have an MTurk acceptance 
rate of at least 90%. You must be 18 or older to participate. 
 
It will involve questions about you (demographics), imagining and answering questions 
about a situation, and survey questions about your feelings and your social attitudes. The 
situations may be as intense as a natural disaster or terrorist attack. Questions will be 
about demographics (for example, race and gender), the situation (for example, writing 
about what you think about it), your feelings (for example, rating how anxious you feel), 
and similarly questions about your social attitudes (for example, rating agreement with 
the statement “I would rather depend on myself than others”). 
 
The study will last about 50 minutes. Upon completion, you will be paid $4.25 through 
MTurk. You will need to submit a confirmation code from the end of the survey to 
receive payment. 
 
Please make sure you are in a quiet space free from distractions during participation, and 
please make sure you have time to do the study in one sitting. To receive payment for this 
study, you must write at least 100 characters thoughtfully addressing each of three 
questions asked about a situation. We will also consider answers to questions designed to 
determine whether you are paying attention. If we suspect that you do not qualify for the 
study, the study was not done in one sitting, or proper attention was not given to 
responses, we may reject your submission and not issue payment. 
 
This research is not designed to benefit you personally, but it may help researchers. 
Possible risks include loss of confidentiality and distress from answering questions or 
writing about topics that are personal or sensitive. You may wish to contact a mental 
health professional if you experience distress. Results from this study may be presented 
or published. Only authorized individuals (members of the research team and associated 
staff) will have access to your responses. Data will be stored securely (password-
protected), and potentially identifying information (such as IP address and MTurk 
username) will not be linked to your responses after initial processing. Your MTurk 
worker ID may be stored in a screening service database such as Turkitron to manage 
eligibility criteria for this study and future studies, regardless of whether you complete 
this study. Data will be kept indefinitely, and documents with personally identifiable 
information will be deleted or destroyed after a period of at least seven years, according 
to UMD’s policies. We will protect your identity and confidentiality of your responses to 
the maximum extent allowable by law. 
 
Your participation is voluntary, and you may stop participating at any time. If you decide 
not to participate or to stop participating, you will not be penalized or lose any benefits to 
which you are otherwise entitled. Except for initial identification and demographic 
questions and the writing questions about a situation, you may skip a question you do not 
want to answer. You must finish the study to receive payment, and accepting the HIT and 




of a series, and participating in this study may affect your eligibility for future studies in 
this series. 
 
You may contact the investigators with any questions about this research: 
ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com. You may also contact the University of Maryland IRB 
with any questions or complaints about your rights as a research participant: 
irb@umd.edu, (+1) (301) 405-0678. 
 
By clicking “Yes, I consent,” you certify that you are at least 18 years old, you meet the 
eligibility criteria, you understand the information above, your questions are answered to 
your satisfaction, and you are volunteering to participate. 
 
Do you consent to participate in this research? 
 
Yes, I consent 






You have indicated that you do not consent to participate. If this was in error, please 
restart the questionnaire (you may need to clear your temporary browser files). Otherwise 




The following survey page will have the researchers’ email address if you have any 
questions or concerns. 
 







INSTRUCTIONS (put on timer) 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
 
- Please read all instructions carefully.  
- Please make sure you are in a quiet space free from distractions during participation 











Please enter your MTurk worker ID. This is your worker ID, not your username or 
email address you log in with.  
It should be about 14 characters long and probably starts with A. You should be able to 
find it at https://www.mturk.com/mturk/dashboard (opens new browser window). 
 ***required, must be at least 10 characters 
 
 









*This question may be used to determine eligibility if certain types of access seem to be 






Please enter your age in years: 
 ___ 
 (DISQUAL if <18) 
 
 
In what country do you currently live? 
 ---pull-down menu 
 ***required 
 ***DISQUAL if not U.S. (/India)… 
 
Are you currently a citizen of the United States (/India)? 
 Yes 
 No 







Please list all languages you speak, ordered from most to least fluent 
 <free response> 
 
 
Are you fluent in English? 
 ***required 
 Yes  No Not sure 










If List of Countries United States of America Is Not Selected Edit (/India for Indian 
sample) 
Or Are you a U.S.(/Indian) citizen? Not Is Selected Edit 
Or Are you a U.S.(/Indian) citizen? Not sure Is Selected Edit 
Or Are you fluent in English? No Is Selected Edit 
Or Are you fluent in English? Not sure Is Selected Edit 




Based on one or more of your responses so far, we have determined that you are not 
eligible to participate in this study. 
 
Please follow the link below to be directed back to the MTurk home page.  
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome 
 
The following survey page will have the researchers’ email address if you have any 
questions or concerns. 
 
 

















How important is your country to you? 






[country collectivism] To what extent do you think society in your country generally 
values the good and interests of people as parts of groups? 
 Not at all---Very much so 
 
[country individualism] To what extent do you think society in your country generally 
values the good and interests of people as individuals? 




[country social tightness] To what extent do you think society in your country has strict 
social norms? 
 Not at all ---Very much so 
 
[country social looseness] To what extent do you think society in your country is tolerant 
of people who break or violate social norms? 















Before each series: 
 











SC1-1: I try to be a good citizen of my country. 
 Not at all true -- very true 
SC1-2: I think of myself as a good citizen of my country. 
 Not at all true -- very true 
SC1-3: It is important to me to be a good citizen of my country. 
 Not at all true -- very true 
SC1-4: I want to help my country however I can. 
 Not at all true -- very true. 
SC1-5: I am proud to be a citizen of my country. 
 Not at all true -- very true 
 
 
[IMPORTANCE OF INGROUP-PROSOCIAL SELF-CONCEPT] 
 
SCIM-1-1: It is important to me to think of myself as a good citizen of my country. 
 Not at all true --- very true 
SCIM1-2: If I were accused of being a bad citizen of my country, I would be very upset. 
 Not at all true --- very true 
SCIM1-3: If I thought of myself as a bad citizen of my country, I would try hard to make 
it so I could think of myself as a good citizen of my country. 










How important is your work or professional group to you? 




How important is your family group to you? 














What social media outlet do you most prefer? Though you may have a preference, the 




















RANDOMLY ASSIGN ONE OF THESE. 
 
[TIMED TO DISABLE SUBMIT FOR 30 SECONDS] 
 
 
***DISPLAY THIS TEXT FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS, AS 
SPECIFIED. 
 





1. Control - country citizen with no mention of threatening words 
 
 


















2. Existential - natural disaster 
 
Consider your country as one of your social groups, where you are a citizen. 
 
Imagine your country has a high risk of experiencing a natural disaster. Examples 
include earthquake, hurricane, flood, and tsunami. Experiencing a natural disaster 
would threaten your country. 
 
 












Consider your country as one of your social groups, where you are a citizen. 
 
Imagine your country has a high risk of experiencing a terrorist attack from 
another group. Examples include bombing, airplane hijacking, shooting, and cyber 

















Guided thinking questions: 
 
 
Please answer the following questions about the social situation you just imagined. Please 
remember that you must respond thoughtfully and write at least 100 characters for each 
of the three questions to receive payment for this study. 
 
 
***Second step: thinking about the situation 
 
Q. [INSERT MANIPULATION TEXT, in bold] 
 




***Third step: thinking about experiencing situation personally 
 
Q. [INSERT TEXT] 
 




***Fourth step: thinking about emotions from experiencing situation 
 
Q. [INSERT TEXT] 
 














[If effects were not observed, I would consider moving the second set of demographic 
questions to the end. Work in the terror management theory (TMT) literature uses a 
distracting task before assessing whether threatened individuals defend their worldviews 




 DEMOGRAPHICS II  
 
 ~combined into one or more pages 
 
 
Please identify your gender: 




Please enter the ZIP code for where you currently live. 





Are you Hispanic or Latino? 
 Yes No Not sure 
 
 
Please check all racial/ethnic groups you identify with: 
 American Indian or Alaska Native 
Black or African American 
East Asian 
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
South American Indigenous or Native 
South Asian 
Southeast Asian 
West Asian or Middle Eastern 








What is the highest level of education anyone in your household has obtained? 




High school graduate or equivalent (e.g., GED) 
Some college, no degree 
Associate’s degree 
Bachelor’s degree 
Post-secondary non-degree award (e.g., EMT) 
Master’s degree 





How often do you use earnings from MTurk to make basic ends meet?  
 ---Never ---sometimes---always 
 










































Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement: 
 
 
[Divided these factors into different subsections within this outcome measures section, 
with all four sections on one page.] 
 




 ---from Choi et al. 2007 
Factor 1: Causality (α = .71) 
1. Everything in the universe is somehow related to each other. 
2. Nothing is unrelated. 
3. Everything in the world is intertwined in a causal relationship. 
4. Even a small change in any element of the universe can lead to significant alterations 
in other elements. 
5. Any phenomenon has numerous numbers of causes, although some of the causes are 
not known.  
6. Any phenomenon entails a numerous number of consequences, although some of them 
may not be known. 
 
Factor 2: Attitude Toward Contradictions (α = .69)  
7. It is more desirable to take the middle ground than go to extremes.  
8. When disagreement exists among people, they should search for ways to compromise 
and embrace everyone’s opinions. 
 9. It is more important to find a point of compromise than to debate who is right/wrong, 
when one’s opinions conflict with other’s opinions.  
10. It is desirable to be in harmony, rather than in discord, with others of different 
opinions than one’s own.  
11. Choosing a middle ground in an argument should be avoided.***  
12. We should avoid going to extremes.  
 
Factor 3: Perception of Change (α = .58)  
13. Every phenomenon in the world moves in predictable directions.*** 
14. A person who is currently living a successful life will continue to stay successful.***  
15. An individual who is currently honest will stay honest in the future.***  





17. Current situations can change at any time.  
18. Future events are predictable based on present situations.*** 
 
Factor 4: Locus of Attention (α = .56)  
19. The whole, rather than its parts, should be considered in order to understand a 
phenomenon. 20. It is more important to pay attention to the whole than its parts.  
21. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.  
22. It is more important to pay attention to the whole context rather than the details.  
23. It is not possible to understand the parts without considering the whole picture.  
24. We should consider the situation a person is faced with, as well as his/her personality, 













Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement: 
 
[Presented as bipolar items] 
 
 
Individualism versus Group-orientedness items (from Lucas and Schooler (2012 
unpublished, based on Schooler 1990 definition) 
 
IGO1: In deciding what goals to strive for, it is more important for individuals to consider 
the consequences for the social groups to which they belong to, such as their family, than 
the consequences for themselves. [Very strongly disagree/Very strongly agree] 
 
IGO2: In considering whether a given outcome is good or bad, I am more likely to be 
affected by its particular effect on me than on the social groups to which I belong. [Very 
strongly disagree/Very strongly agree] 
 
IGO3: Feeling accepted, interdependent, and interconnected with the social groups that 
are important to me is more important than feeling autonomous and self-directed as an 
individual. [Very strongly disagree/Very strongly agree] 
 
IGO4-R: Freedom to think what I may think is more important than accepting and 
agreeing with the beliefs and views held by those in the social groups to which I belong. 





IGO5: In deciding how to achieve a goal, it is more important for individuals to consider 
the consequences for the social groups to which they belong, such as their families, than 
the consequences for themselves. [Very strongly disagree/Very strongly agree] 
 
IGO6-R: Only individuals, not social groups, can be morally good or bad. [Very strongly 
























[Questions presented in order, on one page] 
 
 





codebook in Kitayama, S., King, A., Tompson, S., Huff, S., Yoon, C., & Liberzon, I. 
(in press). The Dopamine Receptor Gene (DRD4) Moderates Cultural Difference in 
Independent versus Interdependent Social Orientation. Psychological Science. 
Notes: 
 
cites Singelis, T. M. (1994). The Measurement of Independent and Interdependent 








____1. I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects. (Sing1)  
____2. I can talk openly with a person who I meet for the first time, even when this 
person is much older than I am. (Sing2)  
____3. Even when I strongly disagree with group members, I avoid an argument. (Sing3) 
____4. I have respect for the authority figures with whom I interact. (Sing4)  
____5. I do my own thing, regardless of what others think. (Sing5)  
____6. I respect people who are modest about themselves. (Sing6)  
____7. I feel it is important for me to act as an independent person. (Sing7)  
____8. I will sacrifice my self interest for the benefit of the group I am in. (Sing8)  
____9. I’d rather say “No” directly, than risk being misunderstood. (Sing9)  
____10. Having a lively imagination is important to me. (Sing10)  
____11. I should take into consideration my parents’ advice when making 
education/career plans. (Sing11)  
____12. I feel my fate is intertwined with the fate of those around me. (Sing12)  
____13. I prefer to be direct and forthright when dealing with people I’ve just met. 
(Sing13)  
____14. I feel good when I cooperate with others. (Sing14)  
____15. I am comfortable with being singled out for praise or rewards. (Sing15)  
____16. If my brother or sister fails, I feel responsible. (Sing16)  
____17. I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important 
than my own accomplishments. (Sing17) 
____18. Speaking up during a class (or a meeting) is not a problem for me. (Sing18)  
____19. I would offer my seat in a bus to my professor (or my boss). (Sing19)  
____20. I act the same way no matter who I am with. (Sing20)  
____21. My happiness depends on the happiness of those around me. (Sing21)  
____22. I value being in good health above everything. (Sing22)  
____23. I will stay in a group if they need me, even when I am not happy with the group. 
(Sing23) 
____24. I try to do what is best for me, regardless of how that might affect others. 
(Sing24)  
____25. Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me. (Sing25) 
____26. It is important to me to respect decisions made by the group. (Sing26)  
____27. My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me. (Sing27)  
____28. It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group. (Sing28)  
____29. I act the same way at home that I do at school (or work). (Sing29)  
____30. I usually go along with what others want to do, even when I would rather do 




[I used an anchored scale to stay consistent with the other questions, still 1-7] 
 




Independent Subscale (Independence) Sing1, Sing2, Sing5, Sing7, Sing9, Sing10, 
Sing13, Sing15, Sing18, Sing20, Sing22, Sing24, Sing25, Sing27, Sing29  
Interdependent Subscale (Interdependence) Sing3, Sing4, Sing6, Sing8, Sing11, Sing12, 
Sing14, Sing16, Sing17, Sing19, Sing21, Sing23, Sing26, Sing28, Sing30  












Collectivism and Individualism (separated into horizontal and vertical) Triandis et 
al. 1998 
  
  ---- 
 
[Questions asked in this order (intentionally mixed), on one page] 
 
 




Never or definitely no to Always or definitely yes 
 
 
1. I’d rather depend on myself than others. (HI) 
1. It is important that I do my job better than others. (VI) 
1. If a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud. (HC) 
1. Parents and children must stay together as much as possible. (VC) 
 
2. The well-being of my coworkers is important to me. (HC) 
2. It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to sacrifice what I want. 
(VC) 
2. Winning is everything. (VI) 
2. I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others. (HI) 
 
3. I often do “my own thing.” (HI) 
3. Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are required. (VC) 
3. Competition is the law of nature. (VI) 





4. I feel good when I cooperate with others. (HC) 
4. It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups. (VC) 
4. My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me. (HI) 







***Qs from this point on displayed one-by-one*** 
 
 





How important is your country to you? 




Please rate the extent to which you feel following statements are true about you: 
 
 
[again with matrices] 
 
 
[INGROUP PROSOCIAL SELF-CONCEPT] 
 
 
[again, statements in bold] 
 
 
SC2-1: I try to be a good citizen of my country. 




SC2-2: I think of myself as a good citizen of my country. 
 






SC2-3: It is important to me to be a good citizen of my country. 
 
 Not at all true -- very true 
 
 
SC2-4: I want to help my country however I can. 
 
 Not at all true -- very true. 
 
 
SC2-5: I am proud to be a citizen of my country. 







[IMPORTANCE OF INGROUP-PROSOCIAL SELF-CONCEPT] 
 
 
SCIMP2-1: It is important to me to think of myself as a good citizen of my country. 
 
 Not at all true --- very true 
 
 
SCIMP2-2: If I were accused of being a bad citizen of my country, I would be very upset. 
 
 Not at all true --- very true 
 
 
SCIMP2-3: If I thought of myself as a bad citizen of my country, I would try hard to 
make it so I could think of myself as a good citizen of my country. 
 


















How important is your work or professional group to you? 
 




How important is your family group to you? 
 


















How ___ do you feel right now? (not at all---very) 
 


























For the following questions, think of your country as a social group you are part of. 
 
[also use bold here, starting the changing question text in lower case] 
 
[Questions listed in this order, on one page] 
 




Q57. Worried for your country? 
TC-2 
Q52. Anxious for your country? 
TC-3 
Q53. Fearful for your country? 
TC-4 
Q108. That your country is vulnerable 
TC-5 
Q110. Vulnerable on behalf of your country 
TC-6-THREATMC 
[MANIPULATION CHECK] Q54. That your country is threatened 
TC-7 
Q109. Threatened on behalf of your country 
TC-8 
Q100. That your country is in danger 
TC-9 



















Thinking about the situation that you were asked to imagine and write about earlier, how 
threatening do you feel this situation is to you personally? 
 




Thinking about the situation that you were asked to imagine and write about earlier, how 
threatening do you feel this situation is to your country? 
 







(Check for suspicion) 
 
SUSPICION 
Were you suspicious that the study might be about anything other than what we told you? 
 
 Yes, No, Not sure 
 
SUSPPROBE 
If no or not sure: 
What did you think the study was about, other than what we told you? 
 




If no or not sure: 
Did your suspicion about the study’s purpose affect your behavior or responses 
during the study? 
 Yes No Not sure 
 
SUSPAFFEXP 
  If yes or not sure: 
Please explain how you think the study’s purpose may have affected your 
behavior or responses during the study. 















We know that sometimes in online studies, people end up participating in studies that do 
not apply to them by mistake. This might happen, for example, if a man takes a survey 
intended only for women because he did not read all of the sign-up instructions.  
 
This study was intended to be only for United States (/Indian) citizens who are fluent 
in English, and who were born in and have lived most or all of their lives in the 
United States(/India), and whose parents or guardians were also born in and lived 
most of their lives in the United States(/India). 
 
We are university-level social science researchers, and want to make sure our results are 
as accurate as possible. The integrity of our data is especially important if we present our 
findings or publish them in a journal article. 
 
We want to ask if you think you might be one of these participants who are not in the 
group intended for this study, for whatever reason. We ask only to help preserve the 
quality of our data. Your response to this question will not affect whether you are 
paid for the study. As long as you also completed the questionnaire with proper 
attention, you will be paid exactly the same, the full amount $4.25 on MTurk, no 
matter what your response is. 
 
Thank you for your honesty and help with our data assessment. 
 
 
Yes, both myself and my parents or guardians were born in and have lived in the United 
States (/India) most or all of our lives, I am a citizen of the United States(/India), and I 
am fluent in English. 
 
No, I am not part of the intended eligible group. I ended up taking this study by mistake 
or for some other reason. 
 







These questions below will be included for at least the first few participants, to produce a 










Did you have difficulty understanding anything or any other issues during the study? If 
so, please describe what it was. 














Thank you for taking part in this study. 
 
This study served as part of a University of Maryland doctoral student’s dissertation 
project. This part tested how engaging with different situations affects social responses 
and emotions across citizens of different countries. This purpose was not mentioned in 
the listing, in case knowing about it might affect the responses. We apologize for 
concealing this purpose from you in the original listing. However, knowing this purpose 
might have affected your responses. 
 
Your help with this research is very much appreciated. Thank you! 
 
 
Because the research is ongoing and includes experimental elements, we are not currently 
sharing all details with participants. We ask that you please do not share too much about 
the specifics of your participation with other people, in case it may affect our results. 
 






You may also contact the University of Maryland IRB with any questions or concerns 
about your rights as a research participant: irb@umd.edu, (+1) (301) 405-4212. You may 
also wish to contact a mental health professional if you experience distress following 
your participation. 
  
We encourage you to retain this information for your records. 
 

























Your responses have been recorded. Thank you. 
 


















Appendix 2: Supplemental Information for Study 2 
 
Manipulation check tables by gender 
 
 
Table A2-1: Study 2 Manipulation and Suspicion Checks: Women Only 
 
 
Study 2 Manipulation 














Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
Feel personally 








25 26 26 24 









26 26 26 26 









26 26 26 26 









26 26 26 26 









26 26 26 26 
Self-reported self CS 








26 26 26 26 
Self CS score compared 








26 26 26 26 








26 26 26 26 









26 26 26 26 
Partner CS score 









26 26 26 26 









26 26 26 26 









26 26 26 26 
Correct/not sure - pay 








26 26 26 26 
Correct - other groups 








26 25 26 26 
Correct/not sure - other 








26 25 26 26 
Situation personally 








26 26 26 26 
Situation threatening to 








26 26 26 26 
Indicated threat-








26 26 26 26 









26 25 26 26 




Study 2 Manipulation 














Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
yes 26 26 26 26 
Any type of suspicion - 








26 26 26 26 
Any type of suspicion 








12 11 14 10 
Any type of suspicion 









12 11 14 10 
Acted real despite any 








12 11 14 10 
Acted real despite any 
type of suspicion - 








12 11 14 10 
Suspicious about partner 








26 26 26 26 
Suspicious about partner 








26 26 26 26 
Suspicion about partner 








12 11 14 10 
Suspicion about partner 









12 11 14 10 
Acted real despite 









12 11 14 10 
Acted real despite 
suspicion about partner - 








12 11 14 10 
Suspicious about partner 








26 26 26 26 
Suspicious about partner 








26 26 26 26 
Suspicion about partner 








11 13 13 14 
Suspicion about partner 
info affect behavior - 








11 13 13 14 
Acted real despite 
suspicion about partner 








11 13 12 14 
Acted real despite 
suspicion about partner 








11 13 12 14 
Final suspicion Q - any 
suspicion affected 









26 26 26 26 
Final suspicion Q - 
whether any suspicion 
affected behavior during 








26 26 26 26 
Number of whether 
suspicious Qs indicated 








26 26 26 26 
Number of whether 
suspicious Qs indicated 

















Study 2 Manipulation 












(1 and 3) 
Combined threat 
conditions (2 and 
4) 
Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
Feel personally 








51 50 51 50 









52 52 52 52 









52 52 52 52 









52 52 52 52 









52 52 52 52 
Self-reported self CS 








52 52 52 52 
Self CS score compared 








52 52 52 52 








52 52 52 52 









52 52 52 52 
Partner CS score 









52 52 52 52 









52 52 52 52 









52 52 52 52 
Correct/not sure - pay 








52 52 52 52 
Correct - other groups 








51 52 52 51 
Correct/not sure - other 








51 52 52 51 
Situation personally 








52 52 52 52 
Situation threatening to 








52 52 52 52 
Indicated threat-








52 52 52 52 









51 52 52 51 









52 52 52 52 
Any type of suspicion - 








52 52 52 52 
Any type of suspicion 








23 24 26 21 




Study 2 Manipulation 












(1 and 3) 
Combined threat 
conditions (2 and 
4) 
Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
affect behavior - yes/not 
sure 23 24 26 21 
Acted real despite any 








23 24 26 21 
Acted real despite any 
type of suspicion - 








23 24 26 21 
Suspicious about partner 








52 52 52 52 
Suspicious about partner 








52 52 52 52 
Suspicion about partner 








23 24 26 21 
Suspicion about partner 









23 24 26 21 
Acted real despite 









23 24 26 21 
Acted real despite 
suspicion about partner - 








23 24 26 21 
Suspicious about partner 








52 52 52 52 
Suspicious about partner 








52 52 52 52 
Suspicion about partner 








24 27 24 27 
Suspicion about partner 
info affect behavior - 








24 27 24 27 
Acted real despite 
suspicion about partner 








24 26 23 27 
Acted real despite 
suspicion about partner 








24 26 23 27 
Final suspicion Q - any 
suspicion affected 









52 52 52 52 
Final suspicion Q - 
whether any suspicion 
affected behavior during 








52 52 52 52 
Number of whether 
suspicious Qs indicated 








52 52 52 52 
Number of whether 
suspicious Qs indicated 
















Table A2-2: Study 2 Manipulation and Suspicion Checks: Men Only 
 
 
Study 2 Manipulation 














Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
Feel personally 








26 26 26 26 









25 26 25 26 









26 26 26 26 









26 26 26 26 









26 26 26 26 
Self-reported self CS 








26 26 26 26 
Self CS score compared 








26 26 26 26 








26 26 26 26 









26 26 26 26 
Partner CS score 









26 26 26 26 









26 26 26 26 









26 26 26 26 
Correct/not sure - pay 








26 26 26 26 
Correct - other groups 








26 26 26 26 
Correct/not sure - other 








26 26 26 26 
Situation personally 








26 26 26 26 
Situation threatening to 








26 26 26 26 
Indicated threat-








26 26 26 26 









26 26 26 26 









26 26 26 26 
Any type of suspicion - 








26 26 26 26 
Any type of suspicion 








11 9 12 11 




Study 2 Manipulation 














Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
affect behavior - yes/not 
sure 11 9 12 11 
Acted real despite any 








11 9 12 11 
Acted real despite any 
type of suspicion - 








11 9 12 11 
Suspicious about partner 








26 26 26 26 
Suspicious about partner 








26 26 26 26 
Suspicion about partner 








11 9 12 11 
Suspicion about partner 









11 9 12 11 
Acted real despite 









11 9 12 11 
Acted real despite 
suspicion about partner - 








11 9 12 11 
Suspicious about partner 








26 26 26 26 
Suspicious about partner 








26 26 26 26 
Suspicion about partner 








7 6 10 10 
Suspicion about partner 
info affect behavior - 








7 6 10 10 
Acted real despite 
suspicion about partner 








7 6 10 10 
Acted real despite 
suspicion about partner 








7 6 10 10 
Final suspicion Q - any 
suspicion affected 









26 26 26 26 
Final suspicion Q - 
whether any suspicion 
affected behavior during 








26 26 26 26 
Number of whether 
suspicious Qs indicated 








26 26 26 26 
Number of whether 
suspicious Qs indicated 

















Study 2 Manipulation 












(1 and 3) 
Combined threat 
conditions (2 and 
4) 
Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
Feel personally 








52 52 52 52 









51 51 50 52 









52 52 52 52 









52 52 52 52 









52 52 52 52 
Self-reported self CS 








52 52 52 52 
Self CS score compared 








52 52 52 52 








52 52 52 52 









52 52 52 52 
Partner CS score 









52 52 52 52 









52 52 52 52 









52 52 52 52 
Correct/not sure - pay 








52 52 52 52 
Correct - other groups 








52 52 52 52 
Correct/not sure - other 








52 52 52 52 
Situation personally 








52 52 52 52 
Situation threatening to 








52 52 52 52 
Indicated threat-








52 52 52 52 









52 52 52 52 









52 52 52 52 
Any type of suspicion - 








52 52 52 52 
Any type of suspicion 








20 23 23 20 
Any type of suspicion 









20 23 23 20 
Acted real despite any 








20 23 23 20 
Acted real despite any 
type of suspicion - 








20 23 23 20 




Study 2 Manipulation 












(1 and 3) 
Combined threat 
conditions (2 and 
4) 
Outcome mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n mean sd, n 
- yes 52 52 52 52 
Suspicious about partner 








52 52 52 52 
Suspicion about partner 








20 23 23 20 
Suspicion about partner 









20 23 23 20 
Acted real despite 









20 23 23 20 
Acted real despite 
suspicion about partner - 








20 23 23 20 
Suspicious about partner 








52 52 52 52 
Suspicious about partner 








52 52 52 52 
Suspicion about partner 








13 20 17 16 
Suspicion about partner 
info affect behavior - 








13 20 17 16 
Acted real despite 
suspicion about partner 








13 20 17 16 
Acted real despite 
suspicion about partner 








13 20 17 16 
Final suspicion Q - any 
suspicion affected 









52 52 52 52 
Final suspicion Q - 
whether any suspicion 
affected behavior during 








52 52 52 52 
Number of whether 
suspicious Qs indicated 








52 52 52 52 
Number of whether 
suspicious Qs indicated 

















Study 2 List of Variables Analyzed and Mnemonics Used 
Minimums and maximums for data used for most analyses – full sample data kept by 
strictest standards and including balancing. 
 
Variable Mnemonic min max 
Mean self (stay) score during task SSMEAN 0 1 
Social dominance orientation scale SDO_overall 16 104 
Partner status rating scale PartnerStatusRatings 8 49 
Extent important to earn as many points 
possible importantearn2 2 7 
Extent tried best at task trybesttask 4 7 
Extent felt like part of the group partofgroup2 1 7 
Whether want to be matched with partner 
again matchpartneragain_recode 0 1 
        
Feel personally threatened (scale) FeelThreatened 14 84 
Feel group threatened (scale) FeelGroupThreatenedNOANXIOUS 8 56 
Feel anxious for country (question) tg2anxious 1 7 
Extent difficult to earn points difficultearn2 1 7 
Self-reported self CS score yourcsscore 3 18 
Self-reported self CS score (recoded) yourcsscore_rec 3 18 
Self CS score compared to national average howyoudidcs 1 7 
Self CS score subjective howrateyourcs 1 7 
Partner CS score reported pcsscore 5 18 
Partner CS score compared to national 
average howpdidcs 1 7 
Partner CS score subjective howratepcs 1 7 
        
Correct response to pay structure question paystructureQ_CORRECT 0 1 
Correct or not sure response to pay structure 
question paystructureQ_C_NS 0 1 
Correct response to other groups threatening 
question othergroupsthreatenQ_CORRECT 0 1 
Correct or not sure response to other groups 
threatening question othergroupsthreatenQ_C_NS 0 1 
Situation personally threatening (question) situationthreateningpersonally 1 7 
Situation threatening to group (question) situationthreateninggroup 1 7 
Whether indicated threat-condition pay 
structure paystructureq_yes 0 1 
Whether indicated other groups threaten othergroupsthreatenq_yes 0 1 
        
Any type of suspicion - yes suspeverYES 0 1 
Any type of suspicion - yes or not sure suspeverYESNOTSURE 0 1 
Any type of suspicion affect behavior - yes suspeveraffectYES 0 1 
Any type of suspicion affect behavior - yes 
or not sure suspeveraffectYESNOTSURE 0 1 
Whether acted real despite any type of 
suspicion - yes suspeveractrealYES 1 1 




Variable Mnemonic min max 
suspicion - yes or not sure 
Suspicious about partner - yes susppartnerYES 0 1 
Suspicious about partner - yes or not sure susppartnerYESNOTSURE 0 1 
Suspicion about partner affect behavior - yes susppartneraffectYES 0 1 
Suspicion about partner affect behavior - yes 
or not sure susppartneraffectYESNOTSURE 0 1 
Whether acted real despite suspicion about 
partner - yes susppartneractrealYES 0 1 
Whether acted real despite suspicion about 
partner - yes or not sure susppartneractrealYESNOTSURE 1 1 
Suspicious about partner information - yes susppartnerinfoYES 0 1 
Suspicious about partner information - yes or 
not sure susppartnerinfoYESNOTSURE 0 1 
Suspicion about partner information affect 
behavior  - yes susppartnerinfoaffectYES 0 1 
Suspicion about partner information affect 
behavior - yes or not sure susppartnerinfoaffectYESNOTSURE 0 1 
Whether acted real despite suspicion about 
partner information - yes susppartnerinfoactrealYES 0 1 
Whether acted real despite suspicion about 
partner information - yes or not sure susppartnerinfoactrealYESNOTSURE 1 1 
Final suspicion question - whether any type 
of suspicion affected behavior during study - 
yes suspanyYES 0 1 
Final suspicion question - whether any type 
of suspicion affected behavior during study - 
yes or not sure suspanyYESNOTSURE 0 1 
Number of suspicion questions (whether 
suspicious) indicated yes to SUSPICIONSCALE_YES 0 4 
Number of suspicion questions (whether 
suspicious) indicated yes or not sure to SUSPICIONSCALE_YESNOTSURE 0 4 
        
Hispanic/Latino indicator hisplarecode 0 1 
American Indian/Alaskan Native indicator RE1_AIAN 0 1 
Black/African American indicator RE2_BAA 0 1 
East Asian indicator RE3_EA 0 1 
White/Caucasian indicator RE9_WC 0 1 
Other race/ethnicity indicator RE10_OTHER 0 1 
Racial/ethnic minority indicator RE_MINORITY 0 1 
How often use MTurk to make basic ends 
meet educhhwhatisthehighestlevelofedu 2 8 
Highest education in household endsmeethowoftendoyouuseearnings 1 7 
Social class rating socialclasspleaseindicatewhichso 1 5 
Age in years q73 [age in years] 19 74 
Whether indicates having worked with other 
MTurkers - yes EverWorkOtherMTurkerYES 0 1 
Whether indicates having worked with other 
MTurkers - yes or not sure EverWorkOtherMTurkerYESNOTSURE 0 1 
Whether indicates having worked with other 
MTurkers - not sure EverWorkOtherMTurkerNOTSURE 0 1 
Self-reported estimate of time to complete in 
minutes (recoded) timeminrecode 15 150 
Flag for issues noted during study ISSUESFLAG_rec 0 1 
Flag for comment indicating potential issue 
at end of group study ISSUECOMMENTSFLAG_rec 0 1 
Flag for potential doubt or further scrutiny 




Variable Mnemonic min max 
Flag for missed questions or technical 
trouble during the pretest flagorangepretest 0 1 
Number of attention-check questions correct ATTENTIONSCORE 2 3 












>>>Collect information on men and women. Considering that there are more U.S. 
women than men on MTurk (e.g., Ross et al. 2010), Study 3 is women only as planned. 
Actual gender distributions may have changed these decisions. 
 
[Study 2 is mixed-gender]  
 
 
SCREENER - STUDIES 2 and 3 
 






Screener for future group interaction studies that pay up to $7 (pretest required before 
these). If you are not eligible, please return this HIT. If you have questions about your 
eligibility, please contact the researchers at ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com 
 
 
Keywords: task, group, survey, research, questionnaire, study, interaction 
 
 
24 hour maximum allotted for completion, HIT expiration after 5 days, auto-approval for 
payment after 30 days 
 
 
Workers do not need to be Master Workers 
HIT approval rate is 90% or greater 







Screener for later group interaction studies that pay up to $7 (and take about 50 minutes). 
A pretest must be taken first (pays $0.50 for about 15 minutes), and eligible participants 





The screener takes about ten minutes and pays $0.15. 
 
***IF YOU ARE NOT ELIGIBLE, OR DO NOT GET A CONFIRMATION NUMBER 
AT THE END, PLEASE RETURN THE HIT TO AVOID REJECTION OF YOUR 
SUBMISSION. 
 
Please make sure you have not already participated in one of our studies before. If you 
have, the Turkitron page will not allow you to enter the screener. If you have questions 
about your eligibility for the screener, please contact the researchers at 
ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com. If you are not eligible, please return the HIT. 
 
You are invited to participate in this study if you currently live in the United States, 
both you and your parents or guardians were born in the United States, and all of 
you have lived in the United States for most or all of your lives. You must be fluent 
in English, and have an MTurk acceptance rate of at least 90%. You must be 18 or 
older to participate. 
 
After the screener, eligible participants will be asked to take a pre-test evaluation (about 
15 minutes, pays $0.50). Participants who remain eligible after the pre-test evaluation 
will be asked to work on one of our real-time group tasks with other MTurk workers. The 
group tasks take about 50 minutes, and pay for the group tasks are based on group 
performance – each participant will earn at least $5, and up to $2 extra in MTurk bonuses 
for $7 total, depending on performance. 
 
At the end of the screener, you will receive a code to paste into the box below to receive 
credit for taking our screener. Follow the link below to complete the screener. 
 
Make sure to leave this window open as you complete the screener. When you are 
finished, you will return to this page to paste the code into the box. 
 
 








<Time for 10 seconds> 
 
 





The purpose of this screener questionnaire is to let us know if you are interested in 
participating in a later group interaction study. If you are eligible for the next stages of 
the study, we will assign you a qualification and invite you to participate. 
 
Please make sure you have not already participated in one of our studies before 
participating. If you have, the Turkitron page will not allow you to enter the screener. If 
you have questions about your eligibility for the screener, please contact the researchers 
at ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com. If you are not eligible, please return the HIT. 
 
This research is run by Social Science Researchers at the University of Maryland to study 
group tasks and survey responses. You are invited to participate in this study if you 
currently live in the United States, both you and your parents or guardians were 
born in the United States, and all of you have lived in the United States for most or 
all of your lives. You must be fluent in English, and have an MTurk acceptance rate 
of at least 90%. You must be 18 or older to participate. 
 
This is a short screening survey for a larger project. After the screener, eligible 
participants will be asked to take a pre-test evaluation (about 15 minutes, pays $0.50). 
Participants who remain eligible after the pre-test evaluation will be asked to work on one 
of our real-time group tasks with other MTurk workers. The group tasks take about 50 
minutes, and pay for the group tasks are based on group performance – each participant 
will earn at least $5, and up to $2 extra in MTurk bonuses for $7 total, depending on 
performance. 
 
In this screener, you will be asked to answer a few questions about yourself (for example, 
What is your age in years?, and Please identify your gender – Man, Woman, Other, or 
Prefer not to say). The screener takes about ten minutes to complete, and you will be paid 
$0.15 for completing it. You will need to submit a confirmation code from the end of the 
survey to receive payment. 
 
This research is not designed to benefit you personally, but it may help researchers. 
Possible risks include loss of confidentiality. Only authorized individuals (members of 
the research team and associated staff) will have access to your personal information and 
responses. Data will be stored securely (password-protected). Your MTurk worker ID 
may be stored in a screening service database such as Turkitron to manage eligibility 
criteria for this study and future studies, regardless of whether you complete this study. 
Data will be kept indefinitely, and unless we get your consent to keep them, documents 
with personally identifiable information will be deleted or destroyed after a period of at 
least three years, according to UMD’s policies. We will protect your identity and 
confidentiality of your responses to the maximum extent allowable by law. 
 
Your participation is voluntary, and you may stop participating at any time. If you decide 
not to participate or to stop participating, you will not be penalized or lose any benefits to 
which you are otherwise entitled. You must answer all questions in the screener 




an expired or rejected MTurk HIT. This study is part of a series, and participating in this 
study may affect your eligibility for future studies in this series. 
 
You may contact the investigators with any questions about this research: 
ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com. You may also contact the University of Maryland IRB 
with any questions or complaints about your rights as a research participant: 
irb@umd.edu, 301-405-0678. 
 
You have the right to withdraw your data. If you wish to withdraw your data, please 
let us know immediately by emailing ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com. This is 
important because withdrawing a specific individual’s data may not be possible 
after a period of time (at least a few weeks), because data will be deidentified after 
initial processing. 
 
By selecting “Yes, I consent to participate,” you certify that you are at least 18 years old, 
you meet the eligibility criteria, you understand the information above, your questions are 
answered to your satisfaction, and you are volunteering to participate. 
 
Do you consent to participate in this research? 
 
Yes, I consent to participate 






You have indicated that you do not consent to participate. If this was in error, please 
restart the questionnaire (you may need to clear your temporary browser files). Otherwise 




The following survey page will have the researchers’ email address if you have any 
questions or concerns. 
 












Please enter your MTurk worker ID. This is your worker ID, not your username or 
email address you log in with.  
It should be about 14 characters long and probably starts with A. You should be able to 
find it at https://www.mturk.com/mturk/dashboard (opens new browser window). 





Please enter your age in years: 
 ___ 
 (DISQUAL if <18) 
 
 
In what country do you currently live? 
 ---pull-down menu 
 ***required 
 ***DISQUAL if not U.S.… 
 
Are you currently a citizen of the United States? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Not sure 
 
 
Were both you and your parents or guardians were born in the United States AND have 




 Not sure 
 
 
Please list all languages you speak, ordered from most to least fluent 
 <free response> 
 
 
Are you fluent in English? 
 ***required 
 Yes  No Not sure 













If List of Countries United States of America Is Not Selected Edit  
Or Are you a U.S. citizen? Not Is Selected Edit 
Or Are you a U.S. citizen? Not sure Is Selected Edit 
Or Nativity Q No Is Selected 
Or Nativity Q Not sure Is Selected 
Or Are you fluent in English? No Is Selected Edit 
Or Are you fluent in English? Not sure Is Selected Edit 




Based on one or more of your responses so far, we have determined that you are not 
eligible to participate in this study. 
 
Please follow the link below to be directed back to the MTurk home page.  
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome 
 
The following survey page will have the researchers’ email address if you have any 
questions or concerns. 
 
 





DEMOGRAPHICS II  
 
 ~combined into one or more pages 
 
 





Please identify your gender: 













Are you Hispanic or Latino? 
 Yes No Not sure 
 
 
Please check all racial/ethnic groups you identify with: 
 American Indian or Alaska Native 
Black or African American 
East Asian 
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
South American Indigenous or Native 
South Asian 
Southeast Asian 
West Asian or Middle Eastern 








What is the highest level of education anyone in your household has obtained? 
Less than high school 
High school graduate or equivalent (e.g., GED) 
Some college, no degree 
Associate’s degree 
Bachelor’s degree 
Post-secondary non-degree award (e.g., EMT) 
Master’s degree 





How often do you use earnings from MTurk to make basic ends meet? (from Ross et al.) 





































 Yes No Not sure 
 
 
IF Yes or Not sure: 
 






Please provide comments about your experience working with other MTurk workers to 













Please provide any further comments you have about HITs that have you work with other 











We expect to have the pretest evaluation available in the next four weeks. 
 
Please enter your email address if you would like to be notified via email when the group 
task study is available if you remain eligible. 
 






Please provide any other comments you have for us. 
 










This is the end of the screener questionnaire. Thank you for your time and interest in 
our study. 
  
We will assign you a qualification if you are eligible to participate in the following 
stages of our study. We will also notify you by email if you provided your email 





You may contact the investigators with any questions or concerns about this 
research: ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com 
 
You may also contact the University of Maryland IRB with any questions or 
concerns about your rights as a research participant: irb@umd.edu, (301) 405-
4212.  
You have the right to withdraw your data. If you wish to withdraw your data, please 
let us know immediately by emailing ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com. This is 
important because withdrawing a specific individual’s data may not be possible 
after a period of time (at least a few weeks), because data will be deidentified after 
initial processing. 
 













Again, your MTurk HIT confirmation number is ${e://Field/confirmation_code} 
 









Your responses have been recorded. Thank you. 
 
***IF YOU DID NOT RECEIVE A CONFIRMATION NUMBER CODE EARLIER, 
PLEASE RETURN THE HIT. 
 
























Short description: Pretest for future group interaction studies that pay up to $7. Follows 
from previous screener. Pretest takes about 15 minutes. If you have any questions, please 






***You may only take and submit this pretest once. If you have already completed it or 
are ineligible, please return the HIT. 
 
Please take this pretest if you are interested in participating in our later group interaction 
study. Must have qualification and 90%+ HIT acceptance rate. 
 
Please make sure you are in a quiet space free from distractions during participation, and 
please make sure you have time to do the study in one sitting. 
 
At the end of the pretest, you will receive a code to paste into the box below to receive 
credit for taking our pretest. Follow the link below to complete the pretest. 
 
Make sure to leave this window open as you complete the pretest. When you are 







Keywords: task, group, survey, research, questionnaire, study, interaction 
 
 
24 hour maximum allotted for completion, HIT expiration after 5 days, auto-approval for 
payment after 30 days 
 
 
Workers do not need to be Master Workers 
HIT approval rate is 90% or greater 
Must be located in United States 




 [only for approved men and women – other selection preferences based on other 







<Time for 10 seconds> 
 
 
Thank you for your interest in participating in this study. 
 
Please read the following carefully. You are encouraged to retain a copy of this 
information. You may electronically save, print, or request a copy of this information for 
your records.  
 
This research is run by Social Science Researchers at the University of Maryland to 
investigate situation experiences and survey responses. You are invited to participate in 
this study if you determined eligible and assigned a qualification to participate following 
the initial screener. You must have an MTurk acceptance rate of at least 90%. You must 
be 18 or older to participate. 
 
You will be asked to answer questions on your own that are designed to measure Critical 
Choice Ability (CCA) traits. You will be asked to make difficult judgments about 
characteristics of geometric figures. This pre-test evaluation will take up to 15 minutes, 
and pays $0.50. 
 
Participants who remain eligible after this pre-test evaluation will be asked to work on a 
group task real-time with other MTurk workers. The group tasks take about 50 minutes, 
and pay for the group tasks are based on group performance – each participant will earn 
at least $5,, and up to $2 extra in MTurk bonuses for $7 total, depending on performance. 
 
Please make sure you are in a quiet space free from distractions during participation, and 
please make sure you have time to do the pretest evaluation in one sitting. If we suspect 
that you do not qualify for the study, the study was not done in one sitting, or proper 
attention was not given to responses, we may reject your submission and not issue 
payment. 
 
This research is not designed to benefit you personally, but it may help researchers. 
Possible risks include loss of confidentiality and frustration from the task activities— 
they are designed to be difficult. You may wish to contact a mental health professional if 
you experience distress. Results from this study may be presented or published. Only 
authorized individuals (members of the research team and associated staff) will have 
access to your responses. Data will be stored securely (password-protected), and 




linked to your responses from this pretest evaluation after initial processing. Your MTurk 
worker ID may be stored in a screening service database such as Turkitron to manage 
eligibility criteria for this study and future studies, regardless of whether you complete 
this study. Data will be kept indefinitely, and documents with personally identifiable 
information will be deleted or destroyed after a period of at least three years, according to 
UMD’s policies. We will protect your identity and confidentiality of your responses to 
the maximum extent allowable by law. 
 
Your participation is voluntary, and you may stop participating at any time. If you decide 
not to participate or to stop participating, you will not be penalized or lose any benefits to 
which you are otherwise entitled. You must answer all questions in this pretest evaluation 
to receive payment, and accepting the HIT and not finishing it may result in an expired or 
rejected MTurk HIT. This study is part of a series, and participating in this study may 
affect your eligibility for future studies in this series. 
 
You may contact the investigators with any questions about this research: 
ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com. You may also contact the University of Maryland IRB 
with any questions or complaints about your rights as a research participant: 
irb@umd.edu, 301-405-0678. 
 
You have the right to withdraw your data. If you wish to withdraw your data, please 
let us know immediately by emailing ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com. This is 
important because withdrawing a specific individual’s data may not be possible 
after a period of time (at least a few weeks), because data will be deidentified after 
initial processing. 
 
By selecting “Yes, I consent to participate,” you certify that you are at least 18 years old, 
you meet the eligibility criteria, you understand the information above, your questions are 
answered to your satisfaction, and you are volunteering to participate. 
 
Do you consent to participate in this research? 
 
Yes, I consent to participate 








You have indicated that you do not consent to participate. If this was in error, please 
restart the questionnaire (you may need to clear your temporary browser files). Otherwise 







The following survey page will have the researchers’ email address if you have any 
questions or concerns. 
 











Thank you for participating in this study. 
 
- Please read all instructions carefully.  
- Please make sure you are in a quiet space free from distractions during participation 





Please enter your MTurk worker ID. This is your worker ID, not your username or 
email address you log in with.  
It should be about 14 characters long and probably starts with A. You should be able to 
find it at https://www.mturk.com/mturk/dashboard (opens new browser window). 
 ***required, must be at least 10 characters 
 






The following questions are designed to test your ability to effectively make important 
decisions with only limited information. These are called Critical Choice tasks. 
 
 
You are now ready to begin the pretest evaluation. You will earn one point for each 
correct answer, out of 20 problems total. 
 
The problem you are answering about only appears for a brief moment, so you must 









On the next page, you will be presented with an example of a critical choice 
(contrast sensitivity) evaluation.  You will be shown an image that contains either 
slightly more white or slightly more black, and you will be asked to decide if this 
image is predominantly white or predominantly black.  You need to make this 
evaluation within 5 seconds and you will automatically advance to the next question 
after 5 seconds.  Once you’ve made your choice, you also have the option of 
moving to the next page sooner using the red arrow at the bottom of the page. 
 












IF FAIL PRACTICE: You did not specify a choice before you reached the 5 second 
limit.  For this study, it’s important that you make a choice within this time frame. 
 
 Please proceed to the next page to try again.   
 
 
IF PASS PRACTICE, SKIP TO: The critical choice (contrast sensitivity) evaluations 







You will now begin the evaluation.  On each page, you will be presented with an 
image to evaluate, two buttons with which to make your decision (either 
predominantly white or black), and a timer.  This timer will count down from 5 to 0 
and you must make your final decision before the timer reaches zero. 
 
Please make sure to provide a decision for each image. 
 









[INSERT PRETEST] --- out of 20 










Critical Choice - Contrast Sensitivity Feedback 
 
 





























As we did after the screener, we will assign a qualification to participants who remain 
eligible for the group task stage of the study. We expect to have the group task available 
in the next two weeks. 
 
We will use the information we have about you to assign groups in the next stage of the 
study. 
 
We will share limited information between assigned group members (such as age and 





Please enter your email address if you would like to be notified via email when the group 
task study is available if you remain eligible. 
 




















Did you have any issues during the pretest? If so, please describe what happened. 












We will assign you a qualification if you are eligible to participate in the following 
stages of our study. We will also notify you via email if you provided your email 
address. We expect this will be in the next two weeks. 
 
You may contact the investigators with any questions or concerns about this 
research: ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com 
 
You may also contact the University of Maryland IRB with any questions or 
concerns about your rights as a research participant: irb@umd.edu, (301) 405-4212. 
 
You have the right to withdraw your data. If you wish to withdraw your data, please 
let us know immediately by emailing ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com. This is 
important because withdrawing a specific individual’s data may not be possible 
after a period of time (at least a few weeks), because data will be deidentified after 
initial processing. 
  












Again, your MTurk HIT confirmation number is ${e://Field/confirmation_code} 
 







Your responses have been recorded. Thank you. 
 












MTurk Listing: Earn up to $7: Critical Choice and Group Interaction: Group Task 
with Survey — About 50 minutes 
 
Brief Listing Description: Earn up to $7 ($5 minimum) – For participants with 
qualification: Complete a challenging group task for a research study, includes survey 
questions, about 50 minutes. Must have qualification and 90%+ HIT acceptance 
 
 
~~Posted as a $5 task - the other $2 to be paid via Bonus 
 
 
Keywords: task, group, survey, research, questionnaire, study, interaction 
 
 
24 hour maximum allotted for completion, HIT expiration after 5 days, auto-approval for 
payment after 30 days 
 
 
Workers do not need to be Master Workers 
HIT approval rate is 90% or greater 






***Please note that you may only participate in this study once, and having previously 
participated in similar studies may mean you are ineligible for this study. The Turkitron 
website is used to screen Worker IDs for eligibility. If you have further questions about 
your eligibility, please contact the researchers at ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com. 
 
 
This research is run by Social Science Researchers at the University of Maryland to study 
group tasks and survey responses. You will be paired with another MTurk user from our 
participant pool during your participation time. Eligible participants will be matched as 
long as this HIT is active. The study will last about 50 minutes. 
 
Pay for participating depends on how you and your assigned partner perform together on 
the task. You personally will earn a minimum of $5 for participating. Depending on 
performance, you personally may earn more on a sliding scale, up to $2 extra for 
excellent group performance (paid via MTurk bonus). This means you personally can 





You are invited to participate in this study if you currently live in the United States, 
both you and your parents or guardians were born in the United States, and lived in 
the United States for most or all of your lives. You must be fluent in English, and 
have an MTurk acceptance rate of at least 90%. You must be 18 or older to 
participate. 
 
The study must be completed in one sitting (session). Though 24 hours are allotted for the 
study, it is only expected to take about 50 minutes. The extra time is provided to allow 
time for resolution in case there are technical issues or other concerns. 
 
We will share limited information (such as age and pretest performance) between 
assigned group members, but never in ways that could potentially identify the 
individuals. 
 
Please make sure you are in a quiet space free from distractions during participation, and 
please make sure you have time to do the study in one sitting. 
 
At the end of the study, you will receive a code to paste into the box below to receive 
credit for taking our study. Follow the link below to complete the study. 
 
Make sure to leave this window open as you complete the study. When you are 



























Please read the following carefully. You are encouraged to retain a copy of this 
information. You may electronically save, print, or request a copy of this information for 
your records.  
 
This research is run by Social Science Researchers at the University of Maryland to 
investigate group problem-solving. You are invited to participate in this study if you 
determined eligible and assigned a qualification to participate following the pretest 
evaluation. You must have an MTurk acceptance rate of at least 90%. You must be 18 or 
older to participate. 
 
Participation will involve completing a group task with other MTurk worker participants 
and answering survey questions. Questions will be about your feelings (for example, 
briefly describing how you feel about the task situation), and your social attitudes (for 
example, rating how much you favor or oppose the statement “Group equality should be 
our ideal”). As a group, you will answer questions that are designed to measure Critical 
Choice Ability (CCA) traits. You will be asked to make difficult judgments about 
characteristics of geometric figures. 
 
The study will last about 50 minutes. Upon completion, you will be paid $5 through 
MTurk, and may receive up to $2 via Bonus, for $7 total. You will need to submit a 
confirmation code from the end of the survey to receive payment. 
 
Pay for participating depends on how well your assigned group performs on the task. You 
personally will earn a minimum of $5 for participating. Depending on performance, 
you personally may earn more on a sliding scale, up to $2 extra for excellent group 
performance (paid via MTurk bonus). This means you personally can earn up to $7 
total for participating. 
 
We will share limited information (such as age in years and individual task performance) 
between assigned group members, but never in ways that could potentially identify the 
individuals. 
 
Please make sure you are in a quiet space free from distractions during participation, and 
please make sure you have time to do the study in one sitting. To receive payment for this 
study, you must write at least 100 characters thoughtfully addressing each of three 
questions about the group task situation, and fully complete the group task with your 
assigned group. We will also consider answers to questions designed to determine 
whether you are paying attention. If we suspect that you do not qualify for the study, the 
study was not done in one sitting, or proper attention was not given to responses, we may 
reject your submission and not issue payment. 
 
This research is not designed to benefit you personally, but it may help researchers. 
Possible risks include loss of confidentiality, distress from answering questions or about 
topics that are personal or sensitive, and frustration from the task activities— they are 
designed to be difficult. You may wish to contact a mental health professional if you 




authorized individuals (members of the research team and associated staff) will have 
access to your responses. Data will be stored securely (password-protected), and 
potentially identifying information (such as IP address and MTurk username) will not be 
linked to these responses after initial processing. Your MTurk worker ID may be stored 
in a screening service database such as Turkitron to manage eligibility criteria for this 
study and future studies, regardless of whether you complete this study. Data will be kept 
indefinitely, and documents with personally identifiable information will be deleted or 
destroyed after a period of at least three years, according to UMD’s policies. We will 
protect your identity and confidentiality of your responses to the maximum extent 
allowable by law. 
 
Your participation is voluntary, and you may stop participating at any time. If you decide 
not to participate or to stop participating, you will not be penalized or lose any benefits to 
which you are otherwise entitled. Except for initial identification, consent to share limited 
personal information with assigned group members (this is required to complete 
participation), questions about the group task, and the group task itself, you may skip a 
question you do not want to answer. You must finish the study to receive payment, and 
accepting the HIT and not finishing the study may result in an expired or rejected MTurk 
HIT. This study is part of a series, and participating in this study may affect your 
eligibility for future studies in this series. 
 
You may contact the investigators with any questions about this research: 
ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com. You may also contact the University of Maryland IRB 
with any questions or complaints about your rights as a research participant: 
irb@umd.edu, 301-405-0678. 
 
You have the right to withdraw your data. If you wish to withdraw your data, please 
let us know immediately by emailing ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com. This is 
important because withdrawing a specific individual’s data may not be possible 
after a period of time (at least a few weeks), because data will be deidentified after 
initial processing. 
 
By selecting “Yes, I consent to participate,” you certify that you are at least 18 years old, 
you meet the eligibility criteria, you understand the information above, your questions are 
answered to your satisfaction, and you are volunteering to participate. 
 
Do you consent to participate in this research? 
 
Yes, I consent to participate 











You have indicated that you do not consent to participate. If this was in error, please 
restart the questionnaire (you may need to clear your temporary browser files). Otherwise 




The following survey page will have the researchers’ email address if you have any 
questions or concerns. 
 









INSTRUCTIONS (put on timer – 5 seconds) 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
 
- Please read all instructions carefully.  
- Please make sure you are in a quiet space free from distractions during participation 










Please enter your MTurk worker ID. This is your worker ID, not your username or 
email address you log in with.  
It should be about 14 characters long and probably starts with A. You should be able to 
find it at https://www.mturk.com/mturk/dashboard (opens new browser window). 














We will share limited information (such as age and individual task performance) between 
assigned group members, but never in ways that could potentially identify the 
individuals. 
 
The specific information we will share includes: a randomly generated identification code 
(NOT your MTurk worker ID), country of citizenship, gender identity, age in years, and 
performance on the pretest evaluation. To confirm, your pretest score was: 7/18 out 
of 20 [POOR/SUPERIOR] 
 




Do you consent to share your information with any other members of your group? 
 
Yes No (if you select no, this will end your participation) 






Eligible participants will be matched with a group for the task as long as this HIT is 
active.  
 
Today we are running several sessions simultaneously, and we expect that group 
matching will take no more than 5 minutes. Between our sessions, we will have 
hundreds of MTurk participants. 
 
Though unlikely, if your group matching takes more than 15 minutes, your session will 
expire. If this happens, please exit the browser tab to close your session. You may either 
restart through the questionnaire link to try re-entering the pool, or contact 






The purpose of this study is to investigate problem solving over computer networks. In 




of problem solving for Critical Choice Ability (CCA) problems, and comparing 




In today’s study, you will be completing a group project. Like the pretest evaluation you 
took earlier, it will involve answering a number of questions. Instead of working alone, 
you will work as a group. In this group project, you will be able to see your group 
members’ answers to each question before you select a final answer. You will then 




Critical Choice Ability (CCA) questions are designed to test your ability to effectively 
make important decisions with only limited information. 
 
Your feedback from the individual Critical Choice Ability (CCA) assessment you took 
earlier is below: 
 
 
Contrast Sensitivity Feedback 
 
 





<time for 5 seconds> 
 
 

















We have observed that in many situations, such as when a doctor diagnoses a difficult 
illness, individuals are called upon to make decisions that must be correct.  That is, if the 
doctor does not make the right diagnosis, the patient might die.  Social scientists refer to 
this kind of situation as a Critical Choice situation. 
 
In Critical Choice situations, when the person is concerned only with the correctness of 
the decision, he or she will often seek all the information and advice from others that is 
available.  Because the most important thing in a Critical Choice situation is to be right, 
individuals will not care whether they or others first realize what the appropriate decision 
is, so long as the decision is the correct one.  It is clear then, that exchanging information 






Several recent studies indicate that individuals working together perform much more 
effectively than do individuals who work the same problems alone.  For this reason, we 
have you work both individually and with a group as a team. 
 
In this part of the study, we are going to be studying team ability levels.  This means that 






To incentivize you to do your best on the group task, we are paying up to $2 in MTurk 
bonuses for good performance. In addition to the base $5 for this HIT, you can earn up 




















The UMDSURVEY platform now allows us to run remote connections through the 
GROUPSNET PORTAL plugin. As a participant, this means a seamless group task 
experience for you. In earlier years, we would have directed you to another website to 
complete the group task, then back to UMDSURVEY to answer any remaining questions 













Please wait while our participant pool matches you with 1-3 other participants. Other 
members of your group may have entered the pool later than you did, so please be patient 
if it takes a few moments. This page will automatically advance once you have been 
matched with a group. 
 
 
[PLEASE WAIT GIF] 
  
 
Eligible participants will be matched with a group for the task as long as this HIT is 
active.  
 
Today we are running several sessions simultaneously, and we expect that group 
matching will take no more than 5 minutes. Between our sessions, we will have hundreds 
of MTurk participants. 
 
Though unlikely, if your group matching takes more than 15 minutes, your session will 
expire. If this happens, please exit the browser tab to close your session. You may either 
restart through the questionnaire link try re-entering the pool, or contact 


















You will be working as partners as a group, or team. 
 






As we explained earlier, we are interested in seeing how well the two of you can do as a 
team when you are not in direct communication with each other.  However, we believe 
that it is best if you know as much as possible about your partner. Consequently, we 
























[TIME THIS PAGE – 10 seconds] 
 
 
Participant Code Number 100008398124 
 









Critical Choice - Contrast Sensitivity Individual Score: 






As we explained earlier, several studies on Critical Choice have found that individuals 
working together perform much more effectively than do individuals who work the same 
problems alone.  For this reason, we will have you work with a partner as a team. 
 
Most of what we know so far about how two-person teams solve problems comes from 
studies where the teams discussed problems and solutions to these problems face-to-face.  
However, advances in technology provide more opportunities for individuals to work 






The study we are conducting involves a situation in which the partners do not discuss 
possible solutions to problems face-to-face, but rather communicate their choices 
virtually. While you will not be solving the problems face-to-face, you had somewhat of 
an opportunity to introduce yourselves to one another by means of the personal 
information exchanged earlier.  We find that it helps people who work together to know 




[Time this page – 4 seconds] 
 



























Research has found that when individuals work alone at solving Critical Choice 
problems, 0 to 10 is a poor performance.  11 to 15 represents an average performance, 
and 16 to 25 is clearly a superior performance. 
 
Individuals can improve their scores substantially if they are given the opportunity to see 
another person’s initial choice before having to make a final decision. 
 
 
In your group: 
 
Your individual score: 7/18 out of 20 
Your partner’s individual score: 7/18 out of 20 
 



































In today’s study, we are interested in seeing how well you can work together as a team.  




between 0 and 21 constitutes a very poor team performance.  A team score of 22 to 26 is 
below average performance.  Scores of 27 to 33 represent an average team performance.  
34 to 37 points represents an above average score.  And, 38 to 40 points clearly 










	 	 	 	 	Individual	Scores	(out	of	20)	
	
Team	Scores	(out	of	40)	

















As you can see from these standards, it has been demonstrated that teams working 
together are able to perform more effectively than two individuals working 
independently.  For example, an individual with average ability working on these 
problems alone could expect to get between 9 and 13 correct.  Thus, you might expect 
that two individuals working together might each get between 9 and 13 correct for a total 
score between 18 and 26.  However, as the team results show, the average team score is 
quite a bit higher -- between 27 and 33.  This is because two people working together as a 










	 	 	 	 	Individual	Scores	
	
Team	Scores


















In today’s study, we are interested in seeing how well you can work together as a team.  
When people work together as partners, it has been found that a team score falling 
between 0 and 21 constitutes a very poor team performance.  A team score of 22 to 26 is 
below average performance.  Scores of 27 to 33 represent an average team performance.  
34 to 37 points represents an above average score.  And, 38 to 40 points clearly 







You and your partner will work together to complete the group task, and you will each 
get paid the same amount based on your group performance. 
 
To incentivize you to do your best on the group task, the better you and your partner 
perform as a group, the more you will get paid for participating. You will receive at least 
$5, and up to $7. 
 





The following instructions show you how the group task works. 
 





ATTENTION CHECK QUESTION: 
 





















***INDIVIDUAL PROBLEM GRAPHIC*** 
 
Look at the above image. You will have a screen that looks like this, and you will 
use it in solving the Critical Choice problems. You will first express your initial 
opinion by pressing either the button marked “Top” or the button marked 
“Bottom.”  When you have made your initial choice, it will be communicated to your 
partner. 
 
You have only a few seconds to make your decisions. A timer will count down for 
you. You may submit your response to continue if you are finished deciding before 
the time expires. 
 






PARTNER PROBLEM GRAPHIC 
 
After all responses are received, you will be able to see the other person’s opinion 
on your panel. That is, on the panel labeled “Your partner’s choice,” you will see 
either “Top” or “Bottom” selected. During the problem series, after each of you has 
received information on the other person’s opinion, you will have a few more 
seconds to decide which is the correct answer.  You should each restudy the 
problem and carefully evaluate your partner’s advice.  You should use this advice if 
it helps you make the right decision.  When you have made your final choice, you 
will indicate your decision by again pressing one of the buttons in the bottom row of 
your panel. 
 










You will not see your partner’s final choice in today’s study.  After both members of 
your team have made their final decisions, they will be recorded, and the choices on the 
panels will go away.  Then, the next Critical Choice problem will appear on the screen. 
 













SCRN3 (or equivalent graphic) 
[NO GRAPHIC] 
 
You and your partner will each provide a final answer for every question (although you 
will not know each other’s final answers). Thus, your group will have a total of 40 final 
answers (one from each partner for each of the 20 questions). The payment you will 
receive for the study today is based on how many questions your group answers 
correctly. 
 
To incentivize you to do your best on the group task, we are paying up to $4 in MTurk 
bonuses for good performance. In addition to the base $5 for this HIT, you can earn up to 
$7 total, depending on group performance. 
 
















































Your group’s goal is to earn as much money as possible. The more points your group 
earns, the higher the payment for each group member. 
 
This week, a number of groups will complete this study. However, the other groups’ 
performance scores will not affect your group’s payments. The number of points your 
group earns is what determines your payment. When a group in this study scores a high 
number of points, it does not affect the ability of other groups to earn a high payment. In 
other words, the payments are non-zero-sum. 
 
< This version does not mention threat-related things, and is not expected to promote 

































The below table shows that to receive a certain amount of payment, you need to score 
better than the corresponding number of points. For example, if you score 34 points, you 
will receive a payment of  $5 total for this study. 
 
These standards are the same no matter what the other groups score. 
 






































Please consider your group’s situation, and write your response below. Your responses 
are confidential, and none of the other participants will see them – only the researchers 
have access to your responses. 
 
This week, a number of groups will complete this study. However, the other groups’ 
performance scores will not affect your group’s payments. The number of points your 
group earns is what determines your payment. When a group in this study scores a high 
number of points, it does not affect the ability of other groups to earn a high payment. In 










Please consider your group’s situation, and write your response below. Your responses 
are confidential, and none of the other participants will see them – only the researchers 
have access to your responses. 
 
This week, a number of groups will complete this study. However, the other groups’ 
performance scores will not affect your group’s payments. The number of points your 
group earns is what determines your payment. When a group in this study scores a high 
number of points, it does not affect the ability of other groups to earn a high payment. In 
other words, the payments are non-zero-sum. 
 




Please consider your group’s situation, and write your response below. Your responses 
are confidential, and none of the other participants will see them – only the researchers 
have access to your responses. 
 
This week, a number of groups will complete this study. However, the other groups’ 
performance scores will not affect your group’s payments. The number of points your 
group earns is what determines your payment. When a group in this study scores a high 
number of points, it does not affect the ability of other groups to earn a high payment. In 
other words, the payments are non-zero-sum. 
 






























































Your group’s goal is to earn as much money as possible. The more points your group 
earns, the higher the payment for each group member. 
 
This week, a number of groups will complete this study. The other groups’ performance 
scores threaten your group’s ability to earn a high payment because the ranking of your 
group’s score relative to the other groups is what determines your payment. When a 
group earns a high number of points, it takes away from the ability of other groups to 
earn a high payment. In other words, the payments are zero-sum, and high payments are 







































The below table shows that to receive a certain amount of payment, you need to score 
better than the corresponding percentage of other groups in this study. For example, if 
you score higher than 63% of the other groups, you will receive a payment of $5 total for 
this study. 
 
These standards depend on what the other groups score. 
 
If another group scores high, this takes away from your group’s ability to earn a high 
































Please consider your group’s situation, and write your response below. Your responses 
are confidential, and none of the other participants will see them – only the researchers 
have access to your responses. 
 
This week, a number of groups will complete this study. The other groups’ performance 
scores threaten your group’s ability to earn a high payment because the ranking of your 
group’s score relative to the other groups is what determines your payment. When a 
group earns a high number of points, it takes away from the ability of other groups to 
earn a high payment. In other words, the payments are zero-sum, and high payments are 












Please consider your group’s situation, and write your response below. Your responses 
are confidential, and none of the other participants will see them – only the researchers 
have access to your responses. 
 
This week, a number of groups will complete this study. The other groups’ performance 
scores threaten your group’s ability to earn a high payment because the ranking of your 
group’s score relative to the other groups is what determines your payment. When a 
group earns a high number of points, it takes away from the ability of other groups to 
earn a high payment. In other words, the payments are zero-sum, and high payments are 
scarce. This is why the other groups threaten your group. 
 






Please consider your group’s situation, and write your response below. Your responses 
are confidential, and none of the other participants will see them – only the researchers 
have access to your responses. 
  
This week, a number of groups will complete this study. The other groups’ performance 
scores threaten your group’s ability to earn a high payment because the ranking of your 
group’s score relative to the other groups is what determines your payment. When a 
group earns a high number of points, it takes away from the ability of other groups to 
earn a high payment. In other words, the payments are zero-sum, and high payments are 
scarce. This is why the other groups threaten your group. 
 






How difficult do you think it will be to earn profit points? 




















<time for 2 seconds> 
 
INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR PARTNER: 
 
Participant Code Number 100008398124 
 






Critical Choice - Contrast Sensitivity Individual Score: 









<Time for 10 seconds> 
 
 




1.  You will be shown a series of 20 problems and will be asked to decide whether the top 
choice or the bottom choice is correct. 
 
 






3.  Each time that one of you makes a correct final decision, your team will receive 1 
point.  If both of you choose correctly, your team receives 2 points.  This means that 
incorrect final decisions add nothing to your team score. 
 
 
4.  Remember:  We are interested in how well the two of you can work together as a 
team.  You should not hesitate to change your initial choices if it helps you to make the 
right decision for your team. 
 
 
5.  Finally, please hold your choices until you see instructions indicating that you should 
make your selection.  Then, make your choice as soon as possible after you have been 






[PARTNER TASK PROGRAM] 
Includes images and content from and adapted from Troyer 2002, programmed 
manually in Qualtrics: 
Qs 1, 6, and 13, and 15 programmed manually to agree 
the others automatically disagree 
 Timings for questions and auto-advances, etc., assigned to appear realistic. 
  Please wait screen GIF  
 
 
Tentative list of task question timings (in seconds): 
 
1. 15, 8 
2. 12, 9 
3. 9, 5 
4. 16, 7 
5. 10, 20 
6. 10, 7 
7. 5, 8 
8. 5, 6 
9. 10, 10 
10. 9, 5 
11. 3, 4 
12. 4, 3 
13. 10, 3 
14. 7, 7 




16. 5, 5 
17.  7, 2 
18. 9, 5 
19. 5, 10 










The group interaction portion is now complete. 
 






Please answer the following questions. Your responses are confidential, and none of the 
other participants will see them – only the researchers have access to your responses. 
 
 
Please rate the following impressions of the partner from your task group. 
[repeat with each, and each of these questions on a separate page] 
 
 
StatusRate-1-Influence: To what extent did your partner influence you during the 
task? 
 Not at all---very much so 
 
StatusRate-2-Consider: To what extent did you take your partner’s initial answers into 
consideration during the task? 
 Not at all --- very much so 
 
StatusRate-3-Correct: To what extent did you think your partner’s initial answers were 
correct during the task? 
 Not at all --- very much so 
 
StatusRate-4-CSLevel: How would you rate your partner’s level of critical choice 
(contrast sensitivity) ability? 





StatusRate-5-Competent: To what extent do you think your partner is competent? 
 Not at all --- very much so 
 
StatusRate-6-Trust: To what extent do you trust your partner? 
 Not at all --- very much so 
 
StatusRate-7-WorkAgain: If you could, would you work with your partner again? 






Social Dominance Orientation - updated with dominance and egalitarianism (SDO7) — 
Ho et al. 2015 
 
 
SDO7: Appendix A: 
 
 
Show how much you favor or oppose each idea below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 
on the scale below. You can work quickly; your first feeling is generally best.  
 
1 Strongly Oppose; 2 Somewhat Oppose; 3 Slightly Oppose; 4 Neutral; 5 Slightly Favor; 





Pro-trait dominance:  
 
(SDO-PTD-1) 1. Some groups of people must be kept in their place.  
 
(SDO-PTD-2) 2. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other 
groups are at the bottom.  
 
(SDO-PTD-3) 3. An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on 
the bottom.  
 
(SDO-PTD-4) 4. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.  
 
 
Con-trait dominance:  
 





(R-SDO-CTD-2) R-6. No one group should dominate in society.  
 
(R-SDO-CTD-3) R-7. Groups at the bottom should not have to stay in their place.  
 
(R-SDO-CTD-4) R-8. Group dominance is a poor principle.  
 
 
Pro-trait antiegalitarianism:  
 
(SDO-PTAE-1) 9. We should not push for group equality.  
 
(SDO-PTAE-2) 10. We shouldn’t try to guarantee that every group has the same quality 
of life.  
 
(SDO-PTAE-3) 11. It is unjust to try to make groups equal.  
 
(SDO-PTAE-4) 12. Group equality should not be our primary goal.  
 
 
Con-trait antiegalitarianism:  
 
(R-SDO-CTAE-1) R-13. We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed.  
 
(R-SDO-CTAE-2) R-14. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different 
groups.  
 
(R-SDO-CTAE-3) R-15. No matter how much effort it takes, we ought to strive to ensure 
that all groups have the same chance in life.  
 







ATTENTION CHECK Q: 
 
What is your favorite social media outlet? Though you may have a favorite, the correct 
















THREAT FEELING Qs: 
 











How ___ do you feel right now? (not at all---very) 
 























For the following questions, think of your task group in this study as a social group you 





[also use bold here] 
 




Q57. Worried for your task group? 
TC-2 
Q52. Anxious for your task group? 
TC-3 
Q53. Fearful for your task group? 
TC-4 
Q108. That your task group is vulnerable 
TC-5 
Q110. Vulnerable on behalf of your task group 
TC-6-THREATMC 
[MANIPULATION CHECK] Q54. That your task group is threatened 
TC-7 
Q109. Threatened on behalf of your task group 
TC-8 
Q100. That your task group is in danger 
TC-9 






Please answer the following questions: 
 




How important to you was it to earn as many points as you could during the task? 
 
 Not at all important --- Very important 
 
 
How difficult was it for you to earn profit points during the task? 









Did you try your best during the group task? 
 




How much did you feel like you were part of a group with your partner? 
 






We are considering conducting a follow-up study to this one on group problem-solving in 






IF YES: We can try to match the same groups again for the follow-up study. This 
would mean working with the same partner you worked with in for this study. 
 






IF NO: If you were participating in the follow-up study, we could try to match the 
same groups again. This would mean working with the same partner you worked 
with in for this study. 
 
If you were participating in the follow-up study, would you like us to match you 















What was your score on the individual contrast sensitivity (Critical Choice) ability test? 
(Out of 20 possible points) 
 [text box - #s 0-20 only] 
 
 
How do you think your individual contrast sensitivity (Critical Choice) ability score 
compares to the national average? 
 Very much below average --- very much above average 
 
 
How would you rate your contrast sensitivity (Critical Choice) ability? 






What was your task partner’s score on the individual contrast sensitivity (Critical 
Choice) ability test? (Out of 20 possible points) 
 [text box - #s 0-20 only] 
 
 
How do you think your task partner’s individual contrast sensitivity (Critical Choice) 
ability score compares to the national average? 
 Very much below average --- very much above average 
 
 
How would you rate your task partner’s contrast sensitivity (Critical Choice) ability? 







Threat manipulation check 
 
 










Which of the following best describes what determines how much pay your group will 
receive for this group study? 
 
- How your group’s score compares to the required score ranges 
 
- How your group’s score ranks among the other groups in this study 
 
 

















Thinking about your group’s situation working on group the task, how threatening do you 
feel this situation was to you personally? 
 




Thinking about your group’s situation working on group the task, how threatening do you 
feel this situation was to your task group? 
 






ATTENTION CHECK Q 
 























[Similar to Study 1] 
 
Separate pages for questions. 
 
 







Please answer the following questions. 
 
 
Did you try your best during the study? 
 
Yes, No, Not sure 
 
 IF NO OR NOT SURE: 
 
 Why didn’t you try your best during the study? 








Did you ever suspect that anything about the study wasn’t actually what we told you it 
was? 
 
Yes, No, Not sure 
 
 
 IF YES OR NOT SURE: 
 
 
What were you suspicious about in this study? 
 
 [text box] 
 
 
Did suspicion about something in the study not being what we told you it was 
affect your behavior in the study? 
 





Did you act as though everything in the study was actually what we told you it 
was? 
   
  Yes, No, Not sure 
 






Did you ever suspect that your partner in the study was not real? 
 
Yes, No, Not sure 
 
   
 
 
IF YES OR NOT SURE: 
 
 Did suspicion about your partner not being real affect your behavior during the 
study? 
 









 Did you act as though your partner was real? 
 
  Yes, No, Not sure 
 




Did you ever suspect that any information we told you about your partner in the study 
was not true? 
 





IF YES OR NOT SURE: 
 
 Did suspicion about information we told you about your partner in the study not 
being true affect your behavior during the study? 
 
  Yes, No, Not sure 
 





 Did you act as though the information about your partner was true? 
 
  Yes, No, Not sure 
 



































We know that sometimes in online studies, people end up participating in studies that do 
not apply to them by mistake. This might happen, for example, if a man takes a survey 
intended only for women because he did not read all of the sign-up instructions.  
 
This study was intended to be only for [insert relevant demographic characteristics, 
e.g., women who identify as white and middle-class] who are United States citizens, 
who are fluent in English, who were born in and have lived most or all of their lives 
in the United States, and whose parents or guardians were also born in and lived 
most of their lives in the United States. 
 
We are university-level social science researchers, and want to make sure our results are 
as accurate as possible. The integrity of our data is especially important if we present our 
findings or publish them in a journal article. 
 
We want to ask if you think you might be one of these participants who are not in the 
group intended for this study, for whatever reason. We ask only to help preserve the 
quality of our data. Your response to this question will not affect whether you are 
paid for the study. As long as you also completed the study with proper attention, 
you will be paid exactly the same, the full amount ($5 plus up to $2 in bonuses based 
on performance) on MTurk, no matter what your response is. 
 






Yes, I am a woman(/man), and both myself and my parents or guardians were born in and 
have lived in the United States most or all of our lives, I am a citizen of the United States, 
and I am fluent in English. 
 
No, I am not part of the intended eligible group. I ended up taking this study by mistake 









>>>These questions below will be included for at least the first few participants, to 




How long in minutes did it take you to complete the study? 
 [] 





Did you have difficulty understanding anything or any other issues during the study? If 
so, please describe what happened. 








Thank you for taking part in this study. 
 
This study served as part of a University of Maryland doctoral student’s dissertation 
project. This part tested how different situations affect social responses in groups. This 
purpose was not mentioned in the listing, in case knowing this purpose might affect the 
responses. Because the research is ongoing and includes experimental elements, we are 
not currently sharing all details with participants. We ask that you please do not share 





Your help with this research is very much appreciated. Thank you! 
 
We will issue $5 of your payment directly through this HIT. We will also issue you the 
remaining $2 as a MTurk bonus, for $7 total. Provided you completed the study with 
satisfactory quality, you will receive this maximum possible payment ($7). We ask that 
you please do not tell other people details about the payments for this study, in case it 
may affect our results. 
 
We actually do not have plans for a study in the following weeks – those questions were 
only asked to get realistic responses. 
 
We apologize for withholding the true purpose of the study. 
 
You may contact the investigator with any questions or concerns about this research: 
ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com 
 
You may also contact the University of Maryland IRB with any questions or concerns 
about your rights as a research participant: irb@umd.edu, 301-405-4212. You may also 
wish to contact a mental health professional if you experience distress following your 
participation. 
 
You have the right to withdraw your data. If you wish to withdraw your data, please 
let us know immediately by emailing ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com. This is 
important because withdrawing a specific individual’s data may not be possible 
after a period of time (at least a few weeks), because data will be deidentified after 
initial processing. 
  
We encourage you to retain this information for your records. 
 






















<Insert confirmation code pages> 
 








Again, your MTurk HIT confirmation number is ${e://Field/confirmation_code} 
 






Your responses have been recorded. Thank you. 
 



















Appendix 3: Supplemental Information for Study 3 
 
Study 3 List of Variables Analyzed and Mnemonics Used 
Minimums and maximums for data used for most analyses – full sample data kept by 
strictest standards and including balancing. 
 
 
Variable Mnemonic min max 
First pre-task coalition vote PREVOTE1 0 1 
Motivated to benefit self during network task selfprosocial1prer_rev 1 7 
Motivated to benefit group during network task - 
pre-task selfprosocial2pre 1 7 
Think Partner A motivated to benefit self during 
network task - pre-task (R) rev_legit_1_prer 1 6 
Feel like part of network group - pre-task cohesion1pre 1 7 
Network group important - pre-task cohesion2pre 1 7 
Extent think Partner A will use their power - pre-
task (R) rev_legit_5_prer 1 5 
Extent think Partner A will use their power in ways 
that benefit himself or herself - pre-task (R) rev_legit_7_prer 1 7 
Hypothetical offer to Partner A - pre-task legit14preofferr_2 5 20 
Legitimacy evaluation scale - pre-task PRE_LEGITIMACY_SCALE 14 98 
If in Position A, extent would use power - pre-task 
(R) usepower1pre 1 7 
If in Position A, extent would use power in ways 
that benefit group - pre-task usepower2prer 1 7 
If in Position A, extent would use power in ways 
that benefit self personally - pre-task (R) usepower3pre 1 7 
Hypothetical offer to Partner A, with power roles 
reversed - pre-task usepower4offerpre_2 0 20 
Difference between hypothetical offers with and 
without power reversal - pre-task diffpreoffervspower -12 20 
Final pre-task coalition vote PREVOTE2 0 1 
Whether changed pre-task vote ChangeVotePRE 0 1 
Whether changed pre-task vote from no to yes NOTOYES_HowChangeVotePRE 0 1 
Whether changed pre-task vote from yes to no YESTONO_HowChangeVotePRE 0 1 





Proportion of Partner A offers accepted meanofferaccepts 0 1 
First post-task coalition vote POSTVOTE1 0 1 
Motivated to benefit group during network task - 
post-task selfprosocial1post_rev 1 7 
Change in motivated to benefit group during 
network task - pre- to post-task changeselfprosocial1 -6 6 
Motivated to benefit group during network task - 
post-task selfprosocial2post 1 7 
Change in motivated to benefit group during 
network task - pre- to post-task changeselfprosocial2 -4 3 
Think Partner A motivated to benefit self during 
network task - post-task (R) rev_legit_1_postr 1 5 
Change in think Partner A motivated to benefit self 
during network task - pre- to post-task changelegit1 -5 3 




Network group important - post-task cohesion2post 1 7 
Change in feel like part of network group - pre- to 
post-task changecohesion1 -6 4 
Change in network group important - pre- to post-
task changecohesion2 -3 3 
Extent think Partner A used their power - post-task 
(R) rev_legit_5_postr 1 7 
Change in extent think Partner A will use/used their 
power - pre- to post-task legit5change -3 4 
Extent think Partner A used their power in ways that 
benefit himself or herself - post-task (R) rev_legit_7_postr 1 7 
Extent think Partner A will use/used their power in 
ways that benefit himself or herself - pre- to post-
task legit7change -6 6 
Hypothetical offer to Partner A - post-task legit14postoffer_2 2 19 
Change in hypothetical offer to Partner A - pre- to 
post-task legit14offerchange -10 14 
Legitimacy evaluation scale - post-task POST_LEGITIMACY_SCALE 14 98 
Change in legitimacy evaluation scale - pre- to post-
task CHANGE_LEGITIMACYSCALE -44 53 
If in Position A, extent would use power - post-task 
(R) usepower1post 1 7 
Change in if in Position A, extent would use power - 
pre- to post-task changeinusepower1 -6 6 
If in Position A, extent would use power in ways 
that benefit group - post-task usepower2postr 1 7 
Change in if in Position A, extent would use power 
in ways that benefit group - pre- to post-task changeinusepower2 -6 5 
If in Position A, extent would use power in ways 
that benefit self personally - post-task (R) usepower3post 1 7 
Change in if in Position A, extent would use power 
in ways that benefit self personally - pre- to post-
task changeinusepower3 -5 4 
Hypothetical offer to Partner A, with power roles 
reversed - post-task usepower4offerpost_2 0 15 
Change in hypothetical offer to Partner A, with 
power roles reversed - pre- to post-task changeinusepower4offer -10 10 
Difference between hypothetical offers with and 
without power reversal - post-task diffpostoffervspower -5 13 
Change in difference between hypothetical offers 
with and without power reversal - pre- to post-task changediffoffervspower -17 14 
Final post-task coalition vote POSTVOTE2 0 1 
Whether changed post-task vote ChangeVotePOST 0 1 
Whether changed post-task vote from no to yes NOTOYES_HowChangeVotePOST 0 1 
Whether changed post-task vote from yes to no YESTONO_HowChangeVotePOST 0 1 
Whether changed first pre-task to first post-task vote ChangePreVote1toPostVote1 0 1 
Whether changed first pre-task to first post-task vote 
from no to yes 
NOTOYES_HowChangePre1toPost
1 0 1 
Whether changed first pre-task to first post-task vote 
from yes to no 
YESTONO_HowChangePre1toPost
1 0 1 
Whether changed second pre-task to second post-
task vote ChangePreVote2toPostVote2 0 1 
Whether changed second pre-task to second post-
task vote from no to yes 
NOTOYES_HowChangePre2toPost
2 0 1 
Whether changed second pre-task to second post-
task vote from yes to no 
YESTONO_HowChangePre2toPost
2 0 1 
Extent important to earn as many points as possible importantearn3 1 7 
Extent tried best at the task trybesttask3 1 7 
Whether want partner again matchpartneragain_recode 0 1 
Whether ever voted in favor of the coalition pre-task EverVoteFavorPRE 0 1 
Whether ever voted in favor of the coalition post-
task EverVoteFavorPOST 0 1 
Whether ever voted in favor of the coalition EverVoteFavorOVERALL 0 1 
        
Rating of self power position selfpowermanipcheck 1 7 




Whether correctly identified network positions as 
assigned randomly NET_ASSN_CORRECT 0 1 
Whether correctly identified network positions as 
assigned randomly or answered not sure NET_ASSN_CORRECT_NS 0 1 
Self-reported self CS score selfcsscore 7 18 
Self CS score compared to national average selfcsnatstandard 1 7 
Self CS score subjective selfcssubj 1 7 
Partner CS score reported partnercsscore 2 20 
Partner CS score compared to national average partnercsnatstandard 1 7 
Partner CS score subjective partnercssubj 1 7 
Feel personally threatened (scale) feelpersonallythreatenedscale 14 97 
Feel group threatened (scale) feelgroupthreatenedscale 9 63 
Extent difficult to earn points difficultearn3 1 7 
Whether indicated threat-condition situation for not 
earning any points in a round pointsq_yes 0 1 
Whether answered question about not earning any 
points in a round correctly for condition pointsqcorrect 0 1 
Whether answered question about not earning any 
points in a round correctly for condition or not sure pointsqcorrect_ns 0 1 
Whether answered question about not earning any 
points in a round correctly for condition (includes 
entire collected sample) pointsqcorrect 0 1 
Whether answered question about not earning any 
points in a round correctly for condition or not sure 
(includes entire collected sample) pointsqcorrect_ns 0 1 
Whether indicated threat-condition situation for risk 
of losing all points in a round riskq_yes 0 1 
Whether answered question about risk of losing all 
points in a round correctly for condition riskqcorrect 0 1 
Whether answered question about risk of losing all 
points in a round correctly for condition or not sure riskqcorrect_ns 0 1 
Whether answered question about risk of losing all 
points in a round correctly for condition (includes 
entire collected sample) riskqcorrect 0 1 
Whether answered question about risk of losing all 
points in a round correctly for condition or not sure 
(includes entire collected sample) riskqcorrect_ns 0 1 
Situation personally threatening (question) threatmanipq1personal 1 7 
Situation threatening to group (question) threatmanipq2group 1 7 
Any type of suspicion - yes suspeverYES 0 1 
Any type of suspicion - yes or not sure suspeverYESNOTSURE 0 1 
Any type of suspicion affect behavior - yes suspeveraffectYES 0 1 
Any type of suspicion affect behavior - yes or not 
sure suspeveraffectYESNOTSURE 0 1 
Whether acted real despite any type of suspicion - 
yes suspeveractrealYES 1 1 
Whether acted real despite any type of suspicion - 
yes or not sure suspeveractrealYESNOTSURE 1 1 
Suspicious about group members - yes suspgrpmYES 0 1 
Suspicious about group members - yes or not sure suspgrpmYESNOTSURE 0 1 
Suspicion about group members affect behavior - 
yes suspgrpmaffectYES 0 1 
Suspicion about group members affect behavior - 
yes or not sure suspgrpmaffectYESNOTSURE 0 1 
Whether acted real despite suspicion about group 
members - yes suspgrpmactrealYES 0 1 
Whether acted real despite suspicion about group 
members - yes or not sure suspgrpmactrealYESNOTSURE 1 1 
Suspicious about group member information - yes suspgrpminfoYES 0 1 
Suspicious about group member information - yes or 
not sure suspgrpminfoYESNOTSURE 0 1 
Suspicion about group member information affect 
behavior  - yes suspgrpminfoaffectYES 0 1 
Suspicion about group member information affect 
behavior - yes or not sure suspgrpminfoaffectYESNOTSURE 1 1 




member information - yes 
Whether acted real despite suspicion about group 
member information - yes or not sure suspgrpminfoactrealYESNOTSURE 1 1 
Final suspicion question - whether any type of 
suspicion affected behavior during study - yes suspanyYES 0 0 
Final suspicion question - whether any type of 
suspicion affected behavior during study - yes or not 
sure suspanyYESNOTSURE 0 1 
Number of suspicion questions (whether suspicious) 
indicated yes to SUSPICIONSCALE_YES 0 3 
Number of suspicion questions (whether suspicious) 
indicated yes or not sure to 
SUSPICIONSCALE_YESNOTSUR
E 0 4 
        
Hispanic/Latino indicator hisplarecode 0 1 
American Indian/Alaskan Native indicator RE1_AIAN 0 1 
Black/African American indicator RE2_BAA 0 1 
East Asian indicator RE3_EA 0 1 
White/Caucasian indicator RE9_WC 0 1 
Other race/ethnicity indicator RE10_OTHER 0 1 
Racial/ethnic minority indicator RE_MINORITY 0 1 
How often use MTurk to make basic ends meet educhhwhatisthehighestlevelofedu 2 8 
Highest education in household endsmeethowoftendoyouuseearnings 1 7 
Social class rating socialclasspleaseindicatewhichso 1 5 
Age in years q73 [age in years] 20 70 
Whether indicates having worked with other 
MTurkers - yes EverWorkOtherMTurkerYES 0 1 
Whether indicates having worked with other 
MTurkers - yes or not sure 
EverWorkOtherMTurkerYESNOTS
URE 0 1 
Whether indicates having worked with other 
MTurkers - not sure EverWorkOtherMTurkerNOTSURE 0 1 
Self-reported estimate of time to complete in 
minutes (recoded) timeminest3rec 10 120 
Flag for issues noted during study issueflag3 0 1 
Flag for comment indicating potential issue at end 
of group study issuecommentflag3 0 1 
Flag for potential doubt or further scrutiny about 
whether to keep the case in the data doubtever_rec 0 1 
Flag for missed questions or technical trouble during 
the pretest flagorangepretest 0 1 
Flag for suspicion about group studies indicated 
during screener flagorangescreener 0 1 
Whether answered attention check question 
correctly attnqcorrect 0 1 
Whether answered attention check question 
correctly (recoded) attnqcorrect_rec 0 1 













Study 3 Protocol Information 
 
Study 3 Protocol (Power) 
 






[This whole questionnaire style, e.g., headers, fonts, and colors, appears to be in a group 
interaction portal] 
 




[footer: GROUPSNETPORTALPLUGIN-v.16.8(2015) No redistribution without 
permission.] 
 (fictitious information) 
 
 
MTurk Listing: Earn up to $7: Critical Choice and Group Interaction - Group Task 
with Survey — About 50 minutes 
 
Brief Listing Description: Earn up to $7 ($5 minimum) – For participants with 
qualification: Complete a challenging group task for a research study, includes survey 
questions, about 50 minutes. Must have qualification and 90%+ HIT acceptance 
 
 
~~Posted as a $5 task - the other $2 to be paid via Bonus 
 
 
Keywords: task, group, survey, research, questionnaire, study, interaction 
 
 
24 hour maximum allotted for completion, HIT expiration after 5 days, auto-approval for 
payment after 30 days 
 
 
Workers do not need to be Master Workers 
HIT approval rate is 90% or greater 









***Please note that you may only participate in this study once, and having previously 
participated in similar studies may mean you are ineligible for this study. The Turkitron 
website is used to screen Worker IDs for eligibility. If you have further questions about 
your eligibility, please contact the researchers at ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com. 
 
 
This research is run by Social Science Researchers at the University of Maryland to study 
group tasks and survey responses. You will be paired with another MTurk user from our 
participant pool during your participation time. Eligible participants will be matched as 
long as this HIT is active. The study will last about 50 minutes. 
 
Pay for participating depends on how you and your assigned partner perform together on 
the task. You personally will earn a minimum of $5 for participating. Depending on 
performance, you personally may earn more on a sliding scale, up to $2 extra for 
excellent performance (paid via MTurk bonus). This means you personally can earn up 
to $7 total for participating. 
 
You are invited to participate in this study if you currently live in the United States, 
both you and your parents or guardians were born in the United States, and lived in 
the United States for most or all of your lives. You must be fluent in English, and 
have an MTurk acceptance rate of at least 90%. You must be 18 or older to 
participate. 
 
The study must be completed in one sitting (session). Though 24 hours are allotted for the 
study, it is only expected to take about 50 minutes. The extra time is provided to allow 
time for resolution in case there are technical issues or other concerns. 
 
*We will share limited information (such as age and individual task performance) 
between assigned group members, but never in ways that could potentially identify the 
individuals. 
 
Please make sure you are in a quiet space free from distractions during participation, and 
please make sure you have time to do the study in one sitting. 
 
At the end of the study, you will receive a code to paste into the box below to receive 
credit for taking our study. Follow the link below to complete the study. 
 
Make sure to leave this window open as you complete the study. When you are 






















<Time for 10 seconds> 
 
Thank you for your interest in participating in this study. 
 
Please read the following carefully. You are encouraged to retain a copy of this 
information. You may electronically save, print, or request a copy of this information for 
your records.  
 
This research is run by Social Science Researchers at the University of Maryland to 
investigate problem-solving in network groups. You are invited to participate in this 
study if you determined eligible and assigned a qualification to participate following the 
pretest evaluation. You must have an MTurk acceptance rate of at least 90%. You must 
be 18 or older to participate. 
 
Participation will involve completing a group task with other MTurk participants and 
answering survey questions. Questions will be about your feelings (for example, briefly 
describing how you feel about the group network task situation), and your social attitudes 
(for example, rating how much you favor or oppose the statement “There is no “ONE 
right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way”). As a group, you will be 
asked to negotiate the exchange of resources following the rules laid out in the task. 
 
The study will last about 50 minutes. Upon completion, you will be paid $5 through 
MTurk, and may receive up to $2 via Bonus, for $7 total. You will need to submit a 
confirmation code from the end of the survey to receive payment. 
 
Pay for participating depends on performance the group task. You personally will earn a 
minimum of $5 for participating. Depending on your performance (points earned), you 
personally may earn more on a sliding scale, up to $2 extra for excellent performance 






We will share limited information (such as age in years and individual task performance) 
between assigned group members, but never in ways that could potentially identify the 
individuals. 
 
Please make sure you are in a quiet space free from distractions during participation, and 
please make sure you have time to do the study in one sitting. To receive payment for this 
study, you must write at least 100 characters thoughtfully addressing each of three 
questions about the group task situation, and fully complete the group task with your 
assigned group. This includes voting on changes to the group structure if you are asked 
to. We will also consider answers to questions designed to determine whether you are 
paying attention. If we suspect that you do not qualify for the study, the study was not 
done in one sitting, or proper attention was not given to responses, we may reject your 
submission and not issue payment. 
 
This research is not designed to benefit you personally, but it may help researchers. 
Possible risks include loss of confidentiality, distress from answering questions or about 
topics that are personal or sensitive, and frustration from the task activities— they are 
designed to be difficult. You may wish to contact a mental health professional if you 
experience distress. Results from this study may be presented or published. Only 
authorized individuals (members of the research team and associated staff) will have 
access to your responses. Data will be stored securely (password-protected), and 
potentially identifying information (such as IP address and MTurk username) will not be 
linked to these responses after initial processing. Your MTurk worker ID may be stored 
in a screening service database such as Turkitron to manage eligibility criteria for this 
study and future studies, regardless of whether you complete this study. Data will be kept 
indefinitely, and documents with personally identifiable information will be deleted or 
destroyed after a period of at least three years, according to UMD’s policies. We will 
protect your identity and confidentiality of your responses to the maximum extent 
allowable by law. 
 
Your participation is voluntary, and you may stop participating at any time. If you decide 
not to participate or to stop participating, you will not be penalized or lose any benefits to 
which you are otherwise entitled. Except for initial identification, consent to share limited 
personal information with assigned group members, questions about the group task, 
voting on changes to the group structure if you are asked to, and the group task itself, you 
may skip a question you do not want to answer. You must finish the study to receive 
payment, and accepting the HIT and not finishing the study may result in an expired or 
rejected MTurk HIT. This study is part of a series, and participating in this study may 
affect your eligibility for future studies in this series. 
 
You may contact the investigators with any questions about this research: 
ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com. You may also contact the University of Maryland IRB 






You have the right to withdraw your data. If you wish to withdraw your data, please 
let us know immediately by emailing ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com. This is 
important because withdrawing a specific individual’s data may not be possible 
after a period of time (at least a few weeks), because data will be deidentified after 
initial processing. 
 
By selecting “Yes, I consent to participate,” you certify that you are at least 18 years old, 
you meet the eligibility criteria, you understand the information above, your questions are 
answered to your satisfaction, and you are volunteering to participate. 
 
Do you consent to participate in this research? 
 
Yes, I consent to participate 








You have indicated that you do not consent to participate. If this was in error, please 
restart the questionnaire (you may need to clear your temporary browser files). Otherwise 




The following survey page will have the researchers’ email address if you have any 
questions or concerns. 
 



















INSTRUCTIONS (put on timer) 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
 
- Please read all instructions carefully.  
- Please make sure you are in a quiet space free from distractions during participation 










Please enter your MTurk worker ID. This is your worker ID, not your username or 
email address you log in with.  
It should be about 14 characters long and probably starts with A. You should be able to 
find it at https://www.mturk.com/mturk/dashboard (opens new browser window). 





We will share limited information (such as age and individual task performance) between 
assigned group members, but never in ways that could potentially identify the 
individuals. 
 
The specific information we will share includes: a randomly generated identification code 
(NOT your MTurk worker ID), country of citizenship, gender identity, age in years, and 
performance on the pretest evaluation. To confirm, your pretest score was: 7/18 out 
of 20 [POOR/SUPERIOR] 
 [gray indicates antique white highlighting, designed 
to help with believability) 
 




Do you consent to share your information with any other members of your group? 
 
(If you select no, this will end your participation.) 
 
Yes No 









Eligible participants will be matched with a group for the task as long as this HIT is 
active.  
 
Today we are running several sessions simultaneously, and we expect that group 
matching will take no more than 5 minutes. Between our sessions, we will have 
hundreds of MTurk participants. 
 
Though unlikely, if your group matching takes more than 15 minutes, your session will 
expire. If this happens, please exit the browser tab to close your session. You may either 
restart through the questionnaire link to try re-entering the pool, or contact 






The UMDSURVEY platform now allows us to run remote connections through the 
GROUPSNET PORTAL plugin. As a participant, this means a seamless group task 
experience for you. In earlier years, we would have directed you to another website to 
complete the group task, then back to UMDSURVEY to answer any remaining questions 














Please wait while our participant pool matches you with a group. Other members of your 
group may have entered the pool later than you did, so please be patient if it takes a few 










Eligible participants will be matched with a group for the task as long as this HIT is 
active.  
 
Today we are running several sessions simultaneously, and we expect that group 
matching will take no more than 5 minutes. Between our sessions, we will have hundreds 
of MTurk participants. 
 
Though unlikely, if your group matching takes more than 15 minutes, your session will 
expire. If this happens, please exit the browser tab to close your session. You may either 
restart through the questionnaire link try re-entering the pool, or contact 







You have been matched with three other participants. 
 














Please be sure to read and follow all instructions carefully. 
 
Thank you for participating in our study. The study is concerned with the ways in which 
people exchange resources with each other in different situations. We do our best to 
simulate situations in the social world with features of an online group task. 
Communication and the exchange of resources are becoming more and more common 
among people who never meet face-to-face. Social scientists have long been interested in 
different factors that may affect how people exchange in these networks. The research we 
are carrying out today is to study interaction in various network formations in which 





You will be participating in the study as part of what’s called an exchange network. In 
the network, you will exchange resources with three other individuals who are also 





Networks can take different forms depending on the connections between people. 
For example, suppose that Barb is selling a bicycle and has two interested buyers, 
Alice and Carrie. Barb can only sell the bicycle to one of the interested buyers. We 
could represent this exchange network as follows: 
 
 





A network type for today’s study will be randomly chosen. Please wait momentarily 










This is the network formation to which you and the other three participants have been 
assigned. 
 
Each position in the network has an exchange relationship with other positions to which it 
is connected. For example, Position B can only exchange with Position A, but Position A 











Like everyone else in your group, you will be randomly assigned to a position in the 
network. When the button appears below, click it to learn your position assignment. 
 
   
 
You have been assigned to Position B in the network. This is one of the low-power 
positions, along with C and D. Position A is the high-power position. 
 
 
[insert network image] 
 
   
 
 
Even when individuals in exchange networks do not meet face-to-face, they usually know 
a little bit about each other. We will allow you and your partners to learn a bit about each 
other by exchanging some basic information. 
 
To best simulate real-life network situations, you will only receive information about 
group members you are directly connected with. This means that Position A will receive 





Because you are in Position B, you will receive information about Position A. 
 























Critical Choice - Contrast Sensitivity Individual Score: 






[Time this page – 3 seconds] 
 
Critical Choice - Contrast Sensitivity Individual Score 
information within your group:  
 
Position A: 7/18 out of 20 [POOR/SUPERIOR] 
 













The exchanges are designed to simulate situations in the social world. We are interested 
in how different group situations affect problem-solving in groups. 
 
You will complete a number of rounds of exchange in this network with the goal of 
earning as many profit points for yourself as possible. In each round, a pool of 20 profit 
points will “float” between each pair of connected positions. For example, Position A and 
Position B will negotiate over a pool of 20 profit points. If they can reach an agreement 
about how to divide the resources, they each get what they agreed to. If they can’t reach 
an agreement, they get nothing. So, for example, A and B might agree to each take 10 of 
the 20 resources. In that case, each of them earns 10 profit points. Alternatively, A might 
demand 12 of the 20 points, and B might demand 11 of the 20 points. In that case, they 





[Each round, there is a risk of the group’s resources being eliminated. If this happens, 
then everyone in the group gets nothing for that round. We explain this in more detail 
shortly.] 
 
In this network, no more than two exchanges can take place per round. Thus, for 
example, if Position A reaches agreements with Position C and Position D before 
reaching an agreement with Position B, then the 20 profit points floating between A and 
B disappear, and B earns nothing on that round of exchange. One way to think about it is 









PAGE FOR THREAT CONDITIONS ONLY: 
 
[GRAPHIC WITH RISK LEVEL] 
 
Before each round of exchange, a risk level from 0-100% will be established. It changes 
every round. This risk level is the chance that all resources are eliminated for that round – 
meaning that all participants and the group as a whole will earn zero points for that 
round. This is a threat to your group. It simulates situations in the social world like 
destruction of group resources at the hands of hostile out-groups, loss of food due to 
overuse of natural resources, and failure to respond effectively to natural disasters like 
hurricanes, floods, or forest fires. You will know that there is a chance of this happening, 
and what the risk is at the beginning of each round. 
 
 





[Insert risk level indication text above] 
 
GRAPHIC WITHOUT RISK LEVEL 
 
 
As you might guess, Position A is at an advantage in this network. Because only two 
exchanges can take place each round, at least one of B, C, or D will be left out of 
exchange on every round. A, in contrast, never needs to get left out. This gives A power 
to decide which of the other actors are excluded from exchanging each round. In 




positions will end up being willing to accept very few resources in exchange with A, 
because getting few resources is better than getting left out and receiving nothing. Thus, 
people in the A position usually end up receiving far, far more resources than people in 




[Insert risk level indication text above] 
 
GRAPHIC WITHOUT RISK LEVEL 
 
 
The format of exchanges in your assigned network is a type of negotiation. In this 
formation, positions B, C, and D will have one possible exchange partner (A), while A 
will have three (B, C, and D).  
  
In each round of exchange, each partner in each exchange relationship will be allowed a 
maximum of four “offers.” For example, an exchange round might start with A 
requesting 17 of the 20 resources in exchange with C. C might then request 13 of the 20 
resources. A might counter by requesting 14 resources. C could then counter with a 
request of 10 resources (i.e., offering a 10-10 split). If A accepts the offer, then an 
exchange occurs and each person gets 10 profit points. If A rejects the offer, then neither 
person gets any profit points from the relationship on that round. 
 
Remember, however, that only two exchanges in the network are possible in each round. 
So, if A reaches deals with B and D, then C gets left out even if the four rounds of offers 
have not been completed. 
 
Partners will alternate making the first offer each round. Each of the two exchange 







[Insert risk level indication text above] 
 





Part of our interest in carrying out this study is in how people operate in situations in 
which both individual and group goals are important. In the study today, you will receive 




does overall. You will earn credits in exchange that will transfer to money at the end of 
the study. You will receive a minimum of $5 for participating and can earn up to $7. The 
conversion from credits to money is computed from a logarithmic formula based on data 
from previous exchange networks.  
  
At the end of each round of exchange, [you will find out if the group resources were 
eliminated for that round. You will be notified before moving to the next round. If they 
were not eliminated,] you will learn how many profit points you earned in that round as 
well as how many resources were exchanged in the network overall.  
 
At the end of each series of 5 rounds of exchange, you will learn how many points each 
member in the network has earned overall.. 
 
You will not only be paid based on your own performance but based on the performance 
of the entire network. You will receive one credit for each profit point you earn in 
exchange. All members of the network will also receive credits totaling one-fourth of all 
points exchanged in the network in each round. In other words, each member will receive 
what she or he earns in exchange as well as an equal portion of the total amount 
exchanged in the network. [However, if the resources end up eliminated, all participants 







[Insert risk level indication text above] 
 






For example, suppose that in a given round A exchanges with B at 15-5 and with C at 17-
3 (because only two exchanges can take place in any round, A exchanging with B and C 
makes an exchange between A and D impossible). In this configuration of exchanges, all 
members will receive one-fourth of the 40 total points exchanged, or 10 points. They will 
also receive the points they accumulated in exchange. Thus, position A will earn 42 
points (calculated as 15+17+10), position B will earn 15 points (5+10), position C will 
earn 13 points (3+10), and position D will earn 10 points (0+10).  
 
[With the 0-100% risk level, there is a chance that all resources will be eliminated in a 
given round. If this happens, then A, B, C, and D earn 0 points from individual earnings 





These points will be converted to cash at the end of the study. Thus, there is an incentive 








In this exchange, you are in position B, attempting to strike deals with position A.  
 
[Each round there is a risk level of 0-100% that all group resources are eliminated, and 
both the participants and group as a whole do not earn any points for that round.] 
 
Each round, you are negotiating with A about how to distribute a pool of resources (20 
points) between the two of you.  
 
A is negotiating with C and D as well. 
 
A maximum of two exchanges can take place each round. This means at least one of B, 
C, or D will be left out of the exchange each round.  
  
A is in a high-power position in this network formation, while B, C, and D are in low-
power positions. 
 
If two partners cannot reach an agreement on how to distribute the 20 points by the end 
of a round, they will not exchange that round, and therefore will not earn any points from 
exchanging with each other that round. 
 
The more exchanges that take place, the more points all members of the network group 
earn. 
 
You will complete two series of 5 rounds of network exchanges. 
 






WRITTEN THREAT Qs: 
 
 








[Language for both conditions at once are included here.] 
 
Please consider your group’s situation and answer the following questions. Your 
responses are confidential, and none of the other participants will see them – only the 
researchers have access to your responses. 
 
[require 100 characters for each] 
 
 
Please consider your group’s situation, and write your response below. Your responses 
are confidential, and none of the other participants will see them – only the researchers 
have access to your responses. 
 
 
Each round, members of your network group are negotiating how to distribute pools of 
resources. If group members agree, up to two exchanges can take place. The more 
exchanges that take place, the more points all members of the network group earn. 
 
[However, each round there is a 0-100% chance that all resources from that round will 
be eliminated. This means that all participants and the group as a whole will earn zero 
points for that round. This is a threat to your group, and simulates situations like 
destruction of group resources by hostile out-groups, loss of food due to overuse of 
natural resources, and failure to respond effectively to natural disasters like hurricanes, 




What do you think about being a member of your task group in this [threatening] 
situation? 
 
What is it like for you personally to be a member of your task group in this 
[threatening] situation? 
 





How difficult do you think it will be to earn profit points? 














In this exchange, you are in position B, attempting to strike deals with position A.  
 
[Each round there is a risk level of 0-100% that all group resources are eliminated, and 
both the participants and group as a whole do not earn any points for that round.] 
 
Each round, you are negotiating with A about how to distribute a pool of resources (20 
points) between the two of you.  
 
A is negotiating with C and D as well. 
 
A maximum of two exchanges can take place each round. This means at least one of B, 
C, or D will be left out of the exchange each round.  
  
A is in a high-power position in this network formation, while B, C, and D are in low-
power positions. 
 
If two partners cannot reach an agreement on how to distribute the 20 points by the end 
of a round, they will not exchange that round, and therefore will not earn any points from 
exchanging with each other that round. 
 
The more exchanges that take place, the more points all members of the network group 
earn. 
 
You will complete two series of 5 rounds of network exchanges. 
 







Although A is the most powerful position in the network, we allow the lower power 
positions (B, C, and D) the opportunity to form a coalition that can counteract some of 
A’s power. In the coalition, B, C, and D collectively negotiate with Position A. The 
figure below the original network diagram illustrates this scenario. 
 








   
 
 
[standard network image] 
 
In this new network, positions B, C, and D would trade as a team, dividing their profits 
equally among each other. By forming a coalition in this manner, positions B, C, and D 
can take away the power held by A and potentially increase the amounts that they earn in 
exchange. The power of A in the original network is based on the fact that either B, C, or 
D gets left out of exchange in every round. That leads to “bidding wars” in which the 
lower power positions make lower and lower offers just to be included in exchange. By 
forming a coalition, however, the low power actors ensure that they are never left out of 
exchanges, or at least that if they are left out, then A is left out too. 
 
In the original network above, Position A will typically gain about 18 points in each 
exchange, leaving two points for its exchange partners. In this new network below, 
however, A’s power is removed, and exchanges are usually at about 10-10, giving B, C, 
and D each an average of more than 3 points in each exchange. 
 
[coalition network image] 
 
   
 
Although low-power actors might earn more points in individual exchanges by forming a 
coalition, group points may be lower. This is because only one exchange is now possible 
in the network. As a result, the total number of points exchanged in the network in any 




position can earn per round in the coalition network has been reduced from 10 (40 
divided by 4) to 5 (20 divided by 4). 
 
In a perfect situation, positions B, C, and D will allow position A to keep her or his 
power. For example, suppose that in the original network A exchanges twice each round, 
keeping 18 points for itself in all exchanges. Positions B, C, and D will earn 10 group 
points every round and 2 individual points in two of every three rounds. This totals to an 
average of 11.33 points per round for these positions. Now suppose, that in the coalition 
network there is an exchange at 10-10 in every round. This will lead to 3.33 individual 
points and 5 group points for positions B, C, and D in each round, for an average earnings 
of 8.33 points per round. 
 
[coalition network image] 
 




   
 
Thus, it is better in principle for positions B, C, and D to let position A keep its power. 
However, this formula is based on the assumption that position A will exchange fairly, 
competently, and with the interests of the group in mind. There are informal rules for 
how exchange should proceed, and if high power positions violate those rules, it is 
usually best for low power positions to form a coalition. For example, suppose that 
position A in the original network trades unfairly. Because the position earns so many 
points in exchange, it can occasionally exclude multiple positions from exchange in order 
to get better future deals. In this case, low power positions will lose valuable group points 
and it will be best to form a coalition. Similarly, because the best interests of the group lie 
in the maximum number of exchanges, and because position A will determine in large 
part how negotiations proceed, position A must use his or her power competently in order 
for the group to benefit. If position A does not act competently, it is best to form a 
coalition. 
 
In order for the coalition to not be the best option, position A must consider the overall 
interests of the group in addition to her or his own interests. Acting solely self-
interestedly, position A might bolster his or her power by occasionally exchanging less 
than the allowed number of times per round, thereby hurting the group. 
Thus, actors should only choose to join a coalition with their fellow low power actors if 
they feel that position A will not use her or his power fairly, act competently, exchange 
according to the rules, or show a level of group-interest in exchange. If actors believe that 
there is a high probability that position A will not satisfy these criteria, then they should 





You are in position B and will vote as to whether you would like to form a coalition with 
positions C and D. The coalition will only be formed if all low-power members vote to 
join. 
 
[image of standard network] 
 






   
 
Please answer the following questions. Your responses are confidential, and none of the 











Vote on coalition. 
 
Please vote for whether you do or do not want to join a coalition with the 
participants in Positions C and D against your partner in Position A. Remember 












Please answer the following questions. Your responses are confidential, and none of the 












[All of these on one page – still as individual Qs] 
 














[self prosocial? – R]  





[self prosocial]  
To what extent are you motivated to benefit your group as a whole during the 





[other legitimate – R?]  
To what extent do you think your partner in Position A is motivated to benefit himself 




[other legitimate]  
To what extent do you think your partner in Position A is motivated to benefit his or 


















[other/structure legitimate]  





[other/structure legitimate]  


















To what extent do you think your partner in Position A will use his or her power? 
 









To what extent do you think your partner in Position A will use his or her power in 




To what extent do you think your partner in Position A will use his or her power in 




[other legitimate]  
How appropriately do you expect your partner in Position A will use his or her power? 
 
[LEGIT-9-PRE] 
[other legitimate]  
How fairly do you expect your partner in Position A will use his or her power? 
 
[LEGIT-10-PRE-R] 
[other legitimate - R]  
How selfishly do you expect your partner in Position A will use his or her power? 
 
[LEGIT-11-PRE] 
[other legitimate]  
How competently do you expect your partner in Position A will use his or her power? 
 
[LEGIT-12-PRE] 
[other legitimate]  
To what extent do you think your partner in Position A will use his or her power 




[other legitimate]  
To what extent do you think your partner in Position A will use his or her power in 






How many points out of 20 do you expect that your partner in Position A would offer 
you when negotiating with you? (You are in Position B.) The total must equal 20 points. 
 

















[other legitimate/status]  
To what extent do you think your partner in Position A is competent? 
 
[LEGIT-16-PRE] 
[other legitimate/status?]  
To what extent do you trust your partner in Position A? 
 
[LEGIT-17-PRE] 
[other legitimate/status]  
How would you rate your Partner in Position A’s level of critical choice (contrast 
sensitivity) ability? 
 very low --- very high 
 
[LEGIT-18-PRE] 
[other legitimate/status?]  
If you could, would you want to work with your partner in Position A again? 








Imagine that you are now in Position A, and your partner is now in Position B (he or 
she had been in Position A). Position A has power over Position B. In other words, your 

















If you were in Position A, to what extent would you use your power in ways that 
benefit your group as a whole? 
 





If you were in Position A, to what extent would you use your power in ways that 
benefit you personally? 
 






If you were in Position A and negotiating with Position B, how many points out of 20 
would you offer your partner in Position B? 
 
Please indicate below what you would offer your partner in Position A. 
 


























Vote on coalition. 
 
Please confirm your vote for whether you do or do not want to join a coalition with 
the participants in Positions C and D against your partner in Position 
A. Remember that all three low-power participants must vote in favor of the 
coalition for it to happen. 
 
You may change from your first vote if you wish. These final votes are the only 











   
 
Not all of the three low power actors voted to join the coalition.  
 
Because a unanimous vote is required, negotiation will proceed according to the 






   
 
 
In this exchange, you are in position B, attempting to strike deals with position A.  
 
[There is a risk level of 0-100% established each round, that all group resources are 
eliminated, and both the participants and group as a whole do not earn any points.] 
 
Each round, you are negotiating with A about how to distribute a pool of resources (20 
points) between the two of you.  
 





A maximum of two exchanges can take place each round. This means at least one of B, 
C, or D will be left out of the exchange each round.  
  
A is in a high-power position in this network formation, while B, C, and D are in low-
power positions. 
 
If two partners cannot reach an agreement on how to distribute the 20 points by the end 
of a round, they will not exchange that round, and therefore will not earn any points from 
exchanging with each other that round. 
 
The more exchanges that take place, the more points all members of the network group 
earn. 
 
You will complete two series of 5 rounds of network exchanges. 
 





You will complete two series of 5 rounds of network exchanges. 
 
 
   
 
Now the network exchange will begin. Please wait for the button to appear below, and 
then click it to proceed. 
 




INSERT PROGRAM from Lucas et al. (manuscript in progress) 
 
--- more lenient (points offered and offer acceptance) 
 











 --- Timings for questions and auto-advances, etc., will assigned to appear 
realistic. 




Five rounds (reduced from earlier plans) 
 
 
2 rounds are early-terminate (making it appear as though deals were already made with 
the other network members, leaving B out) 
 
 
Fourth round -  not all possible exchanges take place 
 
 
ROUND 3 – not all possible exchanges take place (get 5 for 1 of 2) 
 




Threat risk levels (for threat conditions): 
 
1. 4% (.96) 
2. 30% (.70) 
3. 6% (.94) 
4. 2% (.98) 
5. 10% (.90) 
 
from these five rounds, overall probability of never getting the elimination: 55.71% 






For five rounds: 
 
 
The following are the total number of points for each member of the network after 
the first series of exchanges: 
  
  





Position B: 55 
  
Position C: 59 
  




In the first series of exchanges, 260 of 300 possible points were distributed 








[>>> previous version from eight rounds: 
 
The following are the total number of points for each member of the network after 
the first series of exchanges: 
  
  
Position A: 169 
  
Position B: 92 
  
Position C: 93 
  




In the first series of exchanges, 440 of 480 possible points were distributed 

















The first series of 8 exchanges is now complete. You will complete the second series of 8 
exchanges shortly. Please click the button below to proceed. 
 
   
 
Position A: 169 
 
Position B: 92 
 
Position C: 93 
 




In the first series of exchanges, 440 of 480 possible points were distributed 










Please click the button when it appears below to continue. 
   
 
For the second series of exchanges, the lower-power actors have another opportunity to 
form a coalition.  
  
  
As described before the first series of exchanges, a coalition allows actors B, C, and D to 
negotiate as a team with A, and to split the profits equally among them. By forming a 
coalition in this manner, actors B, C, and D can take away the power held by A and 
potentially increase the amounts that they earn in exchange. However, group points may 
be lower because only one exchange is possible in the network. As a result, the maximum 
number of points exchanged in the network in any given round would be reduced from 40 
to 20, and these points are split evenly across all actors in the network. 
 
   
 
Again, it is better in principle for Positions B, C, and D to let position A keep its power. 




competently, and with the interests of the group in mind. There are informal rules for 
how exchange should proceed, and if high power positions violate those rules, it is 
usually best for low power positions to form a coalition. For example, suppose that 
position A in the original network trades unfairly. Because the position earns so many 
points in exchange, it can occasionally exclude multiple positions from exchange in order 
to get better future deals. In this case, low power positions will lose valuable group points 
and it will be best to form a coalition. Similarly, because the best interests of the group lie 
in the maximum number of exchanges, and because position A will determine in large 
part how negotiations proceed, position A must use his or her power competently in order 
for the group to benefit. If position A does not act competently, it is best to form a 
coalition. 
  
In order for the coalition to not be the best option, Position A must consider the overall 
interests of the group in addition to her or his own interests. Acting solely self-
interestedly, position A might bolster his or her power by occasionally exchanging less 
than the allowed number of times per round, thereby hurting the group. 
Thus, actors should only choose to join a coalition with their fellow low power actors if 
they feel that position A will not use her or his power fairly, act competently, exchange 
according to the rules, or show a level of group-interest in exchange. If actors believe that 
there is a high probability that position A will not satisfy these criteria, then they should 




You are in Position B, and will now vote again as to whether you would like to form 
a coalition with Positions C and D. The coalition will only be formed if all low-power 
members vote to join. 
 
   
 
Please answer the following questions. Your responses are confidential, and none of the 


















Please vote for whether you do or do not want to join a coalition with the 
participants in Positions C and D against your partner in Position A. Remember 














Please answer the following questions. Your responses are confidential, and none of the 









[All of these on one page? – still as individual Qs] 
 














[self prosocial? – R]  








[self prosocial]  
To what extent were you motivated to benefit your group as a whole during the 





[other legitimate – R?]  
To what extent do you think your partner in Position A was motivated to benefit 




[other legitimate]  
To what extent do you think your partner in Position A was motivated to benefit his or 















[other/structure legitimate]  





[other/structure legitimate]  





















To what extent do you think your partner in Position A used his or her power? 
 





[other legitimate]  
To what extent do you think your partner in Position A used his or her power in ways 




To what extent do you think your partner in Position A used his or her power in ways 




[other legitimate]  
How appropriately did your partner in Position A use his or her power? 
 
[LEGIT-9-POST] 
[other legitimate]  
How fairly did your partner in Position A use his or her power? 
 
[LEGIT-10-POST-R] 
[other legitimate - R]  
How selfishly did your partner in Position A use his or her power? 
 
[LEGIT-11-POST] 
[other legitimate]  
How competently did your partner in Position A use his or her power? 
 
[LEGIT-12-POST] 




To what extent do you think your partner in Position A used his or her power 




[other legitimate]  
To what extent do you think your partner in Position A used his or her power in ways 






How many points out of 20 do you expect that your partner in Position A would offer you 
when negotiating with you? (You are in Position B.) 
 











[other legitimate/status]  
To what extent do you think your partner in Position A is competent? 
 
[LEGIT-16-POST] 
[other legitimate/status?]  
To what extent do you trust your partner in Position A? 
 
[LEGIT-17-POST] 
[other legitimate/status]  
How would you rate your Partner in Position A’s level of critical choice (contrast 
sensitivity) ability? 
 very low --- very high 
 
[LEGIT-18-POST] 
[other legitimate/status?]  
If you could, would you want to work with your partner in Position A again? 











Imagine that you are now in Position A, and your partner is now in Position 
B (he or she had been in Position A). Position A has power over Position B. In other 







If you were in Position A, to what extent would you use your power? 
 





If you were in Position A, to what extent would you use your power in ways that benefit 
your group as a whole? 
 





If you were in Position A, to what extent would you use your power in ways that benefit 
you personally? 
 






If you were in Position A and negotiating with Position B, how many points out of 20 
would you offer your partner in Position B? 
 



























Vote on coalition. 
 
Please confirm your vote for whether you do or do not want to join a coalition with 
the participants in Positions C and D against your partner in Position 
A. Remember that all three low-power participants must vote in favor of the 
coalition for it to happen. 
 
You may change from your first vote if you wish. These final votes are the only 























THREAT FEELING Qs 
 











How ___ do you feel right now? (not at all---very) 
 























For the following questions, think of your task group in this study as a social group you 
are part of. 
 
[also use bold here] 
 







Q57. Worried for your task group? 
TC-2 
Q52. Anxious for your task group? 
TC-3 
Q53. Fearful for your task group? 
TC-4 
Q108. That your task group is vulnerable 
TC-5 
Q110. Vulnerable on behalf of your task group 
TC-6-THREATMC 
[MANIPULATION CHECK] Q54. That your task group is threatened 
TC-7 
Q109. Threatened on behalf of your task group 
TC-8 
Q100. That your task group is in danger 
TC-9 













This concludes the network interaction part of the study. There will be no second series 
of 5 exchange rounds, but this will not affect your pay for the study. We explain your 
payment in more detail shortly. 
 
Please answer the following questions. Your responses are confidential, and none of the 















How important to you was it to earn as many points as you could during the task? 
 




How difficult was it for you to earn profit points during the task? 





Did you try your best during the group task? 
 





We are considering conducting a follow-up study to this one on group problem-solving in 






IF YES: We can try to match the same groups again for the follow-up study. This 
would mean working with the same participants you worked with in for this 
study. 
 






IF NO: If you were participating in the follow-up study, we could try to match the 
same groups again. This would mean working with the same participants you 
worked with in for this study. 
 
If you were participating in the follow-up study, would you like us to match you 













How were the positions in your network assigned? 
 
Randomly 
By critical choice (contrast sensitivity) score 







If other or not sure:  
 
Please explain briefly why you selected “other” or “not sure” for how the positions in 
your network were assigned. 






What was your score on the individual contrast sensitivity (Critical Choice) ability test? 
(Out of 20 possible points) 
 [text box - #s 0-20 only] 
 
 
How do you think your individual contrast sensitivity (Critical Choice) ability score 
compares to the national average? 
 Very much below average --- very much above average 
 
 
How would you rate your contrast sensitivity (Critical Choice) ability? 









What was your partner in Position A’s score on the individual contrast sensitivity 
(Critical Choice) ability test? (Out of 20 possible points) 
 [text box - #s 0-20 only] 
 
 
How do you think your partner in Position A’s individual contrast sensitivity (Critical 
Choice) ability score compares to the national average? 
 Very much below average --- very much above average 
 
 
How would you rate your partner in Position A’s contrast sensitivity (Critical Choice) 
ability? 






Power manipulation check 
 
 
Please describe your position in the network during the first series of exchanges. 
 





Please describe your partner in Position A’s position in the network during the first 
series of exchanges. 
 













Please briefly describe how the amount of points the members of your network group 







Please briefly describe any situations that may cause your network group members not to 






Which of the following best describes what determines whether the members of your 
network group do not earn any points in a round? 
 
- Only when group members cannot agree on any of the resource distributions 
 
- When the group resources are eliminated that round (there is a risk of this every round), 
and also when group members cannot agree on any of the resource distributions 
 
 





Did a risk of resources being eliminated in a round threaten your network group’s ability 












Thinking about your network group’s situation working on group the task, how 
threatening do you feel this situation was to you personally? 
 




Thinking about your network group’s situation working on group the task, how 











ATTENTION CHECK Q 
 




















--- Similar to Study 1 and Study 2 
 
 







Please answer the following questions. 
 
 
Did you try your best during the study? 
 





 IF NO OR NOT SURE: 
 
 Why didn’t you try your best during the study? 





Did you ever suspect that anything about the study wasn’t actually what we told you it 
was? 
 
Yes, No, Not sure 
 
 
 IF YES OR NOT SURE: 
 
 
What were you suspicious about in this study? 
 
 [text box] 
 
 
Did suspicion about something in the study not being what we told you it was 
affect your behavior in the study? 
 





Did you act as though everything in the study was actually what we told you it 
was? 
   
  Yes, No, Not sure 
 






Did you ever suspect that any of your network group members in the study were not real? 
 
Yes, No, Not sure 
 






IF YES OR NOT SURE: 
 
 Did suspicion about any of your group members not being real affect your 
behavior during the study? 
 
  Yes, No, Not sure 
 




 Did you act as though your network group members were real? 
 
  Yes, No, Not sure 
 




Did you ever suspect that any information we told you about your network group 
members was not true? 
 





IF YES OR NOT SURE: 
 
 Did suspicion about information we told you about your network group members 
in the study not being true affect your behavior during the study? 
 
  Yes, No, Not sure 
 





 Did you act as though the information about your network group members was 
true? 
 








































We know that sometimes in online studies, people end up participating in studies that do 
not apply to them by mistake. This might happen, for example, if a man takes a survey 
intended only for women because he did not read all of the sign-up instructions.  
 
This study was intended to be only for women who are United States citizens, 
who are fluent in English, who were born in and have lived most or all of their 
lives in the United States, and whose parents or guardians were also born in 





We are university-level social science researchers, and want to make sure our results are 
as accurate as possible. The integrity of our data is especially important if we present our 
findings or publish them in a journal article. 
 
We want to ask if you think you might be one of these participants who are not in the 
group intended for this study, for whatever reason. We ask only to help preserve the 
quality of our data. Your response to this question will not affect whether you are 
paid for the study. As long as you also completed the study with proper attention, 
you will be paid exactly the same, the full amount ($5 plus up to $2 in bonuses based 
on performance) on MTurk, no matter what your response is. 
 
Thank you for your honesty and help with our data assessment. 
 
 
Yes, I am a woman, and both myself and my parents or guardians were born in and have 
lived in the United States most or all of our lives, I am a citizen of the United States, and 
I am fluent in English. 
 
No, I am not part of the intended eligible group. I ended up taking this study by mistake 












>>>These questions below will be included for at least the first few participants, to 










Did you have difficulty understanding anything or any other issues during the study? If 
so, please describe what happened. 











Thank you for taking part in this study. 
 
This study served as part of a University of Maryland doctoral student’s dissertation 
project. This part tested how different situations affect social responses in groups. This 
purpose was not mentioned in the listing, in case knowing this purpose might affect the 
responses.  
 
Your help with this research is very much appreciated. Thank you! 
 
Because the research is ongoing and includes experimental elements, we are not currently 
sharing all details with participants. We ask that you please do not share details about 
your participation with other people, in case it may affect our results. 
 
We will issue $5 of your payment directly through this HIT. We will also issue you the 
remaining $2 as a MTurk bonus, for $7 total. Provided you completed the study with 
satisfactory quality, you will receive this maximum possible payment ($7). We ask that 
you please do not tell other people details about the payments for this study, in case it 
may affect our results. 
 
We actually do not have plans for a study in the following weeks – those questions were 
only asked to get realistic responses. 
 
We apologize for withholding the true purpose of the study. 
 
You may contact the investigator with any questions or concerns about this research: 
ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com 
 
You may also contact the University of Maryland IRB with any questions or concerns 
about your rights as a research participant: irb@umd.edu, 301-405-4212. You may also 
wish to contact a mental health professional if you experience distress following your 
participation. 
 
You have the right to withdraw your data. If you wish to withdraw your data, please 
let us know immediately by emailing ResearchUMDSOCY@gmail.com. This is 
important because withdrawing a specific individual’s data may not be possible 
after a period of time (at least a few weeks), because data will be deidentified after 
initial processing. 
  
























<Insert confirmation code pages> 
 








Again, your MTurk HIT confirmation number is ${e://Field/confirmation_code} 
 






Your responses have been recorded. Thank you. 
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